


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
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**THE TOP ELITE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
OF THE USSR IN 1919-1971**

A COMPARATIVE STUDY

Wasył Kalynowych

**Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree Doctor of Philosophy in the
Department of Political Science
Indiana University
February 1972**



1915-16 F

Accepted by the Faculty of the Graduate School,
Department of Political Science, Indiana University,
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Acknowledgments

I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Darrell P. Hammer, Chairman of the Doctoral Committee, for supervising the writing of this dissertation and for his invaluable help in other respects. I wish also to express my gratitude to other members of the Committee: Professors Vaclav L. Benes, Louis E. Lambert, and Dinko Tomasic for their encouragement and advice, particularly in the beginning of the writing of this dissertation. In addition, I want to thank Professor Edward H. Buehrig, a member of the Advisory Committee, for his friendliness and advice during the preparation for qualifying examinations. To all these professors I should like to express my appreciation also for their lectures which enlightened me in the process of my study at Indiana University and for their friendliness which I highly value.

A note of acknowledgment is given to the following libraries whose facilities I used to do the research for this dissertation: Indiana University Library, University of Michigan Library, Detroit University Library, the Library of Congress, the Public Library of the City of New York, Columbia University Library, and Dominican College Library.

I should like to thank Miss Daria Zownir for her assistance in computing the statistics, preparing the Tables, and for her constructive suggestions.

Finally my thanks go to Miss Jane Gray for her typing, suggestions, and kind patience.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The elite aspect of the political systems has been an object of interest to many philosophers and social scientists from the ancient times to the present day. Plato and Aristotle, the two most profound philosophers of antiquity, represented this interest in their times.¹ In later centuries, particularly in the nineteenth century, the appearance of books by such authors as Saint-Simon, Auguste Comte, Gaetano Mosca, and others dealing directly or indirectly with elites indicates that the interest in elites among the scholars and philosophers had greatly increased.

In our time elites in many countries have become an object of wide research and study. Harold D. Lasswell, author and editor of books on elites, summarized this interest by saying that "In recent years the study of elites has come to occupy a prominent position on the research agenda of political scientists, historians, and other scholars in the social and behavioral fields."² Many books on elites have been published in the decades following World War II.

¹ Probably the best selections on elites by the two philosophers can be found in Harry K. Girvetz, Democracy and Elitism (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), pp. 163-229.

² Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (eds), World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 3. Lasswell substantiates his statement by calling attention to the bibliography on elites in Dwaine Marvick (ed.), Political Decision-Makers (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961). This, of course, is not the only source of bibliography. A number of other books on elites also contain good bibliographies.

Their titles indicate that the study of elites has extended to include not only countries of Western Europe, as was the case in the nineteenth century, but also countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. It is interesting to note that most of these books appeared in the United States, and this fact signifies the high degree of development of social sciences in the United States at the present time.

Such a wide interest in elites in our time seems to have several sources. In the first place, it is an observable fact that in all organized societies there are small groups, who rule or who are "very important, very powerful, or very prominent,"³ that we can call elite. Their role in societies is, in general, to provide the leadership in all fields of organized life. Consequently, their decisions and actions greatly affect the mode of life of their respective societies.

In our century, under the impact of industrialization, a trend toward the proliferation of elites has greatly developed. Industrialization has created a need for all kinds of skills or specializations, and this has resulted in an emergence of all kinds of occupational groups which in turn have developed their own elites.⁴ They are responsible

³Suzanne Keller, Beyond the Ruling Class (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 3.

⁴These elites are called differently. T. B. Bottomore in Elites and Societies (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1964), p. 8, calls these functional elites simply "elite" in distinction to "the political elite."

Suzanne Keller, on the other hand, uses the term "strategic elites" which include both political and functional elites. She identifies at least ten such elites in the United States beginning with business and political elites and ending with film elites. Keller, op. cit., pp. 260, 310-312.

For the functioning of their respective groups or professions. However, their activity and influence extends beyond their functional areas into the political area. It is sufficient to mention the role in politics of such groups as managers, businessmen, scientists, journalists, and others in the democratic as well as in the socialist countries. Therefore, it is quite natural that these elites have attracted the attention of the social scientists.

The second source of interest in elites in our time is the writings of the nineteenth-century scholars on the subject. The works of Saint-Simon, Auguste Comte, Karl Marx, Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, Maria Kolabinska, and others have become very influential in the study of elites in the last two decades. This is indicated by the fact that hardly any book on elites at the present time fails to refer, positively or negatively, to these authors. Although not all of these authors use the term "elite," they all refer, in one form or another, to the ruling minorities in the European societies which are now called by most scholars "elites." Among them, it was Vilfredo Pareto who was the first to refine and popularize the elite concept. He divided the societies vertically into "elite" and "non-elite," with the former being further divided into the "governing" and "non-governing" elite.⁵

To be sure, most of the above-mentioned authors interpreted the origin, the function, and the aim of elites

⁵Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society, Vol. 3 (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1935), pp. 1423-1424. This point is very briefly discussed in Bottomore, op. cit., p. 2.

differently and even contradictorily. Mosca and Pareto, for example, tried to refute Marx's contention that there was a closed bourgeois class under capitalism and that there will be a classless society under communism, by pointing to what they saw in history as the process of circulation of elites. Whether correct or incorrect in their descriptions of elites, or right or wrong in their evaluations of these social phenomena, the authors of the nineteenth century have evidently had a stimulating effect upon the social scientists of our time.

The third source of interest in elites seems to be the empirical and behavioral approaches to the study of politics. In spite of a strong criticism as being inadequate to explain political phenomena, these approaches have become increasingly popular among the social scientists today. This is probably due to the usefulness of these approaches in studying at least some aspects of social or political life and to the attractive intentions on the part of some scholars to make science out of social sciences, toward which these approaches are supposed to lead.

Empiricism has a centuries long history. In social sciences it is usually associated with John Locke, John Stuart Mill, Auguste Comte, and a number of others in later times. They intended to re-direct social sciences from a normative approach, metaphysical speculation, and formal logic to a more practical and scientific approach and result. They believed that our knowledge about the world, including

its social aspect, can only be derived from our experiences (observations) and that meaningful statements about this world are those which can be verified, as is the case with the applied sciences. Consequently, they suggested that the methods in the latter fields should also be used in social sciences. The main object is to establish not what social phenomena should or ought to be, but rather what they are and why.

The empiricists, however, recognized very quickly that man's sense-experiences are in themselves inadequate for the study of social life. They need to be guided by presuppositions or "a priori truths" whose more specific functions are to serve as a starting point, goal orientation, and method selection in a given empirical research. Without all these, such a research would be chaotic and meaningless. John Stuart Mill called them hypotheses arrived at by generalizations from previous experiences. Herbert Spencer also thought that they should be derived from the accumulated experiences of previous generations.⁶

Behavioralism, on the other hand, is of a more recent origin and narrower in scope than empiricism. The term was borrowed from "behaviorism" in psychology, slightly modified, and usually applied to the study of politics from the human aspect. Heinz Eulau, however, considers the concept of

⁶This brief discussion of empiricism is based on John Madge, The Tools of Social Science (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1965), pp. XV-XXX, and Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Science Editions, Inc., 1961), pp. 93-111.

behavioralism to be of a much wider application. He strongly believes that "potentially at least, all segments of political science can be treated behaviorally" because "human creativity, and especially scientific creativity, knows of no predetermined limitations."⁷ But David Easton and other behaviorists have taken a more modest position with regard to the scope of this new approach. Assessing the application of behavioralism in political science as shown by experience, he writes: "The behavioral approach has shown its greatest strength in research on individuals, especially in face-to-face relationship, or with respect to a type of aggregative behavior such as voting. Small groups and organizations in their internal structure and processes and certain aspects of well-defined communities represent the maximal scope for which there have been contrived research techniques entirely harmonious with the assumption of behavioralism."⁸ He further notes that "The techniques (of behavioralism) become less reliable and their results less valid when applied to the interrelationships of institutions such as party systems and legislatures, or electoral systems and parties, or the effect

⁷ Heinz Eulau, "Segment of Political Science Most Susceptible to Behavioralistic Treatment," in James C. Charlesworth (ed.), Contemporary Political Analysis (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 33. The author explains the meaning of "segments" as "problematic areas" or simply problems "connoting the defined boundaries of an area of inquiry."

⁸ David Easton, A Framework For Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1965), p. 5.

of alternative types of institutional arrangements on recruitment to positions of leadership and authority."⁹

Behavioralists would obviously disagree with these limitations, particularly with respect to the recruitment of leadership where aims, motivations, and ambitions are of prime importance and lend themselves to be studied by behavioralistic methods. In general, they believe that the process of politics as well as the operation of political systems as a whole can be explained and understood by studying "political men," i.e., their decisions and actions in terms of aims, drives, motivations, attitudes, perceptions, values, and cognitions not only at the personal level but also at the level of a social-political system and culture.¹⁰

Behavioralists find themselves in disagreement not only with respect to the object of study but also with respect to assumptions and specific methods. But from these differences it is possible to distill points on which all behavioralists would more or less agree. Based on a rich behavioral literature, Easton suggests a list of eight "items" which he believes "includes all the major tenets of the behavioral credo and

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Non-behavioralists seriously question this claim. They recognize that behavioralism can make an important contribution to the study of politics but in itself is inadequate to provide an understanding of politics. To understand it "implies the kind of insight characteristic of the artist as well as the precision which we usually associate with science--the comprehension of interrelations of parts to wholes in addition to the analysis of parts themselves." Milford Q. Sibley, "The Limitations of Behavioralism," in Charlesworth, op. cit., p. 52. Other books critical of behavioralism are listed in Easton, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

represents the major differences between the behavioral and traditional modes of research."¹¹ For this reason as well as for showing the connection between behavioralism and empiricism, it is useful to identify these "items." They are: regularities - search for uniformities in political behavior; verification - testing of hypotheses and generalizations; techniques - selecting of means for observing, recording, and analyzing behavior; quantifications - recording and measuring of data; values - separation of ethical evaluation from an empirical explanation; systematization - doing research in the light of theory; pure science - knowledge based on understanding and explanation of political behavior; integration - utilizing the findings and conclusions from other fields, such as psychology, sociology, anthropology, and others.¹²

From this list of "items" it is quite evident that behavioralism is really an individualistic and group aspect of empiricism. This view has been well recognized by both behavioralists and non-behavioralists alike. Easton, for example, states that behavioralism is wedded "to the assumptions and methods of empirical science."¹³ Sibley, a non-behavioralist, asserts that behavioralism in the American political science is a "searching for a more sophisticated and rigorous empiricism--an empiricism that stresses both 'scientific' theory and a verification process testable by

¹¹Ibid., pp. 7-8.

¹²Ibid., p. 7.

¹³Ibid., p. 22.

reference to 'behavior'."¹⁴

Although there has been a wide disagreement among the behavioralists on many points, including the definition of their approach, behavioralism in particular and empiricism in general have been quite often used by many scholars in political science. This is attested by the books and articles on such topics as parties, pressure groups, voters, power elites, etc. Whether a given book is behavioralistic or is such only to a certain degree, in the light of the above-mentioned disagreements, this is rather a subjective question calling for the same kind of answer. But whatever answer, the fact is that many books on individuals and groups in the area of political science in our time are within the empirical-behavioralistic framework. Books on elites in Latin America and European countries are a few examples of this contention.¹⁵ They show that their authors used some of the "items" enumerated by Easton, most often verification, techniques, quantification, and values.

These have been the three sources of interest in elites in our time and since it has been quite wide, the Soviet political elite could not have escaped the attention of the students of the U.S.S.R. Indeed, the Soviet political elite seems to be even more attractive to the scholars than, for

¹⁴Sibley, op. cit., p. 52.

¹⁵Seymour Martin Lipset and Ald Solari (eds), Elites in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).
W. L. Guthsman, The British Political Elite (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1963).

The study of elites in other European countries can be found in Lasswell and Lerner, op. cit.

example, political elites in the European democratic countries. The concept of elite refers to the groups which are powerful, influential, important, and cohesive. The Soviet political elite manifests these characteristics to the highest degree. Like the Nazi and Fascist elites, it is characterized by its tight organization, its claim to an exclusive right to rule, its definite ideology, and its organizational, ideological, and, very often, social cohesiveness. Because of these characteristics, no author on the Soviet Union could have avoided discussing the Party's elite directly or indirectly. In more recent years an interest in the Soviet political elite has greatly increased. This is reflected in the publication of an increasingly greater number of articles, books, dissertations, and biographic dictionaries dealing exclusively with the Soviet political elite.¹⁶

This dissertation is a part of that interest but it is limited only to the top elite of the Communist Party. The top elite is here identified as members of the top Party

¹⁶A few of these can be mentioned here. Boris Nikolayevsky, Power and the Soviet Elite (New York: Frederick and Praeger, 1965).

John A. Armstrong, The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite: A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus (New York: Frederick and Praeger, 1959).

Michael P. Gehlen and Michael McBride, "The Soviet Central Committee: An Elite Analysis," The American Political Science Review, LXII (December, 1968), 1232-1241.

Charles T. McDowell, The Development of Elite and the Role of the Komsomol in the Soviet Union (Thesis, The Russian Institute, Columbia University, 1953).

organs: the Politbureau, the Orgbureau, and the Secretariat¹⁷ between 1919 and 1952, the Praesidium (the Politbureau was renamed the Praesidium and the Orgbureau was abolished) and the Secretariat between 1952 and 1966, and the Politbureau (the Praesidium again became the Politbureau) and the Secretariat between 1966 and 1971.

This dissertation is an attempt to offer an empirical (analysis of empirical indicators) and behavioralistic study of the Party's top elite between 1919 and 1971 in terms of several items identified by David Easton. Its first aim is to establish what types of the Party's top elite existed between 1919 and 1971 and to provide for their causal explanation as well as for their meaning in the context of the Soviet political system. The second aim is to establish the nationality policy of recruitment of the top elite members. To pursue these goals, the analysis will be focused on the elites' age, social origin, education, political career, nationality as well as on the economic, social, educational, and political developments in the country.

In connection with this discussion, the following two hypotheses will be tested:

¹⁷ Although in 1919 when these three organs were established only one Secretary and five technical secretaries were elected, a resolution calling for their election used the term "Secretariat" to denote their office. The Secretariat in the present structure and power developed in subsequent years when Stalin became Secretary General of the Party.

1. The progressive development of industrialization and technology in the Soviet socialist totalitarian state led to the progressive emergence of the technocratic-apparatchiki type of top elite in the Party.
2. After Stalin's death the Party leaders, in their quest for legitimacy among the non-Russian nations, recruited to the Praesidium-Politbureau, unlike in the past, the natives from the major union republics' Parties in a rough proportion to their Party membership and population.

By testing the first hypothesis, it will be shown that the emergence of the technocratic type of top elite was causally related to the economic development of the country, to the socialist system of the state, and to the totalitarian power of the Party in the Soviet society.

By testing the second hypothesis, it will be demonstrated that Lenin and Stalin used other means of legitimizing their power among the non-Russian nations than recruiting the natives from the major union republics to the Party's top elite, and that after Stalin's death this became one of the most conspicuous policies of Khrushchev to achieve the legitimacy of his power.

The discussion of the top elite will reveal that in

the Soviet Union there were three types of top elite: the sophisticated revolutionary type under Lenin, the unsophisticated apparatchiki type under Stalin, and the apparatchiki-technocratic type under Khrushchev and Brezhnev. To prove this classification, the characteristics (social origin, education, career) of the members of the top elite for 1919, 1939, and 1961 as representatives of these three types will be discussed in detail. The characteristics of the elite members for other years will be discussed only in a summary form, for they are, in general, the same as for the former three types of the elite. They will be added in the discussion, however, in order to show the existence of these three types of elite in the historical perspective.

Basically, two methods will be followed in this dissertation: structural-functional and quantitative-comparative. The first, being identified here with the study of the Party structure and the functions of units within this structure, will be used to discuss the hierarchy of the Party's elites from the lowest to the highest level as well as their vertical and horizontal power relationship. The second, dealing with the collecting, measuring, and analyzing of data and with their comparison, will be used to test the hypotheses.

There are, however, several concepts, such as

"totalitarianism," "legitimacy," "power" which cannot be discussed statistically because by their nature they do not have quantitative properties. Therefore, in these cases a more conventional method will be used, such as analysis of documents, statements, historical facts, circumstantial evidence, and other relevant factors.

CHAPTER II

THE HIERARCHY OF THE PARTY'S ELITE

Definition

This study is concerned with the top elite of the Communist Party of the USSR. The term "top elite" very obviously implies the existence of a hierarchy of elite within the Party. If there is a top elite, there must also be the lowest elite and the middle elites. Therefore it is logical as well as useful to begin the discussion of the top elite with a discussion of the elite in the Party in general. Its usefulness lies precisely in the possibility of establishing that hierarchy and in its light to see the top elite in a clearer perspective.

Perhaps the best way to begin the discussion on the Soviet Party's elite is by formulating a definition, for it will not only clarify the meaning of the object under study, but will also provide the guidelines for its analysis. Although the literature on elites is rather rich, no suitable definition has been formulated to apply to all kinds of elites, or at least to all political elites. None of the many definitions consulted fits entirely the Soviet Party elite. The reason for this is that each author in his work has different aims or emphasizes different aspects of an elite and therefore defines it accordingly. The second major reason is related to the fact that each elite,

political as well as non-political, has its own characteristics, derived primarily from the social system and the political culture under which it was formed and began to function. Yet most of the consulted definitions have some elements which are applicable to the Soviet Party elite. A number of these definitions are discussed below and on their basis a definition of the Soviet Party elite is suggested.

Many authors have defined elites in various terms, such as performance, function, influence, power, position, or in terms of a combination of a few of these concepts. Vilfredo Pareto, for example, defines elite in terms of performance and position and, by implication, in terms of function. In a rather descriptive manner he writes that those who are the "best" in their performance "in every branch of human activities", or "who have the highest indices in their branch of activity" are called the elite.¹ They can be lawyers, doctors, scientists, thieves, or other individuals who excel in the performance of their respective works. This definition can be classified as being functional, since performance is closely related to function.

Pareto makes a distinction within this elite between a "governing elite" and a "non-governing elite" as opposed to the non-elite or masses. The first, which has frequently

¹Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society, Vol. 3 (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1935), pp. 1422-1424.

been called by many authors "the political elite," he defines as "comprising individuals who directly or indirectly play some considerable role in government."² He elaborates this point by saying that "the governing elite contains individuals who wear the labels appropriate to political offices of a certain altitude--ministers, senators, deputies, justices, generals, colonels, and so on. . . ."

The non-governing elite consists of all the rest who are the best in performance but who do not exert influence upon the government. As a specific example he mentions a chess champion, but it also refers to all others including "the mistresses of absolute monarchs" who did not "play any part in government."

Pareto's performance criterion of defining the governing and non-governing elites can hardly fit the Soviet Party elite. First of all, in the USSR there is no open competition among the individuals and no free and open competition among the organized groups for the elite status in the Party. Under these circumstances, it is very difficult to know if the members of the elite have really been the "best" in their performance before or after joining the elite, for there is no open challenge to that performance. To be sure, performance, and particularly competence, as will be shown later in the case of the top elite, are important in the process of recruitment of elite, but their quality is open to question. It should be kept in mind that the Soviet Party elite is in

²Ibid., p. 1423. Other quotations are taken from pp. 1423-1424.

practice recruited through the process of cooptation rather than through genuine election. In such a case, security of position and power of those who recruit become of prime importance, as the Soviet sources (including Khrushchev's secret speech) indicate. Consequently, those who are members of the elite may not necessarily be the "best" in their performance but perhaps the "best" in loyalty to their superiors, at least at the time of their recruitment.

Secondly, to assume that the political elites are by definition the "best" in their performance leads to a logical conclusion that there can be no better performance. This, obviously, is not the case under any political system. There were political elites in many countries that proved to be better than others at more or less the same time. Churchill and his associates, for example, were better than Chamberlain and his associates. In 1945, however, Churchill lost the election. In the case of the Soviet Union, Stalin, when still alive, was praised as the "best" in all respects. Yet, in 1956, Khrushchev in his secret speech found that he and his staunch followers had many shortcomings, including criminal records. In general, the quality of performance in the area of politics, aside from obviously harmful (intended or unintended) actions or consequences, depends in great measure upon the subjective judgment of individuals. The same performance can be classified as "good" or "bad" by different people, depending upon their value judgments or their attachment or antagonism to a given political elite.

It follows that Pareto's "best performance" criterion to define political elites is rather dubious. It is, however, applicable to occupational elites where skill and knowledge are of prime importance and their products lend themselves to a more precise "measurement" and objective judgment than performance in politics.

But that part of Pareto's definition which identifies the governing elite with political positions is very applicable to the Soviet Party elite. Positions within the Party are indeed one of the best criteria for establishing not only the elite itself but its hierarchy as well.

Carl J. Friedrich formulates a more comprehensive definition of elite than Pareto. He criticizes Pareto's definition as being statistical, for it identifies elites as consisting of individuals having the highest "indices" in their performance rather than as groups characterized by cooperation and some kind of cohesion. He quite rightly argues that in the area of politics elites operate as groups and not simply as individuals. Moreover, this is also true (although perhaps less frequently recognized) in the case of non-political elites, such as doctors, engineers, scientists, and others, in which cooperation in a form of organization and coordination of actions are very important. In politics, according to him, "only a cooperating group of the 'best' can be said to be

the governing elite."³ With this in mind, Friedrich defines "a political, ruling or governing elite" as "a group of persons who are distinguished by exceptional performance in politics, who effectively unite (monopolize) the rule of a particular community in their hands, and who possess a sense of group cohesion and a corresponding esprit de corps, usually expressed in cooptation; a political elite excels in the ability to secure power and rule."⁴

Although Friedrich in his criticism of Pareto's definition passes a few critical remarks about the idea of "performance" ("good at politics"), he nevertheless inserted it into his own definition. But unlike Pareto, who gave this term the highest quality by using the adjective "the best," Friedrich mitigated it somewhat by using the word "exceptional." To be sure, this mitigated concept can still be questioned, but it is more readily acceptable than that of Pareto. In general, Friedrich's definition rests upon three key concepts: performance, power, and group cohesion. Of these three, the last concept received most consideration both in his criticism of Pareto and in an elaboration of his own definition. Indeed, the idea of "cohesion," as it is indicated by the fact that many other authors emphasize the group aspect of elites, appears to be a very real characteristic of elites and, consequently, a very useful concept for analytical purposes. It also applies very well to the Soviet Party elite and especially to its highest echelon. The study

³Carl J. Friedrich, Man and His Government (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963), p. 138. The author uses the word "best" in parenthesis apparently to indicate that he does not mean this literally.

⁴Ibid., p. 316.

of the latter since 1919, as will be discussed later, shows that it was cohesive not only organizationally and ideologically, but socially in the broadest sense as well (social background, political experience, and frequently education).

Suzanne Keller defines elites on the functional-performance and "goal realization" basis. To her "the term elites refers, first of all, to a minority of individuals designated to serve a collectivity in a socially valued way. Elites are effective and responsible minorities--effective as regards the performance of activities of interest and concern to others to whom these elites are responsive. Socially significant elites are ultimately responsible for the realization of major social goals and for the continuity of the social order."⁵

This rather long definition can be summarized by the author's own brief expression that the elite is "social leadership." It should be said at the outset that some parts of her definition do not constitute a specific quality or characteristic of elites that can be applied to the Soviet Party elite, or, for that matter, to any other political elite. The elite's function of serving the collectivity, for example, although true, is too obvious and too general to constitute its specific feature. All elites under all systems have to serve the society in their particular way for the simple reason that they are social entities that exist and operate within their respective societies. This point, however, serves very well the author's aim of estab-

⁵Suzanne Keller, Beyond the Ruling Class (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 4.

lishing what she calls "the strategic elites" comprising all functional elites.

Her other point in the definition, namely, that the elites are "responsible for the realization of major social goals," on the other hand, perfectly fits the Soviet Party elite and especially the top elite. Although she does not explain her meaning of the term "realization," from her later discussion it appears that she means both goal formulation as well as its implementation (both functions, of course, are performed by different elites). The Soviet Party elite, and particularly its top echelon, having assumed the monopoly on power, has as one of its main functions the formulation of the political and social goals for the Soviet society as well as supervision over their implementation. At this point it is sufficient to mention the very known fact that the introduction of socialism in Russia was the work of the Party's top elite. It can also be added that, for example, such goals as the New Economic Policy under Lenin, or collectivization and industrialization under Stalin, were again the fruit of the top elite.

A few other definitions should be briefly discussed here, for they emphasize still another dimension of the concept of elite.

Harold D. Lasswell defines elite very briefly: "Most simply, the elite are the influential."⁶ Since "sharing

⁶Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, eds., World Revolutionary Elite (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1967), p. 4.

is unequal, the most influential are called elite; others are mid-elite and rank-and-file."⁷ In Lasswell's interpretation, this applies to all kinds of elites, including power elites. But the latter, in addition, is characterized by "having severe sanctions at its disposal."⁸ He does not, however, elaborate the meaning of "influence" and "power elite" in the cited work. Therefore, for their meaning it is perhaps fair to turn to one of his earlier works in which he defines and quite extensively discusses not only the above concepts but many others as well.⁹ In it, he defines "influence" as a "value position and potential" explaining this to mean that a group or individuals are influential when they occupy positions highly valued by the society and their influence may increase when the potential value of these positions is increased.¹⁰ To him, the term "influence"

⁷Ibid., p. 5.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, eds., Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950).

¹⁰Ibid., p. 60. In one of Lasswell's later works, he interprets influence as a struggle for values in a society. In it he writes: "The influential are those who get the most of what there is to get. Available values may be classified as deference, income, safety. Those who get the most are elite; the rest are mass. The fate of an elite is profoundly affected by the ways it manipulates the environment; that is to say, by the use of violence, goods, symbols, practices." By this interpretation the author gives the term "influence" a wider application and a more dynamic connotation than in the previous work but he does not change its value. Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1958), pp. 13, 27.

has a broad meaning and "power is comprised under influence," or "power is a type of influence." Power, in turn, he defines as a "participation in the making of decisions: G has power over H with respect to the value K if G participates in the making of decisions affecting the K policies of H."¹¹ As in the case of the elite discussed in his later work, Lasswell here differentiates power from influence by applying to the former a threat of sanctions. But unlike in his later work, in this one he defines elite more narrowly, namely, in terms of power. He writes: "The elite are those with most power in a group; the mid-elite, those with less power; the mass, least power."¹² He does not, however, state what elite he has in mind, but from this definition as well as from other passages related to it, it appears that he refers to all kinds of elites, including the power elite.

As can be seen from these definitions, Lasswell is rather unclear and inconsistent. In order to find some clarity it would perhaps be useful to choose his definition of elite in terms of influence from the 1967 book and the meaning of the term from his earlier works, or to accept the definition of elite in terms of power from the 1950 book. However, neither of these definitions can be applicable to the Soviet Party elite. The main problem is that Lasswell ascribes a different meaning to the term "influence" from that frequently used by sociologists and political scientists. Two sociologists,

¹¹Lasswell and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 84.

¹²Ibid., p. 201.

for example, interpret influence as follows: "Influence is the ability to affect the decisions and actions of others beyond any authority to do so."¹³ Carl Friedrich, a political scientist, is even more elaborate. He writes that "influence" has no structure or is unenforceable and very difficult to measure. To him "influence frequently operates as a corrective to direct an institutionalized (structured) power."¹⁴ He further argues that it is not power that is "a type of influence" but, on the contrary, influence is a kind of "formless" power. By accepting these meanings of influence, it is very difficult to apply them to the Party's elite under consideration. To be sure, influence cannot be excluded from the functioning of the elite. It is inconceivable that the Party's elite operates on sheer authority and sanctions alone. Obviously, there are many people in the USSR who support the elite, not out of fear of sanctions, but because they respect it, or are convinced by means of mass media that it follows the right course, or they believe that at least some of its decisions merit support.

Influence is also operating within the elite itself, both downward and upward. Fainsod, for example, writes on the basis of the Soviet secret documents that "the raikom first secretary and the bureau of the raikom exercised considerable influence in designating their subordinate

¹³Paul B. Horton and Chester L. Hunt, Sociology (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 293.

¹⁴Friedrich, op. cit., p. 206. The next quotations are taken from p. 207.

personnel."¹⁵

But influence is not what makes the Soviet Party elite distinctive; it is rather power derived from occupied positions and authority. As a ruling group in the Soviet state, it has both legal and physical means at its disposal.

The second problem with the concept of "influence" is that under the Party's autocratic rule in the USSR it is very difficult, without access to the secret documents or the possibility of observation, to establish where the power ends and influence begins and vice versa.

Lasswell's definition of elite in terms of power with the latter being limited to decision-making is too narrow to be applicable to the Soviet Party elite. It does not account for other characteristics of the elite, such as its hierarchical structure, or possession of sanctions.

Although Lasswell's definitions have to be rejected here, some of his concepts used in various contexts in his books, such as positions, sanctions, and decision-making, are very much applicable to the Party's elite and will be used later in formulating our definition of elite.

Amitai Etzioni, along with many others, defines elite in terms of power. He writes: "By elites we mean groups of actors who have power. Lower elites are groups of actors who have direct power over lower participants." Power, in turn, he defines as "an actor's ability to induce or influence

¹⁵Merle Fainsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), p. 86.

another actor to carry out his directives or any other norms he supports."¹⁶ Thus, power has a relational quality where the wishes or decisions of one group are carried out by another. Etzioni's definition of elite is interesting for the fact that it refers to the hierarchy of the elite which is exactly the case with the Soviet Party elite. In addition, in his elaboration of the definition he also makes another noteworthy point: he classifies power and elites in accordance with their sources. To him "Power derived from the actor's office may be coercive, remunerative (e.g., the foreman's right to recommend a pay increase), or normative (e.g., the pastor's right to administer the sacrament)."¹⁷ In another place he makes the same general classification, only in this case he uses different terms: power "may be physical, material or symbolic."¹⁸ He classifies the elite as follows: "Actors whose power is derived mainly from their position in the organization are referred to as officers. Actors whose power is derived from their personal characteristics are referred to as leaders as long as the kind of power involved is normative."¹⁹ Although this classification is not very precise and obviously needs some modification and

¹⁶ Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1961), p. 89.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 90.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 5.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 90.

refinement, its importance for this study lies in the fact that the author connects at least part of the elite (officers) and its power with the positions they occupy in the organizations. This aspect of the elite is important because the official positions within organizations legitimize the political status and power of the elite under all political systems, including that of the Soviet Union.

Finally, T. B. Bottomore, following, as he writes, "The fresh distinctions and refinement," differentiates between the elite, the political class, and the political elite. He refers the term elite "to functional, mainly occupational, groups which have high status (for whatever reason) in a society."²⁰ He applies the term "political class," borrowed from Gaetano Mosca, to the field of politics. It consists of "all those groups which exercise political power or influence, or are directly engaged in struggles for political leadership." Within this class, Bottomore identifies "a smaller group, the political elite, which comprises those individuals who actually exercise political power in a society at any given time." The political elite includes "members of government and of the high administration, military leaders, and, in some cases, politically influential families of an aristocracy or royal house and leaders of powerful economic enterprises." It is interesting to point out that the author, like Friedrich, excludes the elites

²⁰T. B. Bottomore, Elites and Society (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1964), p. 8. All other quotations are taken from pp. 8 and 9.

of the political parties which are not in power at a given time. These elites, as well as the elites of social interest groups, such as trade unions, businessmen, intellectuals, and others who are active in politics, belong to the political class.

From Bottomore's classification and interpretation of elites, it is apparent that the political elite is recruited from the political class. The distinction and the relation between the two are very similar to Pareto's distinction between the governing and the non-governing elites as discussed above, and to Lasswell's distinction between the rulers and the ruling class.²¹ These distinctions are tempting, for they can be applied to the Soviet situation where the entire Party membership can be considered as the political class, and the Party's elite as the political elite, or the rulers. This, however, is outside the scope of the present study.

Bottomore's definition of the political elite is relevant to the Soviet Party elite, for he identifies the former with the political positions and the actual exercise of "political power in a society" and this is the case with the Party elite in the Soviet Union.

²¹Lasswell, discussing the social structure, makes a distinction between the ruling class and the rulers as follows: "The ruling class is the class from which the rulers are recruited and in whose interest they exercise power. The rulers have been defined as those supreme in the body politic--the most active and powerful members of the elite." Lasswell and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 206.

As was indicated in each case, all these definitions apply to the Soviet Party elite only in part. They contain five basic concepts: power position, group cohesion, sanctions, goal formulation, and decision making. It is in terms of these concepts in the context of the Soviet system that we now can define the Soviet Party elite in general, and the top elite in particular. Accordingly, we can say that the Soviet Party elite is a ruling group of Party members who occupy power positions within the structure of the Party and the state, who have at their disposal legal and physical sanctions, and whose function is to make decisions for the Party members as well as for the Soviet society in general. The top Party elite is a ruling group of Party members who occupy pivotal power positions within the Party and the state, who have at their disposal legal and physical sanctions, and whose function is to formulate social goals for the Party members and the Soviet society as well as to make all other important decisions to be carried out by the lower elites.

The statement in the second definition that the decisions of the top elite are carried out by the lower is not in contradiction, as it may imply, with the similar statement in the first definition. That the lower elites have to implement the decisions of the top elite is hardly disputable. But the process of their implementation involves the adoption of certain methods of work and the allocation of resources

and men. Therefore, at least in these areas, the lower elites have to make decisions directly affecting both the Party members and the society in general. In addition, there are areas, such as improvements of agriculture, or state and Party administration on the local levels, or methods of propaganda, and others, where the lower elites have to initiate their policies and make corresponding decisions. Otherwise, the entire system will not work, for the top elite cannot issue specific decisions covering all areas of social life. At the same time it should be admitted, as will be discussed later, that this is done within the scope of the general policies or goals of the top elite and the system of approval by the higher Party officials of all decisions made by the lower officials.

These two definitions allow us, above all, to establish the hierarchy of the elite, for power positions within the Party (and the state as well) are vertically structured. It is equally true that these positions are also organized territorially or horizontally; i.e., position holders at a certain level are equal in rank and power at least in similar localities as, for example, the first secretaries of the districts or regions. The hierarchy of the Party elite is discussed next.²²

²²The cohesion aspect of the elite is discussed in the next three chapters.

The Hierarchy of the Elite

The term "hierarchy" is of older origin, and its meaning, unlike that of many new concepts, has been generally agreed upon by many social scientists. The quotations from the works of three authors would perhaps suffice to exemplify this assertion.

Harold D. Lasswell defines hierarchy as "a structure of power relationships of varying amounts of power. . . ." ²³ He further elaborates this by saying that "A hierarchy is thus a coordinated aggregate of persons among whom power relationships hold so as to establish an order of superiors and subordinates. A section of this order may be called a vertical echelon in the hierarchy, as distinguished from a horizontal echelon constituted by power holders of equal rank in the hierarchy." ²⁴

Victor A. Thompson considers hierarchy as "a system of roles--the roles of subordination and superordination--arranged in a chain so that role 1 is subordinate to role 2; and 2 is superordinate to 1 but subordinate to 3. The chain so continues until a role is reached that is subordinate to no other role, except perhaps to a group of people such as a board of directors or an electorate." ²⁵

Although the first author is rather rhetorical and the second more concrete, both base their definitions of hierarchy

²³Lasswell and Kaplan, op. cit., p. 204.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Victor A. Thompson, Modern Organization (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 58.

on the same central idea: vertical structure of organizations where the lower units are subordinated to the higher and the latter in turn are superimposed on the lower.

Carl J. Friedrich, on the other hand, defines hierarchy in terms of a special type of functioning. To him, organizations structured hierarchically are characterized by "a directive mode of work" as opposed to a non-hierarchical organization characterized by "consultation and criticism" and the cooperative mode of operation.²⁶ Although he does not elaborate on the idea of "directive mode of work," it is quite clear from the context of his discussion that he has in mind modes of work where the lower units operate within the scope of orders, resolutions or directives from the higher units.

If any political party at the present time can serve as a model of hierarchical organization (vertical structure) and a "directive mode of work," it is the Communist Party of the USSR. The Soviet Party organization is based on the occupational-territorial principle. This means that the Party's primary organizations, or Party cells as they were officially called from 1919 until 1934, "are formed at the places of work of Party members--in factories, on state farms, and at other enterprises, collective farms, units of the Soviet army, offices, educational establishments, etc., wherever there are not less

²⁶Friedrich, op. cit., p. 133.

then three Party members."²⁷ All other Party units from rural and urban districts upward are organized on the territorial principle, i.e., to direct and supervise the work of the Party organizations at a given territory such as district, areas, regions, etc. The Party Rules also allow that primary organizations be formed on this principle "in villages and at house administrations" where economic enterprises or Party membership in them are too small to form separate Party organizations. But this is an exception. The territorial principle, as a rule, applies to all Party units above the primary organizations. This is the official and real structure of the Party leadership or elite, which, in fact, parallels the territorial structure of the state, with the exception of the autonomous republics and the autonomous regions where the highest Party units are designated as the ordinary regional rather than as autonomous republican or autonomous regional Party organizations.

The occupational-territorial principle has been practiced in the Party to various degrees and in various forms, depending upon the situation, in Russia from the pre-revolutionary time, although the occupational principle at that time was not explicitly stated in the Party Rules.²⁸ But the Soviet author describes, rather briefly, the Party structure prior

²⁷Article 53 of the 1961 and 54 of the 1952 Party Rules in Jan Triska, ed., Soviet Communism: Programs and Rules (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1962), p. 186.

²⁸The Party Rules were adopted for the first time at the Second Party Congress in 1903. Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 2nd ed., XLIV, 394.

to the November revolution as consisting of the Party circles formed in the place of work of the members (mills, factories) as the lowest level; the city and district Party committees as the next level; the Bureaus of the RSDRP, such as the North-Western Bureau of the RSDRP, or the United Committees, as, for example, the Caucasus United Committee, as still higher. These in turn were subordinated to the Central Committee as the highest Party organ being responsible to the Party congresses.²⁹ What happened after the revolution was really the refinement of the Party structure along these lines. Since 1919 the Party Rules have been amended or changed at least ten times (in 1922, 1923, 1925, 1927, 1934, 1939, 1952, 1956, 1961, 1966) but the structure of the Party has not essentially been changed. It underwent the process of adjustment to the administrative-territorial reorganization of the Soviet state whose aim was also a higher degree of centralization.³⁰

²⁹D. Bakhshiev, Organizatsionnye Osnovy Bolshevitskoi Partii (Moskva: Gospolitizdat, 1945), pp. 55-58.

³⁰The basic administrative-territorial units of the Soviet state inherited from the Tsarist Russia (and these were also the units of the Party) were gubernia, uezd, and volost. In 1923-24 the Soviet Government began the process of reorganization of the state by replacing gubernia and uezd with okrug which ended in 1928-29. In 1930, however, the government decided to abolish okrug units and replace them with smaller units of oblast and raion. Okruqi eventually remained only in the Russian republic as part of krai or oblast. But only as national or ethnic units. There are now six national okruqi in that republic. The aim of these reorganizations was to enhance the control of the central organs over the lower in time of industrialization and collectivization of the country.

The same reorganization took place in the Party. In the 1920's gubernia Party units were replaced by that of okrug but on July 10, 1930, the Central Committee decided, and the Sixteenth Party Congress approved, to replace okruqi with

The introduction and retention of the occupational-territorial principle in the Party was motivated by political and practical considerations. Its occupational part is perhaps best explained by the above-quoted Soviet author and by the Party Rules of 1961. In reference to the pre-revolutionary time, he writes: "On the eve of Bolshevism [the establishment of the Bolshevik system in Russia] the followers of Lenin were forming the Party organizations (the Party circles) in the mills and factories for they were guided by Lenin's directives that a factory and a mill are fortresses of the Party, that in the enterprises work the supporters and the army of the Party--the working class."³¹ It is obvious that the idea was to have the Party cells operating among the workers in order to exert influence upon them against the Tsarist regime. After the revolution the role of the cells changed but their place remained the same. The Rules of 1961 explain this elaborately as follows: the primary Party organization "conducts its work directly among the working people, rallies them around the Communist

oblast and to organize more raion units. The Soviet author explains that the aim of these changes was "to enhance our forces and to improve our leadership in the villages" and to establish "a maximal contact between the apparatus of the Party, state, state and cooperative organizations, trade unions and that of the raion and the village." E. Veger, "Likvidatsia Okrugov i Zadachi Partorganizatsii," Partiinoe Stroitelstvo, No. 13-14 (July, 1930), 10.

Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1st ed., XIX, 726-734.

³¹ Bakhshiev, op. cit., p. 56.

Party of the Soviet Union, organizes the masses to carry out the Party policy and work for the building of Communism." It "ensures the vanguard role of Communists in the sphere of labor and in the socio-political and economic activities of enterprises, collective farms, institutions, educational establishments, etc."³²

The territorial principle was motivated by the desire of the top elite, and particularly by Lenin and later Stalin, to ensure the highest degree of centralization of the Party, i.e., strict direction and total control of the entire Party machinery by the central organs, mainly in order to make it an obedient and effective instrument for implementing the top elite's goals and decisions.

In the Party so organized we can establish several levels of elite which are standing in an hierarchical relation to each other. It should be admitted at the outset, however, that this is rather complicated for three reasons: first, the Russian Republic does not have a Party organization with the central organs as do all other union republics; second, the territorial and area Party organizations in the same republic do not have their equivalent organizations in other union republics; and third, the Party organizations in the autonomous republics and in the autonomous regions have a status of the regional

³²Triska, op. cit., p. 189.

Party organizations.³³ This is one of the reasons that different authors see different numbers of levels in the Party structure. Merle Fainsod, for example, writes that "At least four and sometimes five layers of administration can be distinguished" in the Party from the all-union down to the primary organizations.³⁴ Julian Towster, on the other hand, enumerates six layers, or as he calls them "tiers," but he excludes the primary organizations considering them to constitute "the floor" on which these "tiers" rest. In addition, he treats the territories and areas as separate tiers in the structure of the Party.³⁵

It is possible to look at the Party "layers" or "tiers," which really constitute the hierarchy of the elite, somewhat differently. The criterion for establishing the elite in the Party, it will be recalled, is leadership--defined in terms of power positions, sanctions, goal formulation, decision-making, and group cohesion. The criteria of establishing the

³³In 1956, at the Twentieth Party Congress, the Bureau of the Central Committee for the R.S.F.S.R. was established to supervise the Party's bureaucracy in that Republic. It was not, however, comparable in structure to the Union Republican Party organizations. It was abolished in 1966. The territorial and autonomous republic Party organizations in the Russian republic are directly subordinated to the All-Union Central Committee in Moscow. Derek J. R. Scott, Russian Political Institutions (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 136-137. Bakhshev, op. cit., p. 58.

³⁴Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 190.

³⁵Julian Towster, Political Power in the U.S.S.R. 1917-1947 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 135.

hierarchy of the elite are power positions and their corollaries: subordination and superordination. Following these criteria, we can establish six levels of the elites in the Soviet Party: the leaders of the primary organizations as the lowest level, then, moving upward, the leaders of the urban-rural districts, cities and areas, regions, territories and union republics, and finally, the leaders of the all-union Party organs as the highest level.³⁶ In this classification the primary organizations are considered as forming the basis for the entire elite structure because they comprise the masses of the Party who do not occupy any power positions within the Party. It is, however, their leaders who constitute the elite of the first instance.

This division of the elite calls for an explanation which, for the sake of consistency, should start with the lowest elite. The primary Party organizations are formed in the place of work of the members and the candidates of the Party. The Party Rules after World War II have provided that the Party primary organizations with less than fifteen members elect only a secretary and his deputy to conduct the work of the organization; those with more members elect, in addition,

³⁶According to Stalin's report to the Eighteenth Party Congress in March 1939, there were in the Soviet Union at that time 113,060 primary Party organizations, 3,479 rural district committees, 336 city district committees, 212 city, 30 areal, 104 regional, 6 territorial, and 11 union republican organizations headed by the Central Committee on the national level. Quoted in Towster, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

In 1967 there were 337,915 primary organizations, 2,746 rural districts, 417 city districts, 747 city, 10 areal, 133 regional, 6 territorial, and 14 union republican organizations. Partiinaiia Zhizn, No. 19 (October, 1967), 18-19.

bureaus consisting usually of less than a dozen members. The Rules stipulated that the primary organizations can have salaried functionaries when they have more than 150 members. Otherwise, the secretaries and other leaders are unpaid functionaries working full time in their respective professions. The primary organizations in the factories, collective farms, offices, and other establishments with more than fifty members and candidates can be subdivided functionally into shop, team, departments, and other units. In large factories and offices with more than 300 members and candidates, or in exceptional cases with over 100, the primary organizations can elect the committees. In such cases, the functional units such as team, shop, and others are "granted the status of primary Party organization."³⁷ In the collective farms a primary organization with over 50 members and candidates can elect committees. It is apparent that these committees cannot be considered to constitute a higher layer of the elite over the primary organizations. Their formal function is to coordinate the work of various units.

The elite of the urban and rural districts are considered here as constituting one level. It should be admitted, however, that they are subordinated to different higher organizations: the rural districts to the regions and the urban

³⁷ This is stipulated in section 8 of the 1952 and section 6 of the 1961 Party Rules. Triska, op. cit., pp. 186-188. The number of primary organizations with the committees has grown from 13,975 in 1962 to 26,367 in 1967. The total number of primary organizations in 1967 was 337,915. Partiinaiia Zhizn, No. 19 (October, 1967), p. 18.

districts to the cities. In spite of this fact, they all are more or less equal in function, power, and status throughout the country. They receive their orders and instructions from above; they supervise the work of primary organizations; and they are responsible for the functioning of their respective districts in all fields of social life.

Towster, as was noted before, treats areas as a separate "tier." In our classification the elite of areas and those of the cities are combined to constitute one level in the Party structure. It is admitted that the city elite somewhat differs from the area elite in quality of work and, perhaps, in status within the Party. Areas are usually large territorial units comprising rural and small urban populations in the Russian Republic. Cities, on the other hand, are strictly urban centers. These differences affect the quality of work. In addition, the city elites have a number of reasons to be more important than that of the areas. They hold positions in the Party organizations which, from the power point of view, are strategically located. The elites of such cities as Moscow and Leningrad, for example, have many reasons to be more influential than those of other areas because these cities are populous and constitute the centers of political, cultural, and economic life in the country.³⁸ But these

³⁸A reflection of the strength of these cities can be seen from the fact that at the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939 Moscow had 208 delegates or 13.3% of the total number of delegates and Leningrad had 143 or 9.1% as against, for example, the Azerbaidzhan Republic with 42 delegates or Kiev with 37. XVIII S'ezd VKP(b) (Moskva: Gussudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1939), p. 147.

differences also exist between the larger and smaller cities as well. Yet both the Soviet and the Western authors recognize that all city elites form one level. Despite some differences, the city and area elites can be considered as forming one "layer" because both are subordinated to the regional elites and both supervise the work of the districts.

The elites of the regions are equal in many respects including, in most cases, superordination and subordination. Except in cases of areas, they direct the work of the rural districts and the cities and are in turn responsible to the union republics, territories, or directly to the Central Committee. Regional elites in all national republics except Russian are responsible to the Central Committees of the union republics. In the Russian republic, all regions are directly subordinated to the Central Committee in Moscow because that republic, as was noted before, does not have its central organs. The Party organizations in autonomous republics have the status of regions and, as such, are responsible to the Central Committee of the union republics other than Russian of which they are part, or, if the autonomous republics are in the Russian republic, directly to the Central Committee in Moscow.

The elites of the union republics and those of the territories differ in some respects but are similar in others. The union republics are based on ethnic principle while the territories are not. Unlike the territories, the union republics are cultural units, usually highly populated, and frequently highly developed economically. Consequently, the

elites from the union republics have a greater weight in the politics of the state and the Party than do the elites of the territories.

Despite these differences, the two elites are within the Party structure similar at least in one very important respect: both elites supervise the work of the regions and both in turn are directly responsible to the Party elite on the national level.

At the peak of the Party's pyramid there is the highest elite which directs and controls all the lower elites, but itself is responsible to no other permanent organ. This elite comprises the members of the Central Committee, including the members of the Politbureau, the Secretariat, and, until 1952, the Orgbureau as well as the important members of the highest Party apparatus. The Party Congresses, as will be noted later, ceased in practice to be the supreme organ of the Party in the 1920's.

The hierarchical structure of the Party elite was described by all Party Rules since 1919 as follows:

"A Party organization serving a given area is superior to all organizations serving part of that area."³⁹

³⁹ Article 11 of the 1919, article 19 of the 1934 and 1939, article 22 of the 1952, and article 20 of the 1961 Party Rules. VKP(b) v Rezoliutsiakh (Moskva: Partizdat Tsk VKP(b), 1936), 5th ed., I, 326 and II, 599. Triska, op. cit., p. 169.

The Operational Principle of the Hierarchy

The operational principle applying to all levels of the elites, which makes the hierarchical structure of the Party a daily reality, is democratic centralism. Perhaps the most explicit formulation of this principle was made and adopted at the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934 which is as follows:

1. The election of all leading Party bodies, from the lowest to the highest.
2. Periodic reports of the Party bodies to their Party organizations.
3. Strict Party discipline and subordination of the minority to the majority.
4. The absolutely binding character of the decisions of higher bodies upon lower bodies.⁴⁰

From all these points, very obviously, the last one makes the hierarchical relations among the elites very clear. This principle was expressed in various forms in the Party Rules from the Second Party Congress in 1903 on. The Party leadership tried to reconcile the ideas of democracy with that of centralism. But in the entire Party history the centralist ideas received preference both in theory and practice. The democratic ideas were always either limited, or circumscribed, or qualified.

From the early days of the Party, Lenin always insisted upon centralism under which he understood that the Party in the Russian empire and abroad should have one Party organ

⁴⁰ Article 18 of the 1934 Party Rules. VKP(b) v Rezoliutsiakh, 5th ed., II, 599.

The Party Rules of 1961 somewhat mitigated the fourth point by declaring "That the decision of higher bodies are obligatory for lower bodies." Article 21 in Triska, op. cit., p. 169.

superior to all others--The Party Congress--and between the Congresses, the Central Committee, one program and Party Rules, and one discipline. All lower organizations were, in his conception, accountable in all respects--organizational, financial, and others--before the Central Committee. The new Party committees on the lower levels, or their "unions," were supposed to be created by the Central Committee. Democracy within the Party was limited to the decision-making process by a simple majority.

These ideas he first expressed in his "Project of the Organizational Rules for the R.S.D.P." which he submitted to the Second Congress in 1903.⁴¹ In proposing this "Project," Lenin was motivated by the conviction that in order to fight the Tsarist regime, the Party had to be united and well disciplined. But his "Project" was not accepted, for it contained some other ideas which were contrary to the delegates' ideas. Instead, the Congress adopted the Party Rules which were, in some cases, less strict. Among the articles, one provided that all Party organizations are autonomous in their work in the fields directly relating to their respective regions.⁴²

The term "democratic centralism" was first used in the resolutions adopted by the First Party Conference in 1905. They called for the election of local Party committees and for the accountability of the latter to the Central Committee. The Rules of 1906 specified the concept of "democratic

⁴¹VKP(b) v Rezoliutsiakh, 5th ed., 1, 24-25.

⁴²Ibid., p. 26.

centralism" by stating that the regional "centers" were to be elected by the regional conferences or congresses; that the new Party organizations were to be confirmed by the regional conferences or "by the two neighboring organizations" with the stipulation that the Central Committee was to enjoy its right to approve this confirmation.⁴³

From that time on, all Party Rules contained elements of both centralism and democracy, with the latter being always sacrificed for the sake of the former. It should be emphasized that even the qualified version of democracy, as formulated by all Party Rules, was not faithfully adhered to by the Party's elite. On the other hand, the hierarchical mode of relations within the Party, manifested in many forms of superordination, has been persistently practiced. This can be exemplified by the Party discipline, election of the elites, and the Party discussions.

Party Discipline

Lenin, Stalin, and a number of other Party leaders considered the Communist Party as a revolutionary, dynamic, and monolithic (both organizationally and ideologically) unit. For this type of Party Lenin fought at the Second Congress in 1903 where the split occurred within the Party primarily on this point. For the same reason he introduced a resolution at the Tenth Party Congress in 1921 "On Party Unity" banning all factions within the Party.

⁴³Ibid., p. 84.

Stalin was even more explicit. He considered the Party as "the embodiment of unity of will," an "absolute unity of action," based on "solidarity and iron discipline." He admitted that the free exchange of opinion within the Party was not precluded but that it should not undermine these qualities of the Party.⁴⁴ For these reasons the Party's top elite continuously insisted upon rigorous discipline. For them discipline was the cornerstone of the Party's strength. In 1920, Lenin said that "Certainly almost everyone now realizes that the Bolsheviks could not have maintained themselves in power for two and a half months, let alone for two and a half years, without the strictest and truly iron discipline in our Party. . . ."⁴⁵

The essence of the Party discipline is contained in points three and four of the democratic centralism discussed above. But the idea of discipline was too important for the top elite to be left unspecified. Therefore, all Party Rules, at least since the October revolution, specified in one form or another the content and the meaning of discipline. In addition, several resolutions were passed on the subject, particularly in times of struggle for power in the 1920's and in the 1950's. Many articles were also published in the press and many speeches were delivered on the subject of Party discipline. All these referred to discipline basically in terms of Party unity and the obedience of lower elites to the higher.

⁴⁴ Joseph Stalin, Foundations of Leninism (New York: International Publishers, 1939), pp. 119-120.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 118.

The insistence on unity was derived from the concept of the Party as a monolithic group and the experience of factionalism within the Party, particularly in the 1920's. Lenin, in order to put an end to the Party's grouping, proposed the above-mentioned resolution to the Congress in 1921 which empowered the Central Committee to dissolve all factions immediately and to expel any member from the Party violating this rule.⁴⁶ This resolution was of great importance for the future Party leaders. It was very conveniently used by both Stalin and Khrushchev in their struggle for power.

The Party Rules continuously contained the banning of factionalism. Thus, the Rules of 1952 stated that it was the duty of all Party members to "protect the unity of the Party . . . as the chief requisite for its power and strength." The Rules of 1961 spelled out that "All manifestations of factionalism and group activity are incompatible with Marxist-Leninist Party principles, and with Party membership."⁴⁷

In 1957, when Khrushchev was engaged in the struggle for power with Molotov, Malenkov and others, the Central Committee passed the resolution "On the Anti-Party Group." It stated in part that "the Anti-Party group, having embarked on the path of factional struggle, violated the Party Statutes and the decision of the 10th Party Congress 'On Party Unity' drafted by Lenin." It also stated that they "endeavored to

⁴⁶ Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), p. 211.

⁴⁷ Article 3 and Introduction (1961) in Triska, op. cit., pp. 155-156.

change the composition of the Party's leading bodies elected by the plenum of the Party Central Committee."⁴⁸ This latter statement was, indeed, the central point in the concept of Party unity. It indicated that the top elite would not tolerate factional groups, even on the highest level, within the Party. All dissidents had to submit entirely to the strongest or victorious group within the top elite or face the expulsion from the Party or even liquidation.

The clearer picture of the hierarchical relations of the elite, however, can be seen in the area of obedience. All Party Rules explicitly stated that the decisions of the higher elites have to be carried out by the lower. The strictest formulation of this requirement can be found in the Rules of 1919. Article seven under the heading "Centralism and Discipline," in an apparent reference to the Civil War in Russia, declared:

The Party finds itself in such a situation that strict centralism and rigorous discipline is absolutely necessary. All decisions of higher organs are absolutely binding on lower. Every decree has to be first implemented, and only after that an appeal to a proper Party organ is admissible. In this sense in the Party at the present epoch a war-like discipline is necessary. . . . All conflicts are decided by the proper higher Party organs.⁴⁹

The Rules of later years until 1952 did not essentially change this type of discipline, although some of its ideas were reformulated. The Rules of 1934 formulated the Party discipline as follows:

The preservation of the Party unity, the relentless

⁴⁸ Pravda, July 4, 1957.

⁴⁹ VKP(b) v Rezoliutsiiakh, 5th ed., I, 313.

struggle with factional strife and splits, the most rigorous party and state discipline are the first obligations of all members and all party organizations.

The decisions of party and state "centers" have to be implemented promptly and accurately. Failure to implement the decisions of higher organizations . . . will result for the organization: censure, reorganization, or abolition of that organization; for the members of the party: this or that form of censure including public censure, temporary relief from the responsible party and state work, expulsion from the party, or expulsion from the party with the notification about the offence to the administrative and judicial organs.⁵⁰

The Party Rules of 1939 contained the same formulation of the Party discipline. The Rules of 1952 and 1961 somewhat mitigated the form of discipline. The Rules of 1952, for example, declared that the Party member had "To be an active fighter for the implementation of Party decisions," and the Rules of 1961 similarly stated that the members had "to put Party decisions firmly and steadfastly into effect."⁵¹ In a direct reference to discipline, the former Rules declared: "To observe Party and state discipline, which is equally binding on all Party members. There cannot be two disciplines in the Party--one for leaders, the other for rank-and-file members. The Party has one discipline, one law for all Communists, irrespective of their past services or the positions they occupy. Violation of Party or state discipline is a serious evil, which is detrimental to the Party and therefore incompatible with continuance in its ranks."⁵²

⁵⁰ KPSS v Rezoliutsiiakh, 7th ed., III, 243-244.

⁵¹ Articles 3 and 2, in Triska, op. cit., pp. 156, 157.

⁵² Ibid.

The Rules of 1961 shortened this formulation by dropping the second and the last sentences.

These two Rules changed the strictness of the Party discipline when compared with that of 1919, but they did not change the hierarchical nature of the elite structure in the area of obedience.

Election of the Elite

The concept of democratic centralism, as was noted before, contained the idea of election of Party organs on all levels. The first Party Rules of 1903 provided that all local committees as well as "united committees" were to be created by the Central Committee. But the resolution passed at the first Party Conference in 1905 changed the appointive principle in the Party to that of election. In a formulation, loose in structure but clear in intention, the resolutions in part declared:

Recognizing unquestionably the principle of democratic centralism, the Conference considers it necessary to adopt a wide basis for election with the right for the elected centers to have full power in the area of ideological and practical leadership . . . and with strict accountability for their work "before their elective bodies. Consequently the Conference orders all Party organizations to reorganize immediately and energetically all local organizations on the elective basis."⁵³

From that time on, all Party Rules provided for the election of the Party committees, praesidiiums--bureaus, and the secretaries on all levels. Yet in this process of election

⁵³KPSS v Rezoliutsiakh, 7th ed. (1954), I, pp. 99-100.

the hierarchical principles of subordination and superordination were established by both statutes and practice. These took the form of confirmation of the elected lower elite by the higher. This method of control of the election within the Party was gradually introduced after the October revolution. In 1922 the Party Rules stated for the first time that the secretaries of gubernia and uezd were to have a pre-revolutionary Party standing and had to be confirmed by a higher Party organ.⁵⁴ No other specifications were included. In 1925 this rule was extended to the secretaries of okrug. In addition, the Rules of the same year declared that the praesidium or bureau of the territorial committees had to be confirmed by the Central Committee. By 1939 the rule of confirmation was completed by being applied to the secretaries on all levels below the national level. The Rules of 1934 declared that the executive organs of the republican, territorial, and regional committees were to be confirmed by the Central Committee. In 1939 this requirement was applied to the secretaries on all these levels. The Rules of the same year further stated that the area, city, and district secretaries were in turn to be confirmed by their respective regional, territorial, or union republican Party organs.⁵⁵ All these regulations were not changed until 1961.

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 660-661.

⁵⁵ KPSS v Rezoliutsiiakh, 7th ed. (1954), II, 389-393. The secret documents of Smolensk of the 1930's reveal that at least district secretaries were also approved by the Central Committee. Merle Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), pp. 86-87.

In that year, the Party leaders decided to drop the requirement that the Central Committee confirm the secretaries of the regional, territorial, and union republican committees. But they retained the requirement that all area, city, and district secretaries be confirmed by the regional, territorial, or union republican committees.⁵⁶ Taking into account the autocratic nature of the Soviet Party, it is doubtful that the top elite had really ceased to practice the approval of the regional, territorial, and republican secretaries.

It is interesting to note that no Party Rules ever stipulated that the secretaries of the cells or later primary organizations be confirmed by their superiors. Aside from speculation, it is difficult to find an explanation for this fact. This does not, however, mean that the secretaries on the lowest level were genuinely elected by the Party members. Merle Fainsod, using as a basis another Party authoritative source published in 1948, writes that "The election of all secretaries of primary Party organizations must be ratified by the bureau of the raikom or gorkom in whose jurisdiction the primary Party unit falls."⁵⁷

It is equally interesting that except for the Rules of 1925 and 1934, no Rules required that the praesidia-bureaus on the lower level be approved by the elite on the higher level. The same is true with the committees in all Party organizations. The most probable reason for this fact was

⁵⁶ Triska, op. cit., p. 185.

⁵⁷ Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 193.

that the top elite wanted to retain at least a shadow of democracy within the Party. The committees were (and still are) elected by their respected conferences and, in the case of the union republics, by congresses. The bureaus, in turn, were elected by these committees. Hence both were representative bodies allegedly elected by the democratic process. To require that they be approved legally and openly in each case by the higher Party organ would have meant to destroy the democratic image of election. But what could not have been made openly was made discreetly. Fainsod quotes a former raikom secretary and a member of an obkom who, in reference to this question, testified that "the membership in the bureau of gorkoms and raikoms requires obkom approval."⁵⁸ If this is true, then we can reasonably assume that this applies to the bureaus and committees on all levels.

The process of confirmation of the secretaries as well as other Party officials by the higher elite in each case is not, however, black and white. The documents of Smolensk quoted by Fainsod reveal, for example, how the raion elite in several cases in the 1930's was struggling with the oblast elite over the designation and confirmation of the raion secretaries and other officials at this level. Although these documents illustrate, as Fainsod remarks, "the sham character of local election and the dominant role of the obkom in designating raion personnel," they also show that the raion elite exercised a considerable influence over the

⁵⁸ Ibid.

oblast elite in the process of recruitment of the raion elite.⁵⁹

Barrington Moore goes even so far as to suggest that "At the lower level of the Party hierarchy the elective principle plays a considerable role in both theory and practice."⁶⁰ As an indication of this, he cites several examples from the Soviet press of the late 1930's and early 1940's. The press reported that in one case the oblast secretary was removed from his post by the oblast committee; in another, the oblast committee itself was censured by the conference at the same level; in still another case, in one oblast ⁹² per cent of the primary organizations approved the work of their bureaus and offices as satisfactory, in comparison with 68 per cent at the previous election."⁶¹ His first quoted statement and these examples may imply that more freedom was exercised in the election of the elite on local levels. But Moore himself recognizes that there are strong forces which prevent "the extension of inner Party democracy and the free selection of Party leaders even at the lower levels." As these examples show, it was the executive Party officers who were removed, or censured, or their work was not completely supported by the Party members. This was probably due either to their incompetence in general or to failure in their particular work. It is therefore possible that these

⁵⁹Merle Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), pp. 87-88.

⁶⁰Barrington Moore, Soviet Politics--The Dilemma of Power (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1965), p. 248.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 249.

sanctions were allowed (or even encouraged) to be used by the higher elite. In general, however, it can be said that there are indications that the lower elites were playing a considerable role in the process of "confirmation" of the elite members at their respective levels. There are indications that after the death of Stalin, at least for a short time, this role of the lower elites was extended. T. H. Rigby, a close student of the Party membership and the elections, writes that in 1956 and in the beginning of 1957 "the readiness of rank-and-file members and delegates to resist regimentation and to insist on having their say reached a point unknown since the 1920's."⁶² This was particularly manifested in the primary Party election in the fall of 1956. However, probably due to the critical situation in Poland and Hungary, the election of raion, city, and oblast committees "took place in an atmosphere far less sympathetic to 'spontaneity' than that prevailing during the primary Party elections three months earlier."⁶³ This can be ascertained by the Soviet press which prior to the Polish and Hungarian problem emphasized collective leadership, but afterwards began to balance this by stressing Party discipline and subordination of the lower elite to the higher. It is, therefore, most probable that the old hierarchical principle of superordination of the higher elite over the lower in the area of Party elections was reintroduced with perhaps less rigidity.

⁶² T. H. Rigby, "The Democratic Impulse in the Communist Party" in D. Richard Little, Liberalization in the USSR: Facade or Reality (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1968), p. 26.

⁶³ Ibid.

The Mode of Discussion in the Party

The mode of discussion within the Party also reflects the hierarchical nature of the elite. The freedom of discussion was formulated in the official Party documents in such a way as to give more freedom to the higher echelon of the elite than to the lower. It means that the lower the elite, the less freedom it has to criticize the higher elite, and vice versa.

The records of the Party congresses, conferences, and plenums of the Central Committee as well as the articles in the Soviet periodicals indicate that until the 1920's there was within the Party a high degree of freedom of discussion and criticism of the top elite. Moore quotes Riazanov, a member of the Central Committee and later editor of Marx's works in Russia, who, in arguing with Lenin at the meeting of the Central Committee, said that he could not refrain from criticism, and that when the decisions of the Central Committee were "dictated by political combinations and are not based upon the decisions of the supreme organ of the Party Congress, I consider it my duty to struggle against them."⁶⁴ Within the Party several groups opposed Lenin's policies. One of these groups was the "Democratic Centralists" headed by V. V. Osinskiĭ, T. V. Sapronov, and V. M. Smirnov who opposed the bureaucratic control within the Party. Another group was led by Leo Trotskiĭ who at that time believed that the labor unions should be incorporated into the government because

⁶⁴ Moore, op. cit., p. 147.

under the dictatorship of the proletariat they had outlived themselves. But the most vocal was the so-called "Workers' Opposition" led by Alexandra Kollontai and A. G. Shliapnikov who insisted that the decisions in the field of economy should be made by the trade unions. These and other groups as well as individual Party members very often sharply criticized particular policies of Lenin and the Central Committee. At the Tenth Party Congress held in 1921, for example, the Workers' Opposition proposed and argued in its favor a resolution which, among many things, declared:

The Central Committee did not protect nor did it practice the principles of the workers' democracy within the Party, the accountability of the leading organs before the masses of the Party, and the wide discussions of all questions of Party and state construction.⁶⁵

In the 1920's pamphlets were published challenging some Party policies. Moreover, the Party organ Pravda from time to time published articles of the same nature.

This freedom of discussion, however, was not left unchallenged by Lenin and later Stalin. At the same time when the factionalism and criticism were "flourishing," they undertook the legal measures to curb the freedom of discussion, believing that it undermined the strength of the Party. The Party Rules of 1919 stated:

The rigorous Party discipline is the first obligation of all members of the Party and all Party organizations. The decisions of the Party central organs have to be implemented promptly and accurately. Together with this the debate of all controversial

⁶⁵M. Zorkii, Rabocheia Oppozitsiia (Moskva: Gossudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo, 1926), p. 26.

questions of Party life is completely free until such time when the decision has been made.⁶⁶

This conditional freedom of discussion was retained in subsequent Party Rules until 1934. But, as was mentioned above, the polemics were going on within the Party in the early 1920's despite the Party Rules. Therefore, Stalin was using more practical measures to limit the discussion, such as crushing his opponents at the Party congresses and removing them from power positions. In 1926 he said:

There are people in our Party whose one dream is to have a general Party discussion. . . . What we need now is not an artificial discussion, nor the conversion of our Party into a debating society but . . . the strengthening of a militant, solid, united and indivisible party that can firmly and confidently direct our constructive work. Anyone who strives for endless discussion . . . undermines the unity and saps the strength of our Party.⁶⁷

The Party Rules in 1934 elaborated on the conditions under which the discussions within the Party could take place.

Article 57 stated as follows:

The free and businesslike discussion of questions of Party policy in individual organizations or in the Party as a whole is the inalienable right of every Party member which logically follows from inner-party democracy. Only on the basis of inner-party democracy is it possible to develop Bolshevik self-criticism and to strengthen Party discipline, which must be conscious and not mechanical.

But wide discussion, especially discussion on a national scale, of questions of Party policy must be so organized as to prevent the attempts of an insignificant minority to impose its will upon the majority of the Party, or the attempts to form factional groupings, which break the unity of the Party, attempts to cause splits, which may shake the strength and stability of the dictatorship of the

⁶⁶KPSS v Rezoliutsiakh, 7th ed. (1954), I, 467.

⁶⁷Quoted in Herbert McClosky and John E. Turner, The Soviet Dictatorship (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960), p. 230.

proletariat to the joy of the enemies of the working class. Therefore wide discussion on a national scale can be regarded as necessary only:

a. If this necessity is recognized by at least several local Party organizations of regional or republican scale;

b. If there is not a sufficiently solid majority in the Central Committee on important questions of Party policy;

c. If, in spite of the existence of a solid majority in the Central Committee holding a definite opinion, the Central Committee deems it necessary to test the correctness of its policy by means of a discussion in the Party.

Only compliance with these conditions can safeguard the Party against abuse of inner-party democracy by anti-Party elements, only these conditions can give the assurance that inner-Party democracy will be beneficial and not be used to the detriment of the Party and the working class.⁶⁸

Article 27 of the 1961 Party Rules is the same as that quoted above, except that in several cases different wording was used and the reference to prevention of the minority from imposing its will upon the majority was dropped. These minor changes made the article appear as being somewhat less strict than the one of 1934. But it should be emphasized that the aim and the conditions under which wide discussion can take place remained the same as before.

The purpose of such an organized discussion was not to allow anyone to challenge the decisions or programs of the top elite; on the contrary, it was to find the best methods and resources to implement them, or to check the pulse of public opinion and to mobilize the Party members and the

⁶⁸KPSS v Rezoliutsiakh, 7th ed. (1954), III, 243.

public in general to support these programs and decisions. A letter of a Party member, G. Shuvalev, in Pravda of 1958 is very revealing. In it he bitterly complained that the Party officials of his local organization had behaved at the meetings of the organization in a dictatorial manner by limiting the debates to the list of speakers prepared in advance. But he took it as obvious that the aim of such a debate was to organize support for the Party's decisions. Complaining about the formalities, he wrote:

One gets the impression that aktiv meetings are held in our borough not in order to mobilize Communists for the carrying out of Party decisions but merely as a matter of form, i.e., that can be reported to the city Party committee that meetings have been held.⁶⁹

With this and similar aims in mind, many wide discussions were organized in the Soviet Union. Five Year Plans, for example, were always openly discussed. But it is quite clear from the Soviet press that the top elite was interested in mobilization of the popular support to implement those Plans. The constitution of 1936 was also widely debated before it was approved, again with a similar purpose. In 1957 Khrushchev published his theses on government (ministers) and economic (establishment of economic councils) reorganization with the aim "to hold a nationwide discussion of this question so that a widespread exchange of opinions and a broad consideration of available experience may be used as a basis for working out the most practical forms of administra-

⁶⁹Pravda, August 2, 1958.

tion of the country's national economy."⁷⁰

In the last case the top elite, evidently in addition to mobilizing the support for its economic reorganization, wished to benefit from the experience of the lower Party, state, and professional elites.

In general, wide public discussions were always positive, i.e., directed not at the merit of a given decision or program of the top elite with the possibility to criticize them but rather at finding the best ways to implement them.

Criticism and self-criticism is a part of organized discussions. Their official aim is to correct mistakes, inefficiencies, or abuse of power of the Party members in the performance of their duties or functions. In the above quoted resolution "On the Party Unity" of 1921, Lenin stated that criticism was to be allowed only in cases related to the work of the Party, and its aim was to correct the errors in program and practice.⁷¹ Party Rules of 1952 and 1961, in somewhat different words but with the same content and aim, declared that the Party members have the duty "to develop self-criticism and criticism, boldly to lay bare shortcomings and strive for their elimination."⁷²

But perhaps the clearest expression of the aim of criticism is found in the book by the two Soviet authors. In reference to the entire Soviet people they write:

Criticism is one of the basic manifestations of freedom of speech in the U.S.S.R. At their meetings

⁷⁰Pravda, March 30, 1957.

⁷¹V. I. Lenin, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers Co. Inc., 1937), Vol. IX, pp. 131-134.

⁷²Triska, op. cit., p. 158.

and in the press the citizens of the socialist state reveal shortcomings and errors in the work of undertakings, state and other bodies. Under the guidance of the Communist Party, the working people of the U.S.S.R. are combatting harmful and dangerous manifestations of arrogance, ostentation and complacency; along with shortcomings and errors in work, they disclose negative features in the life of society and make suggestions concerning the ways and means in which they can be eliminated.⁷³

Criticism and self-criticism in the Soviet Union has been a daily occurrence. This can be seen from the Soviet press which has been replete with letters of complaint and criticism. Alex Inkeles and H. Kent Geiger made a study of almost three thousand such letters from nine different newspapers of 1947 representing various geographic regions. These letters revealed that the complaint and criticism were directed at individuals and Party or economic institutions in the areas of housing, consumer goods, production, abuse of power, and others.⁷⁴ It is important for this discussion to call attention to a letter in which the author accused a member of the Orgbureau in the Turkmen Republic that he had abused his powers by refusing to hire invalids of World War II and had, instead, hired his own friends. When this was confirmed by other officials, he was released from his post.⁷⁵

The characteristic feature of criticism and self-criticism is, as the two authors rightly point out, that

⁷³A. Denisov and M. Kirichenko, Soviet State Law (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1960), p. 333.

⁷⁴Alex Inkeles, Social Change in Soviet Russia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 291-306.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 307.

they emanate from above rather than from below. The higher elites either initiate criticism of lower elites or allow the lower elites or Party members to criticize individuals occupying positions on higher Party levels. When the Soviet press publishes critical letters it means in effect that the higher elites allowed these letters to appear in the press. Since the late 1920's, the top elite, as well as its decisions and works, have not been an object of public criticism. But it is this elite that is at complete liberty to criticize all lower elites. A reflection of this can be seen from the following quotations. At the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934, Lazar Kaganovich remarked:

Formal paper measures are useless; you receive a report, scribble an order, and finished. Sometimes an order from above is received, it is slightly paraphrased and sent down to the next link, and they send it down still lower. And so the red tape is spun out.

Stalin: And then the document is put in the file.

Kaganovich: Quite right, and then the document is put in the files.⁷⁶

Criticism of the work of the top elite, however, after Stalin had crushed his opposition, was never heard at the Party Congresses, in the press, or in other public form.

After the death of Stalin, the top elite, although less rigorous and different in its form and style of work, did not allow itself to be criticized either. Pravda in 1956, for example, sharply attacked some Party members who

⁷⁶Quoted in Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 203.

tried to use criticism in order to make "slandorous speeches directed against Party policy and its Leninist foundations." The paper called those critics "rotten elements" who attempted "to cast doubt on the correctness of the Party policy."

In a more recent time at least two voices were heard among the leading Party members on the question of criticism-- either of top Party organs or top elite. One of them was that of Vasilii M. Zasorin, former Second Secretary of the Komsomol in Estonia and a member of the Central Committee Department for the Union Republics. In 1969 he published an article in Partiinaiia Zhizn in which, in a rather esoteric form, he criticized the top elite. The author called for a need to strengthen and to improve collective leadership which he identified with the Party Congresses and the Central Committee. In his article he wrote:

Lenin attributed exceptional importance to the sovereignty of the Central Committee, to its ability 'not only to advise and persuade . . . but really to direct the orchestra,' i.e., to implement the Party's policy, the recruitment of cadres, and the checking on execution. . . . V. I. Lenin took unflinching care that the Central Committee be, in fact, the embodiment of collective leadership.⁷⁷

He further stated that only congress had the right to "determine the Party line on questions of domestic and foreign policy." He also wrote that in order to strengthen collective leadership, All-Union Party Conferences should be convened as it is provided for by the Party Rules. It appears from these and several other passages that he is trying to

⁷⁷ Partiinaiia Zhizn, No. 3 (February, 1969), 13. Other quotations are taken from the same page.

say that it is not the Politbureau (as it is in practice) but the Central Committee, Party conferences and congresses that should determine the Party's policy.

Another voice was that of Evgenii I. Bugaev. Until 1966 he was chief editor of Partiinaiia Zhizn and a member of the Central Auditing Commission. In 1966 he published an article of the same Zadorin which could have been interpreted as being critical of Brezhnev. Three months after publication of the article, Bugaev was dismissed as chief editor and not reelected to the Auditing Commission at the Party Congress in 1966.⁷⁸ In 1968 he managed to publish a booklet in which, among other things, he expressed the view in the same esoteric form that criticism should be applied not only to the local but to the central Party organs as well. Apparently in order to protect himself and, at the same time, to make his views more convincing under the Soviet system, the author frequently quotes either Lenin or documents drafted by him or with his consent.

In a direct reference to criticism of the central Party bodies he quotes a resolution passed by the Party Conference in 1920 which reads as follows:

It is necessary in the internal life of the Party to implement broader criticism of the local as well as of the central institutions of the Party. The Central Committee is to be given the task of indicating by circular letter the means of broadening inner-party criticism at general meetings.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ This information is taken from Christian Duevel, Radio Liberty Dispatch (February 24, 1969), 4-5. The author gives a very good analysis of Zadorin and Bugaev views.

⁷⁹ Evgenii I. Bugaev, O Nekotorykh Zakonomernostiakh Razvitiia KPSS (Moskva: Izdatelstvo "Znanie," 1968), p. 35.

The aim of such a criticism, in his view, was to correct the mistakes of the Party. In this connection he wrote:

[A] direct appeal by the Party to its members, to the whole people, with an explanation of some of the mistakes committed, with an indication of the concrete way for their correction, is a sign of the vital force and invincibility of the Party.⁸⁰

It is possible that there were more such or similar voices heard in the Soviet Union among the Party's leading personnel. But there is no indication that the top elite was willing to submit itself to public criticism.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 37.

CHAPTER III

FUNCTIONAL DIFFERENTIATION OF THE PARTY'S ELITE

The Party Rules and practices discussed in the previous chapter were intended to illustrate the hierarchical structure of the elite in the Party. But the elite at each level is also functionally differentiated. This is important to note because functions are associated with positions and powers, and they in turn can serve as a criterion for establishing a more powerful group within the elite at each level. By applying this criterion to the elite on the national level, we can determine which group constitutes the top elite. As is commonly known, the members of the elite at each level belong to one or more Party organs which perform different functions. These functions, however, are not equal in terms of power, for some of them carry more weight in the operation of the Party than others. Thus, in the Party practice the function of making decisions is more important than, for example, the function of ratification of these decisions. Hence the groups belonging to the decision-making organs are more powerful than the groups belonging to the ratification organs.

It should be recognized at the outset, however, that it is not easy to divide functionally the elite at each level. The problem lies in the fact that the functions of the Party organs at each level, with a few exceptions, have never been

clearly formulated or firmly delineated. As an example it can be mentioned that the Party congresses on the national and union republican levels, and the conferences on all other levels as well as the general meetings of the Party members at the bottom were given several functions to perform, such as electing some Party organs, passing on resolutions, approving reports of the secretaries, and a few others. Beyond that the Statutes have never been clear. They declared that the congresses on the national level were "the supreme organs" of the Party, and the conferences on all other levels were "the highest bodies" of their respective Party units. It is implied that the first could decide any question without restriction (indeed, this was openly stated many times by the top leaders) and the latter, any question within the limit of their localities. But the problem is that the border line between the national and local questions, or between the questions of several localities has never been drawn by the basic law of the Party. In addition, the Party Statutes have been conspicuously devoid of procedures for these "organs" or "bodies" to function.

This lack of specification of functions and procedures also applies to the committees on all levels but in this case with more exceptions, at least as far as functions are concerned. For an illustration the Central Committee on the national level can be mentioned. Its functions, as stated in the Party Statutes, "to set up various Party organs" and "to appoint the editors of the central newspapers and

journals," seem to be quite clear because they are limited to specific acts performed at the plenary sessions. But the function (and power) "to direct the work of central government bodies and social organizations" is not that clear because the term "to direct" has not received a definite meaning and can be interpreted very liberally as it is, indeed, the case in the Party. It can, and in practice it does, involve action and control, but the Statutes left totally open the question of the method of action and the type of control to be used and thereby made the Central Committee unlimited in this respect. The same applies to all lower committees which were given similar general functions to perform in their localities.

But the least clearly formulated functions in the Statutes were with regard to the bureaus and the secretariats or secretaries. Until 1952 the Party Statutes declared that all the committees (below the national level) elect praesidia, later called bureaus, and the secretaries to "do the daily work" for the Party. From 1934 until 1961 these latter bodies at the regional, territorial, and union republican levels were designated as "the executive organs" and on the lower levels as simply "bureaus" and "secretaries." In 1961, however, the term "executive organ" was not used in the adopted new Statute. Although these changes were made in the Statutes, no particular functions were ever mentioned with regard to these bodies.

The second problem of making functional classifications of various Party organs is due to a well-known secrecy which the Party leaders maintain with respect to the real operation of practically all of their organs. They simply do not publish records or other documents about the functioning of the bureaus and the secretaries at any level.

In spite of these, there are many evidences contained in the reports and speeches delivered at the Party congresses or in the articles or books published in the Soviet Union-- which make it possible to establish the functional differentiation of the Party organs at many levels. Some of this evidence was cited in the books published in the United States. Taking these sources into account, it is possible to distinguish between the three kinds of organs at each level of the Party pyramid: the representative-ratification organs; the deliberation-legalization organs; and the decision-making-administrative organs. The first are congresses, conferences, and the meetings of the primary Party organizations; the second are the committees on all levels; and the third are the bureaus and the secretariats, also on all levels. The first three bodies by the nature of their function are the weakest, while the last two bodies for the same reason are the most powerful in the Party structure.

This classification does not pretend to be absolute or exhaustive but on the basis of available evidence it is

believed to be the closest to the reality. Julian Towster in his tripartite division of authority calls congresses, conferences, and membership meetings "representative bodies."¹ But this designation is, apparently, based only upon their composition without due regard to their functions. Hence the designation based on composition and functional characteristics of these organs seems to be more complete. Before discussing further the nature of the functions in terms of reality, one clarification at this point is in order. There is no such thing as elites of the congresses, conferences, and Party membership meetings, for unlike the committees, bureaus, and secretaries, the assemblies are occasional, although more or less regular, events consisting of delegates from all elites elected for that particular purpose. But these organs are of interest here because of their functions and powers.

There are several reasons to claim that the representative bodies perform in reality the ratification function of the decisions made by the small and most powerful groups within the elite at each level and that they, therefore, are the weakest in the Party structure. In the first place, congresses, conferences, and the membership meetings on the lowest level are legally and practically mass gatherings. As such, they are unwieldy bodies being vulnerable to the

¹ Julian Towster, Political Power in the U.S.S.R. 1917-1947 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 136.

manipulation of the powerful groups. The selection of the delegates, drafting of resolutions, changes of policies, all these and many other items are prepared in advance by the decision-making bodies. These Party mass gatherings can only respond to the prepared materials and, as the Soviet records show, they do this always in an affirmative way.

Second, at least since 1930 and until the death of Stalin, these assemblies did not meet regularly in accordance with the requirements of the Statutes. The Party Statutes from 1907 until 1927 declared that the national congresses meet once a year; from 1927 until 1934, once in two years; from 1934 until 1952, once in three years; and since 1952, once in four years. The records of congresses, however, show that between the Sixteenth and the Seventeenth Congresses (1930-34), four years had elapsed instead of two; between the Seventeenth and the Eighteenth (1934-39), five years instead of three; and between the Eighteenth and the Nineteenth (1939-52), thirteen years instead, again, of three years. It is difficult to find in the Soviet sources records showing the irregularities of conferences on all lower levels. But here and there in the Soviet press the reader can spot at least a hint of this practice. Thus, Pravda of October 25, 1946, in an editorial, in reference to lower Party organs, stated: "One cannot be reconciled with a situation where Party organizations permit violations of the Statutes of the CPSU concerning the time intervals

and method of elections of Party organizations."² As far as the meetings of the members of the primary Party organizations are concerned, here, too, the Soviet press noted irregularities. In 1952, for example, when Stalin was still alive, the same Pravda in an editorial disapprovingly declared with regard to one district that "the Party meetings are held irregularly and extremely rarely in a number of the district's primary Party organizations."³ S. Kuzmenko, again in the same paper several months later, complained that there were cases where membership meetings of the primary Party organizations were not convened "for months."⁴ The inference one can draw from the irregular meetings of the representative bodies is that they are not the "supreme" or the "highest organs" of the Party, as they appear to be in the Statutes, for the entire Party was continuously functioning without their authorization many times and this, in effect, means that the supreme power rested some place else. After the death of Stalin they were held regularly, at least on the national level, but there are no indications that they have become more powerful.

The third and perhaps the most important indication that the Party assemblies lack real power is that the

² Quoted in Barrington Moore, Soviet Politics--Dilemma of Power (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1965), p. 249.

³ Pravda, June 30, 1952.

⁴ Pravda, August 4, 1952.

national congresses and all local conferences and Party membership meetings, at least since 1930, always discussed all issues and proposals made to them by the most powerful groups approvingly and adopted them unanimously. It has to be admitted that the process of waning of real debates from the Party congresses where the conflicting views are expressed and counter proposals are made began much earlier. Edward H. Carr, a careful student of the Soviet Union during its formative years, writes about this as follows:

The seventh party congress of March 1918, which voted for the ratification of Brest-Litovsk, was the last to decide a vital issue of policy by a majority vote. The next few congresses continued to debate crucial issues and witnessed on occasion sharp exchanges of opinion: this was particularly true of the twelfth congress of 1923--the first since the October revolution at which Lenin was not present. But even when discussions took place on the floor of the congress, the real decisions were reached elsewhere.⁵

The author states that these decisions were made first in the Central Committee and later in the "smaller and more effective organs," apparently meaning the Politbureau, the Orgbureau, and the Secretariat. By 1930, the process of elimination of real debates from the congresses was completed by the elimination of all opposition. At the Sixteenth Party Congress of that year, Stalin, with a tone of satisfaction, declared

that the Sixteenth Congress is one of the few Congresses in our Party at which there is no longer an organized and well-defined opposition capable of putting forward its own particular policy as

⁵E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923 (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1950), Vol. I, pp. 199-200.

against the general policy of the Party.⁶

It is very probable that it took more than one year to introduce this practice of congresses to the corresponding bodies on the lower levels. It is also possible that in spite of this method, the debates at some localities, particularly far away from the metropolitan centers, were lively.

To complete the picture of the representative bodies, a few more words should be added. From the records of the national congresses and from the Soviet press it appears that they were convened by the secretaries in the name of their respective committees. The secretaries usually opened the congresses and conferences, and, as a matter of statutory obligation, read the reports of the work of the entire committees. Other dignitaries of the top elite and on the lower level members of the most powerful group also read the reports or delivered important speeches.⁷ These leaders, as a matter of rule, always announced in various forms new goals (collectivization, economic plans) or new policies, or, in the case of the lower elite, interpreted these policies for the delegates and through them for the entire Party membership.

⁶J. Stalin, Political Report to the Sixteenth Party Congress of the Russian Communist Party (New York: Workers' Library Publishers, 1930), p. 175.

⁷After the October revolution until 1923 Lenin always opened the Party congresses. After that time it was Secretary General Stalin. Occasionally, however, other top leaders, such as Rykov and Molotov, performed this function. In 1956, 1959, and 1961 it was Khrushchev, and in 1966 and 1971 Brezhnev, both First Secretaries, who opened the Party congresses.

In addition, the secretaries (with their staffs) prepared agenda, resolutions, as well as all kinds of proposals to be adopted by the congresses or conferences. As a result, the Party assemblies played a submissive role. They discussed all the ideas and materials presented to them affirmatively and eventually adopted them unanimously. Merle Fainsod, in reference to the national congresses, calls this practice "ratification."⁸ Indeed, this "ratification" has become the real function of congresses, conferences, and the meetings of the members of the primary Party organizations. This ratification, however, is not a practice for its own sake. It legitimizes the elites' goals, policies, ideology, and the elites themselves.⁹

The Committees

From their operations, the committees on all levels appear to be more powerful than congresses, conferences, and general meetings of the Party members but at the same time less powerful than the bureaus and the secretariats, although formally the case is just the reverse.¹⁰ There are several reasons for making such a contention. First of all, unlike congresses and conferences, the committees are much smaller bodies. All

⁸ Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 187.

⁹ In addition to the works of several authors already cited in this chapter, a good discussion of Party congresses can be found in Vernon V. Aspaturian, "The Soviet Union," in Roy C. Macridis and Robert E. Ward (eds.), Modern Political Systems: Europe (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1968), pp. 533-536.

¹⁰ The Central Committee is excluded from this discussion. Since it is one of the Party's central organs and the main concern of this chapter is the top elite, it will be discussed later separately.

Party Statutes made no provision about their size, except for the Statutes of 1934 which stipulated that the cities, rural districts, and primary organizations elect the committees of eleven members. On the national level, the same Statutes provided that the size of the Central Committee was to be determined by the congresses. Similarly, the Statutes of 1961 stated that the size of the committees of the (large) primary Party organizations was to be decided by the general meetings of the members or conferences. Most probably, these regulations served as a model for all other Party units to follow. In any case, the size of the committees on all levels has been very small in comparison with the size of their respective "supreme" organs. Derek J. R. Scott writes that "in some of the larger towns or districts" the size of the committees "seems to have been fairly uniform of forty-five to fifty; possibly in rural districts they would be rather smaller."¹¹ In the Soviet press and journals from time to time appear articles depicting the work of the lower Party organizations which occasionally also reveal the size of the committee in a particular case. Thus, L. Tanakov, a district Party official responsible for organizational section, wrote in 1968 that the committee of the Kamerovo district, which had about 300 primary Party organizations, consisted of 77 members and 17 candidates.¹² The general rule seems to be that the

¹¹Derek J. R. Scott, Russian Political Institutions (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 139.

¹²L. Tanakov, "Kak Rabotayesh Chlen Raikoma?" Partiinaiia Zhizn, No. 24 (December, 1968), p. 37.

larger the organization, the larger the committee it elects and vice versa.

It is important to add that the members of the committees are much more cohesive than the delegates to the congresses and conferences because the latter consist of people from all levels of the Party elite and thereby greatly differ in power and status. The committees usually consist of the secretaries and some members of their staff, government officials, representatives of the police, trade unions, youth organizations, cultural and educational organizations at a given level as well as important Party officials from the lower organizations.¹³ Thus, the members of the committees are official persons, most of them on the same level, who perform various executive and administrative functions (and some of them decision-making functions as well) in their respective organizations. They obviously differ in terms of function, experience, status, and power but this difference is not as great as, for example, between the first secretary of a district and the first secretary of a union republic who may both be delegates to the republican congress. Therefore, the small size of the committees and a high degree of cohesiveness of their members make the committees more unified, better organized, and more efficient than the congresses and conferences.

¹³The statement about the group composition of the committees from the republican to the district level can be found, for example, in "KPSS v Tsifrakh," Partiinaiia Zhizn, No. 1 (January, 1962), p. 53. The same source also revealed the group composition of the city and district committees in the entire country for 1961 in terms of percentages.

In addition, the committees have always been required to meet more frequently than their representative bodies. Thus, since 1952 the committees of the union republics, territories, and regions were required to meet once every four months while their assemblies once every two years, except that the republics which had regions could convene their congresses once every four years. The area, city, and district committees were obliged to meet once in three months but their respective conferences between 1952 and 1961 once a year and since 1961 once in two years.¹⁴ Prior to that time these meetings were supposed to be held more frequently. In general, since 1919 the intervals between these meetings or plenary sessions were gradually extended. These, comparatively speaking, frequent meetings of the committees means that they had more opportunities to exercise their powers than had the congresses and conferences. As a result the committees became more powerful than their respective representative bodies.

However, the committees are not as powerful as their functions on the paper indicate simply because they do not perform them fully and independently. The Statutes of 1952 and 1961, for example, provided that the republican, territorial, and regional committees "direct the activities of area, city, and district Party organizations, inspect their work and regularly hear reports of area, city, and district Party committees." The area, city, and district committee,

¹⁴Articles 41, 44, 52 of the 1952 Rules and Articles 44, 46, 51 of the 1961 Rules in Jan Triska, Soviet Communism: Programs and Rules (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1962), pp. 180, 182, 184.

in turn, "direct" the work of the primary organizations and keep "a register of Communists." It is very easy for the committees on a higher level to hear the reports from the lower because this could be a single event taking place at the meetings of the former. But it is very difficult for the higher committees to direct and inspect the work of the lower Party units. A "direction" can mean not only issuing instructions but also selecting personnel to various offices, keeping daily contact with them, prescribing the methods of work, and doing many other duties. Whatever its specific meaning, both direction and inspection are of the executive-administrative nature and, therefore, have to be performed on a daily basis. The committees, however, work through their plenary sessions which meet rather infrequently. No doubt, the functions of directing and inspecting are performed with great zeal, but it is done by the secretaries, their apparatuses, or the bureaus rather than the committees. Of course, formally the secretaries and the bureaus are organs of the committees. Therefore, following the formal approach, it can be said that whatever they do, it means the committees are doing it. The realistic approach which coincides with the practice in the Party leads to a different conclusion. Both bureaus and the secretariats are separate institutions and whatever they do they take credit for it. As far as the editors of the newspapers, the chairmen of various commissions and departments are concerned, the Statutes declared that the committees only confirm them. Apparently, they are proposed by the secretaries

with the approval, at least in some cases, of the higher organs.

Finally, to this can be added the practice that the secretaries convene the plenary sessions of the committees, prepare the agenda and, with their staffs, also the resolutions, enactments, and other materials for discussion and their eventual adoption. The following quotation throws some light on this practice. F. Iakovlev, after the death of Stalin, published an article "Collective Leadership--The Highest Principle of Party Leadership" in Kommunist of July 1953, in which he wrote (of course disapprovingly):

Preparation for a plenum often is conducted only by the forces of the service apparatus of the Party organ--sectors and departments--and members of the Party committee are not attracted to this business; not infrequently it is determined ahead of time who should speak at the plenum; employees of the apparatus, on instructions of the secretariat of the committee, commission separate workers to prepare the text of a speech on this or that question. At the plenum one hears reports in which achievements and successes are glorified and shortcomings and mistakes are smoothed over.¹⁵

No doubt, the author referred to this method that existed not only in 1953 but also during the entire period of Stalinism. The significance of this revelation for the present discussion is that it indicates the passive and inferior role of the committees as compared with the role of the secretaries. It is quite probable that since 1953 this was changed somewhat in favor of the committees. But it is doubtful that the powers of the secretaries were significantly diminished because the initiative of the work of

¹⁵ Quoted in Howard R. Swearer, The Politics of Succession in the U.S.S.R. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964), p. 102.

the committees remained in their hands as before. One of the indications of the modest changes can be found in an article published in 1968 by the secretary of the Party committee of a large factory. With an unconcealed pride, the author described how he, together with a few other committee members (probably from his staff), personally visited the work on a project of electrification of the railroad line in one area which was behind schedule. On the basis of their experience, they drafted a preliminary enactment to improve the work which they then distributed among all members of the committee before the plenary session took place. As a result, a lively discussion developed at the session and the enactment was adopted with some changes. The author concluded that "such an approach to the preparation of the questions for the meeting of the Party committee has become a habit with us."¹⁶

This and other similar statements, as well as the fact that the article was published in one of the main organs of the Party, suggests that the described method was intended to serve as an example for other committees to follow. If so, it obviously means that it was not practiced in the Party work. But it should be emphasized that even in the case of this "new" method, the role of the secretaries still remains dominant. This, undoubtedly, has to be so because the committees, as all other organizations of this kind everywhere,

¹⁶F. Dorynovskii, "Resheniia i yikh Vypolneniie," Partiinaiia Zhizn, No. 17 (September 1967), p. 41.

in order to work at all have to have leaders. But in the context of the entire Party system this fact has a specific meaning: it limits the power of the committees and increases that of the secretaries.

This discussion leads us to restate at this point that the real and essential functions of the committees from the republican down to the lowest level are deliberations of issues before them and the legalization of the work of the bureaus, the secretaries, and the lower Party units in each case. From the above discussion it is apparent that the committees are not operational institutions as are the secretariats and bureaus. They rather resemble the legislative bodies in Western countries. Like the latter, they work, as was stated earlier, through their meetings or plenary sessions where they debate all kinds of issues and adopt resolutions. There is no legal limitation on the number and kind of topics to be discussed. They come from above, from below, or originate in their own localities. They can deal with economy, government, party, culture, ideology, labor, youth, or with any other topic. Barrington Moore quotes from Pravda an account of one plenary session which, in his evaluation, is typical. Accordingly, the plenum of the Moscow region committee which took place on June 23, 1943 discussed the following topics: "the preparation for sowing and harvesting; the degree of fulfillment of the government plan for livestock . . .; the work of the city and district committee in accepting new

members during the first five months of 1943."¹⁷

Another example can be taken from a more recent time. According to the Party journal, between June and September of 1968 more than 75 Party committees of the union republics, territories, and regions discussed 26 topics. They included the preparation for the celebration of the centennial birth of Lenin, the increasing role of the intelligentsia in the ideological work, the fulfilling of the decisions of the 23rd Party Congress, the increase of atheistic education of the people, and other matters.¹⁸

Not much has been revealed about the process of debates at the plenary sessions. But in accordance with the Party's emphasis on discipline and the rule that the decisions of higher bodies are binding on the lower, the policies and decisions coming from above are not challenged, but discussed in terms of their implementation. The celebration of the centennial of Lenin's birth, for example, was decided by the Central Committee plenum. This decision was apparently conveyed to the lower Party units and, as the quotation above showed, within a few months it was discussed affirmatively by all republican, territorial, and a number of regional committees. In general, the discussion of the decisions from above is focused upon finding the best method and the most appropriate means to implement them. The Party organs, carrying reports on the Party work, are replete with such

¹⁷Moore, op. cit., pp. 269-270.

¹⁸Partiinaiia Zhizn, No. 20 (October, 1968), p. 58.

information, although in a summary form.

The committees most probably have more latitude of freedom to discuss their own local problems or those coming from below because in this case, being superior themselves, they can also look into the merit of the local problem, or a decision made by the lower units. But even in this case it has to be done within the spirit of the general policies of the top elite. Otherwise such decisions will be nullified. Moore, based on the Party organ Partiinoye Stroitelstvo of 1940, summarizes this practice as follows:

The Party Central Committee frequently annuls decisions of subordinate units, reprimands them, and directs them to reconsider questions that in its opinion have been improperly handled.¹⁹

Similar cases have been reported in Partiinaya Zhizn in the 1950's and 1960's. The controlling power of the Central Committee over all other committees has been recognized from its inception. The same power was given to all committees in their relations with each lower committee.

Within these limits, however, there is still plenty of room for debates. Indeed, there is a necessity for them. The Party committees bear the formal responsibility before the public and the higher Party authorities for the functioning of their localities in all spheres of social life. It should also be recalled that the committees consist of leaders and activists of the Party, government, and other public organizations. These two factors make it inevitable that they discuss all problems carefully and thoughtfully, although the

¹⁹ Moore, op. cit., p. 270.

discussion can be affirmative. This kind of discussion can be called deliberation and its purpose, undoubtedly, is to make an impression that the elective bodies are working in a democratic manner.

The legalization function is a complementary to the deliberation function. It refers to the formal approval by the plenums of the higher committees of the decisions reached by the lower, and to the approval by the committees of the decisions reached by the bureaus and secretaries at each level. In the first case, the consulted Party organs since 1930 have been (as for the Soviet sources) replete with reports or information about the approval (or nullification) of the decisions or activities of the lower committees by the higher.²⁰

There is much less information, however, about the legalization of the bureaus' decisions, particularly on the intermediary levels. On the national level and, to a lesser degree, on the lowest level, the Soviet sources have revealed a number of such cases. Thus, for example, in 1928 the plenum of the Central Committee adopted a resolution which "approved the decision of the Politbureau" on the financing of the technical education and the improvement of students' living conditions.²¹ The Soviet source published after the death of Stalin, in reference to the bureaus of the primary Party organizations, stated indirectly that the question

²⁰ These organs are: Partiinoe Stroitelstvo and Partiinaiia Zhizn.

²¹ KPSS v Rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. II, 7th ed. (1954), p. 524.

decided by the bureau can be "put for the discussion at the higher organ--the general meeting of the communists."²² If these two quotations can serve as an example, there should be no doubt that the committees at all other levels also legalize, at least occasionally, the decisions of their bureaus.

As far as the secretaries are concerned, their decisions, as has already been noted, such as proposals expressed in their speeches at the plenary sessions, or resolutions prepared in advance, or in any other form, are always approved. This is partly indicated in an indirect way in the earlier quoted article by Iakovlev. Criticizing the method of adopting decisions by the meetings of the committees by 1953, and obviously before, the author wrote in part as follows:

One usually observes a contradiction of the role of Party committees where the secretaries of the Party committees do not learn the organizational principles of our Party, permit themselves to command, to administer, forgetting about the fact that the vicious method of one man decision-making inevitably leads to grave mistakes, to divorce from the masses and to disregard of the interests of the working people. In such cases a committee plenary session is held only as a formality in order to report to the superior organ that the requirements of the statute have been observed.²³

In a similar way, a few months earlier (April, 1953),

²²Voprosy Partiinoi Raboty (Moskva: Gossudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1959), p. 332. This is a compilation of articles from Partiinaia Zhizn for the years 1954 to 1958 dealing exclusively with the organizational work of the Party in a form of official advice. Henceforth this work will be identified only by its title.

²³Quoted in Swearer, op. cit., p. 102.

L. Slepov in an article in Pravda wrote:

The principle of collectivity in work means, above all, that decisions adopted by Party committees on all cardinal questions are the fruit of collective discussion. No matter how experienced leaders /secretaries/ may be, no matter what their knowledge and ability, they do not possess and they cannot replace the initiative and experience of a whole collective.²⁴

The method of approving or adopting the decisions of the secretaries, or for that matter of the bureaus, is not important for this discussion because whether these debates are limited or unlimited, it still remains the function of the committees to approve them.

The Bureaus

The bureaus and the secretariats or secretaries on all levels are classified here as the decision-making and administrative organs, and due to these functions they are considered to be the most powerful organs in the entire Party structure. Hence the members of these organs constitute the most powerful groups within the Party elite at each level, and the top elite on the national level. While the decision-making function applies to both, the administrative function applies to the secretariats for the reason that they head the Party apparatus or bureaucracy at each level. By administration it is meant here, in general, the management of the Party affairs and the personnel on a daily basis. It involves the execution of their own decisions as well as those coming from the higher authorities, and the direction and control of the

²⁴Pravda, April 16, 1953.

work of the bureaucracy and the Party members in general.

It should be re-emphasized that the inner workings of both organs still remain in many respects secret. But from what has been published so far (and seen by this writer), it appears that the bureaus, in contrast to the Statutes, are more powerful than the committees but weaker than the secretariats. This is reflected, first of all, in their composition both in a quantitative and qualitative sense. The bureaus are small bodies consisting of only prime leaders of the Party, government, and other organizations at a given level. Between 1919 and 1922 the bureaus below the national level were called praesidia and since then until now, "the bureaus." In the primary Party organizations, however, they have always been called "bureaus." In 1919, the Party Statute provided that the regional committees elect praesidia of three Party members "for the current work "; gubernia, of no less than five; and uezd, of three members. The volost committees did not elect the praesidia but acted as such themselves. The primary organizations (cells) elected bureaus, but their numerical composition was not specified by the Statutes.²⁵ In 1922 the bureaus of the regional committees were increased to five members, but the bureaus of all other Party units remained the same as in 1919. The Statute of 1922, however, provided for the first time that the primary organizations elect their bureaus of three

²⁵KPPS v Rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. I, 7th ed. (1954), pp. 464-467.

Party members.²⁶ With the increase of the Party members and the expansion of its work in the succeeding years, the bureaus were enlarged. Thus, by 1939 the Statute declared that the bureaus of the union republics, territories, and regions were to consist of eleven members, those of areas up to nine, cities and districts between seven and nine, and of the primary organizations with more than fifteen members up to eleven.²⁷ These provisions were repeated in the Statute of 1952 but dropped altogether in 1961, perhaps in order to give the Central Committee (or more accurately, the Secretariat) a legal freedom to decide how large the bureau in each case should be. It is possible, therefore, that the larger Party units have larger bureaus but it is doubtful that they were increased in any particular case to more than a dozen.

It is rather difficult to establish on the basis of the consulted Soviet sources who were the members of these bureaus. However, from the Party organs dealing with all kinds of organizational problems it is clear that since the early time after the revolution the secretaries have always been members of the bureaus.²⁸ In 1952 this practice was made legal by the Statute which provided that each committee

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 659-662.

²⁷ KPSS v Rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. III, 7th ed. (1954), pp. 389-393.

²⁸ One Party secretary, for example, in his article in 1947 called himself "a secretary of the bureau" and indirectly stated that his deputies were also members of the same bureau. I. Meshkov, "O Zamestiteli Sekretaria Partorganizatsii," Partiinaiia Zhizn, No. 1 (January, 1947), p. 74.

elect bureaus "including the secretaries." As far as other members of the bureaus are concerned, Merle Fainsod and Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov write, although without indicating their sources of information, that the bureaus, at least on the regional, city, and district levels, consist, in addition to the secretaries, of the heads of the local governments, heads of various important departments or sections within the apparatus, such as propaganda, agriculture, and others, the public prosecutor, chairmen of large production concerns, and, under Stalin, the chief of the secret police, and other local leaders.²⁹ If this is true, and there is no reason to doubt it, then the bureaus consist of all top leaders in a given locality.

The bureaus usually meet, or rather should meet according to Avtorkhanov, once a week,³⁰ but it is most probable that they meet on an ad hoc basis depending in many cases upon the secretaries who convene their meetings. There are many indications in the Soviet sources, as will be seen later, that not all bureaus met regularly both prior to the death of Stalin and afterwards. This, however, was criticized as an improper practice.

The functions of the bureaus were never formulated in the Party Statutes or resolutions. The Statutes since 1919

²⁹Fainsod, op. cit., pp. 191-193. A. Avtorkhanov, The Communist Party Apparatus (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 135, 145, 161.

³⁰Ibid., p. 161. In the consulted sources one case was found where the city bureau member, N. Novikov, complaining about too long meetings, revealed that "The meetings of the Kazan city committee bureau were held every Monday." Partiinaiia Zhizn, No. 5 (March, 1947), p. 34.

only stated that the bureaus, as was already noted, were to be elected by their respective committees to do "the current work" of the Party. In 1934 the bureaus, in addition, were termed by the Statute as being "the executive organs" of the committees, but in 1952 both phrases were dropped from the Statute with respect to the area, city, and district bureaus and in 1961 with respect to the regional, territorial, and union republican bureaus. The bureaus of the primary organizations were never called "the executive organs," but from 1919 until the present day they were elected to do "the current work" of the Party. Undoubtedly, these changes had their meanings, particularly the last one, for the bureaus, in effect, became to act as "committees" between the plenary sessions of the real committees. Thus, the power and status of the bureaus were legally enhanced. The Party publication covering the years between 1954 and 1958 described the bureaus as follows:

The bureau is the executive organ of the Party committee: district, city, region, and others. In the intervals between the plenums of the committees the bureau directs the entire activity of the Party organization, ensures the practical execution of the directives of higher Party organs, issues instructions on the important questions of economic, cultural, and Party construction, selects and confirms a definite group of workers, and examines and decides the personal affairs of the communists.³¹

There are many indications in the Party organs, as will be shown shortly, that the bureaus indeed perform many of the above enumerated functions. But the same indications make it

³¹Voprosy Partiinoi Raboty (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1959), p. 374. Henceforth only the title will be identified.

difficult to believe that the bureaus really were, at least since the 1930's, "the executive organs of the committees." The term "executive" usually means, even in the context of the above quotation, to give effect or to put into practice the decisions made by the legislative or superior organs. From the earlier discussion, however, it is evident that the committees do not really make decisions. They receive them both from the higher authorities and from the secretaries and the bureaus at their respective levels. Those decisions that come from above, the committees discuss only in terms of their implementation, and those that come from the secretaries or the bureau at their own level they discuss affirmatively and then formally approve them. Under these circumstances, the bureaus cannot be the executive organs of the committees because the latter are, in the final analysis, the legal instrumentalities of the former. The bureaus, however, have a very strict obligation to ensure the execution of the directives coming from the higher Party organs. But the same obligation applies to all other Party organs including, in a special way, the conferences. Therefore, it can be said that all lower Party organs are the executive bodies of the higher.

The bureaus work through their meetings where they make decisions. These decisions, as the quoted Party source states with regard to the primary organizations but which equally applies to all other Party units, are "obligatory for the members of the bureau (regardless what position this or that member of the bureau took during the debate on a given question)

as well as for the rest of the communists in the Party organization."³² Since the functions of the bureaus have never been defined or limited, at least publicly, they discussed and decided all kinds of questions, such as Party operation, personnel, economic and cultural life, government operation, and many others. In addition, the bureaus were occasionally empowered by the top elite to decide, or participate in the decision of specific questions such as the confirmation of the expulsion of the members from the Party during the great purges in the 1930's. All these can be seen from the scattered information published, for example, in Partiinoe Stroitelstvo and particularly in its successor Partiinaiia Zhizn. The latter, in addition to frequent articles of informational character, began to publish in 1947 "the Party chronicle" devoted entirely to the organizational problems of the Party.

In order to exemplify the scope of the decision-making powers of the bureaus on various levels, several cases can be cited from these sources. Thus, in 1930, in connection with the abolition of the okruzs and the transfer of their functions to the raions, I. Gruskin, a member of the Kursk district bureau, wrote:

At the first meeting of the bureau of the (Kursk) district committee, nine important questions were decided, such as the general and material situation of the teachers, and others.³³

³² Ibid., p. 332.

³³ Partiinoe Stroitelstvo, No. 21 (November, 1930), p. 33.

In 1947, N. Novikov, a bureau member of the Kazan city committee, wrote that at one meeting of his bureau five questions were discussed: the report of the work of the district committee, the election to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic, political work among the masses, the fulfillment of the scientific-research plan by the Kazan University, and the communication in the city.³⁴

With regard to the Party organizational work, a member of the bureau of the Orlovsk city committee, A. Sokolov, wrote, for example, that in February 1931 his bureau had decided "to establish at each state and large collective farms, five village committees" to control the fulfillment of the city committee's decisions.³⁵ The earlier quoted Party publication covering the years between 1954 and 1958 states that the secretaries on the lowest level are approved by the bureaus on the next level. It states:

In the practical work of the Party an order has developed that the secretaries of the primary Party organizations are approved by the bureaus of the district or city committees. . . . The approval of a secretary by the district committee bureau is not a formality. It presupposes that the bureau analyses and decides the question in reality and not reducing it to formality.³⁶

The latter part of this quotation, contrary to its intention, can create a suspicion that this confirmation really is

³⁴Partiinaiia Zhizn, No. 5 (March 5, 1947), p. 34.

³⁵Partiinoe Stroitelstvo, No. 8 (April, 1931), p. 21.

³⁶Voprosy Partiinoi Raboty, p. 362.

a formality because the same secretaries can also be approved by still higher authorities beforehand. Nevertheless, the city and the district bureaus still play their role in the process of confirmation of the secretaries on the lowest level.

In 1936, during the purges in the Party, the Central Committee issued an instruction that the bureaus of the union republics, territories, and regions "confirm the results of the exchange of the Party documents in each district and city Party organization separately."³⁷ There are cases reported in the cited Party organ of 1936 which indicated that this "confirmation" took the form of hearing the appeals in some cases from the members who were expelled from the Party.

The bureaus have also examined the work of the lower Party units and made decisions in that respect. In 1947, for example, the bureau of Stalin's regional committee in the Ukrainian Republic, after a discussion, decided to express its opinion that the city committee of Chistiakovsk had "insufficiently directed the work of the Party groups in the shafts" and instructed the committee to change its policy of work aiming at improving it.³⁸ In 1960 the bureau of the regional committee of Kamerovsk rejected the decision of the district Party committee to fire a Party member from her work in the hospital for her criticism of the district Party leadership.³⁹ Since the death of Stalin, many similar cases

³⁷Partiinoe Stroitelstvo, No. 11 (June, 1936), pp. 42-43.

³⁸Partiinaiia Zhizn, No. 7 (April, 1947), p. 49.

³⁹Loc. cit., No. 1 (January, 1960), p. 80.

have been reported in the Soviet press.

The cultural and political (ideological) questions were also the subjects of the bureaus' decisions. In 1947, for instance, the bureau of the Kursk regional committee expressed its dissatisfaction with "the political and cultural work in the center of the Lgovskii district--the city of Lgovsk" and, accordingly, issued an enactment obliging the district leadership to improve it.⁴⁰ In the same year the bureau of the Leningrad city committee, after hearing the report, "decided to enhance the ideological and practical work" of the Party in one of the shops of Leningrad.⁴¹ There are many cases of this nature reported in the Party organs, particularly since 1953.

There are cases reported in the Party publications showing that the bureaus have also decided on economic questions, of course, within the scope of the general plan and policy of the highest Party authorities. It was already mentioned that the bureau of the Kazan city committee, among five questions, discussed the city communication problem. A few other examples can be added. In 1930, D. Alexandrov, describing the system of work of the Party in the Moscow electric factory, wrote that the bureau of the primary Party organization appointed, as a matter of rule, the leaders of

⁴⁰Loc. cit., No. 7 (April, 1947), p. 49.

⁴¹Ibid.

the working sections such as economic, professional, mass-culture, and others. Each leader was obliged to prepare a monthly plan for his section. The bureau then approved these plans and afterwards controlled their fulfillment "point-by-point."⁴² Another example refers to the regional bureau. In 1954 the bureau of the Smolensk region, after the control of the work of the Kardymovskii district, concluded that the district Party had not fulfilled the agricultural plan and the corresponding decisions of the Party and government. Therefore, the bureau adopted a decision pointing to the specific measures to be taken by the district Party to fulfill its plan in agriculture.⁴³ A number of similar cases can be found in the cited journal in the past as well as in most recent years. In 1968, for example, the bureau of the Voronezh city committee, being dissatisfied with the increase of the salary of the engineers and the highest technical personnel in the city factories, decided that for the reason of maintaining a high morale and for encouraging the improvement of the qualifications, the salary of the middle technicians should be raised instead.⁴⁴

Finally, there are examples which show that the bureaus passed their judgments and made the decisions with regard to

⁴²Partiinoe Stroitelstvo, No. 3-4 (April, 1930), pp. 64 and 66.

⁴³Partiinaiia Zhizn, No. 14 (October, 1954), p. 80.

⁴⁴Loc. cit., No. 21 (November, 1968), pp. 65-66.

the local government. In 1947, for instance, the bureau of the Smolensk regional committee, after the discussion of "the drying economy in the collective and state farms," issued a decision "obliging the district executive committee (of the government) and the district agricultural sections (in the Party) to make ready all the grain drying before the harvest season begins."⁴⁵ Another example can be cited from 1960. In that year, the bureau of the Arkhangelsk city committee, after discussion, concluded that the executive district committee of the government poorly organized the implementation of the decisions reached by the district Soviet and, accordingly, issued a decision to improve the work of the executive committee.⁴⁶

All these examples show that the bureaus on all local levels make the decisions in many areas of public life. At the same time they indicate that these organs have a great power and a high status in the Party structure.

The Secretaries

However powerful the bureaus might be, there is evidence in the Party press which indicates that the secretaries (or secretariats) are more powerful. In general, this is due to the nature of their position and work within the Party. First of all, the first secretaries with their deputies head the

⁴⁵Loc. cit., No. 13 (July, 1947), p. 71.

⁴⁶Loc. cit., No. 10 (May, 1960), p. 80.

entire Party units in their respective localities. As such, they are responsible for the work of these units. F. Petrenko wrote in the Party organ in 1967 as follows:

To create really friendly conditions for the collective leadership, much depends upon the secretary of the Party committee (bureau). He has a special responsibility for the work of the Party organs and the entire Party organization. From him it is expected the initiative, activity, and persistence.⁴⁷

"A secretary," declares another source, "is an organizer. The task of a secretary is to organize the work of the Party organization as a friendly, militant, and collective unit of the communists."⁴⁸ Iakovlev, although being critical of the secretaries for their abuse of power, nevertheless, recognized that

. . . on the secretaries of the committees, and above all on the first secretaries, is placed a high responsibility and obligation for the leadership of the current work of the Party organ.⁴⁹

There are also many indications that the secretaries are in fact the heads of the bureaus. As was noted earlier, one article in the Party organ of 1947, for example, was entitled "How a Secretary of the Party Bureau Should Work."⁵⁰ I. Meshkov in his brief article in the same issue called himself "a secretary of the Party bureau." It is, therefore, quite natural that the first secretaries, or in their absence one

⁴⁷ Loc. cit., No. 17 (September, 1967), p. 53.

⁴⁸ Voprosy Partiinoi Raboty, p. 317.

⁴⁹ Quoted in Swearer, op. cit., p. 102.

⁵⁰ Partiinala Zhizn, No. 1 (January, 1947), p. 74.

of their deputies, convene the meetings of the bureaus.

I. Stepanenko, a district secretary, after attending a conference of his district in 1938, learned that many secretaries did not organize their work very well. But in his article he gave them credit in the following words: "The secretaries and other Party workers of the district work hard regardless of time. They frequently call the meetings of the bureaus where they analyze necessary and important questions. . . ." ⁵¹

In addition to convening the meetings of the bureaus, there is also evidence that the secretaries and their apparatuses prepare the agenda and all kinds of resolutions to be adopted by the meetings. As a matter of practice, the secretaries at these meetings read their reports in which they suggest various proposals. Under Stalin, the secretaries exercised such powers which, in 1953, were considered as being abusive. Both Iakovlev and Slepov, quoted earlier, complained in their articles that the secretaries still in 1953 in many cases subordinated to themselves the committees, made the decisions of great importance without consulting the bureau members, and sometimes did not even convene the meetings of the bureau. At one point Iakovlev revealingly described the atmosphere of the meetings of the bureaus and the role of the secretaries in these words:

⁵¹ Partiinoe Stroitelstvo, No. 11 (June, 1938), p. 53.

We still, however, encounter cases when members of the bureau forget about their responsibilities before the Party committee, before the Party organization, when at sessions of the bureau, at plenums, and in practical daily conduct of their work, they are worried only about being able to strike the right tone for the first secretary of the committee. This is a vicious line of conduct: members of the bureau in this case do not risk expressing their own opinion, even if in their heart they consider the point of view of the committee secretary to be incorrect. And although decisions in such cases are taken unanimously, such "unanimity" has nothing in common with collectivity.⁵²

It is interesting that similar criticism was raised in later years. Thus, in 1967 F. Petrenko in the quoted article wrote that some secretaries still followed "the incorrect practice" of delivering speeches at the meetings of the committees and bureaus only by themselves, ignoring other experienced Party and government officials. In a form of instruction he stated:

The decisions of important questions is the competence of the Party organ--the committee. The secretaries of the Party committee (bureau) influence the decisions not by the power of their positions but by their arguments and proofs.⁵³

This quotation implies that the secretaries, fourteen years after Stalin's death, still exercised too much power. From the Soviet publications it appears that the top elite since 1953 has been trying to achieve the balance between the collective form of decision-making and the individual responsibility for the implementation of these decisions. But the occasional public criticism of the secretaries indicates that it is very difficult to achieve this aim. As

⁵²Quoted in Swearer, op. cit., p. 102.

⁵³Partiinaiia Zhizn, No. 17 (September, 1967), pp. 52-53.

usual, several explanations can be offered for this difficulty. One of them is the fact that the secretariats are the operational organs, and as such they have the natural tendency to dominate over all other Party bodies. This tendency is noticeable not only in the Communist Party of the USSR but also in the organizations based on democratic principles. This is understandable when we realize that the operational (usually executive) organs are dynamic due to the nature of their work which, unlike that of the deliberating organs, consists essentially of the initiative and action. What makes the Party secretariats especially prone to arrogate to themselves too much power is, on the one hand, the absence of the legal and effective restraints and, on the other, the pressure from above. More specifically, there is a lack of specification and limitation of functions of all Party organs as well as the lack of genuine adherence to the democratic principles. On the other hand, there is an excessive pressure from the top elite upon all lower, and especially upon the secretaries, to increase the activity and to produce more results.

It is expected that the secretariats hold their meetings, but they are very rarely publicized in the Soviet press. In the consulted Party sources only two such meetings were reported to have taken place: one in 1931 where the regional secretariat discussed the question of implementation of the Central Committee's decision to abolish the okrug Party units,

and another in 1960 where the secretariat on the same level considered the shortcomings of the satirical and literary sections in the district newspapers.⁵⁴

The secretariats, in addition to the decision-making functions, also perform the administrative functions. Such a conclusion is derived, first of all, from the fact that they head the Party apparatus by means of which they operate. Obviously, the apparatus consists of all kinds of bureaucrats doing daily Party work. The Party periodical describes the apparatus in a rather lofty manner as follows:

The Party apparatus is the center of better Party people, the most experienced, authoritative, and enduring cadres which are closely united with the people of the country. The apparatus organizes the fulfillment of the Party directives and helps to direct the efforts of many state and social organizations of our country toward the common goal.⁵⁵

The same source identifies the role of the secretaries in the apparatus in the following words:

The organization of the work of the apparatus depends upon the secretaries of the Party committee and first of all upon the first secretary. He is called upon to ensure that all sections and workers worked purposefully directing their efforts toward the organization of the masses.⁵⁶

Earlier in the discussion the administrative function of the secretaries was identified as the management of the Party affairs. The above quotations quite clearly indicate

⁵⁴Partiinoe Stroitelstvo, No. 9-10 (May, 1931), p. 41. Partiinaya Zhizn, No. 2 (January, 1960), p. 80.

⁵⁵Voprosy Partinoi Raboty, pp. 364-365.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 371.

that this is the case. The organization of the work of the apparatus involves, among other things, the distribution and control of work, personnel, and the allocation of the resources. The secretaries on the district and primary organization levels are also in charge of accepting new members into the Party, issuing Party documents, collecting dues, and doing a number of other duties on a daily basis.

Finally, the high status and great power of the secretaries is reflected in the process of their recruitment. From the early 1920's they were selected very gingerly. Candidates for the secretaries had to meet the requirements of Party standing and to be approved by the higher authorities in each case. Thus, in 1925, for example, the secretaries of gubernia had to have seven years of Party standing, okrugs--five years, uezd--three years, volost--one year, and the cell also one year. In 1939 the secretaries of the union republics, territories, and regions were required to have five years of Party standing, cities and districts--three years, and the primary Party organizations--one year. These requirements are still in force today. This indicates that the position of the secretaries is highly sensitive and, of course, powerful. As was mentioned before, they have the responsibility and power to put into motion the entire Party machinery. For this they have to have the credentials of loyalty, experience, and efficiency in their work.

The Central Committee

According to the Party Rules and the official interpretation, the Central Committee is the most powerful Party organ between the Congresses. Article 24 of the 1919 Rules declared as follows:

The Central Committee represents the Party in its relations with other parties and organizations, sets up various Party institutions and directs their activities, appoints the editors of the central organs who are working under the control of the Central Committee, organizes and manages enterprises which have general Party character, distributes the forces and resources of the Party, and manages the central funds. The Central Committee guides the work of the central government and public organizations through the Party fractions.⁵⁷

These powers were reaffirmed in all subsequent Rules with only stylistic modifications. In 1934, however, a power of a general nature but of great significance was added. Article 33 of the Party Rules stated that "the Central Committee directs the entire work of the Party between the Party Congresses."⁵⁸ This power, too, remains in force until the present day.

In addition, the Central Committee, unlike the Congresses, has its permanent members and meets more frequently than the Congresses. Therefore, to a formalist it would appear that the Central Committee between the

⁵⁷VKP(b) v Rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. I, 5th ed. (1936), p. 327.

⁵⁸Ibid., Vol. II, p. 600.

Congresses is, indeed, the most powerful Party organ and its members are the top elite in the Party. The reality, however, is different. Studying the working of the Central Committee from the Soviet sources, it is quite evident that this organ in practice became an instrument of the Politbureau, the Orgbureau, and the Secretariat whose members form the top elite. Before the revolution and immediately afterwards, the Central Committee was, indeed, the most powerful organ of the Party, but with the reorganization of its structure and work in 1919, it began to lose its strength rather rapidly. In that year the Politbureau, the Orgbureau, and the Secretariat were established as organs of the Central Committee which immediately began to supplant their parent body.

The Central Committee could not retain and exercise its original powers for several reasons. First of all, with the growth of the Party, it became too large and unwieldy to be efficient in its work. In 1917 the Central Committee had 9 members and 4 candidates and a year later, 15 members and 8 candidates. At the Eighth Party Congress in 1919, Gregory E. Zinoviev in his organizational report proposed to increase the Central Committee to 19 members and 8 candidates which, of course, was approved. It is interesting for our discussion to quote some of his arguments in favor of the proposal he had made as against those

who wished to see the Central Committee enlarged even further. At one point he stated:

It is necessary to broaden the composition of the C.C. up to 19. There are propositions to broaden it up to 21, 23, and so on. In all organizations there is a limit which cannot be crossed. If we enlarge the number a little more, we will deprive the C.C. of its business-like capacity and will turn it into a small meeting. 19 is the number which will enable us to form the Politbureau into a proper size, the Orgbureau, the Secretariat, and the Traveling Collegium. And this is what we need.⁵⁹

From these arguments it is quite evident that the top elite was very well aware of the consequences of having a large Central Committee. Yet, in spite of this, the growth of the Central Committee in subsequent years proceeded inexorably toward 241 members and 155 candidates in 1971.

The question of an increase of the Central Committee membership was a subject of an interesting discussion in 1923 which throws some light on reasons other than the numerical increase of the Party members as a whole. In December 1922 and January 1923, Lenin wrote several letters, including the now well-known "Testament," addressed to the pending Twelfth Party Congress in 1923. In these letters he proposed to increase the Central Committee between 50 and 100. He gave three reasons for this: in the first place, the new members, in his opinion, coming from among the Party members, will increase the prestige and authority

⁵⁹Vosmoi S'ezd RKP(b): Protokoly (Moskva: Gossudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1959), p. 285.

of the Central Committee in the eyes of the Party members; second, the new members will inevitably receive a professional training in the Party and government apparatuses and then in turn will improve the latter's functioning; third, the new members, being free from any attachments or involvement in the emerging conflict between Stalin and Trotskii, can prevent a split within the Party and secure its stability.⁶⁰ It is interesting that Stalin, who must have known about Lenin's letters, in his defense of the idea of increasing the Central Committee members at the Twelfth Party Congress (from which Lenin was absent due to his illness) also referred to the struggle within the Central Committee as one of the reasons, but he formulated it impersonally, in a sense of "bad Party tradition" that could be eradicated with the inflow of the new members. He further argued that the kernel of the Central Committee, consisting of 10-15 members and (apparently he had in mind the members of the Politbureau, the Orgbureau, and the Secretariat) having received experience in leadership but not being surrounded by the new members who knew the local conditions and problems, may become demoralized and isolated from the masses of the people. In addition, he stated that the kernel was becoming old, and it needed replacement which could come only from the Central Committee.⁶¹ As a result, the Central Committee was

⁶⁰ V. I. Lenin, Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii (Moskva: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1964), Vol. XLV, 5th ed., pp. 343-345 and 354-355.

⁶¹ I. V. Stalin, Sochineniia (Moskva: Gossudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1947), Vol. V, pp. 218-219.

increased to 40 members and 17 candidates. The following Table, based on the Party sources, shows the progressive growth of the Central Committee.

TABLE 1
NUMERICAL GROWTH OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

<u>Year</u>	<u>Members</u>	<u>Candidates</u>
1917	9	4
1919	19	8
1921	25	15
1923	40	17
1925	63	43
1927	71	50
1934	71	68
1952	125	111
1956	133	122
1961	175	155
1966	195	165
1971	241	155

As the Central Committee began to grow, it became too large, unwieldy, and cumbersome. From the point of view of its composition, the Central Committee became a body of the Party officials representing all kinds of important organizations--the Party, national and some local governments, trade unions, Komsomol, the army, cultural establishments, and others. It is now a matter of fact that such a body could not have withstood its powers against the small and efficient Politbureau, the Orgbureau, and the Secretariat.

The second reason that it could not retain its power was that the Central Committee did not operate on a daily basis. It worked, and obviously still works, through its plenary sessions which were convened rather infrequently.

Thus, between 1919 and 1921 the Central Committee was obliged to meet in plenary sessions twice a month; between 1921 and 1934, once in two months; between 1934 and 1962, once in four months; and since 1952 until the present time, once in six months. Such occasional meetings with so many people in attendance could not exercise its directive powers as provided by the Statutes, not only over the three smaller bodies established in 1919 but over the entire Party as well. To be sure, practically all decisions or decrees between the plenary sessions were issued in the name of the Central Committee, but in fact they were prepared and issued by the three top organs (since 1952, by the two). To this it can be added that the Central Committee, except in name, is practically without bureaucratic instrumentalities to operate in accordance with the Statutes. Fainsod and Conquest in previously quoted works proved that the Central Committee departments which constitute the Party apparatus, or bureaucracy, are in practice under the direct control of the Secretariat.

A few words can be said about the plenums themselves, for they indicate a weaker position of the members of the Central Committee vis-a-vis those members of the same institution who are also members of the Politbureau (Praesidium), the Orgbureau (of course, until 1952), and the Secretariat. The plenums usually last for two or three days and occasionally for a week. One of those occasions was the struggle for

power in 1957 and the plenum of the same year that expelled the so-called "anti-Party group" lasted from June 29 to July 29. After the plenary sessions end, the members of the Central Committee return to their usual work. Since the next plenary session is not fixed by the previous one and factionalism is strictly forbidden by the Party Statutes, the members of the Central Committee have no way of organizing themselves, of deciding on the date of the next plenum or on its agenda.⁶² They are summoned to the plenums by the top elite which decides the above questions and many others as well.

It has become a practice since the beginning of 1928 when Stalin became a virtual dictator, that all proposals or policies suggested by the top elite were approved unanimously. In his speech to the Moscow Party organization on April 13, 1928, immediately after the plenum, Stalin, with a tone of satisfaction, stated that all "resolutions at the plenum were adopted unanimously."⁶³ The published records of all other plenums since that time show that all proposals were adopted in the same manner. The only exception was the above mentioned plenum of June 1957 when Molotov abstained from voting on the resolution to remove the so-called "anti-Party" group from the top organs to which he himself belonged.

⁶²The Party sources indicate that in 1958 and 1959 the plenary sessions and their agenda were announced several weeks ahead of time. However this was done by the top elite and not by the previous session. Pravda, May 10, 1959, and July 14, 1959.

⁶³Stalin, op. cit., Vol. XI, p. 27.

The unanimity, however, does not exclude the possibility that the conflicting views were expressed at the plenums. Boris I. Nicolaevsky, in his explanatory notes to Khrushchev's "Secret Speech", writes that the majority of the Central Committee elected in 1934 with "the most influential leader" (after the murder of Kirov and the poisoning of Kuibyshev) Ordzhonikidze, opposed Stalin as late as 1937. Ordzhonikidze himself "died" (Nikolaevsky suspects that he was poisoned) just before the opening of the plenum on February 23, 1937, and then Stalin at that plenum "smashed the resistance of the majority. . . ." ⁶⁴ If the majority of the Central Committee indeed opposed Stalin, then perhaps this can explain why Stalin in 1937-38 liquidated 70 percent of the members and candidates of the Central Committee elected in 1934. In any case, under the condition of unanimity, which Stalin perfected since Lenin's days in the name of "Party unity" and "iron discipline", and which his successors have perpetuated in a more mitigated form, the members of the Central Committee were hardly at liberty to use their statutory power, except in a formal and affirmative way.

At this point it could also be mentioned that the plenums as well as the Congresses were not convened regularly under Stalin. Khrushchev in his "Secret Speech" to the Congress in 1956 stated that this was so "especially . . . during the last 15 years of his life." He specifically mentioned that during the war "not a single Central Committee plenum took

⁶⁴ Nikita S. Khrushchev, The Crimes of the Stalin Era (New York: "The New Leader," 1956), p. 53.

place" and after the war "the plenums were hardly ever called." Undoubtedly, during Stalin's time the power of the Central Committee was at its lowest level. After his death, the plenums were generally held more frequently than required by the Party Statutes. Many authors believe that since 1953 the Central Committee regained much of its former powers. Indeed, it was more active than ever under Stalin since the 1920's. Particularly during the struggle for power between Khrushchev and his rivals it showed signs of strength. But, as will be discussed later, even during that time the Central Committee played a role of an instrument in the hands of the top elite which fought for the supremacy in the Party rather than the role of a superior organ and an independent arbiter.

If we begin our study of the Central Committee since 1917 just before the November revolution, we will discover that it was the top decision-making and directing organ of the Party not only in theory but also in practice. It was, for example, the Central Committee which, although under the pressure of Lenin and after rather prolonged debate and hesitation, decided at the end of October 1917 to seize power in Russia. It was also the same Committee that after even more heated debate and clashes decided by a small majority to accept the terms of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty in February 1918. The Treaty was then ratified by the Seventh Party Congress in the beginning of the next month,

and a week later by the All-Russian Congress of Soviet.⁶⁵ It should be kept in mind that unlike after 1919, the Central Committee then was the only Party organ operating between Congresses. The office of the secretary of the Party headed by Iakub M. Sverdlov performed only an administrative and not a decision-making function. The policies of the Party were originated, discussed, and decided by the Central Committee. Except for Lenin's personal influence, all members of the Central Committee were to a high degree equal and exercised their powers in accordance with their will and ability. When in 1919, at the Eighth Party Congress, the Politbureau, the Orgbureau, and the Secretariat were established, the locus of power began to shift to these organs. This is reflected, for example, in a preponderant number of meetings the new bodies held immediately after their inception over that of the Central Committee.

Nicolai N. Krestinskii, a Secretary, in his organizational report to the Eighth Party Conference held on December 2-4, 1919, revealed that during the eight months since the last Congress, the Central Committee held 6 plenary sessions, while the Politbureau 29, the Orgbureau 110, and both in addition held 19 "combined meetings."⁶⁶ From April 25, 1923, to May 1, 1924, the Central Committee met 17 times (which was

⁶⁵ A good description of these events can be found in Georg von Rauch, A History of Soviet Russia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 54-60, 72-77.

⁶⁶ Vosmaia Konferentsiia RKP(b): Protokoly (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1961), p. 221.

more than required by the Statute), but during the same time the Politbureau met 86 times. The total number of questions considered at all these last meetings was 3,923, and of these, the Central Committee discussed 252 and the Politbureau 3,671.⁶⁷ This disparity of meetings was in no way a violation of the Statutes, for both the Politbureau and the Orgbureau, being empowered to decide everyday Party policies between the plenary sessions, were not limited to have a specific number of meetings. But this disparity had a practical effect of undermining the power of the Central Committee because the policies of the Party were then originated and decided by the newly established organs.

Undoubtedly, the conditions of the Civil War in Russia, under which the three new Party bodies were established and began to function, had also contributed to the decline of power of the Central Committee. These conditions required quick and, very frequently, hasty decisions that could be made (and were made) much faster by the smaller bodies than by the growing Central Committee. What these conditions did was to provide the Politbureau, the Orgbureau, and the Secretariat with many opportunities to make decisions which in effect speeded up their development and enhanced their strength.

In addition, it should be kept in mind that the new Party organs from the beginning were packed with the most prestigious members of the Party. Having been given the power to decide

⁶⁷Quoted in Towster, op. cit., p. 155.

the current policy of the Party and being of the dictatorial nature, this group was bound to arrogate to itself too much power and put the Central Committee into its shadow.

The changing of the Central Committee was noted by Lenin publicly in 1923. In his judgment, this body had already entered the road toward becoming a conference. It is interesting that he was not displeased with the process; on the contrary, he argued that it should continue toward its completion. In his "Proposal to the Twelfth Party Congress" written in January 1923, he stated:

The plenum of the C.C. of our Party has already disclosed its tendency to develop into a sort of higher Party conference. It meets on the average no less than once in two months, and the current work in the name of the Central Committee is carried on, as is known, by our Politbureau, our Orgbureau, our Secretariat, and others. I think that we should complete this path onto which we have entered and definitely convert the plenums of the Central Committee into higher Party conferences convening once in two months with the participation of the C.C.C. (Central Control Commission) in it.⁶⁸

It is important to emphasize that Lenin attributed the transformation of the Central Committee into a conference to two causes: rare plenary sessions and the daily decision-making function of the above-mentioned three Party organs. Facing this situation, he added his own idea of allowing the members of the Central Control Commission to participate at the plenums of the Central Committee on the basis of equal rights of all attendants. This meant, in effect, watering down even further the power of the Central Committee, for the plenums

⁶⁸ Lenin, op. cit., p. 384.

then were to become larger, more cumbersome, and consequently, weaker. Undoubtedly, Lenin realized this but he, nevertheless, proposed his "plan" basically for two reasons: since the plenums were destined to become conferences, he wished to make them as broad in their composition as it was reasonably possible, so that there would be more representatives from the Party who, by virtue of their participation at the plenums, would form a bridge between the elite and the masses of the people. It should be recalled that at the same time Lenin proposed to increase the membership of the Central Committee up to 100. Now, speaking about the Central Control Commission, he also suggested that it be enlarged from 75 to 100 new members "from among the workers and peasants." He argued that in the process of fulfilling their tasks, both institutions will benefit from this by establishing "a contact with really broad masses" of the workers and peasants.⁶⁹ In general, Lenin wished to establish what we would call today a more direct system of communication between the elite and the masses.

On the other hand, Lenin by 1923 was very much concerned about the possible split within the Party. Therefore, he thought that if the plenums were enlarged by the new members who were not involved in the developing conflict between Trotskii and Stalin, the unity of the Party would be secured.

Lenin's proposal to allow the Central Control Commission to participate at the plenums was approved by the Congress in

⁶⁹ Ibid.

1923 and a provision to this effect was inserted into the Statute. Since then until 1934, the Central Control Commission quite frequently took part at the plenums of the Central Committee. In 1934 the Central Control Commission was transformed into the Party Control Committee, but the Statute did not mention its right to participate in the Central Committee plenums. After Stalin's death, Khrushchev very often invited the officials of the government who were in charge of the questions discussed at the plenums. In addition, according to the Party sources, he also invited first secretaries as well as some secretaries of the union republics, regions, and territories who were not members of the Central Committee (probably for the purpose of getting direct information from them about the local conditions and for making them more responsible for carrying out the decisions of the plenums) to attend the plenums. In 1957, at the plenum which expelled "the anti-Party group" from the central organs, the members of the Central Auditing Commission also participated without the Statutory authorization. Most conceivably, this was done by Khrushchev for the purpose of making the decisions of the plenum more authoritative.

Brief attention should now be turned to the functions of the Central Committee, for they also reveal the power relationship between the members of the Central Committee and the members of the top Party organs. Studying the organization and the work of the Central Committee, it appears that this body performs essentially the following functions within the

Party: debates, confirms (legalizes) the proposals and the decisions of the Politbureau, the Orgbureau (until 1952), and the Secretariat; serves as a forum of personal communication between the top elite and the various organizations and the Party and non-Party masses of the people; and legitimizes the top elite and its policies.

The plenums debate all kinds of questions on the agenda prepared in advance by the top elite. Towster in his study, based on resolutions until 1948, writes that the economic problems had "occupied first place, followed in order by questions of the Party structure, Soviet structure, 'work in the village,' foreign policy, the Comintern and its auxiliaries, other 'political' questions, matters of the trade union and cooperative movements, and miscellaneous."⁷⁰ Even the superficial look at the published records of the plenums not only under Stalin but under Khrushchev and Brezhnev as well indicate that this, indeed, was the case. Since the late 1920's, the debate took the form of speeches delivered by various delegates in support of the main speakers who, as a rule, have always been members of the top elite.

The practice of confirmation of the proposals and policies of the top elite in various forms, such as any simple proposal, a drafted resolution, or a communique, or its decisions and actions before the plenums took place, is a matter of record. Resolutions are usually the summary of the main speeches or reports. Thus, for example, at the

⁷⁰Towster, op. cit., p. 155.

plenum which took place on October 25-27, 1924, Molotov spoke on "The Tasks of Daily Work in the Villages." After the debate, a resolution was adopted under the same title which was a summary of Molotov's speech.⁷¹ Another example can be taken from a more recent time. At the plenum of December 15-19, 1958, for example, Khrushchev delivered a report on agriculture for the past five years in which he proposed some measures of improvement in this field. The plenum, after a debate, elected the editorial commission with Khrushchev as its chairman to draft a resolution which, again, appeared to be a summary of his speech.⁷² There are several examples indicating that the resolutions, or simple proposals, were introduced by the Politbureau as an organ or later the Praesidium. The Party source, for instance, states that the Plenum of April 5-9, 1926, "approved with minor corrections the project of the resolution prepared by the Politbureau."⁷³ In another case a different source stated that at the plenum of February 10, 1964, "The Praesidium of the C.C. introduced for the consideration of the present plenum one question: On the Intensification of the Agricultural Production" which, of course, was approved unanimously.⁷⁴ The description of the plenum of June 22-29, 1957,

⁷¹KPPS v Rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. I, 7th ed. (1954), p. 322.

⁷²Pravda, December 20, 1958.

⁷³KPPS v Rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. II, 7th ed. (1954), p. 258.

⁷⁴Plenumy Centralnogo Komiteta KPSU, Vol. III, 1964, p. 3.

which overruled the anti-Khrushchev majority of the Praesidium, is not clear. It is possible that some members of the majority defected Malenkov's group and joined that of Khrushchev during the heated debate. If they did not, this plenum then would be an exception that can be easily understood by taking into account the fact that the top elite itself was split.

There are also many examples showing that the plenums approved the policies and actions of the Politbureau retroactively. Thus, the plenum of July 14-23, 1926, after hearing the information about the decision and action of the Politbureau in connection with the strike of the coal miners in England and the coup d'etat in Poland, "approved the activity of the Politbureau as well as that of the delegation of the VKP(b) in the Central Committee of the Comintern on international questions."⁷⁵ Another example of 1968, perhaps the outstanding one, can be cited. On October 30-31 of that year, more than two months after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the plenum took place, which, after the report of Brezhnev under the title "On the Activity of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. in Foreign Affairs," adopted a decree which reads in part as follows:

Having heard and discussed the report of the General Secretary of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. comrade L. I. Brezhnev, the Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. unanimously approves and fully supports the activity of the Politbureau of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ KPSS v Rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. II, 7th ed. (1954), p. 268.

⁷⁶ Kommunist, No. 16 (November 1968), p. 10.

Obviously, there is nothing illegal or unfair for the Central Committee to approve the decisions and actions of the Politbureau or any other formally subsidiary body. This happens in the genuinely democratic organizations and parties which have a division of power between the executive and the legislative or quasi-legislative organs. But in this case the latter organs may overrule the decisions or disapprove the actions of the former. The Central Committee, on the other hand, has always (and since the late 1920's, unanimously) confirmed the decisions and actions of its offspring bodies. This fact, contrary to the Statutory provisions, indicates the inferior status and power of the Central Committee to the top Party organs.

The second function performed by the Central Committee is to maintain a communication between the top elite and the various organizations and masses of the Party in the Soviet Union. This function is very well reflected in its composition. If we look at the Central Committee in 1917, we will discover that it consisted of well-known revolutionary leaders, such as Lenin, Trotskii, Kamenev, Zinoviev, and others. Already in 1919 there were several members, although well-known revolutionaries (like Muranov, Mitskevich), who came from local Party organizations. The idea of expanding the Central Committee and recruiting more people from the Party in the country was openly proposed by Lenin in 1923, as was mentioned above. With its growth, the Central Committee became more representative. It came to include the representatives from

the union republics, territories, cities, regions, and even districts. In addition, it also included the Party officials in the government, trade unions, Komsomol, army, the police, cultural organizations, and others. T. H. Rigby in his study presents the Table of the representatives in the Central Committee for 1939 and 1952 which, in part, is reproduced here.⁷⁷

TABLE 2
GROUP REPRESENTATION IN THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE IN 1939 AND 1952

Name	1939		1952	
	Members & Candidates	Percent	Members & Candidates	Percent
Central Party Officials	7	5	17	7.2
Regional Party Secretaries	39	28	78	33.2
Central Gov't. Officials	40	27.8	62	26.2
Regional Gov't. Officials	8	5.7	22	9.2
Military	18	13	26	11.0
Police	7	5	8	3.4
Komsomol, Trade Union, etc.	4	2.9	6	2.5
Industry	2	1.5	--	--
Ideology and Culture	3	2.1	14	6.0
Unidentified	11	7.8	3	1.3
Total	139		236	

Aspaturian, following a somewhat different classification, has a Table which in part shows the following composition of the Central Committee for 1961 and 1966:⁷⁸

⁷⁷T. H. Rigby, "Khrushchev and the Resuscitation of the Central Committee," Australian Outlook, Vol. 13, No. 3 (September 1959), p. 169. Since the purpose of this discussion is to exemplify and not to analyze the composition of the Central Committee, Rigby's breakdown of the membership into full members and candidates is omitted.

⁷⁸Aspaturian, op. cit., p. 558.

TABLE 3

GROUP REPRESENTATION IN THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE IN 1961 AND 1966

1961

(April) 1966

Name	Members & Candidates	Percent	Members & Candidates	Percent
Party Apparatus	158	48.0	155	43.0
State and Economic Officials	112	34.0	136	37.9
Military Officers	31	9.3	33	9.7
Culture and Science	18	5.4	15	4.2
Police	2		2	0.5
Workers and Peasants			10	2.8
Others	9	3.3	9	2.5

To be sure, these members are not officially called the "representatives" as is the case with the Supreme Soviet. But these Tables show very clearly that the principle of representation is practiced in the Central Committee. The process of selection of the members of the Central Committee has never been revealed but, undoubtedly, it must be complicated, going through the system of screening, followed by debate and calculation by the top elite and especially by the Secretariat. The potential candidates for membership, in order to be noticed by the top elite or its bureaucracy, must distinguish themselves with their devotion to the Party, their loyalty to the superiors, and the efficiency in their work. Undoubtedly, some other criteria are taken into account in the process of recruitment of the members of the Central Committee, such as nationality, personal integrity, or general respect among co-workers, etc. It is very difficult to establish which of the above criterion or criteria are more emphasized by the top elite. But it is reasonable to believe that different dictators considered different criterion to be the most important.

The membership in the Central Committee, on the other hand, means honor, higher prestige, and higher political status among the members of the Party. But the membership in this body involves something more than, for example, loyalty or higher prestige, for these are only conditions for or results of the membership on the personal level. It involves keeping one of the channels of communication between the top elite and the various institutions as well as the Party and non-Party masses. When the members of the Central Committee go to Moscow for the plenary session, they bring with them the knowledge of the situation in their localities, the problems of their institutions, and, undoubtedly, the feelings of the people toward the Party's policies. These are then expressed, at least partly, in their speeches at the plenums when they invariably refer to their experiences at work. This kind of information (of course the top elite has many other sources of information) is important for the top elite and the bureaucrats to formulate the new plans and policies, or to take steps to remedy the shortcomings of the old ones. On the other hand, the members of the Central Committee, upon returning to their place of work, represent the Central Committee and, consequently, bear the responsibility for explaining and, to a degree, implementing the policies adopted by the plenums.

Finally, the function of legitimation performed by the Central Committee can be briefly discussed. By this is meant the election of the members to the Politbureau, the Orgbureau (until 1952), the Secretariat, as well as the Central Auditing Commission, and until 1934 the Central Control Commission, and since then the Party Control Committee. The Party is based

upon the principle of dictatorship but the dictators, having always professed to believe in democracy, needed to formalize their right to rule. This right is given to them by the Central Committee in a form of election.

It has been established a long time ago by many authors that the election not only of the top elite but of all other elites in the Party and the government as well is a formality, i.e. the act of voting affirmatively for the candidates proposed from above without the ability on the part of the voters to select them. The process of selection of the candidates to the top organs is covered with a veil of secrecy. Only during the struggle for power among the members of the top elite is this secrecy unveiled to a very limited degree which allows us to make inferences. If the revelations during these times can serve as an example, then the selection of the candidates to the highest Party organs is based on bargainings and manipulations on the part of the contenders for the supremacy in the Party. Stalin, for example, while fighting the opposition of Trotskii, Zinoviev, and Kamenev in the 1920's, allied himself with Bukharin, Tomskii, Rykov, and others and thus was able in 1925 to add to the Politbureau Molotov, Voroshilov, and Kalinin who were his followers. But perhaps a clearer picture of bargaining and manipulation was revealed during the struggle for power after the death of Stalin. One day after the death of the dictator, the top elite decided to reduce the Praesidium from 25 members and 11 candidates to 10 members and 4 candidates and appointed Malenkov as the Prime Minister of the USSR. Then on March 14 the plenum relieved Malenkov from the Secretariat and the plenum of September 3-7 elected Khrushchev First Secretary of the Central

Committee.⁷⁹ These arrangements could have been done only by means of bargaining and manipulations on the part of Khrushchev and Malenkov with the aid of their supporters. It is logical, however, to assume that once the supremacy is established, the bargaining and manipulation are limited simply because one group loses its powers and ceases to exist as an opposition to the victors. In either case, the role of the Central Committee remains to formalize their selection by means of election.

During the struggle for power, when the top elite is weak because of split, the Central Committee has an opportunity to increase its powers. Indeed, after the death of Lenin and Stalin the Central Committee was quite active. After 1953, for example, the Central Committee held more plenary sessions than it was required by the Party Statute. It also was called upon to be the "arbiter" between the two factions at the plenum of June 1957. This activity of the Central Committee prompted some authors to conclude that the Central Committee had regained its powers.⁸⁰ However, a closer study of the Central Committee in the area of legitimation function indicates that even during that time (similarly as was the case in the 1920's), it was manipulated and used by Khrushchev as it had been by Stalin before him. One form of manipulation was packing the Central Committee with one's followers. Looking back to the 1920's, we can recall that in 1925 the Central Committee was increased from 40 members and 17 candidates to 63 members

⁷⁹ KPSS v Rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. III, 7th ed. (1954), pp. 607-611.

⁸⁰ Among these authors is Aspaturian in an earlier quoted work.

and 43 candidates. Following their election, the members of the Central Committee held their usual plenary session at which Kalinin, Voroshilov, and Molotov were elected to the Politbureau. They had been known to be Stalin's supporters. The inference is that at least the majority of the Central Committee members were Stalin's men. Similar manipulation took place after Khrushchev became First Secretary of the Party. At the Twentieth Party Congress, which took place in 1956, 53 out of 133 new members and 76 out of 122 new candidates were elected to the Central Committee. The next year the same Central Committee defeated the "anti-Party group" and rooted Khrushchev in power. Again the same inference can be made from this case. The Party sources reported that it was the plenum of the Central Committee that removed Khrushchev from power. There are some authors who doubt that such a plenum took place. But if it really did take place and, at least, the majority of the Central Committee were Khrushchev's men, it would mean that it was used as an instrument by the conspirators in the top elite against Khrushchev to promote their own interest. If, on the other hand, such a plenum did not take place, it would indicate that the Central Committee is inferior vis-a-vis the top elite to such an extent that it can even be ignored altogether. In general, the Central Committee, as Myron Rush rightly states, "is better suited for manipulation by the chief protagonists than for playing an independent role."⁸¹

⁸¹ Myron Rush, Political Succession in the USSR (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 151.

The Political Bureau

The Political Bureau (Politbureau) was created at the October 23, 1917 meeting of the Central Committee when the final decision to seize power in Russia was reached. It consisted of V. I. Lenin, G. Zinoviev, L. B. Kamenev, J. V. Stalin, L. D. Trotskii, G. Y. Sokolnikov, and A. S. Bubnov and its purpose was to provide "the political leadership in the uprising."⁸² However, the Party publications do not indicate that this Politbureau really played its intended role in the October revolution. Most probably it did not because the preparation for and the execution of the uprising was in the hands of the Military Revolutionary Committee established on October 25, 1917, under the leadership of Trotskii.

When the Civil War developed in Russia necessitating quick decisions and actions and the Central Committee with its 19 members and 8 candidates could not even meet regularly, the three permanent organs of the Central Committee were established at the Eighth Congress in March 1919. They were the Political Bureau (Politbureau), the Organizational Bureau (Orgbureau), and the Secretariat. The Congress resolution gave the Politbureau rather loosely defined power. It declared that "the Politbureau makes

⁸² A brief description of this Politbureau can be found in Fainsod, op. cit., p. 262, and in Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), p. 173.

decisions on the questions requiring an immediate action, and it reports for all its activities for two weeks to the next plenary sessions of the Central Committee."⁸³ The Statute adopted eight months later (December 1919) stated even more generally that "the Central Committee establishes the Politbureau for the political work. . . ."⁸⁴ The first statement quite clearly reflects the conditions of the Civil War which prompted the establishment of the Politbureau. The statement in the Statute, on the other hand, qualifies the power of the Politbureau by limiting it to questions of a political nature. But, as will be shown later, the political questions were interpreted by Lenin to include also organizational questions.

The Politbureau, in order to be efficient, was kept small from the very beginning. The quoted resolution of 1919 provided that it consist only of five members. However, Krestinskii in his report to the Eighth Party Conference in December 1919 stated that in the eight months since the last Congress "the Politbureau was functioning in one and the same composition: Lenin, Trotskii, Stalin, Kamenev, and Krestinskii; the candidates: Kalinin, Zinoviev, and Bukharin."⁸⁵

⁸³ VKP(b) v Rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. I, 5th ed. (1936), p. 312.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 327.

⁸⁵ Vusmaia Konferentsiia RKP(b): Protokoly (1961), p. 221.

In later years until 1952, its membership was increased to a maximum of 10 members and 8 candidates. At the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1952, the Politbureau was transformed into the Praesidium whose membership was increased to an unprecedented number of 25 members and 11 candidates. Khrushchev, who read the report at this Congress on the changes of the Party Statute, explained very briefly the reason for the change in the following words:

In the projected changes of the Statute, it is proposed to transform the Politbureau into the Praesidium of the Central Committee of the Party which will direct the work of the Central Committee between the plenary sessions. Such a transformation is justified because the name "Praesidium" more closely corresponds to those functions which the Politbureau in fact is performing at the present time.⁸⁶

No other explanation was recorded in the Party sources. The Statute is even less helpful in this case. It stated similarly that "The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union sets up a Praesidium to direct the work of the Central Committee between plenary meetings"⁸⁷ without mentioning that the Praesidium should decide political questions, as all previous Statutes had declared in reference to the Politbureau. The above statements quite clearly indicate that the Praesidium was made "a little Central Committee" to deal with all kinds of questions

⁸⁶Pravda, October 13, 1952.

⁸⁷Triska, op. cit., p. 177.

between the Central Committee plenums. Undoubtedly, the Politbureau before 1952 had decided the same questions as the Praesidium did after 1952, but it did so without Statutory or legal sanction.

At that Congress, however, Khrushchev was completely silent on the question of the increase of Praesidium members and it remained enigmatic at least until 1956. In his "Secret Speech" to the Party Congress in that year the same Khrushchev, in reference to Stalin, said:

His proposal, after the 19th Congress, concerning the election of 25 persons to the Central Committee Praesidium, was aimed at the removal of the old Political Bureau members and the bringing in of less experienced persons so that these would extol him in all sorts of ways.⁸⁸

Taking into account the purges and physical liquidation not only of many Party members but also of many members of the Central Committee, and even of some of the Politbureau, such an aim of Stalin would not be unusual. But since many new members, and particularly candidate members, were younger than the members of the former Politbureau, it is probable that Stalin aimed at rejuvenating the top Party body. It is also possible that he wanted to achieve both of these aims at the same time.

On March 8, 1953, one day after Stalin's death, it was revealed that the Praesidium had its bureau, apparently a smaller body whose function, size, and membership has never

⁸⁸Khrushchev, op. cit., p. 63. Khrushchev implies that until the meeting of the new Central Committee he did not know that Stalin would propose to elect 25 persons to the Praesidium.

been disclosed. On that day the top elite published its decision to abolish the bureau and reduce the membership of the Praesidium to 10 members and 4 candidates. Since that time, the Praesidium consisted of a maximum 11 members and 8 candidates, except for 1957 and a year or so afterwards when it had 15 members and 9 candidates. This increase can be related to Khrushchev's wish, or perhaps necessity, to reward some of his supporters during his struggle for power, such as Marshall Zhukov and a few younger men like Mazurov and Mzhavandze. Following the Twenty-Second Congress in 1961, the membership of the Praesidium was set at 11 members and 5 candidates.

At the Twenty-Third Party Congress in 1966, the Praesidium was renamed the Politbureau and the number of its full members remained at 11 but that of the candidates was increased to 8. The First Secretary of the Party, Leonid L. Brezhnev, in his report to the Congress, very briefly explained the "proposal" to change the name of the Praesidium in the following words:

Many communists in their letters express a suggestion to rename the Praesidium the Politbureau of the C.C. of the K.P.S.S. They motivate their suggestion by the fact that for a long period of time under Lenin and afterward the Politbureau of the C.C. had existed in the Party. The name Politbureau more fully reflects the character of the activity of the higher political organ of our Party which directs the work of the Party between the plenary sessions of the C.C. of the K.P.S.S. We support the above suggestion.⁸⁹

Thus Brezhnev gave two reasons for changing the name of the Praesidium: the return to the traditional name of "Politbureau" and the political nature of the Praesidium's functions. While the first reason can easily be understood as having an emotional and political meaning of continuity, the second is far from being clear. As will be shown later, both the Politbureau and the Praesidium dealt with political and organizational questions, but the top elite since Lenin interpreted the latter as having a political significance. On the basis of the top elite's policies since 1964, it is more reasonable to think that the return to the traditional name "Politbureau" was a symbolic sign of bridging some gaps created by Khrushchev between the past and the present, and a hint that his policies and methods will not be continued.

The Table below (which includes the selected years following the Party Congresses, except for 1953, 1957 and 1969) shows the numerical composition of the Politbureau (Praesidium).⁹⁰

⁹⁰ The data for this Table are based on the following sources: Vosmaia Konferentsiia RKP(b) (1961), p. 221; KPSS v Rezoliutsiakh, Vol. I, 7th ed. (1954), pp. 724-25; Partiinoe Stroitelstvo, No. 13-14 (July 1930), p. 79; No. 7 (April 1934), p. 45; No. 7-8 (April 1939), p. 110; Pravda, March 20, 1946; October 17, 1952; March 7 and March 21, 1953; February 6, 1956; July 3, 1957; October 31, 1961; and April 9, 1966; U.S. Department of State, Appearances of Soviet Leaders, A 69-7 (May 1969), p. 2. These sources will be used later to identify the numerical composition of the Orgbureau and the Secretariat.

TABLE 4
NUMERICAL COMPOSITION OF THE POLITBUREAU

Year	Members	Candidates
March 1919	5	3
April 1923	7	4
December 1925	9	8
July 1930	10	5
February 1934	10	5
March 1939	9	2
March 1946	11	4
October 1952	25	11
March 1953	10	4
February 1956	11	6
July 1957	15	9
October 1961	11	5
April 1966	11	8
April 1971	15	6

The structure of the Politbureau and its methods of reaching decisions remain secret. But there are scattered indications in the Party sources, revealed on different occasions, which allow us to make a fairly realistic conclusion. First of all, it is a well known fact that the Politbureau (Praesidium), or at least its kernel, has always consisted of senior and prestigious Party leaders. Lenin, Trotskii, Stalin, Suslov, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Kosygin exemplify these leaders. There are no indications that the Politbureau had a structure of power. Except for the chairman and perhaps personal influence or influence derived from the high position a given member occupied in the Party or government, such as First Secretary or Prime Minister, all members probably shared the power equally. It was (and still is) to a very great extent an oligarchic institution. This pattern was interrupted by Stalin between the 1930's and his death in 1953. Speaking about that period, Khrushchev in his "Secret Speech" declared that Stalin had established his personal dictatorship to the

extent that he "ceased to an ever greater degree to consider the members of the Party's Central Committee and even the members of the Political Bureau."⁹¹ Moreover, he had liquidated some of the members of the Politbureau, such as R. I. Eikhe, V. Y. Chubar, E. Rudzutak, N. A. Voznesenskii, not to mention his open opponents Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, and Rykov.

Khrushchev further revealed that Stalin, in order to undermine the power of the Politbureau, established several commissions, such as "quintets," "sextets," "septets," and "novenaries." Khrushchev read one document which identified "the sextets" as being in charge of foreign policy. Obviously, other commissions were in charge of other areas of public policy. Each of them then made decisions in its respective area and thus dispersed the power of the Politbureau as a unit. Khrushchev did not mention whether these commissions existed in the Praesidium, but it is proper to assume that even if they did exist, they were abolished after Stalin's death.

There are indications that the Politbureau had its chairman. It is, however, interesting to note that Lenin does not appear to have been one. At the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1925, the opposition against Stalin was quite strong and vocal. G. Iu. Sokolnikov, one of the opposition, said in his speech: "Yes, we had Lenin. Lenin was neither chairman of the Politbureau nor General Secretary. Yet he, nonetheless, had the deciding political word in our Party."⁹² He further implied

⁹² XIV Sezd VKP(b): Stenograficheskiĭ Otchet (Moskva: Gossizdat, 1926), p. 335. Henceforth only the first half of the title and the year will be identified.

that Stalin was chairman of the Politbureau. K. E. Voroshilov, one of Stalin's supporters, replied that "after the death of our leader V. I. Lenin [the Politbureau] has been always and continuously chaired by comrade Kamenev."⁹³ If Lenin had been chairman of the Politbureau, Sokolnikov, himself a member of the 1917 Politbureau and a man who belonged to the Party hierarchy and knew pretty much about the top organs, would not have made such a statement in the presence of all members of the top elite. Khrushchev in his "Secret Speech" confirmed that Kamenev was chairman of the Politbureau. But from his remarks it appears that Kamenev held that position when Lenin was still alive. Before reading two letters, one of Krupskaya, Lenin's wife, of December 23, 1922, in which she complained about Stalin's rudeness to her, and another of Lenin on the same subject of March 5, 1923, Khrushchev said:

These documents are a letter from Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya to Kamenev, who was at that time chairman of the Politbureau, and a personal letter from Vladimir Illich Lenin to Stalin.⁹⁴

In light of these revelations, there is no doubt that Kamenev was chairman of the Politbureau both before and after the death of Lenin. There are, however, no indications when he had become chairman of the Politbureau and how long he held that post. It is logical to assume that since Stalin had occupied the most powerful position in the Party (General

⁹³Ibid., p. 397.

⁹⁴Khrushchev, op. cit., p. 10.

Secretary) and constantly grew in power, he made himself chairman of the Politbureau. It is, of course, very difficult to speculate when specifically he did this. But there is no doubt that he was chairman in the 1940's. This can be inferred from Khrushchev's revelation. In order to demonstrate Stalin's dictatorship, he read in his speech the Politbureau's resolution signed by Stalin which added to the foreign affairs responsibility of the "sextet" commission the "internal construction and domestic policy." He also stated that it was Stalin who, "for several years . . . forbade" Voroshilov "to attend the Political Bureau sessions and to receive documents." Khrushchev added that when Voroshilov heard about the Politbureau meeting, "he telephoned each time and asked whether he would be allowed to attend. Sometimes Stalin permitted it, but always showed his dissatisfaction."⁹⁵ Khrushchev made these statements in the presence of Voroshilov and other Politbureau members under Stalin. Under this circumstance, it is unlikely that he would say things which were not true. Khrushchev's revelations indicate that Stalin was the chairman of the Politbureau.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 62. In the memoirs attributed to Khrushchev, the author says that when in 1935 he, as candidate member, began to attend the meetings of the Politbureau, Molotov chaired the meetings. But from the way Khrushchev writes about this, it is clear that Stalin was the real chairman. He states: "Actually, in those days, Stalin never chaired the Politbureau sessions himself. He always left that job to Molotov." "Khrushchev Remembers," Life (November 27, 1970), p. 60.

We have no indications whatsoever about the chairmanship of the Praesidium-Politbureau under Khrushchev and Brezhnev. But it seems reasonable to assume on three grounds that this post was retained after Stalin's death and that both First Secretaries occupied it. In the first place, the chairmanship of the Politbureau was a tradition developed under Lenin, probably out of organizational necessity. It is, therefore, quite likely that this tradition was continued after Stalin's death as it was after Lenin's death. Secondly, if Stalin was chairman of the Politbureau, he established the tradition that this post belongs to the First or General Secretary, and both Khrushchev and Brezhnev held the latter position. Thirdly, it was to their advantage to head the Praesidium-Politbureau because it meant more power within the top elite. Since Khrushchev, and to a lesser degree Brezhnev (at least as far as the public is concerned), were struggling for the supremacy in the Party, it seems unlikely that they would yield the chairmanship in the top organ of the Party to someone else. As far as Brezhnev is concerned, it is perhaps indicative the fact (quoted earlier) that it was he who made a report to the plenum of the Central Committee in 1968 on the decision of the Politbureau to invade Czechoslovakia.

There are indications that the Politbureau had a technical (clerical) secretariat which was in charge of taking minutes at the meetings, distributing the documents among

the members, and probably notifying the members about the time of the meetings. A. Kurskii, chairman of the Central Auditing Commission, in his report to the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1927, stated that he "had received a note from the Secretariat of the Politbureau" which showed that each member in the last year "had to read 5,900 pages of material and 73 minutes of the meetings."⁹⁶ At the same Congress Voroshilov also referred in his remarks to "the Secretariat of the Politbureau." That such an office would be established in the Politbureau is nothing unusual for it is a technical necessity. As such, this office undoubtedly has remained in existence until the present time.

The Politbureau (Praesidium) has functioned through its meetings. The Party sources indicate that at least in the past these meetings were held on an ad hoc basis, i.e., whenever the necessity arose. As noted earlier, in the eight months between the Eighth Party Congress and the Eighth Party Conference in 1919, the Politbureau met 29 times, and this was on the average slightly more than one meeting a week. But during the same time, it also held 19 joint meetings with the Orgbureau. However, in 1923-24, the Politbureau had 86 meetings, and this was on the average almost two meetings a week.⁹⁷ We have no indications about the exact frequency of the Politbureau meetings in later years, but judging by the irregularity of the Party Congresses and the Central Committee plenums under Stalin,

⁹⁶ XV Sezd VKP(b) (1928), p. 108.

⁹⁷ Quoted in Towster, op. cit., p. 157.

it is expected that they were held rarely. It should also be kept in mind that the Politbureau was broken down into various commissions which held their own meetings. In addition, Khrushchev said in the quoted speech that during "the last years" of Stalin's life "the sessions of the Politbureau occurred only occasionally, from time to time. . . ." ⁹⁷ After Stalin's death, the meetings of the Praesidium, according to Khrushchev, were held more frequently. In an interview given to Turner Catledge of the New York Times on May 10, 1957, Khrushchev said that "The Praesidium of the C.C. of the C.P.S.S. meets regularly at least once a week." ⁹⁸ This statement quite clearly implies that the Praesidium could meet even more than once a week, depending upon the need.

In the beginning, the members of the Central Committee, who were not members of the Politbureau were allowed to attend the meetings of the Politbureau. The resolution of 1919 which established the three new Party organs declared that "All the rest of the Central Committee members, who have the ability to attend this or that meeting of the Politbureau, have a right of a consultative voice at those meetings." ⁹⁹ The consulted sources, however, do not indicate that other members of the Central Committee

⁹⁷ Khrushchev, op. cit., p. 61.

⁹⁸ Quoted in William G. Andrews (ed.), Soviet Institutions and Policies: Inside Views (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966), p. 116.

⁹⁹ Vosmoi Sezd RKP(b): Protokoly (1959), p. 425.

really participated at such meetings, although such a possibility should not be excluded. The resolution on the Politbureau passed at the Twelfth Party Congress in 1923 also repeated this right, but in the late 1920's such a provision was not included in the Party resolutions.

In 1923 Lenin proposed to the Twelfth Party Congress to give the right to attend the Politbureau meetings (and have access to its documents) to a certain number (representatives) of the Central Control Commission. He argued that this arrangement will "lower the fear of a split" within the Party and will make the work of both the Politbureau and the Central Control Commission more efficient.¹⁰⁰ Accordingly, the Congress passed a resolution declaring that such a right be given to "three permanent representatives from the Praesidium of the C.C.C."¹⁰¹ As in the first case, the Party records do not show that the three representatives of the Central Control Commission participated in the Politbureau meetings, but in this case they undoubtedly did. The Fifteenth Party Congress in 1927 adopted a resolution which declared that the Praesidium of the Central Control Commission had a right to delegate four members and four candidates to the Politbureau meetings. It is not known how long this arrangement lasted. The consulted sources, however, reveal that the Politbureau occasionally

¹⁰⁰V. I. Lenin, Polnoe Sobraniye Sochinenii, Vol. XLV, 5th ed. (1964), pp. 386-87.

¹⁰¹KPSS v Rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. I, 7th ed. (1954), p. 724.

held the joint meetings with the whole Praesidium of the Central Control Commission. Such a joint meeting, for example, took place in December 1923, and it adopted a resolution "On the Party Structure" which was then approved by the Plenum of the Central Committee in January 1924.¹⁰² Another such meeting took place in September 1927 which made several decisions, one of them against Trotskii, Zinoviev, Muralov, and others. Still another took place in February 1929 which condemned "the factional activities of Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomskii."¹⁰³ These decisions indicate that the joint meetings of the two organs took place when controversial and important questions had to be decided. As a matter of rule, such decisions were always approved by the Central Committee plenums. In the absence of evidence, it can only be surmised that these joint meetings were additional arrangements not connected with the legitimate rights of the delegated members of the Central Control Commission's Praesidium to attend the Politbureau meetings.

In the earlier days, the Politbureau appointed from time to time commissions to study the particular problems and prepare reports. The final decisions, of course, were made by the Politbureau. It can be noted that this method

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 769.

¹⁰³Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 430, 549.

of work was quite widely used at that time by the Soviet government and at one time caused Lenin to complain that it had led to confusion and a loss of a sense of personal responsibility among the government officials. It is not known if the same method produced the same result in the Politbureau. The Politbureau commissions are mentioned several times in the consulted sources. For instance, the resolution of the Central Committee plenum which took place on October 25-27, 1923, at one point stated: "The plenum directs the Politbureau to do everything necessary to speed up the works of the commissions appointed by the Politbureau and the plenum of last September: a commission on 'scissors,' on internal conditions of the Party, and on wages."¹⁰⁴ V. V. Kuibyshev, Chairman of the Central Control Commission since the Twelfth Party Congress (1923), in his report to the next Congress in 1924 said in reference to the Politbureau: "I checked the minutes of the Politbureau from the point of view of quantity of commissions which were appointed for the reorganization of the Central Committee."¹⁰⁵ There are no indications that such

¹⁰⁴ KPSS v Rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. I, 7th ed. (1954), p. 767. The "scissors" commission was apparently to study the policy of cutting the prices on industrial goods, on production cost, the possibility of stabilizing the currency, and the methods of stimulating the peasants to increase their prosperity. This policy resulted from the need to narrow down the disparity between the prices on the industrial and the agricultural goods. The Party sources refer to this policy of 1923-24 as the "scissors crisis."

¹⁰⁵ Trinadtsatii Sezd RKP(b) (Moskva: Izdatelstvo "Krasnaia Nov," 1924), p. 281.

commissions were used by the Politbureau-Praesidium in later years.

It should also be noted that the Politbureau used in its work various state and Party organs. As the Politbureau plans of work for the years of 1926 and 1928 reveal, in 1926 it intended to use 26 and in 1928 15 different state and Party organs. They included the Central Statistical Administration, the All-Union Council on the National Economy, the Finance Ministry (Kommissariat), the State Planning Committee, and others. They were to be supplemented by the Central Control Commission, the Orgbureau, the Central Auditing Commission, and occasionally by the special Politbureau commissions.¹⁰⁶ It is worth noting that when the non-Party organs were to make a report before the Politbureau, the selected Party organs were to read a co-report on the same problems. The latter also had a "monopoly" on strictly Party questions, while the former discussed all other problems, mostly economic in nature. It is not known whether the Politbureau used these organs, particularly the non-Party ones, in later years. It is probable that since the Secretariat had developed a highly specialized departments and bureaucrats, the Politbureau relied upon their judgment with perhaps occasional use of at least such state organs as the State Planning Committee.

The Politbureau's scope of decision-making is an

¹⁰⁶ VKP(b) v Rezoliutsiakh, Vol. II, 6th ed. (1940), pp. 100-102, 275-276.

indicator of its power. But it is very difficult to define it in precise terms primarily because the decision-making process is kept secret. However, the occasional revelations of the questions decided by the Politbureau indicate that the range of its decision-making power is very wide. A quoted resolution of 1919 gave the Politbureau power to deal with any question requiring immediate action. But the Party Statutes from 1919 until 1952 stated that the Politbureau was to be concerned with the political problems. The Praesidium during its existence, on the other hand, was declared "to direct the work of the Central Committee between the plenary sessions," without any reference to the type of questions it was to decide. It is interesting that the changes in the Party Statute in 1966 also defined the power of the Politbureau in the same words, although Brezhnev in his explanation of the change of the Praesidium to Politbureau very clearly implied that the latter was to continue to deal with the political questions. But the idea of "political questions" was interpreted by the top elite from the beginning rather broadly. It became the subject of an open debate for the first time at the Ninth Party Congress in 1920. Lenin in his report, as well as in his reply to the critics at this Congress, said that in the preceding year "the main task of the Orgbureau was the allocation of the Party forces and the task of the Politbureau [was to decide] the political questions." But he

immediately added that such a division was to a certain degree an artificial one "for it is not possible to execute any political decision without finding expression in appointment and transfer." "Consequently," he continued, "every organizational question assumes a political significance; and among us the practice has developed that a demand of a single member of the Central Committee is sufficient to consider any question for any reason as a political question."¹⁰⁷ In the same report he stated that "the Politbureau had decided all questions of international and domestic politics" and he said that it would be impossible to enumerate them. But he mentioned that they were related to "all state and Party institutions, all organizations of the working class" and that they were "expressed in the government's decrees and in the activities of the Party organizations. . . ." Indeed, he added, there were so many questions to be decided that the Politbureau had to do it hastily, and occasionally even used a telephone conversation instead of a regular meeting.

At the Eleventh Party Congress in 1922, Lenin again discussed the Politbureau. But this time, he complained that it was overburdened with daily work. Using one example, he said that he wanted to show how "the minor matters are dragged before the Politbureau" from the People's Commissariat. He then expressed his hope that the Congress

¹⁰⁷ These and all subsequent quotations are taken from Lenin, op. cit., Vol. XL (1963), pp. 237-239 and Vol. XLV (1964), pp. 113-114.

would adopt a resolution which would relieve the Politbureau of the minor matters and which would make government officials more responsible for their own work. But there are indications that this was not accomplished at least in subsequent years. As quoted earlier, Kurskii in his report to the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1927 said that each member of the Politbureau in the preceding year had to read 6,682 pages of material. If we take into account that each member held a post in the government, Party, or in any other organization, such a reading load appears to be quite heavy.

The enumeration of specific questions to be decided by the Politbureau appeared in the prepared plans of work for the years 1926 and 1928. The lists of questions shows that the decision-making power of the Politbureau was, indeed, very wide. In 1926 the Politbureau planned to decide 40 and in 1928, 20 different questions. They included the control figures for 1926-27, five year perspective plan, the implementation of the electrification plan, the condition of the war industry, the development of the credit system in the U.S.S.R., imports-exports, wages and work discipline, the work of the central institutions, the implementation of the revolutionary jurisprudence, the condition of the Red Army, the establishment of the state and collective farms, the Central and local Party apparatuses, the program of the Comintern, the defense of the country, radio and the movies, the political and state work in the Ukraine, Northern

Caucasus, and Moscow, state budget, and many others.¹⁰⁸

The two plans show that the majority of questions were in the area of Soviet economy. It is noticeable that neither plan provided for the Politbureau to decide questions of foreign affairs. This, however, does not mean that the Politbureau was not concerned with foreign affairs. On the contrary, the Soviet sources show that the Politbureau worked very closely with the People's Kommissariat of Foreign Affairs and decided many important questions. Lenin's works, for example, contain many letters addressed to the Politbureau in which he proposed what specific policies with regard to foreign countries should be decided. As early as 1923, when the Soviet Union was not yet extensively involved in foreign affairs, of all the questions the Politbureau decided, the questions of foreign affairs constituted 17.2 per cent, and this was only second to the percentage of economic questions (26.8%) which the Politbureau decided.¹⁰⁹

There is evidence in the Soviet sources which indicate that in later years the Politbureau was even more concerned with foreign policy of the Soviet Union. It can only be recalled that Stalin established the "sextet" within the Politbureau to deal specifically with foreign affairs, and that in 1968 it was the Politbureau which decided to invade Czechoslovakia.

¹⁰⁸ VKP(b) v Rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. II, 6th ed. (1940), pp. 100-102, 275-276.

¹⁰⁹ Towster, op. cit., p. 162.

Although no other Politbureau plan was ever published, the scattered information in the Soviet sources, usually in a passing form, indicates that the range of questions decided by the Politbureau after 1928 was not narrowed down. Such information was usually revealed in connection with the plenary sessions of the Central Committee. On such occasions, the plenums were sometimes asked to approve the Politbureau's report, or a resolution, or a specific action in domestic and foreign affairs. A few examples taken from such information would perhaps suffice to illustrate the scope of questions decided by the Politbureau in later years. Thus, the plenum which took place on October 28-31, 1931, adopted a resolution which read in part as follows:

Having heard the report of the NKPS (People's Kommissariat of Roads and Communications) the plenum of the C.C. considers the judgment and the conclusions of the Politbureau of October 5 of this year with respect to the operation of the railroad transportation to be correct and, in particular, it completely approves its decision to change the NKPS leadership.¹¹⁰

The joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission which took place on January 7-12, 1933, passed a resolution which stated:

The joint plenum of the C.C. and the C.C.C. approves the decision of the C.C. Politbureau on the purge of the Party during the year of 1933, and on the termination of admissions of the new members into the Party until the end of the purge.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ KPSS v Rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. III, 7th ed. (1954), p. 127.

¹¹¹ Ibid., Vol. II (1953), p. 741.

With Stalin's growth of power, we have less and less information of this kind. But it should be recalled that Khrushchev revealed that Stalin at one time created a number of Politbureau commissions to deal with various areas of public policies. Foreign affairs was specifically mentioned as belonging to "the sextet," but other areas such as economy or defense were, undoubtedly, assigned to other commissions.

After Stalin's death, more information was released about the activities of the Praesidium. Thus, for example, the Party sources revealed that L. P. Beria was expelled from the Central Committee and the Party "as an enemy of the Communist Party and the Soviet people" at the Central Committee plenum of July 2-7, 1953, "on the basis of the report of the C.C. Praesidium [read by] comrade G. M. Malenkov."¹¹² It is quite obvious that the Praesidium had reached that decision before the plenum took place.

Another example can be cited from later years. The Central Committee plenum of February 25-26, 1958, passed a resolution which in part declared:

To approve as correct and actual the proposal of the Praesidium of the C.C. on the question of continuous development of the collective farm structure and on the reorganization of the MTS along the line of fulfilling the decrees of the Twentieth Party Congress with respect to agricultural economy.¹¹³

¹¹²Ibid., p. 609.

¹¹³Ibid., Vol. IV (1960), p. 319. The plenum decided to sell the machinery of the MTS to the collective farms and replace MTS (Machine Tractor Stations) by RTS (Technical-Repairing Stations).

At still another plenum of the Central Committee which took place on June 24-29, 1959, to deal with the technological progress of the Soviet economy, Khrushchev very revealingly stated: "The Praesidium of the C.C. had considered it necessary to discuss this question at the plenum with a wide participation of the 'active'," i.e., officials from the local Party organizations.¹¹⁴

The methods of reaching decisions in the Politbureau (Praesidium) have always been kept secret. But again on various occasions some facts came to light which provide clues as to the inner working of this organ. The most notorious occasions were the struggles for power within the top elite. After Lenin's death, the conflict over the supremacy in the Party among the members of the top elite was made public. The membership policy in the Politbureau followed by Stalin indicates that at that time the majority rule was practiced in the Politbureau. This, of course, was natural due to the fact that the Politbureau was not as homogeneous as it came to be later when Stalin firmly established his supremacy. In 1923-1925 Stalin gradually brought into the Politbureau his supporters, such as Molotov, Voroshilov, Kuibyshev, Rudzutak, Dzierzhinskii, and Frunze. They were first admitted as candidates and then between 1925 and 1927 became (except for the last two) full members of the Politbureau. It is quite obvious that this recruitment

¹¹⁴Plenum Tsentralnogo Komiteta KPSS, 24-29 iunia, 1959 (Moskva: Gosspolitizdat, 1959), p. 5.

meant that Stalin wanted to secure his majority in the Politbureau. It is also a known fact to the historians of the Soviet Union that Stalin during this period, in order to have a majority, tried and won the support of Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomskii first against Trotskii and then against Zinoviev and Kamenev. To these two indications it can be added that at the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1925, during a heated debated, F. I. Goloshchekin in his speech said about Stalin's opponents: "Or they want another General Secretary? Having the majority in the Politbureau, they will appoint another Secretary. But they do not have such a majority and they never will."¹¹⁵ After Stalin's death, as it was noted before, it was also the majority in the Praesidium that tried unsuccessfully to unseat Khrushchev in 1957 from his post. It is not known whether the decision to oust him in 1964 was reached unanimously or by a majority.

During the time of organizational normalcy at least one more procedural option is open--unanimity. Khrushchev, in a response to the question of Catledge in a formerly quoted interview in 1957 said: "During the discussion, the members of the Praesidium usually arrive at a unanimous point of view. If on some question unanimity cannot be reached, the problem is decided by a simple majority vote." He also said that "different points of view are expressed" and "very heated debates sometimes arise" at the Praesidium

¹¹⁵XIV Sezd VKP(b) (1926), p. 401.

meetings. There is no reason to doubt this statement, for besides the majority rule and the unanimity (regardless of its nature) there is no other principal procedure to follow in making decisions. There are indications that under Lenin the majority rule prevailed. Speaking about the role of the Secretary at the Ninth Party Congress in 1920, Lenin said that the Secretary of the Central Committee implemented only those decisions which were adopted "collegially" and this probably meant by the majority of all members.¹¹⁶ But this is indicated more clearly in his letter to the Politbureau in which he suggested to give a negative answer to the international commission which tried to investigate the famine in Russia in 1921. He wrote that if members individually did not agree with his proposal, then the formal meeting of the Politbureau should be held next day.¹¹⁷ This implies that there was room for open disagreement in the Politbureau and, if such condition existed, the majority rule must have been practiced. It can be added that the decisions at the Party Congresses and the plenums of the Central Committee in earlier years were reached by a majority vote. Under such conditions it is natural to expect that the same procedure was followed in the Politbureau. Under Stalin, on the other hand, the unanimity characterized the work of the Politbureau. Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" is a good testimony of this.

¹¹⁶ Lenin, op. cit., Vol. XL (1963), pp. 238-239.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., Vol. XLIV, p. 116.



Indeed, under Stalin the unanimity was extolled as a symbol of a monolithic unity of the Party. Therefore, all Party and state gatherings always adopted their resolutions and policies unanimously.

The Organizational Bureau

The second new Party organ established by the Eighth Party Congress in 1919 was the Organizational Bureau or, in short, the Orgbureau. It was in charge of organizational work, or more specifically, the preparation and distribution of the Party officials to work both in the Party and state institutions. Although such broad functions required a large Orgbureau, or an extensive bureaucratic apparatus, the Orgbureau remained small from the beginning until its dissolution in 1952. It appears from the Soviet sources that it never developed its bureaucratic machine as, for example, the Secretariat did. The resolution which called for the establishment of the three new organs stated that the Orgbureau was to consist of 5 members of the Central Committee,"each being in charge of a proper section of work."¹¹⁸ However, the areas of work of each member were never revealed. Because many members of the Central Committee, including those of the Orgbureau, were dispatched quite frequently to work outside Moscow in connection with the Civil War, the membership of the Orgbureau in 1919

¹¹⁸ KPSS v Rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. I, 5th ed. (1936), p. 313.

changed several times. Ten persons were reported to have been members of the Orgbureau at different times in 1919. At the Eighth Party Conference, Krestinskii reported that after these changes the Orgbureau was formed to include members who stayed most of the time in Moscow. This size was against the still binding resolution which limited the Orgbureau to 5 members. The seven members were identified by Krestinskii as follows: L. B. Kamenev, N. N. Krestinskii, L. D. Trotskii, E. D. Stasova, F. I. Dzerzhinskii, Kh. G. Rakovskii, and M. I. Kalinin.¹¹⁹ In later years, the Orgbureau was slightly expanded, reaching the maximum size of 11 members and 5 candidates in 1925. Afterwards it was gradually reduced until in 1939 it had only 9 full members. In 1946, however, it was enlarged to 15 full members. It is difficult to determine the Orgbureau's size on the eve of its dissolution, but most probably it had no more than 15 members. The Table below, based on the same sources used earlier for the Politbureau Table, shows the numerical composition of the Orgbureau.

TABLE 5
NUMERICAL COMPOSITION OF THE ORGBUREAU

Year	Members	Candidates
March 1919	5	
December 1919	7	
April 1923	7	
December 1925	11	4
July 1930	11	5
February 1934	10	4
March 1939	9	2
March 1946	15	

¹¹⁹ Vosmaia Konferentsiia RKP(b): Protokoly (1961), p. 221.

From the very beginning the Secretary of the Central Committee was a member of the Orgbureau, just as he was of the Politbureau. This arrangement was motivated in 1919 by the need to provide a coordination and consistency between the work of the two organs. This practice was not abandoned even after the Secretariat had grown in power to the extent of practically supplanting the Orgbureau. In addition to Krestinskii, E.A. Preobrazhenskii and L. R. Serebriakov, upon becoming secretaries in 1920, were automatically elected to the Orgbureau. Stalin was a member of both the Politbureau and the Orgbureau all the time, except for a short interruption in the latter body at the end of 1919. Obviously, since he became General Secretary in 1922, he was also automatically elected a member of the Orgbureau. But it should be noted that since that time not all Secretaries were members of the Orgbureau. Some of the members or candidates of the Politbureau and the Secretariat elected at different times between 1919 and 1952 to the Orgbureau either as members or candidates were: V. M. Molotov, P. P. Postyshev, N. M. Shvernik, I. M. Moskvyn, K. Ia. Bauman, S. M. Kirov, A. A. Zhdanov, V. V. Kuibyshev, A. A. Andreev, and G. M. Malenkov. Since they were members of two Party organs at the same time, they can be considered as having been the most powerful individuals in the top elite.

The internal structure and the method of reaching decisions in the Orgbureau were always kept secret. On

the basis of the above quoted resolution of 1919 which stated that each member was supposed to be in charge of certain areas of work, we can guess that the division of work was established in the Orgbureau. But we have no clues to even speculate about the hierarchy or power structure within the Orgbureau because the areas of work or the position each member held in this body were never mentioned in the consulted sources. We do not know if the Orgbureau had its chairman, although in view of the fact that both the Politbureau and the Secretariat had such officers, such a possibility cannot be excluded. We are equally in the dark in regard to the method of reaching decisions, but again, following the practice of the Politbureau, it can be surmised that the Orgbureau also used the majority-unanimity rules. The lack of information on all these aspects of the Orgbureau was found not only in the consulted sources but also in the works of many Western scholars who had access to a great number of the Party sources. Such careful authors, for example, as Schapiro and Fainsod in their works quoted earlier, say practically nothing about the power structure or the method of decision-making of the Orgbureau, although their bibliography of Soviet sources is impressively rich. Indeed, their discussion of the Orgbureau is very brief. There is no doubt that if they had found more information on the Orgbureau, they would have used it as they had done in the

case of the Politbureau and the Secretariat. This lack of information can be attributed to the general policy of the top elite to maintain secrecy with regard to its internal work, and to the fact that the Orgbureau from the beginning held the secondary status in relation to the Politbureau, and later also to the Secretariat.

The Orgbureau was primarily a decision-making organ in the area of organizational work. The resolution of 1919, which had established it, provided for the Orgbureau to meet no less than three times a week and to make a report of its work before the Central Committee plenum every two weeks. As was quoted earlier, Krestinskii reported in December 1919 that between March and December of the same year the Orgbureau had 110 meetings and 19 joint meetings with the Politbureau. Between December 1919 and the end of March 1920 it had 22 meetings. This means that within the full year the Orgbureau had 132 meetings of its own, averaging less than three meetings a week. Later resolutions and Party Statutes did not mention how often the Orgbureau was supposed to meet. The resolution adopted at the Twelfth Party Congress in 1923 declared (as in the case of the Politbureau) that 3 representatives (from the Praesidium) of the Central Control Commission had a right to attend the meetings of the Orgbureau, but it did not mention anything about their voting rights.¹²⁰ It will

¹²⁰ KPSS v Rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. I, 7th ed. (1954), p. 725.

be recalled from the discussion of the Politbureau that this resolution was in line with Lenin's policy to have members of the Central Control Commission at the meetings of both organs in order to decrease the possibility of a split within the Party and, through their participation in the decision-making process, make all three organs more cooperative and efficient. How long this rule was in force is difficult to determine.

The same resolution also provided that members of the krai and oblast bureaus, as well as those secretaries of the gubernia who were invited to read the reports, had a right to attend the meetings of the Orgbureau but only with consultative voice. Again, no information is available to show that all these Party officials really attended the meetings of the Orgbureau. However, as far as the invited reporters are concerned, the Orgbureau plan of work for 1925 and 1931 provided for many officials from oblast, krai, and even from raion Party organizations to read the reports at the Orgbureau meetings on the assigned topics.

The scope of decision-making of the Orgbureau was very broad in spite of the fact that many areas within its jurisdiction, as those that logically should have fallen within its jurisdiction, were gradually, but rather rapidly, taken over by the Secretariat. The resolutions and the Statutes identified only the nature of its functions not mentioning at all its specific tasks or the areas of activity.

The resolution of March 1919 (Eighth Congress) declared very generally that "The Orgbureau directs all the organizational work of the Party."¹²¹ The Statute adopted in December 1919 stated even more generally that the Orgbureau was set up by the Central Committee "for organizational work."¹²² These formulations were slightly but significantly changed in 1920. The resolution passed at the Ninth Party Congress of that year, as well as all the Statutes since then, declared that the Orgbureau was established "for general direction of the organizational work" of the Party.¹²³ Here the word "general" was added and the word "all" from the 1919 resolution was not included. These seemingly minor changes really reflected the growing engagement of the Secretariat in the organizational work and the diminishing power of the Orgbureau.

More precise functions of the Orgbureau were revealed by Lenin, Krestinskii, and Kurskii in their reports to the Congresses. A discussion of the organizational problems at these gatherings as well as the published information on the reorganization of the Party apparatus in various years also throw some light on the Orgbureau's activities. Lenin in his report to the Ninth Congress in 1920 gave a brief, but at the same time very succinct, formulation of the Orgbureau's function. He said that

¹²¹Ibid., 5th ed. (1936), p. 313.

¹²²Ibid., p. 327.

¹²³Ibid., 6th ed. (1941), p. 344.

"the practice had developed that the main and real task of the Orgbureau was the distribution of the Party forces. . . ." ¹²⁴

He did not elaborate on this statement but instead went on to argue that it was not possible to separate the organizational work from the political. Krestinskii in his report to the Eighth Party Conference in December 1919 touched upon this question in a very revealing way. He said that the distribution of the Party forces in the army and also the establishment of the leadership over the Party organizations in the army was done with a "close contact of the Secretariat under the general direction of the Orgbureau." ¹²⁵

In another report read to the Ninth Congress in 1920, he devoted a few more sentences to the work of the Orgbureau, although still picturing it only in general contours. First of all, he revealed an interesting practice that "many questions" which belonged to the Central Committee were transferred to the Orgbureau for decision because the former could not meet regularly. Consequently, he said, the Orgbureau decided many questions which "under different conditions it would not have dealt with." ¹²⁶ He further described the work of the Orgbureau as follows:

If you look at the minutes of the Orgbureau, you will see that all kinds of questions, including

¹²⁴ Lenin, op. cit., Vol. XL, p. 237.

¹²⁵ Vosmaia Konferentsiia RKP(b): Protokoly (1961), p. 220.

¹²⁶ Deviatyi Sezd RKP(b): Protokoly (1960), p. 38.

purely government ones, sometimes even inadequately prepared, were placed before the Orgbureau for its decision. But gradually, month after month, the work of the Orgbureau was becoming more organized and planned; the questions were more often prepared, and those belonging to the government were dropped from the agenda, leaving only those which could not have been agreed upon by the government, or which required the principal decision.¹²⁷

A little more information was given by Kurskii in a report of the Central Control Commission to the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1925. He revealed that the Orgbureau was working for the first time on the basis of its plan of work. According to him, there were two such plans for the year 1925: one prepared in January and another in September 1925. The first contained 23 questions to be discussed and decided and the second 16. Kurskii stated that the first plan was completely "fulfilled" and the second only partially so due to the interruption caused by the preparation for the Fourteenth Congress. He did not enumerate all the questions, but he mentioned some of them which give a pretty good idea of the work of the Orgbureau. From the first plan he cited the question of internal Party construction, the registration and the distribution of the Party works, the intensification of the preparation of the Party workers in the villages, the trade union in the villages, and leadership in the field of publication. He also mentioned a few other questions but in general terms. These included the Soviet construction in the national

¹²⁷ Ibid.

republics, education, military construction, and others. From the second plan Kurskii only named "the question of the Party internal leadership and the reports of 9 local Party organizations" but without identifying them.¹²⁸

Some indications as to the nature of the Orgbureau functions can also be found in the Politbureau's plan for 1926. The plan expected the Orgbureau to prepare 8 reports which included the following topics: the control of the fulfillment of the Party's instructions concerning the practice of industrial counselling, the election of the Soviets, the formation of the non-Party peasant active, the intensification of work of the Soviets, cooperatives, and the government institutions in the villages, the question of the revolutionary jurisprudence, the question of the cooperatives, the work of the Village Council, its cadres and their specialization, the control of the implementation of the Party directives concerning the internal democracy of the Party, and finally, the central and local Party apparatuses and their connections with the state organs.¹²⁹ Obviously, all these questions were decided by the Politbureau but the fact that the Orgbureau made reports on them indicates that they also were in the area of the Orgbureau's concern.

¹²⁸ XIV Sezd VKP(b) (1926), pp. 87-88.

¹²⁹ VKP(b) v Rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. II, 6th ed. (1940), pp. 100-101.

However, the best source of information on the scope of the Orgbureau's functions was its plan of work for 1931, the only one ever published in the Soviet press. It embraced 9 major areas and 8 sub-areas: industry, agriculture, transportation, finances, supply and grain storing, trade unions and the Soviets, cadres and their work, culture and the press, and the internal Party work. The area of industry was subdivided into metalurgy, fuel and energy, chemistry, automobile and tractor production, agricultural machine building, and forest industry. The transportation area was also divided into the railroad construction industry and the water and sea transportation industry. The nature of the tasks of the Orgbureau in each of these areas was similar in many cases. In order to avoid repetition, it is useful to summarize them in the form of the following points: the control of the fulfillment of the Central Committee's directives; the improvement of the Party and trade unions work in several industrial establishments; the preparation (training) and the allocation of the engineering and technical cadres in all industrial establishments and agricultural areas; the strengthening of the Party leadership in many industrial and agricultural places of work; the improvement of mass work in several areas; and finally, the reorganization of the scientific and research works and the preparation of

the scientists and the researchers.¹³⁰ It can be said very briefly that the function of the Orgbureau was to prepare and to distribute the Party's professional cadres to meet the needs of industrialization - collectivization of the country.

The Orgbureau plan provided that before a final decision could be reached, the particular tasks in each area were to be thoroughly discussed first. At least one report on each topic was to be delivered by the professional "experts" from various economic establishments which were directly affected by the tasks under consideration. In addition, as a matter of rule, another report on the same topic was to be read by the Party secretaries of the krai, oblast, or raion Party organizations (occasionally also by the secretaries of the Party units in a given place of work) whose localities were also directly affected by the tasks under discussion. It is obvious that this arrangement was based on the idea of getting complete information on the economic and political conditions in the enumerated areas before decisions could be made. It is also logical to assume that the top leaders were interested in suggestions coming from below. In addition, it is very probable that by inviting the local professional experts and Party officials to read their reports and participate in the discussion of various problems on the highest level, the

¹³⁰ Partiynoe Stroitelstvo, No. 5 (March 1931), pp. 14-20.

top elite intended to boost their egos and encourage them to work harder in order to fulfill the first Five Year Plan.

After 1931 not much information was published about the Orgbureau's operation. Only occasionally brief notes appeared in the Soviet press, usually in connection with the decision or work of another Party organ. Such was the case, for example, in 1935 when the plenum of the Central Committee formally instructed the Orgbureau to issue an explanatory note to all local Party secretaries concerning the method and technique for the exchange of the Party's identification cards.¹³¹ Undoubtedly, the Orgbureau continued to deal with questions of organizational nature, but their range was gradually narrowed down as the Secretariat became more and more concerned with the organizational questions of the Party.

In conclusion, it can be said that in spite of its importance in the early years of the Soviet regime, the Orgbureau was from the very beginning lower in status than the Politbureau and in later years, lower than the Secretariat. This was reflected, for example, in the resolution passed by the Twelfth Party Congress in 1923 which declared that the members of the Politbureau had a right to appeal to the Politbureau against the decision of the Orgbureau.¹³²

¹³¹ KPSS v Rezoliutsiakh, Vol. III, 7th ed. (1954), p. 828.

¹³² Ibid., Vol. I (1954), p. 725.

This means that the Politbureau could reverse the decision of the Orgbureau. It was also reflected in the developed usage (discussed earlier) that any organizational question, upon the demand of any one member of the Central Committee, could have been considered as a political question and, consequently, decided by the Politbureau. It is also significant that Lenin, who enjoyed great prestige among the Party members, was not a member of the Orgbureau but that of the Politbureau.

However, the decline of power of the Orgbureau and its eventual dissolution was not the result of its lower status (although this factor might have played a contributing role) but rather of the growth of power of the Secretariat. From the very beginning the Secretariat began to encroach upon the area of jurisdiction of the Orgbureau. In accordance with the resolution of March 1919, the Secretariat organized several departments or sections. Among them were the Account and Assignment Department (Uchraspred) and the Organization-Instruction Department (Orgotdel). Both were given responsibilities in the areas of organizational work. The first was in charge of collecting data on the Party members and of making appointments and transfers of Party's personnel, and the second was responsible for establishing the local Party apparatuses and for supervising their activities. These two departments underwent many changes since they were established--they were fused, one time abolished, and then again re-established in a

different form and under a different name. Throughout these changes, however, the Secretariat's organizational powers grew and that of the Orgbureau declined. In 1952 it was finally dissolved. Khrushchev in his report to the Nineteenth Party Congress (1952) on the changes of the Party Statute gave the following reason for its dissolution:

As experience has shown, it is better to concentrate the current organizational work of the Central Committee in one organ--the Secretariat, and in this connection there is no need to have the Orgbureau of the C.C.¹³³

The Secretariat

The Secretariat of the Central Committee was first established at the "April Conference" in 1917 and then re-established in a strengthened form at the Eighth Party Congress in March 1919. It has become the central administrative body of the Party which directs and controls the entire Party organization. It has also become the executive organ of the Politbureau, particularly when the latter was manifestly strong as under Lenin, immediately after Stalin's death, and as it probably is at the present time. In addition, it has become the most influential organ in the formulation of the Party's domestic and foreign policies. In short, it can be said that the Secretariat has become the nerve center of the Party. Its functions and powers were developing under several favorable conditions: the struggle for survival of the

¹³³Pravda, October 13, 1952.

regime during the Civil War when the need to expand the apparatus' control over the entire Party was urgent; the strong personality of General Secretary Stalin and his determination to become the supreme leader within the top elite after Lenin's death; and, finally, the top elite's policy, since the 1920's, to control all aspects of public life in the Soviet Union. The Secretariat, as an operational body, was most suitable to implement those goals but in order to do so, it needed to be strengthened.

From the "April Conference" in 1917 until March 1919 the Secretary of the Central Committee was Iakub M. Sverdlov, the so-called "committee man" during the underground period, who had an inclination toward the organizational work. Lenin in his report to the Ninth Party Congress in 1920 praised him for his exceptional ability "to unite the political and organizational work."¹³⁴ This evaluation quite clearly indicates that the Secretariat under Sverdlov was concerned both with the political and organizational questions. However, the extent of this dual function remains rather obscure. There are practically no records of its operation, primarily because of Sverdlov's unbureaucratic style of work based on a personal involvement in all affairs. In addition, he had no sufficient bureaucratic apparatus at his disposal to keep records and prepare the reports. Krestinskii reported to the Eighth Conference in December 1919 that at the time of the Eighth Congress in March 1919, the Secretariat had

¹³⁴ Lenin, op. cit., Vol. XL, p. 237.

not been divided into departments and it had only 15 workers.¹³⁵ With such a small staff, Sverdlov's Secretariat could not have expanded operationally (as was the case after 1919) even if it had used the government's bureaucracy for the Party's work, as Schapiro suggests in his book, for the latter at that time was also small.¹³⁶

In March 1919, just before the Eighth Congress took place, Sverdlov unexpectedly died. The Congress then established the Secretariat in a modified form. The adopted resolution declared: "The Secretariat of the Central Committee consists of one responsible secretary and five technical secretaries selected from among the experienced Party workers." In addition, the resolution allowed the Secretariat to organize "a number of departments" to deal with the work in various fields of the Party's concern.¹³⁷ This passage in the resolution had far reaching consequences: it opened the gates for the Secretariat to develop a huge bureaucracy and to expand its powers. The first secretary under the new rules was Nikolai N. Krestinskii, a man who proved to be neither enthusiastic about his position, as

¹³⁵ Vosmaia Konferentsiia RKP(b): Protokoly (1961), p. 221.

¹³⁶ Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), p. 243. Sverdlov was also Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Congress of Soviets.

¹³⁷ Vosmoi Sezd RKP(b): Protokoly (1959), p. 425.

Sverdlov had been, nor interested in personal power, as Stalin proved to be in the 1920's. The Party sources indicate that he performed his duties correctly, executing the decisions of the Politbureau and the Orgbureau as it had been arranged in the process of work after the Eighth Party Congress.

The needs of the Party in the turbulent years of the Civil War in Russia must have exceeded the physical capabilities of one secretary to cope with the multiple problems facing the Party, for the next Congress in 1920 added two more secretaries to the Secretariat. After the Congress, the Central Committee elected the following secretaries: N. N. Krestinskii, E. A. Preobrazhenskii, and L. P. Serebriakov. At the Tenth Congress the next year, however, evidently because of their support of the so-called "workers' opposition" against Lenin, they were not elected to the Central Committee and, consequently, lost their posts in the Secretariat. The new secretaries were V. M. Molotov, E. Yaroslavskii, and V. Mikhailov. Yet the most fateful change in the Secretariat took place immediately after the Eleventh Party Congress in 1922. Pravda of April 4, 1922, published the following announcement:

The Central Committee elected by the Eleventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party has approved the Secretariat of the Central Committee in the following composition: comrade Stalin (General Secretary), comrade Molotov, and comrade Kuibyshev.

The title "General Secretary" was introduced for the first time in the Party and it meant the leadership of the

Secretariat as well as of the entire Party. Stalin was honored to assume this post. Both Molotov and Kuibyshev were strong supporters of Stalin. Having them in the Secretariat, he was able to develop his apparatus and expand his control over the Party's machinery. Eventually, this machinery enabled him to defeat his competitors for supremacy in the top elite. After 1922, the number of secretaries increased but it never remained constant for a long period of time. In 1925 the Secretariat consisted of 5 secretaries and 2 candidates but in 1934 and 1939, of only 4 secretaries. In 1952, when the Politbureau was transformed into the Praesidium of 25 members, the Secretariat had 10 secretaries, but following Stalin's death in 1953, it was reduced to 5 secretaries. The eleven secretaries elected after the Twenty Third Party Congress in April 1966 comprised the largest number the Secretariat ever had before, but in 1971 their number was reduced to 10. The following Table, based on the same sources used earlier regarding the Politbureau and the Orgbureau, gives a more complete picture of the numerical strength of the Secretariat.

TABLE 6
NUMERICAL COMPOSITION OF THE SECRETARIAT

Year	Members	Candidates
March 1919	1 (plus 5 technical secretaries)	
April 1920	3	
August 1922	3	
December 1925	5	2
December 1927	5	3
July 1930	5	2
February 1934	4	
March 1946	5	
October 1952	10	
March 1953	5	
February 1956	8	
July 1957	9	
October 1961	9	
April 1966	11	
April 1971	10	

Among the secretaries who held their posts for the longest period of time, in addition to J. V. Stalin, were: V. M. Molotov, V. V. Kuibyshev, L. M. Kaganovich, S. M. Kirov, A. A. Zhdanov, G. M. Malenkov, N. S. Khrushchev, B. N. Ponomarev, M. A. Suslov, and L. N. Brezhnev. To be sure, some of them, like Molotov and Brezhnev, were secretaries with interruption.

Not much information is available about the specific function or functions each secretary had to perform. In many cases, particularly after Stalin's death, the Soviet sources identified the secretaries as heads of the departments, but usually without naming the departments. Only occasionally they revealed both the department and the secretary who headed it. Schapiro, discussing the election of three secretaries in 1920, writes that "Each of these secretaries became responsible for a group of Central Committee departments" without, however, mentioning which

departments were headed by each secretary. He is more specific about the secretaries of 1939. Based on the identified sources, Schapiro writes that in 1939 Secretary Malenkov was head of the Cadres Administration Department and at the same time supervised the industry and transport in the country (in 1939 the Industry and Transport Departments within the Secretariat were abolished). Another Secretary, Zhdanov, was head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department and Andreev, of the Agricultural Department.¹³⁸

As far as more recent times are concerned, according to the researchers of the U. S. Department of State, in 1966 four secretaries were heads of specific departments: F. D. Kulakov of the Agricultural Department, A. P. Rudakov of Heavy Industry, Yu. V. Andropov of the Liaison with the Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, and I. V. Kapitonov of the Party Organizational Work Department. According to the same source, Kulakov and Kapitonov remained in 1968 heads of the same departments, but Rudakov was replaced by M. S. Solomentsev who had become a secretary in 1966. Secretary B. N. Ponomarev was head of the International Department since 1957.¹³⁹

Studying the educational background of the last group, it appears that the departments they headed corresponded

¹³⁸ Schapiro, op. cit., pp. 240, 450, 492.

¹³⁹ U. S. Department of State, Directory of Soviet Officials, Vol. 1--USSR and RSFSR, A 66-5, February 1966 and A 65-5, January 1968.

with their formal educational training. Thus, Kulakov received his education in agriculture; Rudakov, in engineering; Kapitonov, in communication engineering; Solomentsev, in engineering; and Ponomarev, in "social science." The picture, however, is different with the 1939 secretaries. Malenkov obtained his education in engineering (indeed, he was the only one in the entire top elite of 1939 with a degree in engineering) but because of many years of work in the Party apparatus, he received experience in organizational matters. Andreev had only an elementary education but, like Malenkov, he became familiar with the agricultural problems in the course of his work in the Party apparatus. It is difficult to establish whether Zhdanov received higher education, but his great interest in ideology in the 1930's, in addition to the organizational work, made him fit to head the Propaganda and Agitation Department. Excluding the years under Lenin, the further back we go, the more men like Andreev and perhaps Zhdanov we will find in the Secretariat. This leads to the conclusion that from the 1920's through the 1940's, loyalty and experience were the determining factors in appointing heads of particular departments, while in the 1950's and 1960's, when the Party had already produced highly trained cadres in many fields, loyalty and education became of prime importance.

It should be noted that there were always more departments than there were secretaries. It is possible that in some cases one secretary headed two or more departments,

or at least supervised their work. But it is an established fact that many departments were headed by non-secretaries. Krestinskii mentioned in his report in December 1919 that the Records and Assignment Department was headed by Maksimovskii, who was neither a secretary nor even a member of the Central Committee. In 1968, according to the above-quoted State Department source, only 4 departments were headed by secretaries and there were at that time 23 departments. Of the 19 remaining heads of the departments, 3 were full members and 6 candidate members of the Central Committee, 7 were members of the Central Auditing Commission, and 3 of neither. There is no doubt that these heads, together with their deputies and chairmen of various sections into which many departments were subdivided, were bureaucrats and experts in their respective fields.

Nothing is known about the internal structure or hierarchy of the positions within the Secretariat except, of course, for the fact that the Secretariat has been headed by a General (First) Secretary since 1922, with a brief interruption in 1953. Obviously, when Krestinskii was a one-man secretary, the question of division of authority did not exist, but it emerged in 1920 when three secretaries were elected and none of them was designated as head of the Secretariat. Schapiro, in reference to this case, writes that the following solution was found:

. . . it became established that matters of sufficient importance to require decision by one of the secretaries but not warranting the attention even of the Orgbureau should be settled on the basis of consultation between

the three secretaries. Thus the Secretariat became a board.¹⁴⁰

When Stalin became General Secretary, this arrangement, undoubtedly, changed because he was the legal head of the Secretariat. It is interesting to note that Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar for 1955 carries a biography of Stalin containing the statement that he was not General Secretary from the Nineteenth Congress (1952) until his death in 1953 but merely a secretary. The same source states that no one else was elected General Secretary.¹⁴¹ If this is true, then judging Stalin by his whole career there should be no doubt that he continued to perform the functions of General Secretary informally.¹⁴² But more interesting was the "interregnum" in the Secretariat which developed after his death. From March until September 1953 no one was elected to head the Secretariat. The Central Committee decree of March 7 declared that it was "necessary for comrade N. S. Khrushchev to concentrate on the work of the Central Committee", most probably in the Secretariat. On March 14 he was elected as secretary but at that time Suslov, a

¹⁴⁰Schapiro, op. cit., pp. 240-241.

¹⁴¹Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar (Moskva: Gussudarstvennoe Nauchnoe Izdatelstvo "Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia," 1955), Vol. III, p. 310.

¹⁴²Stalin had his personal Secretariat probably since the 1930's headed by Alexander N. Poskrebyshev but nothing is known about its functions and powers.

well known ideologist, was also a secretary.¹⁴³ It is difficult to establish for certain who of the two men dominated the Secretariat but, judging Khrushchev by his aggressive nature as well as by the fact that he was elected First Secretary (the title "General Secretary" was dropped) on September 7, it was probably he who played the role of a First Secretary, or at least was primus inter pares in the Secretariat. After his election he remained First Secretary until October 15, 1964, when, through a skillful coup d'etat, he was replaced by Brezhnev. The Twenty Third Party Congress restored the title "General Secretary" and following the Congress, the Central Committee re-elected Brezhnev head of the Secretariat under Stalin's former title.

Out of necessity, the Secretariat has its clerical or technical staff. Kurskii mentioned this in his report to the Fourteenth Congress in 1925 and called this staff "the Bureau of the Secretariat."¹⁴⁴ It is not known whether the name "bureau" was retained or dropped in later years, but it can be certain that due to sheer need such an office remained in existence.

The methods of work, as well as many other aspects of the Secretariat, are also covered with a shield of secrecy. Kurskii stated in the report referred to above that in the preceding year the Secretariat held its meetings

¹⁴³ KPSS v Rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. III, 7th ed. (1954), pp. 607-611.

¹⁴⁴ XIV Sezd VKP(b) (1926), p. 92.

once a week. Undoubtedly, this practice was changed in later years because the Secretariat, as an operational body, had to deal with many problems as they arose in daily life.

There is less secrecy regarding the functions and powers of the Secretariat. The Soviet sources show very clearly that the Secretariat grew into a directing and controlling giant of the entire Party machinery. A resolution passed at the Eighth Party Congress in March 1919 (which called for the establishment of the three new organs) did not even mention the functions of the Secretariat. The new Party Statute adopted at the Eighth Conference in December 1919 declared, very generally, that both the Orgbureau and the Secretariat were responsible "for organizational work."¹⁴⁵ A year later, however, the Ninth Party Congress divided the "organizational work" between the two organs by empowering the Secretariat to deal with "current questions of an organizational and executive nature" and by leaving the Orgbureau in charge of "the general direction of the organizational work of the Central Committee."¹⁴⁶ This division of authority resulted, intentionally or unintentionally, in the strengthening of the Secretariat and the weakening of the Orgbureau. It should be recalled that at the same time three secretaries were elected instead of one, as was the case in 1919. The above formulation of the division of functions was incorporated word for word into all subsequent Statutes

¹⁴⁵ VKP(b) v Rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. I, 5th ed. (1936), p. 327.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid. (6th ed., 1941), p. 344.

until 1952, when the Orgbureau was abolished and the Secretariat assumed the responsibility for all organizational works of the Party. At first the Secretariat was subservient to the Orgbureau and the Politbureau. Its function then was to provide a coordination and consistency of work between the Politbureau and the Orgbureau as well as to execute the decisions of both. For this reason Secretary Kréstiniskii was elected a member of both bureaus. Lenin, in his report to the Ninth Party Congress in 1920, explained the role of the Secretariat in relation to other two organs as follows:

The work of both bureaus in general proceeded harmoniously, and practical fulfillment was facilitated by the presence of the Secretary who completely and exclusively executed the will of the Central Committee. In order to avoid all misunderstandings, it should be emphasized from the very beginning that only collegial decisions of the Central Committee adopted in the Orgbureau or the Politbureau, or in the plenum of the Central Committee--exclusively such matters were carried out by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party.¹⁴⁷

While Lenin was describing the subservient role of the Secretariat, it was already in the process of transformation toward a more independent and more powerful organ of the Party: its bureaucracy was growing, its eight departments were already in existence, and its functions were multiplying. When Stalin became General Secretary, the seeds of its expansion had been already sown, and he took great care that they grew well. Less than nine months after Stalin had assumed his post, Lenin in his so-called

¹⁴⁷ Lenin, op. cit., Vol. XL, p. 238.

"Testament" of December 1922 wrote that "Stalin had concentrated in his hands unlimited power" and that he was not sure if Stalin would use it properly.¹⁴⁸ Although this statement was a criticism of Stalin personally, it also reflected the power of the Secretariat.

One indication of the Secretariat's growth of power was the growth of the bureaucratic staff. As noted earlier, Krestinskii reported in December 1919 that at the time of the Eighth Party Congress in March 1919 the Secretariat had 15 workers, and at the time of his report it had "over 80 comrades."¹⁴⁹ In March 1920, at the time of the Ninth Congress, the staff workers had been increased to 150 persons and a year later (March 1921) to 602 men plus 140 messengers and guards.¹⁵⁰ In 1925 Kurskii, in the above-quoted report to the Fourteenth Congress, said that the apparatus of the Secretariat had 767 workers. We do not have statistics for the later years but, on the basis of the enhanced bureaucratization of the Party in general, we can assume that the bureaucratic staff of the Secretariat had greatly increased since 1925.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁸ Lenin, op. cit., Vol. XLV, p. 345.

¹⁴⁹ Vosmaia Konferentsiia RKP(b): Protokoly (1961), p. 221.

¹⁵⁰ Quoted in Edward H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, Vol. I (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1950), p. 211.

¹⁵¹ The extent of bureaucratization of the Party can be seen from Stalin's speech to the Central Committee Plenum in 1937 who said that there were in the Party about 3,000 to 4,000 first rank leaders, about 30,000 to 40,000 middle rank leaders, and about 100,000 to 150,000 lower rank leaders. Quoted in Fainsod, op. cit., p. 178.

The open debates in the 1920's between Stalin and his opponents over the supremacy in the Party also revealed a great expansion of functions and powers of the Secretariat. Stalin's competitors were very much concerned over his accumulation of power, and they wanted to reduce it by reducing the power of the Secretariat in general. In 1925 at the Fourteenth Party Congress, during a heated debate, Zinoviev revealed that in 1923, when Lenin was ill, he met with the Party leaders (Bukharin, Voroshilov, Ordzhonikidze, Lashevich, and Evdokimov) at their vacation resort near Kislovodsk and presented two alternatives designed to limit the power of the Secretariat. The first called for making the Secretariat a purely technical organ of the Politbureau, while the second called for making it a political organ, something like a "small" Politbureau. After the discussion they agreed upon the second alternative with the stipulation that the Secretariat would be made responsible to the three Politbureau members--Stalin, Trotskii, and either Kamenev, Bukharin, or Zinoviev. Stalin, upon receiving this plan, replied by a telegram and later came personally from Moscow to discuss it with Zinoviev and his supporters. He proposed that the Secretariat remained intact and that, instead, three Politbureau members be added to the Orgbureau in order "to coordinate the organizational and political work." This solution was supposed to prevent the Secretariat from expanding into the areas of organizational and political works. Stalin's

proposal was adopted and Trotskii, Bukharin, and Zinoviev were made members of the Orgbureau. But, as Zinoviev himself admitted, nothing came out of it because he attended the Orgbureau meetings only "once or twice" and the other two members, not even once.¹⁵²

The question of power of the Secretariat was openly debated at the same Congress where Kamenev waged the sharpest attack on Stalin and his Secretariat. He made several revealing statements which in part read as follows:

We are against the creation of a "vozhd." We are against the situation where the Secretariat, uniting in itself the organizational and political works, is above the political organ. We cannot consider it as normal when the Secretariat, having united in itself the political and organizational work, in fact predetermines political decisions. We are in favor of a real sovereignty of the Politbureau which would unite all political leaders of our Party and to whom the Secretariat would be subordinated, technically executing its decisions.¹⁵³

Sokolnikov argued along the same line. He said, among other things, that under Lenin the Politbureau had decided all political questions, but now it was the Secretariat which was doing the same thing. He was opposed to Stalin's membership in the Politbureau and wanted to see the Secretariat as an "executive organ" of both the Politbureau and the Orgbureau.¹⁵⁴ In his final speech, Zinoviev

¹⁵² XIV Sezd VKP(b) (1926), pp. 455-457.

¹⁵³ Ibid., p. 274.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 335.

proposed that the Central Committee be instructed to separate the functions of the Politbureau, the Orgbureau, and the Secretariat "from the point of view of the sovereignty of the Politbureau and the servicing subordination of the Secretariat to it."¹⁵⁵ The criticism and proposals of Stalin's opponents were rejected by the majority of the delegates to the Congress who, undoubtedly, were selected by the apparatus of the Secretariat.

From the Soviet sources it appears that after Stalin's death, there was another attempt to limit the power of the Secretariat. For example, the fact that no General Secretary was elected between March and September 1953 could have meant just that. But much clearer indications of such an attempt were two articles published in the Party organs in 1955. For a better understanding of these articles, it should be recalled that Malenkov "left" the Secretariat in March 1953 and "resigned" as Prime Minister in February 1955. This situation strengthened the position of Khrushchev. However, he still was not the supreme leader because his opponents Malenkov, Molotov, and others continued to be members of the Praesidium. Most probably they were alarmed by Khrushchev's growth of power and, in their drive to stop him, made it possible for these two articles to be published. G. I. Petrovskii, an old Bolshevik, Commissar of Internal Affairs under Lenin, a candidate member of the

¹⁵⁵Ibid., p. 468.

Politbureau since 1930, the victim of "great purges" in the late 1930's and then rehabilitated after Stalin's death, published an article-memoir about Lenin in Pravda of April 20, 1955. The article was neither highly sophisticated nor very revealing but it ended with the following statement which was very significant under the circumstances: "Lenin taught us collegiality in work, frequently reminding us that all members of the Politbureau are equal and that the Secretary is elected to carry out the decisions of the Central Committee." Two other authors published an article in the Party's theoretical journal Kommunist, also in April of the same year. After stating that Lenin had always consulted on all important Party and state questions with the members of the Central Committee, the government's officials, and even with the "ordinary workers," they quoted Lenin word for word from his report to the Ninth Party Congress (quoted here earlier) that the Secretariat had carried out only the collegial decisions of the Politbureau and the Orgbureau.¹⁵⁶ Apparently, these two articles were an indirect attack on Khrushchev. But the campaign to prevent Khrushchev from becoming too powerful failed as had a more open campaign against Stalin in the 1920's, primarily because both leaders had the Party apparatus behind them.

Perhaps the best indication of the expansion of functions

¹⁵⁶ L. Slepov and G. Shitarev, "Leninskie Normy Partiinoi Zhizni i Printsipi Partiinogo Rukovodstva," Kommunist, No. 6 (April 1955), p. 66.

and powers of the Secretariat has been its departments. Their names and functions resemble very closely the ministries of the Soviet government. As stated earlier, a resolution of the Eighth Congress in 1919 allowed the Secretariat to establish various departments. According to Krestinskii, by December 1919 there were "eight regularly functioning" departments within the Secretariat: General, Finance, Information (Informotdel), Organization-Instruction (Orgotdel), Records and Assignment (Uchraspred), Travelling Inspectorate, Work in the Villages, and Work among Women.¹⁵⁷ Except for the last two departments, Krestinskii did not explain their functions, but Fainsod and Schapiro, in their well-documented analyses of these as well as of other departments of later years, give probably the best picture in the political literature on the Soviet Union of their functions, problems, and changes.¹⁵⁸ For some reason, however, they neglected to include in their lists the General and Finance Departments. While it is rather easy to detect that the function of the latter was to deal with the financial matters of the Party, it is difficult to speculate on the function of the former.

The Information Department was in charge of collecting the data from the local Party committees on their "composition, structure, methods, and activities." The Organization-

¹⁵⁷ Vosmaia Konferentsiia RKP(b): Protokoly (1961), p. 221.

¹⁵⁸ Unless otherwise indicated, this section is based in many cases on the findings of Fainsod, op. cit., pp. 157-160, 166-176, and of Schapiro, op. cit., pp. 246-251, 315-316, 447-451.

Instruction Department was responsible for "establishing the institutional forms of the Party apparatuses" on the local level and for the supervision of their work. The Department had at its disposal a corps of instructors who were regularly sent to various localities to fulfill the Department's duties. These instructors played a great role in vitalizing the Party's machinery. They maintained the communication between the center and local organizations by conveying the orders and directives from above and by supplying the information to Moscow from below.

The Records and Assignment Department was another very important organ of the Secretariat. Its duties were to collect data on Party members and to control the "mobilizations, transfers, and appointments of members of the Party." Under the conditions of Civil War, the appointments took the form of "mass mobilization" which was based on a quota system, i.e., the Party organizations with a sufficient number of Party members who could perform various duties were required to supply a specific number of such members to the Party organization in another locality where they were needed. In 1923 this method was replaced by individual appointment. It is important to note that at this time the power of making appointments was divided between the Orgbureau and the Record and Assignment Department (Uchraspred). The first made appointments to the central Party organs and the second to the

lower Party organizations. By 1923 Uchraspred had already reached its control over the Secretariat on the county (uezd) level. The extent of its operation can be seen from the statistics which show that between April and November 1919 Uchraspred assigned 2,182 Party members to various posts, and the Orgbureau assigned only 544. At the Twelfth Party Congress in 1923 it was reported that Uchraspred had made "more than 10,000 assignments" in the preceding year.

The short-lived Travelling Inspectorate had the power to send its officials to check upon the work of local Party organizations. Its functions were complementary and perhaps overlapping with those of Informotdel and could have been the reason that it was abolished.

From Krestinskii's description of the Work in the Villages Department, it appears that it was responsible for propaganda, agitation, and organizational work in villages. For these purposes the Department trained the Party members to work exclusively in villages, published instructions on how the work should be organized, and convened conferences in rural areas for discussions of various problems and for giving instructions to the village leaders. The Work among Women Department was also in charge of agitation, propaganda, and organizational work among women both in cities and villages. It sent organizers to various places, convened women's conferences, and published appropriate organizational literature.¹⁵⁹ Some of

¹⁵⁹ Vosmaia Konferentsiia RKP(b): Protokoly (1961), pp. 222-223.

the departments (Informotdel, Orgotdel) had their sections in the local Party organizations.

Because of the disrupting conditions during the Civil War, the Secretariat had some difficulty in maintaining close contact with various gubernia Party organizations, particularly those located far away from Moscow. As a result, according to Fainsod, some of them manifested "the spirit of independence." In order to bring them under the control of the central apparatus, the regional (gubernia) bureaus were established in the Secretariat in 1920 which, as Fainsod writes, turned these gubernias into "the firmest strongholds of Stalin's machine."

In addition to the departments and the regional bureaus, the Secretariat in 1920 also established "bureaus" to control the work of the Parties of many nationalities in Russia, and "groups" to supervise the work of the foreign Communists living in Russia as well as to keep contact with the Communist (Social Democratic) Parties abroad. It should be noted that within the Russian Communist Party the national "sections" had existed which represented the organizational forms of Communists of various nationalities in the Russian empire. These sections had a right to convene their conferences and to elect bureaus to perform the executive functions. In 1920, according to Krestinskii's report to the Ninth Congress, these sections were forbidden to form their extra-territorial or national Parties, and their powers were limited to questions of propaganda and

agitation. In order to have a closer control over the sections, the Secretariat established bureaus. In 1920 the following bureaus were formed: the Central Bureau of the Communists of the East, Bureaus for Jewish, Latvian, Finnish, Polish, Estonian, Lithuanian-Belorussian, Votiak, and Chuvash sections. According to the same report, the Communists from outside Russia (but living in Russia) formed (no date is given) the Federation of Foreign Communist Groups in Russia. In 1920 this Federation was also abolished, and the Secretariat established instead the so-called "Groups" as its own organs to maintain contact with the Foreign Communists in Russia and the Communist Parties abroad. These Groups were: German, Hungarian, French, Italian, Czechoslovak, Yugoslav, and Romanian.¹⁶⁰

The enumeration of all these departments, bureaus, and groups shows very clearly that the controlling power of the Secretariat by 1920 was impressively great. From 1920 until the present time the apparatus of the Secretariat underwent many changes. The regional bureaus were abolished in the early 1920's; the national sections and bureaus were abolished in 1921; the foreign groups "ceased" to exist (probably were reorganized but kept secret); some of the departments were abolished, some were reorganized, and a number of new ones were established. The purpose of so many reorganizations of the apparatus was always the same: to enhance the control of the Secretariat over the local Party units and the population, to fulfill the aims of

¹⁶⁰ IX Sezd RKP(b): Protokoly (1960), p. 506.

industrialization and collectivization, and to make the apparatus more efficient in its functions. Some of these changes are worth mentioning here because they illustrate the expansion of functions and powers of the Secretariat in later years.

First of all, in September 1920, the Department of Agitation and Propaganda (Agitprop) was established for the purpose of conducting agitation and propaganda among the Party and non-Party masses. More specifically, the Department was in charge of dissemination of the Communist doctrine and the mobilization of the masses to support the Party's policies. In the beginning, its jurisdiction was rather narrow but it gradually began to expand. In 1921 Agitprop absorbed the national sections and bureaus--a rather logical step since the latter were limited to deal with propaganda and agitation. In the same year the Press Section was established and placed under the control of Agitprop. In 1922 this Section took charge of the local press and in 1923 it began to control creative literature as well. Agitprop formed its sections in all local Party organizations down to the district level.

In 1924 one major change took place within the apparatus of the Secretariat. The Organization-Instruction Department was merged with the Records and Assignment Department and formed the Organization Assignment Department (Orgraspred). As can be expected, the new department took over the functions of the two former departments. It was placed in charge of preparations, appointments, and transfers of

the Party officials to various posts, not only in the Party but also in government, trade union, and industrial and cooperative establishments. It was also responsible for organizational matters of the local Party units and the supervision over their work. After these changes, according to Fainsod, the following nine departments existed within the Secretariat between 1924 and 1930: Organization-Assignment, Press (which again was placed under the jurisdiction of Agitprop in 1928), Work in the Villages, Statistical, Administration of Affairs, Agitation and Propaganda, Work among Women, Accounting, and Information. Schapiro notes in his book that there was one reference to the Secret Department in the Soviet source which presumably existed within the Secretariat to serve as liaison between the Party and the Secret Police (OGPU).

The departments of the Secretariat were reorganized in 1930 to meet the needs of industrialization and collectivization under the First Five Year Plan. An editorial in the Party organ explained this reorganization in terms of historical determinism. It referred to the resolution adopted by the Tenth Party Congress in 1921 which declared that forms of organizations and their methods of work are always determined by the existing historical conditions and the tasks which "flow" from those conditions.¹⁶¹ The conditions in point were industrialization

¹⁶¹ Partiinoe Stroitelstvo, No. 2 (February 1930), p. 1.

and collectivization of the country which imposed the burden upon the Party to prepare and to distribute the professional and skilled workers which the country lacked at that time. Kaganovich, in a speech at the Orgbureau meeting in February 1930, said that Orgraspred was not fulfilling its task because selecting the cadres "for everything" was too much for one organ. Therefore, he argued, it should be broken up into two departments and the power of appointment be divided between them. Implying a similar reason, he contended that Aqitprop be divided into two separate departments as well.¹⁶² A few months later, Kaganovich presented this plan to the Sixteenth Party Congress and, as can be expected, it was approved unanimously without changes. Consequently, Orgraspred was divided into the Organization-Instruction Department and the Assignment Department. The first was given the power to make appointments only to the apparatus of the Party and to supervise the work of the local Party organizations, and the second, to make assignments to government administration, trade unions, and economic establishments. In order to function more efficiently, the latter department was divided into eight sections: Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Transport, Agriculture, Foreign Cadres, Finance-Planning-Trade, Soviet Administration, and Accounting.

¹⁶² Ibid., pp. 9-11.

The Agitation and Propaganda Department was also split into two new departments: the Agitation and Mass Campaign Department and the Culture and Propaganda Department. The first, as its name indicates, was concerned with agitation among the people, basically for the purpose of developing their enthusiasm for the Party's program of industrialization and collectivization. It also took over the functions of the Work in the Village and the Work among Women Departments which were thereby abolished. The Culture and Propaganda Department was made responsible for the control of the press, literature, education, science, and propaganda of Marxism and Leninism. The old Department of Administrative Affairs and the Secret Department remained intact.

This structure of the Party apparatus was based on a "functional" principle but, evidently, such a structure proved to be unsatisfactory, for the next Congress in 1934 reorganized it on the "production-branch" principle. The aim of the reorganization was to deepen the apparatus' control over the economic sector of the Soviet Union. The following nine departments were organized in 1934: Agricultural, Transport, Political Administration, Culture and Propaganda of Leninism (Kulturprop), Administration of Affairs, Industrial, Planning-Finance-Trade, Leading Party Organs, and Special Department. The last department, undoubtedly, replaced the old Secret Department and assumed its function of being a link between the top elite and the Secret Police. The Political Administration Department

was probably responsible for the political and organizational work in the Army. According to Fainsod and Schapiro, four industrial departments (including Agricultural Department) performed, within their jurisdiction, several functions: selecting cadres, checking on the fulfillment of Party and government decrees, organizing the work of the Party, and supervising mass agitation. The new Department of Leading Party Organs was in charge of distributing the Party cadres among the Party institutions and of supervising the work of the republican, territorial, and regional Party organizations. The Culture and Propaganda Department took over the functions of the old Propaganda Department. However, so many functions apparently proved to be too much for one department because the following year it was divided into six separate departments: Party, Propaganda and Agitation, Press and Publishing, Schools, Cultural Instruction Work, and Science.

In 1939 the apparatus of the Secretariat was again reorganized. This time the spokesman for the change was Andrei A. Zhdanov. At the Eighth Party Congress in March 1939, he criticized the industrial-branch principle of departmental organization on the ground that each department on "the territorial and regional levels" was competing for cadres and, therefore, hindered the process of selection and promotion of Party officials. Under this condition, he said, the Party could not best utilize its professional cadres. He also added that the industrial departments were interfering

with the work of the officials in the economic establishments and thereby were undermining their sense of responsibility. For these reasons he advocated to abolish all the industrial departments, except for the Agricultural Department which he recognized to be of such importance that it should be retained. He proposed instead that one department should be made responsible for preparation, selection, appointment, promotion, and transfer of Party officials.¹⁶³ It goes without saying that Zhdanov's plan was approved by the top elite (of which he was also a member) in advance. The best indication of this is the fact that Stalin, at this Congress, expressed his support for it. The reorganization resulted in the establishment of the following departments: Cadres Administration, Organization-Instruction, School, Administration of Affairs, Propaganda and Agitation Administration, Agriculture, and Special Department. The Cadres Administration Department was charged with all the appointments, promotions, and transfers of Party officials who were to work in the Party institutions, state administration, economic establishments, and in other organizations.¹⁶⁴ All other departments performed their organizational or propaganda functions as before.

¹⁶³Pravda, March 20, 1939.

¹⁶⁴A very good description of the functions of the Cadres Department can be found in Louis Nemzer, "The Kremlin's Professional Staff: The 'Apparatus' of the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union," The American Political Science Review, Vol. XLIV, No. 1 (March, 1950), pp. 66-68.

After Zhdanov's death in 1948, the industrial principle of the Secretariat's apparatus was re-introduced. It was preceded by the abolition of the Cadres Department whose functions were distributed among other departments. The Organization-Instruction Department was also abolished (in 1946) and succeeded by the Administration for Checking Party Organs, which in turn was replaced in 1948(?) by the Party-Trade Union-Komsomol Department. Other departments which, according to Fainsod, existed in 1948 were: Heavy Industry, Agriculture, Planning-Finance-Trade, Foreign Affairs, Main Political Administration of the Armed Forces, Propaganda and Agitation, Light Industry, Transport, Administration, and Special Department.

Further changes took place after Stalin's death. Some of the departments were reorganized, some new ones were formed, and, perhaps most interestingly, several departments were established to deal exclusively with the Russian republic. It will be recalled that in February 1956 the Central Committee issued a decree establishing the Bureau for the RSFSR attached to the Central Committee. It was in line with this innovation that the departments for the Russian republic were organized. Fainsod, based on a fragmentary Soviet data and on an interview given by Iakovlev (a deputy head of the important Party Organs Department) to the Communist delegation of Italy in 1958,¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁵ This interview can be found in Robert Conquest, Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957), pp. 464-465.

writes that by 1960 the following departments existed within the Secretariat. For the Russian republic there were: Party Organs, Propaganda and Agitation, Administrative-Trade-Financial Organs, Agriculture, Industry and Transport, and Sciences-Schools-Culture. For the union-republics the departments were: Party Organs, Propaganda and Agitation, Administrative Organs, Agriculture, Transport and Communications, Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Machine Building, Construction, Higher Education and Schools, and Culture and Science. In addition, there were the following departments dealing with foreign affairs and the Army: Foreign Affairs, Liaison with Block Parties, Liaison with Non-Block Parties, and Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy.¹⁶⁶ Fainsod somehow omitted from his list the Commercial and Economic Organizations Departments, which were mentioned by Iakovlev in his interview. Iakovlev also revealed that the Propaganda and Agitation Department was divided into sections of Propaganda, Agitation, Mass Work, Central Newspapers, and Publications-Reviews. Likewise, the Party Organs Department was divided into four territorial (not identified by him) and the following four functional sections: Organization and Statutory Questions, Membership, Cadres, and Trade Union-Youth-Soviet Organs.¹⁶⁷ Altogether by 1960 there were 22

¹⁶⁶Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (rev. ed., Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 201-203.

¹⁶⁷Quoted in Conquest, op. cit., pp. 464-465.

departments. It is clear from their names that the departments were organized on the industrial-specialization principle. Since this structure has remained until the present time, it means that the functional principle, which was used in 1930 and 1934, was abandoned.

The Twenty-Third Congress held in 1966 abolished the Bureau of the Central Committee for the Russian republic and, consequently, the Bureau's departments were abolished. Yet by 1968 the number of the departments was not decreased but rather increased. According to the quoted State Department source, in 1968 there were 23 departments within the Secretariat: Administration of Affairs, Administrative Organs, Agriculture, Cadres Abroad, Chemical Industry, Construction, Culture, Defense Industry, General, Heavy Industry, Information, International, Liaison with Block Parties, Light and Food Industry, Machine Building Industry, Party Organizational Work, Planning and Finance Organs, Propaganda, Science and Educational Institutions, Trade and Domestic Services, Transport and Communications, and two unidentified departments. These departments very clearly paralleled the government's ministries and their names indicate their functions.

The enumeration of the departments from 1919 until 1968 and a sketchy description of their functions amply illustrate the thesis that the Secretariat became a multi-functional and excessively powerful organ of the Party. Many changes took place in the organization of the departments

but they were always aimed at increasing the power of the Secretariat. From very early times, the bureaucracy of the Secretariat began to grow rapidly and its controlling and directing power began to penetrate the entire Party organization at the same speed. It is no surprise, therefore, that both Stalin and Khrushchev, as heads of the Secretariat, won the victory over their competitors.

On the basis of the discussion in this and in the previous chapter, it is quite clear that, contrary to the Statutes, neither the Congress nor the Central Committee (as it functions between the sessions of the Congresses) is the most powerful organ of the Party. As has been pointed out, they perform the useful functions of deliberation and ratification of the decisions reached by the top elite and thereby make their decisions appear legal and democratic. In addition, by means of formal election, these two organs legalize the very existence and powers of the top elite.

It is also fairly clear from the discussion that, at least since the 1920's, the Orgbureau within the triangle of the Politbureau, the Orgbureau, and the Secretariat was the lowest in both status and powers. The fact that Trotskii, Kamenev, and Zinoviev, upon becoming members of the Orgbureau in 1923, showed no interest in it by ignoring its meetings is indicative of its low status. Perhaps one of the contributing factors to the decline of the Orgbureau was the absence from its membership of Lenin, who enjoyed

the greatest respect in the Party, and the preoccupation of Stalin with the Secretariat. Another reason could have been its failure to develop the bureaucratic machine which could have served as a source of its strength. The fact that it was abolished in 1952 suggests that it must have reached such a low point of usefulness that it was not needed any more. This does not mean, however, that the Orgbureau was not one of the top organs of the Party. While it was in existence, it still decided at least some of the organizational questions on the highest level. But, as an institution, it was lower in status than the Politbureau and the Secretariat.

Of the two remaining top organs, it appears that the Politbureau is more powerful than the Secretariat.¹⁶⁸ Yet it must be emphasized that the picture is not white and black because the Secretariat possesses some elements of strength which the Politbureau does not, such as bureaucracy and control over the Party. Much evidence has already been cited to suggest that the Secretariat gradually became a huge directing and controlling center of the Party. Its functions were spread widely and deeply into practically all sectors of Party and non-Party life. Its bureaucracy, since 1919, has multiplied many times and improved in skill and in efficiency. The Secretariat, with its departments,

¹⁶⁸In the discussion of the local elites it was suggested on the basis of the Soviet sources that the secretariats were more powerful than the bureaus. This appears not to be the case with the Secretariat of the Central Committee.

became like the second government of the Soviet Union. Its instrumental role in securing the victory of Stalin and Khrushchev over their politically experienced and highly prestigious competitors is in itself an indicator of its great power.¹⁶⁹ It is true that Khrushchev lost his power in 1964, but this was the result of a plot or conspiracy and not of a prolonged struggle for power, as was the case with Stalin in the 1930's and Khrushchev in the 1950's.

Yet, in spite of these important elements of power, the Secretariat does not appear to be superior over the Politbureau. It is true that in its history the power of the Politbureau fluctuated while that of the Secretariat was growing rather steadily. In several periods of the Party's history (as under Lenin and in the early 1920's as well as immediately after Stalin's death, and most probably even now) the Politbureau has enjoyed great power. But from the 1930's until Stalin's death its power decreased due to the fact, as has been discussed above, that Stalin established his personal dictatorship in the Party. Yet at the same time the power of the Secretariat does not appear to have increased at the expense of the Politbureau, for the Secretariat remained as powerful and as subservient to Stalin then as it had been before.

¹⁶⁹ It is important to emphasize the word "instrumental" because their victories can also be attributed to their skill of manipulation, cunning, personal influence, political conditions in the Party, and the organizational weakness of their opponents.

The supremacy of the Politbureau is indicated, first of all, by its composition. It is a sort of "Grand Council" consisting of the heads of the important institutions of the Soviet Union: Chairman of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet, Prime Minister, Secretary of Trade Unions, occasionally Secretary of the Komsomol, the Chief of the Secret Police, a few Secretaries of the Central Committee Secretariat, and, in more recent times, the First Secretaries of some union republics. Thus, the Secretariat is only one of the institutions represented in the Politbureau. Its role and influence, however, must be greater than that of any other institution. This can be inferred from the fact that the Secretariat has always had a few representatives in the small Politbureau, while other institutions had usually only one. The following Table exemplifies the numerical representation of the Secretariat in the Politbureau.¹⁷⁰

TABLE 7
SECRETARIES IN THE POLITBUREAU

Year	Politbureau (Praesidium)		Secretariat		Secretaries in the Politbureau	
	<u>Members</u>	<u>Candidates</u>	<u>Members</u>	<u>Candidates</u>	<u>Members</u>	<u>Candidates</u>
1930	10	5	5	2	3	
1934	10	5	4		3	
1939	9	2	4		3	
1946	11	4	5		3	
1952	25	11	10		7	3
1956	11	6	8		2	3
1957	15	9	8		7	1
1961	11	5	9		4	
1966	11	8	11		4	2
1971	15	6	10		4	

¹⁷⁰ This Table is based on the sources used earlier for the tabulation of the numerical composition of the Politbureau on p. 136.

These statistics show that, except for the years 1952 and 1957, usually more than one half of the Secretaries were members of the Politbureau (Praesidium) and they constituted on the average one fourth of the Politbureau (Praesidium) membership (including the candidates). In the absence of any information in the Soviet sources, it is very difficult to speculate why in 1952 all the Secretaries were members of the Praesidium. Likewise, it is difficult to determine the meaning of the fact that the Secretaries constituted more than one third of the Praesidium membership at that time. On the other hand, there are clues to understand why in 1957 all the Secretaries became members of the Praesidium. As discussed earlier, the majority of the Praesidium opposed Khrushchev. After his final victory in June 1957, the Praesidium was enlarged. Drawing upon his recent experience, he probably felt that for his own security the position of the Secretariat should be enhanced in the expanded Praesidium. It is worth noting that all Secretaries, except for one, were full members of the Praesidium, and the remaining one was a candidate member. All the Secretaries accounted for slightly more than one third of the Praesidium membership. Later, when Khrushchev felt more secure, he apparently returned to the old quota of the Secretariat's representation in the Praesidium, i.e., about one fourth of the latter's total membership. One fourth of the members in the Politbureau-Praesidium is not in itself very significant, for if the majority rule was practiced in these organs (at

least occasionally) it could easily have been defeated. But its importance becomes clearer when we take into account the fact that all the other institutions were represented by only one man. The fact that the Secretariat always had a greater representation than any other organization points to the importance and supremacy of the Politbureau-Praesidium over the Secretariat.

In the second place, the supremacy of the Politbureau is indicated by its power to appoint the General Secretary and, most probably, all other secretaries. There is one reference to this in the Soviet sources. As quoted earlier (in a different context), one of Stalin's supporters, F. I. Goloshchekin, during a heated debate at the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1925, said at one point of his speech that "having the majority in the Politbureau" Stalin's opponents could "appoint another Secretary," but he added that "they do not have such a majority and they never will."¹⁷¹ There is no reason to doubt that the Politbureau had such power, for if it were not true, the speaker would not have said so in the presence of all members of the Politbureau, or, after having said this, he would have been corrected. It can be added that there was no other Party organ to make such an important decision as "appointment" of the General Secretary. The Central Committee only formalizes the appointment by means of election. Undoubtedly the Praesidium

¹⁷¹XIV Sezd VKP(b) (1926), p. 401.

inherited the same power. The fact that between March and September 1953 no General Secretary was elected, while many important organizational changes were made both in the Party and the government, indicates that the selection of the First Secretary rested within the hands of the Praesidium.

Finally, the members of the top elite themselves stated that the Politbureau was the supreme organ of the Party. Thus, Zinoviev, at the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1924 in his reply to the criticism that the Politbureau was disunited and therefore weak, said that "Everybody knows that our Politbureau is the essential organ of the state."¹⁷² At the next Congress in 1925 he was corrected by Stalin, who said that "The Politbureau is the highest organ, not of the state, but of the Party and the Party is the highest directing force of the state."¹⁷³ If a syllogism is applied to Stalin's statement, it will result in the conclusion that the Politbureau is the highest organ of the state as Zinoviev had contended. But irrespective of logic, the fact remains that both leaders publicly recognized that the Politbureau was higher than any other organ in the Soviet Union. Another Party leader, Ordzhonikidze, said at the same Congress that "The Politbureau is the highest Party organ in the country."¹⁷⁴ Similar statements were made by other Party leaders at various Congresses in later years.

¹⁷²XIII Sezd VKP(b) (1924), p. 259.

¹⁷³XIV Sezd VKP(b) (1925), p. 51.

¹⁷⁴Ibid., p. 222.

It should be conceded that such utterances of the Party leaders in the Soviet Union do not necessarily reflect the reality. But in this case, as the previous discussion of the Politbureau indicates, there is no reason to question their statements. No such statements can be found in more recent Party sources, but neither do these sources contain statements which would contradict the claims of Zinoviev, Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, and others.

CHAPTER IV

THE TOP ELITE OF 1919

Studying the social and political characteristics of the top elite between 1917 and 1971, it appears that three types of top elite have existed within the Party. The first was headed by Lenin, the second by Stalin, and the third by Khrushchev-Brezhnev. The top elite of 1919, 1939, and 1961 were selected for the analysis in the three chapters that follow because they exemplify these three types of elites. The top elite under Brezhnev does not constitute a separate type but only a purer type which had already emerged in the late 1950s under Khrushchev. Therefore, the elite of 1966 and 1971 will be discussed only in a summary form.

As it was pointed out in the preceding chapter, by December 1919 the membership of the Politbureau and particularly that of the Orgbureau was well stabilized. According to Krestinskii's report to the Eighth Party Conference in December 1919, the following Party leaders were members of the top elite: full members of the Politbureau--Vladimir Ilich Lenin, Lev Davidovich Trotskii, Iosif Vissarianovich Stalin, Lev Borisovich Kamenev, and Nikolai Nikolayevich Krestinskii; candidate members--Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, Grigorii Evseevich Zinoviev, and Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin; members of the Orgbureau--Lev Borisovich Kamenev, Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, Lev Davidovich Trotskii, Elena Dmitrievna Stasova, Nikolai Nikolayevich Krestinskii,

Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinskii, and Khristian Georgievich Rakovskii; the Secretariat--Nikolai Nikolayevich Krestinskii.¹

Social Origin

The Soviet sources reveal that, except for Kalinin and Stalin, all members of the top elite came from the middle class or lower-middle class families. It should be admitted that the Soviet Encyclopedias identify their social origin usually with only one or, in some cases, a few words without providing any explanations. But at the same time the same sources are rather elaborative on the political activities of all members of the top elite. A little more light is thrown upon their social background by the book of biographies published in the second half of the 1920's.² But even here the authors are usually laconic about the social origin of the top elite and rather detailed about its revolutionary activity and

¹Vosmaia Konferentsiia RKP(b): Protokoly (1961), p. 221.

²Iu. S. Gamberov, V. Ia. Zheleznov, M. M. Kovalevskii, S. A. Muromtsev, and K. A. Timiriachev (eds), "Deiateli Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i Oktiabrskoi Revoliutsii," Parts I, II, and III, in Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar Russkogo Bibliograficheskogo Instituta "Granat," 7th ed., Vol. XLI (Moskva: Russkii Bibliograficheskii Institut "Granat," n.d.). These parts contain biographies of many Party leaders. No date of publication is given but judging from the biographies, it must have been published in the first half of the 1920's.

political career. This tendency of obscuring the middle class origin of the top elite becomes understandable when we take into account the leaders' position that the Communist Party was the Party of the workers and poor peasants. Under this aura, it was inconvenient for the members of the top elite to emphasize their middle class (bourgeois) origin. It was only in 1961 that the new Party Rules proclaimed that "The Communist Party, the Party of the working class, has today become the Party of the Soviet people as a whole."³ But this was done under the pretext that in the Soviet Union the exploiting classes were allegedly abolished.

In spite of brevity of information, the Soviet sources still present a clear picture of the social origin of the 1919 top elite. Accordingly, both Lenin's father and mother came from the middle class and themselves belonged to that class. His father, Ilia N. Ulianov, was first a secondary school (gymnasium) teacher at two different towns, then inspector of elementary schools in the Simbirsk gubernia, and finally, director (principal) of the elementary schools at Simbirsk where Lenin was born in 1870. His mother, Maria I. Blank, was the daughter of a doctor (M.D.) from Astrakhan. According to Lenin's sister, A. Ulianova-Elizarova, Lenin's parents owned

³Jan Triska (ed.), Soviet Communism: Programs and Rules (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1962), p. 155.

two estates in the area of Simbirsk and Astrakhan.⁴

Leon Trotskii, whose real name was Bronstein, was born in 1879 in the village of Ianovka, Kherson gubernia (now Kirovograd Oblast). His father was a landowner in that village. V. Nevskii (Trotskii's biographer) writes that Trotskii, before he was sent to the secondary school, "lived on a not large estate of his father, a colonist of Kherson." Trotskii in his book My Life writes that his father was a "farmer", "first on a small scale and later on a large one", and that he belonged to "the lower-middle class." From his further description of his father's estate, it is obvious that he underestimates his father's social status. As an owner of 250 acres of land plus about 400 acres that he leased from a neighboring landowner, under the Russian conditions at that time, he should be classified as belonging to the middle class rather than to the lower-middle class.⁵

Iosif V. Stalin, whose father's name was Dzhugashvili, was born in 1879 in the town of Gory, Tiflis gubernia in Georgia. He was one of the two members of the top elite who came from a lower class. His father was a shoemaker and later a worker in the shoe factory in Tiflis.⁶

⁴ Malaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, 1st ed., VI, 145-174. Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, 1st ed., XXXVI, 333-384, and 2nd ed., XXIV, 393-394. Gambarov, et al., op. cit., pp. 304-326. All these sources will be used for the discussion of the education, political activity and career, and nationality. The same applies to all sources of other members of the top elite. The Soviet Entsiklopedias will be henceforth identified by their initials.

⁵ Gambarov, et al., op. cit., pp. 151-160. Leon Trotskii, My Life (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1930), pp. 3-5.

⁶ B.S.E., 1st ed., LII, 535-612; 2nd ed., XL, 419-424. M.S.E., 1st ed., VIII, 406-412; 3rd ed., 1044-1046; Gambarov, et al., op. cit., pp. 107-112.

Lev B. Kamenev, real name Rosenfeld, was born in 1883 in Moscow. Both his father and mother received a higher education--his father in engineering and his mother in education. His father worked first as a railroad engineer-machinist in Moscow, later as chief engineer in a factory near Vilno (Lithuania), and finally as a railroad engineer in Tiflis. There is no indication that his mother worked professionally.⁷

Nikolai N. Krestinskii was born in 1883 in the town of Mogilev, Ukraine. In his biography, Krestinskii does not identify his mother's education, but he writes that she was close to the populist movement in Russia, and after her marriage she remained "an intelligent citizen." About his father he says that he was under the influence of the nihilists, and that he received a higher education and was both a secondary school teacher and government official.⁸

Michail Kalinin was another member of the top elite who came from the lower class--the peasant family. He was born in 1875 in the village of Verkhnaia Troitsa, Tver gubernia, now Kalininskaia oblast. The Soviet Encyclopedias identify his parents as being "poor peasants", but his authorized (unsigned) biography states that they "were not rich peasants." These two statements are not identical in meaning. The latter most probably means that Kalinin's parents belonged to the middle peasants (seredniaki)

⁷ M.S.E., 1st ed., III, 644-645; 2nd ed., V, 191-192. Gambarov, et al., op. cit., pp. 161-168.

⁸ M.S.E., 1st ed., IV, 328-329; 2nd ed., V, 943. Gambarov, et al., op. cit., pp. 232-234.

being in the middle between the rich and the poor. This contention is supported by the remarks of Lenin who, upon nominating Kalinin Chairman of the Central Executive Committee in 1919, said that Kalinin was the best choice for that post because, knowing well the middle peasants from his own experience, he would swing that group to the side of the Soviet regime.⁹

Grigrii E. Zinoviev, father's name Radomyslskii, was born in 1883 in the city of Elizavetgrad (now Kirovograd). His father was the owner of a dairy farm and the Soviet sources classify him as "petty bourgeois."¹⁰

Nikolai I. Bukharin, the youngest member of the top elite, was born in 1888 in Moscow. His father received a degree in mathematics and physics from Moscow University and taught in an elementary school in Moscow. Only for four years he held a government position in Bessarabia and afterwards returned to Moscow. His mother also received a higher education (the field of her study is not identified) and taught in the same elementary school as her husband.¹¹

Elena D. Stasova was born in 1873 in Petersburg.

⁹B.S.E., 1st ed., XXX, 716-725. M.S.E., 2nd ed., V, 166-167; 3rd ed., IV, 387-388. Gambarov, et al., op. cit., pp. 156-159.

¹⁰B.S.E., 1st ed., XXVII, 47-51. M.S.E., 2nd ed., IV, 534-536. Gambarov, et al., op. cit., pp. 143-149.

¹¹B.S.E., 1st ed., VIII, 272-284. M.S.E., 1st ed., I, 912-915; 2nd ed., II, 173-176. Gambarov, et al., op. cit., pp. 52-56.

Her parents can be considered as belonging to the upper-middle class. In her biography, unlike many others, Stasova describes quite broadly her parents' social status and the environment under which she was raised. Accordingly, her father was a lawyer practicing law in Petersburg and briefly at Tula. He was one of the lawyers who in the 1860's, after the abolition of serfdom in Russia, worked on "the new juridical norms" (new legal principles) entitled "The Great Epoch of Reforms." Until his death in 1918, he was the first Chairman of the newly established (no date is given) Council of Lawyers of Petersburg. In the early period of his professional career, he was close to the royal family and during the coronation of Alexander II was named "herald." In addition, Dimitrii V. Stasov was interested in music (his brother, Vladimir V. Stasov, was a well known critic of music and art). Together with others, he founded Petersburg Conservatory and the Russian Society of Music. Stasova describes her family as being progressive and sympathetic to socialist ideas. Her father defended many students for their participation in the demonstrations, and for his involvement in the defense of the revolutionary elements he was even exiled to Tula for a short time.¹²

Felix E. Dzerzhinskii was born in 1877 at Dzerzhinovo (his father's estate), Vilno gubernia (Lithuania). According

¹²B.S.E., 1st ed., LII, 732; 2nd ed., XL, 522-523. Ezhigodnik B.S.E., 1967, p. 617. Gambarov, et al., op. cit., pp. 112-119.

to the Soviet sources, including his biography, his parents were landowners and belonged to the Polish "petty nobility."¹³

The Soviet Entsiklopedias give no information on Khristian G. Rakovskii, except for one published in 1930. But plenty of information on this Party figure can be obtained from his autobiography. According to Rakovskii, he was born in 1873 in the town of Kotel, Bulgaria. His father received a secondary education and was both a farmer and a businessman (engaged in commerce). As a businessman, he was spending several months every year in Konstantinopol, Turkey. This indicates that he was a prosperous man. His mother came from a family known in Bulgaria for its cultural and revolutionary (against the Turks) activities. Raskovskii mentions, among others, Georgii Mamarchev, captain in the Russian army and a revolutionary in the 1830's, and Sava Rakovskii, also a revolutionary in the 1840's.¹⁴

¹³B.S.E., 1st ed., XXII, 16-22; 2nd ed., XIV, 250-253. M.S.E., 1st ed., II, 849; 3rd ed., III, 503-504. Gambarov, et al., op. cit., pp. 122-125.

¹⁴M.S.E., 1st ed., VII, 168. Gambarov, et al., op. cit., pp. 169-187.

TABLE 8

DISTRIBUTION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE TOP ELITE OF 1919
ACCORDING TO DATE OF BIRTH, PLACE OF BIRTH, AND SOCIAL ORIGIN¹⁵

Name	Date of Birth and Death	Place of Birth	Social Origin
Bukharin, N. I.	1888-1938	Moscow	Middle Class
Dzerzhinskii, F.E.	1877-1926	Dzierzhinovo, near Vilno	Middle Class
Kalinin, M. I.	1875-1946	Verkhniai- Troitsa, vil. Kalinin, <u>Obl.</u>	Peasant
Kamenev, L. B.	1883-1936	Moscow	Middle Class
Krestinskii, N. N.	1883-1938	Mogilev	Middle Class
Lenin, V. I.	1870-1924	Simbirsk, now Ulanovsk	Middle Class
Rakovskii, K. G.	1873-1939	Kotel, Town Bulgaria	Middle Class
Stalin, I. V.	1879-1953	Gory, Town, near Tiflis	Worker
Stasova, E. D.	1873-1966	Petrograd, now Leningrad	Middle Class
Trotskii, L. D.	1879-1940	Ianovka, vil. Kirovograd <u>Obl.</u>	Middle Class
Zinoviev, G. E.	1883-1936	Elizavetgrad, now Kirovograd	Middle Class

Education

All members of the top elite, except for one, received either a secondary or a higher education. The exception was Kalinin who received only elementary education in his native village. At

¹⁵The names listed in this Table are in alphabetical order. The listing of names in subsequent Tables will follow the listing order herein.

the age of sixteen, he began to work at an ammunition factory in Petersburg, and in the evenings he attended the factory turning school to become a skilled worker. He never went beyond an elementary education and factory school.

Dzerzhinskii and Stasova received only a secondary education. Studying at Vilno gymnasium, Dzerzhinskii in the last years in school became so captivated with the revolutionary activity that in his final year he quit the school, in 1896, and became a professional revolutionary. Stasova was tutored at home until the age of thirteen and in 1897 she entered the gymnasium for women in Petersburg. She was dreaming of studying medicine, but after her graduation in 1902, she devoted herself to the work in the Party and never attended the university.

Speaking very formally, Trotskii also received only a secondary education. At the age of nine, he was sent to the gymnasium in Odessa where he finished "seven classes" (this was the "realistic" school which had only seven classes) and, in order to complete his secondary education, he went to Nikolayev gymnasium from which he graduated most probably in 1897. Since he attended the "realistic" as opposed to both humanistic and classic types of gymnasium, Trotskii wanted to enter the Nikolayev University to study mathematics. However, due to his revolutionary activity, he did not fulfill his plan, for in 1898 he was arrested. But Trotskii, unlike Dzerzhinskii and Stasova,

read many books on his own, although not systematically, and wrote many articles and a number of books. It should be conceded that he was a better activist than intellectual.

The other members of the top elite received either unfinished or finished higher education. Bukharin, upon his graduation from the gymnasium in Moscow, studied economics at Moscow University for almost two years--from the fall of 1907 until May 1909. In 1909 he was arrested and was never able to finish the university education in Russia. Being in Western Europe since 1910, however, he spent, as he writes in his biography, "all days in the libraries." Bukharin, after Lenin, was undoubtedly the greatest intellectual mind in the Party. He was a very studious person and the author of many articles and books.

Zinoviev's lower education is not well explained in the Soviet sources. His biography states that he received "home education", undoubtedly on the elementary school level. It also states that since the age of fifteen he worked, among others, as a tutor. From this it can be concluded that he attended the secondary school. The same source is rather explicit about his higher education. It says that Zinoviev, after passing the entrance examination, studied chemistry at Bern University in Switzerland between 1904 and 1905, and law at the same University between 1905 and 1906. Like Bukharin, he wrote a number of articles, a few books, and was the author of a number of Party documents.

Kamenev attended the gymnasium at Vilno and after his father moved to Tiflis, he attended the gymnasium in that city from which he graduated in 1901. In the same year he began to study law at Moscow University but was arrested in 1902 for his revolutionary activity among the students. His attempt to enroll at the same University for the second time was rejected by the school authorities on the ground of his police record. However, like most of the other members of the top elite, he read many books and was himself the author of many articles and several books.

Stalin was the only one who studied theology. He received his secondary education at the religious school (dukhovnoe uchilishche) in his native town Gory. After his graduation in 1894 (possibly in 1893), he studied theology at Tiflis Orthodox Seminary from which he was expelled in 1899 for "spreading Marxism."

Lenin, Krestinskii, and Rakovskii not only completed their formal higher education but also worked professionally for a short time. Lenin finished gymnasium at Simbirsk in 1887. Being interested in law and economics, he enrolled in the same year at Kazan University but three months later was expelled from the University for his participation in the students' demonstration. Since the doors to the university were closed for him, Lenin studied at home. It was during this time that he thoroughly read Marx's works. Due to his mother's efforts, Lenin was allowed to take examinations in law at Petersburg University in the fall

of 1891 as an externist. According to his sister, Lenin, after passing the examinations, worked between 1891-1892 as an assistant lawyer in Samara and between 1893-1895 in Petersburg. But she admits that he handled only minor cases (and not many of them) and most of his time he devoted to political work.

Krestinskii was also a lawyer, but he practiced law more often than Lenin. After his graduation from Vilno gymnasium in 1901, he studied law at Petersburg University and received his degree in 1907. From that time on until 1914, he practiced law (with interruptions due to his arrests) first as an assistant and later as an independent lawyer. Being arrested in 1914 and exiled to Siberia, he was not able to work professionally.

Rakovskii in his biography writes that he attended gymnasium at Varna in Bulgaria from which he was expelled in 1887 for his participation in the students' demonstration. After staying at home for a year, he entered the gymnasium at Gabrovo, but before he could finish the sixth "class" he was again expelled for similar reasons as before. Although Rakovskii did not complete his secondary education, he studied medicine in Geneva, Berlin (only for six months), and finally at Montpellier, France, where he received his M.D. degree in 1896. He admits, however, that he was "neutral" to medicine and very much interested in political activity. Rakovskii

practiced medicine only while serving in the Romanian army, most probably in 1898-1900, and for six months in a French village in 1902-1903. Rakovskii mentions in his biography that in 1900 he enrolled at Paris University to study law, but in the same year he left for Russia. In 1902 he was preparing himself for one semester examinations but this was also interrupted by his practicing medicine. He is the author of many articles in Bulgarian and Russian periodicals, and of several books in Bulgarian, Romanian, and Russian.

TABLE 9

DISTRIBUTION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE
TOP ELITE OF 1919 ACCORDING
TO LEVEL AND TYPE OF EDUCATION

Name	Level	Soc. Sci.	Other
Bukharin, N. I.	Higher	x	
Dzerzhinskii, F.E.	Secondary	x	
Kalinin, M. I.	Elementary		
Kamenev, L. B.	Higher	x	
Krestinskii, N. N.	Higher	x	
Lenin, V. I.	Higher	x	
Rakovskii, K. G.	Higher		Medicine
Stalin, I. V.	Higher	x	
Stasova, E. D.	Secondary	x	
Trotsky, L. D.	Higher	x	
Zinoviev, G. E.	Higher	x	

Political Activity and Career

The consulted Soviet sources provide more information about the political activity and career of the members of the 1919 top elite than on any other aspect of their lives. They amply illustrate the well-known fact that the 1919 top elite consisted of the revolutionaries and builders of the Soviet system. All members, except for one, joined the Russian Socialist Democratic Labor Party or other revolutionary parties and groups between the ages of sixteen and twenty, and only one at the age of twenty-three. They all became professional or semi-professional revolutionaries and after the November Revolution occupied the most strategic positions in the Soviet government and the Communist Party.¹⁶

While still a secondary school student, Lenin was introduced to the revolutionary ideas by his brother Alexander who was a student at the University of Petersburg. All sources on Lenin admit that the government's punishment by death of the same brother in 1887 for his involvement in the preparation of the assassination of Tsar Alexander III had a profound psychological affect upon Lenin, making him a personal enemy of the Tsarist regime.

¹⁶The political activities and careers of those leaders who, for one reason or another, ceased to be members of the top elite by 1939 are discussed here in full.

In the fall of 1887, while a student at Kazan University, Lenin took part in the students' demonstration for which he was subsequently expelled. The years between 1887 and 1891 were ideologically his formative years. He joined the revolutionary circles at Kazan in 1888 at the age of eighteen. Living in Samara and Kazan at the estates of his parents, he studied intensively the Marxist literature, including Marx's Capital. In addition, he worked occasionally with the youth in Samara and Kazan delivering political speeches at their meetings. In 1893 he moved to Petersburg (he was by then a lawyer) and formally joined the Marxist group "Stariki" which he reorganized in 1895 and renamed "The Union for Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class," known in short as "the Union." Between 1891 and 1895 he wrote several articles and led the polemics (written and oral) with the populists (narodniks). In 1895 Lenin left for Western Europe for the purpose of acquainting himself with the well-known Russian Marxist, G. Plekhanov, and his group. While in Europe, he also met with foreign Marxists, and in the fall of 1895 he returned to Russia and became very active in the Union. This was one of the organizations which in 1898 united with other groups and formed the Russian Socialist Democratic Labor Party, officially renamed in 1919 the Russian Communist Party.

Late in 1895, Lenin was arrested and exiled to Siberia where he remained until 1900. It was there that he began

to think about the Party of professional revolutionaries. His ideas about such a Party are elaborated in one of his most important books, What is To Be Done, published in 1902.

In 1900 Lenin left for Western Europe and after consultation with and support from Plekhanov, he founded and edited the paper Iskra until 1903. At the RSDLP Congress in 1903, Lenin, by his insistence upon strict Party organization, caused a split within the Party into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. From that time until his death, he was the real leader of the former. In 1904 he published another work, One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward, dealing with the Party's strategy. Next year he organized the Third Party Congress which took place in London. When in the same year a political crisis developed in Russia as a result of the Russo-Japanese War, Lenin, together with other revolutionaries, returned to Russia hoping for a revolution. Since nothing came out of this revolutionary ferment, Lenin was forced to hide in Finland where, at the end of 1905, he organized the Party Conference and in 1906, the Unification Congress (with the Mensheviks) which took place in Stockholm. Being warned that the police were looking for him, Lenin secretly left for Western Europe once more, and this time did not return to Russia until April 1917. In Europe Lenin, as usual, was very active in organizational and intellectual pursuits. He lived in Geneva, Paris, and

Krakow, and played the most important role in organizing the Fifth Party Congress in 1907 and four Conferences between 1907 and 1912. He contributed to the Party's papers Pravda and Zvezda, and journals Mysl and Prosvishchenie as well as to foreign periodicals. He published several pamphlets, such as Materialism and Empiriocriticism, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, and others.

Lenin was also active in international Marxist movements. In 1908 and 1909 he took part at the meetings of the International Socialist Bureau, and in 1912 was elected a member of the Bureau. In addition, he took part at the Conferences of the European socialists who disagreed with the leadership of the Second International on the question of war and the role of the proletariat in it. The first Conference was held at Zimmerwald in 1915 and the second at Kienthal in 1916. At these Conferences Lenin and Zinoviev headed the left group which took the position that the proletariat should start the civil war against their own governments in order to end the imperialistic war.

In April 1917, Lenin returned to Petersburg and immediately started a campaign within the Party to seize power in Russia. This eventually happened in November 1917. Following the revolution, Lenin became Chairman (Prime Minister) of the People's Commissariat and held this post until his death in January 1924.

Lenin became a member of the Central Committee in 1903 and a member of the Politbureau in 1917 and 1919. It can be noted at this point that the Party did not have its formal head or chairman until the election of the General Secretary in 1922. In theory, the function of the Party chairman was performed by the Central Committee collectively, but in fact by Lenin personally, for it was he who provided the Party with goals, stimulation, direction, and ideological articulation.

Trotskii began his revolutionary activity in 1897 at the age of eighteen while still in the gymnasium at Nikolayev. Together with other students, he joined in that year the Southern Russian Union of the Workers. For his propaganda and organizational work among the workers, he was arrested in January 1898, jailed for two years, and then exiled to Siberia. But in 1902 he escaped and appeared in Vienna. He immediately began acquainting himself with the Russian Marxists living in Europe. It was in the same year that he went to London and met with Lenin, Martov, and Zazulich. Since the latter were editing the paper Iskra, Trotskii began to contribute to the paper and he continued to do so even after it became an organ of the Mensheviks. While in Geneva, Trotskii met with Plekhanov, Axelrod, and others. In addition, he spent a great portion of his time studying the Socialist literature and occasionally delivered

speeches to the Russian emigres in several European cities.

At the Second Party Congress held in 1903, Trotskii represented the Siberian Socialist Democratic Union (he established a contact with this Union while fleeing Siberia) and when the Party split, he joined the Menshevik faction. In 1904, however, he parted with the Mensheviks over their attempt to cooperate with "the liberal parties." From then until 1917 he oscillated between the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, joining neither group but being mostly on the side of the Mensheviks. This was due to a great extent to his dynamic and independent personality which made it difficult for him to conform to the Party's organizational norms and one ideological line.

In January 1905, Trotskii, like many other Russian revolutionaries, returned to Russia. First he became a member of the Petersburg Soviet of the Workers' Deputies and then its Chairman. In December 1905 he was arrested and once more exiled to Siberia but again escaped even before he reached his destination in Siberia. During the years between 1907 and 1917, he lived in various European countries doing different work. In 1908, together with Ioffe, he began to edit the paper Pravda, the organ of the Ukrainian Mensheviks published in Lviv, and in 1914 the new journal Borba which also supported the Mensheviks. During the Balkan War in 1912 he was a reporter (the paper not named) in Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania. As a result

of the War, Trotskii left Vienna in 1914 first for Zurich and then Paris. Like Lenin, he took part in the Zimmerwald Conference. In 1916 he was expelled from France, and then from Spain, and in the beginning of 1917 he arrived with his family in New York. He returned to Russia in May 1917 and in Petersburg joined the Social-Democrats-Internationalists, known in short as Mezhduraionnyi Komitet which, according to Trotskii, had friendly relations with the Bolsheviks. However, in July 1917 he joined the Bolshevik Party and at the Sixth Party Congress (July-August, 1917) was elected a member of the Central Committee and in 1919, a member of the Politbureau and the Orgbureau.

From a technical point of view, Trotskii played the most important role in the November uprising. On October 8, 1917, he was elected Chairman of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies in Petersburg which practically functioned as the second government in Russia. As Chairman of the Soviets, he became the head of the Military Revolutionary Committee, an organ of the Soviets which executed the plan to seize power in Russia in November 1917. After the revolution, Trotskii served as Commissar for Foreign Affairs from November 1917 until March 1918, and as Commissar of War from March 1918 until January 1925. As Commissar of War, he was the real creator of the Red Army. During the Civil War he also

served for a short time as Commissar of Transportation and Communication and Chairman of the Revolutionary War Council.

After Lenin's death he waged and lost a battle against Stalin over supremacy in the Party. In 1925 he was removed as Commissar of War, and in 1927 was expelled from the Central Committee and the Party. In January 1928 he was also expelled from Russia and, after a brief wandering in Europe, he was finally allowed to settle in Mexico where in 1940 he was assassinated by an unconfirmed Stalinist agent.

Stalin claimed that he had joined the revolutionary movement at fifteen, although from his explanation it appears that at that age he was only in "contact" with the underground groups of the Russian Marxists in Georgia. But by 1896 he was already active in the revolutionary movement while studying theology in the Seminary at Tiflis. In 1896-1897 he even headed the Marxist groups in the Seminary. In 1898 he formally joined the Tiflis Russian Social Democratic Labor Party and in 1900 became a member of the Tiflis Committee of the Party. In 1901, after he fled to Batum, he was a member of the Batum Committee of the Party. During this time he was mainly concerned with propaganda among the workers and organizational work in the Party.

In 1902 Stalin was arrested, jailed for more than a year, and then exiled to Siberia. In 1904 he managed

to escape to Tiflis where he became a member of the United Transcaucasus Committee of the Russian SDLP. Between 1904 and 1908, in addition to propaganda and organizational work in the Party, he organized raids on the treasury transports in Georgia for the purpose of obtaining money to finance the Party's activities.

Stalin took part in the First Party Conference held at Tammerfors (Finland) in 1905, in the Fourth Unification Congress held in Stockholm in 1906, and the Fifth Party Congress held in London in 1907; but each time he returned to Russia. At the Prague Conference in 1912, he was elected in absentia a member of the Party's Central Committee. At the end of the same year, he took part in the meeting of the Bolsheviks in Krakow (Poland) where he stayed for about a month to write an article (later published in the form of a pamphlet), Marxism and the National Question. He began in 1905 to publish articles under different names. In 1912 he was co-founder of the Party's organ in Russia, Pravda.

Between 1908 and 1913 Stalin was arrested and exiled to Siberia four times, but each time, except for the last one, he escaped and appeared once in Baku and twice in Petersburg. Being arrested for the last time in 1913, he remained in exile until the March Revolution in 1917. Like many other Party leaders, he returned to Petersburg in March 1917 and immediately became one of the editors of Pravda. At the April Conference in 1917, Stalin was



elected a member of the Politbureau and in October he became a member of the Military Revolutionary Committee headed by Trotskii.

Following the Bolshevik uprising, Stalin became Commissar for Nationalities and during the Civil War a member of the Revolutionary War Council. In addition, in 1919 he was appointed Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate which functioned as a checking board on the government bureaucracy. With the establishment of the three top permanent organs of the Party in 1919, he became a member of the Politbureau and the Orgbureau, although by December 1917 he was not a member of the latter.

Kamenev became familiar with the revolutionary groups in the gymnasium at Tiflis. But he formally joined the Russian Socialist Democratic Labor Party in 1901 at the age of eighteen at Moscow University where he studied law. He became very active among the students, and for this he was arrested in 1902 and then expelled from the University.

Being unable to re-enter the university in Russia, Kamenev left in 1902 for Paris. Once in Europe, he became acquainted with Lenin and other Russian Marxists. As a result, he joined the so-called "Iskra group" headed by Lenin at that time. Immediately after the Second Party Congress in 1903, Kamenev returned to Russia for Party work. He stayed first at Tiflis, and in the beginning

of 1904 he moved to Moscow where he worked mostly as a propagandist. In 1905 he took part in the Third Party Congress in London and then was appointed an agent of the Central Committee in Russia. In that capacity he visited several cities where he met with the Party committees. But most of the time between 1905 and 1907, he worked in Petersburg.

In 1908 Kamenev, at the request of Lenin, arrived in Geneva where he became the editor of the Bolshevik organ Proletarii. In addition, he participated in several conferences or meetings of the European Marxists. In the beginning of 1914, Kamenev was sent once more to Petersburg to become the editor of Pravda and to direct the Bolshevik faction in the Duma, a para-parliamentary organ of the government since 1905. The following year, however, he was arrested and exiled to Siberia. Upon his return from Siberia after the March Revolution, he was co-editor of Pravda and a member of the Petersburg Soviet. At the April Party Conference (1917), he was elected a member of the Central Committee. In 1918 he became Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, but very soon he was replaced by Iakub Sverdlov. In 1919 he was elected a member of the Politbureau.

Kamenev, together with Zinoviev, opposed Lenin's proposal to seize power in Russia as well as his insistence upon the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and in both cases Lenin was very irritated. Yet Kamenev was very

close to Lenin. He was the first editor of Lenin's works and the creator and director of Lenin's Institute.

Between 1918 and 1926 Kamenev was Chairman of the Moscow Soviet; in 1922 he also became First Deputy Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissariat (Lenin's deputy); in 1924 (until 1926) he was made Chairman of the Council of Work and Defense; and in 1926, Commissar for Trade. From 1925 he was in opposition to Stalin and his star began to fall. He was expelled from the Party in 1928 but after publicly admitting his mistakes, he was re-admitted into the Party and given a minor government job. In 1936, being accused of organizing the assassination of Kirov, he was sentenced to death by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

Krestinskii is not as well known for his revolutionary activity as the rest of the members of the top elite. He became familiar with the Marxist groups while still in the gymnasium at Vilno, but he became active among the students of the Moscow University in 1901 at the age of twenty. He formally joined the RSDLP in 1903 at twenty in Moscow where at that time he studied law. He was active in northern and western Russia. For his political work in various cities, such as Vitebsk, Vilno, and Petersburg, he was arrested eight times between 1904 and 1912, but was always released after short detention and expelled from the city in which he was caught at work.

After he had received his law degree from Moscow University, Krestinskii practiced law, worked with the Bolshevik faction to the Duma, and contributed to the Party's paper Pravda. Finally, in 1914 he was arrested and exiled to the Ural area. Following the revolution in March 1917, Krestinskii became Deputy Chairman of the Ekaterinburg Party Committee and Chairman of the Ural Oblast Committee. At the Sixth Party Congress in 1917, he was elected a member of the Central Committee in absentia. After the November revolution, he became Commissar of Justice for the northern Russian region and in 1918 (until 1922), Commissar of the Finance in Lenin's government. In 1919 he was elected Secretary of the Central Committee and a member of the Politbureau and the Orgbureau. In 1921 he was relieved from his Party work and between 1921 and 1930 was ambassador to Germany. In 1930 he became First Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs. In 1938, during the Great Purges, Krestinskii, together with twenty other old Bolsheviks, was tried for allegedly belonging to the Anti-Soviet Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites and condemned to death.

Kalinin was active among the workers and after the revolution made his career in government. In 1895, at the age of twenty, he joined the Union for the Struggle for the Liberation of the Proletariat in Petersburg where he worked at that time in one of the factories. In 1898

he formally became a member of the RSDLP. For his propaganda work among the workers, he was arrested several times and spent many months in jail, and once was exiled to Tiflis. In 1904 he was arrested once more and this time exiled to Siberia but in 1905, due to the amnesty of the Tsar, he was freed.

Between 1906 and 1917 he worked in factories in Petersburg and Moscow and, at the same time, continued working actively for his Party, for which he again was arrested several times. At the Prague Conference in 1912, he was elected a candidate member of the Central Committee in absentia. In 1913, after the arrest of Stalin and Sverdlov, Kalinin was put in charge of the Bolshevik publications in Petersburg. At the end of 1916 he was arrested, but the revolution in March of the next year prevented his exile to Siberia.

Following the revolution in March 1917, Kalinin was elected Chairman (Mayor) of Petersburg. After the death of Sverdlov in 1919, he became Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Russian Republic. In the same year he was elected a member of the Central Committee, a candidate member of the Politbureau, and a member of the Orgbureau.

Zinoviev, like all other members of the top elite, was first exposed to the revolutionary ideas in the 1890's, but he formally joined the RSDLP in 1901 at the age of

eighteen. Being persecuted by the police, he left for Europe in 1902 and lived briefly in Berlin, Paris, and Bern. It was in Switzerland that he first met with Lenin in 1903. At the Second Party Congress in 1903, he joined the Bolshevik faction, and at the end of that year he returned to Russia for Party work.

Because of illness, he again went to Europe in 1904 and, as his fellow revolutionaries, returned to Russia in 1905, but due to the same reason (heart ailment) he left once more for Europe. He came to Russia in 1906 and was elected a member of the Petersburg Party Committee and a member of the Executive Commission of the same Committee, holding these posts until his recall by Lenin to Geneva in 1908. At the Fifth Party Congress in 1907, Zinoviev was elected a member of the Central Committee, and in that capacity he became one of the members of the Bolshevik Center which directed the entire work of the Bolsheviks. In Petersburg he also became one of the editors of the Party's organ, Sotsial Demokrat.

On instruction from Lenin, Zinoviev appeared in 1908 in Geneva, and from that time he worked very closely with Lenin. He became one of the editors of the Party's paper, Proletarii, contributed to the Party's papers in Russia, participated in all the Party's meetings and conferences, and worked in the Central Committee. Together with Lenin, he represented the Bolshevik Party at Zimmerwald Conference and, also with Lenin, returned to Russia in April 1917.

Once in Petersburg, Zinoviev became one of the editors of Pravda, was very active in the preparation of the April Conference, worked in the so-called "working section" of the Petrograd Soviet, and delivered speeches at various meetings and conferences of the workers and peasants. After the November uprising, he was elected Chairman of the Soviet in Petrograd and in 1918, Chairman of the Petrograd Council of the People's Commissariat. He was the main organizer of the Third Communist International (the Comintern) and until 1926 was Chairman of its Executive Committee.

Zinoviev was a member of the Central Committee between 1907 and 1927, a candidate member of the Politbureau between 1919 and 1921, and a full member between 1921 and 1926. In 1923-1924 Zinoviev supported Stalin, but in 1925 he began his opposition to him. For this he was removed from the Politbureau (in 1926) and the next year from the Party. However, in 1928, after public confession of his mistakes, Zinoviev was readmitted into the Party. Exactly the same procedure was repeated in 1932-1933. But after Kirov's assassination in 1934, Zinoviev was arrested in 1935 and accused of being the leader of the terroristic center which was receiving its instructions from Trotskii in exile and which was responsible for Kirov's assassination. In August 1936, at the so-called "show trials," Zinoviev, with thirteen other Party leaders, was convicted, sentenced to death, and executed.

Zinoviev was the author of many articles, several books, and a number of Party documents.

Bukharin was connected with the revolutionary groups in the last years in the gymnasium in Moscow. He formally joined the Bolshevik Party in 1906 at the age of eighteen as a university student and began to work as a propagandist. In 1908 he became a member of the Moscow Party Committee. After his arrest and exile to Siberia in 1910, Bukharin fled to Europe and briefly lived in Switzerland, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Austria. In 1916 he came illegally to New York and became the editor of the Russian paper Novy Mir.

In his biography, Bukharin writes that, while in Europe, he spent days in the libraries studying Marxist literature and, at the same time, wrote articles for the Party's papers and several books, such as The Political Economy of Rent and World Economy and Imperialism.

After the revolution in Russia in March 1917, Bukharin returned there via Japan and settled in Moscow where he played the most important role in the Party. He became a member of the Executive Committee of the Moscow Soviet, the Moscow Party Committee, the editor of the paper Sotsial Demokrat, and co-editor of the Party's theoretical journal, Spartak. Between 1917 and 1929, with the exception of several months in 1918 when he opposed Lenin on the question of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, he was the editor of Pravda.

At the Sixth Party Congress in 1917, Bukharin was elected a member of the Central Committee; in 1919, a candidate member; and in 1921, a full member of the Politbureau. With the creation of the Comintern in 1919, he was elected a member of its Executive Committee and with the downfall of its Chairman Zinoviev in 1926, he became a member of the Comintern Praesidium, being in fact responsible for the work of the Comintern. Between 1932 and 1936 he was the editor of Izvestia.

Being a theoretician, Bukharin frequently had his own ideas on many ideological and political issues. In 1918 he headed the so-called "Left Communists" which opposed Lenin on the treaty with Germany (Brest-Litovsk Treaty) on the grounds that it was a betrayal of communism. In 1924 he joined Stalin against the "Left Opposition" led by Trotskii which later (1925-1926) was actively supported by Zinoviev and Kamenev. But very soon (1926) he found himself in opposition to Stalin. Bukharin, together with Rykov (Chairman of the Sovnarkom from the death of Lenin until 1930) and Tomskii (head of the Trade Union), opposed Stalin's policy of collectivization and industrialization, arguing quite rightly that this policy was borrowed from the "Left Opposition", and that it would put too heavy a burden upon the peasants to finance the industrialization. As a result, in 1929 the plenum of the Central Committee

removed Bukharin from the Comintern, the Politbureau, and the editorship of Pravda. He was then appointed the editor of Izvestia, serving in that capacity between 1932-1936.

Arrested in 1936, Bukharin was first exonerated, then arrested again the next year, tried in 1938 with twenty other Party leaders for "belonging to the Anti-Soviet Bloc of Rights" and sentenced to death. In the Party's history, Bukharin is described as a representative of the Rightist Opposition to the Party's Central Committee.

Stasova was the only member of the top elite who became affiliated with the revolutionary movement at the age of twenty-three. She formally joined the RSDLP in 1898 and from that time was engaged principally in the technical-organizational work of the Party. Until the beginning of 1904 she worked for the Petersburg Party Committee, being in charge of printing and distributing Party literature. She also did the secretarial work for the Committee. In 1904-1905 Stasova worked as a propagandist and a secretary in Moscow, Orel, Vilno, and again in Petersburg.

For a short time (August 1905-January 1906) Stasova worked in the Party's Central Committee in Geneva, Switzerland. Upon her return to Russia, she resumed her secretarial duties in the Party Committee of Petersburg and worked there, with a short interruption due to her arrest, until the fall of 1907.

Because of her illness, Stasova moved to Tiflis where she worked as a propagandist until 1910, and from 1910 until 1912, as a technical secretary in the Central Committee (at Tiflis). At the Prague Conference in 1912, she was elected in absentia a candidate member of the Central Committee. In the same year she was arrested with other Party members at Tiflis, tried, and in 1913 exiled to Siberia where she stayed until 1916. Allowed to visit her old parents in Petersburg in 1916, she decided to hide and not to return to Siberia. But she was arrested nevertheless and freed only by the revolution in March 1917.

In 1917 Stasova became the main organizer of the Party's Secretariat where she worked until 1920. At the Sixth Party Congress in 1917, she was once more elected a candidate member and in 1918, a full member of the Central Committee. In 1919 she was also elected a member of the Orgbureau.

In 1921-1926 Stasova worked in the Comintern apparatus, in 1930-1934 she was a member of the Central Control Commission, and in 1938-1946 edited Internatsionalnaia Literatura, a journal published in English and French. In addition, in the 1930's Stasova participated in several international conferences. She died in 1966 at the age of 93.

Dzerzhinskii joined "the Social-Democratic Circle" in the gymnasium at Vilno in 1894 at the age of seventeen.

Next year he became a member of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, and from that time on he worked as a professional revolutionary. In addition to his work in the Lithuanian Party, he also organized the Polish Social-Democratic Party. Strongly anti-nationalistic, Dzerzhinskii always insisted upon the union of the two Parties with that of the RSDLP. For his revolutionary activity, he was arrested six times and exiled to Siberia four times. He escaped from Siberia three times. Altogether he spent eleven years in jails and in exile.

In 1899 Dzerzhinskii, after his escape from Siberia for the first time, appeared at Vilno and sharply criticized the Lithuanian SDP for not uniting with the RSDLP. In the same year he went to Warsaw to organize the Polish SDP as a rival to the Polish Socialist Party which, he thought, was too nationalistic. He did succeed in his efforts but the Polish Social-Democratic Party was very weak. In the same year (1899), Dzerzhinskii united the Polish and Lithuanian Parties. At the Fourth Conference of the latter held in Berlin in 1903, he was unable to persuade the delegates to unite their Parties with the Russian SDLP, but he was, nevertheless, elected a member of the Main Governing Committee of the two united Parties. In that capacity he participated in the Fourth Unification Congress of the RSDLP held in Stockholm in 1906. It was only at this Congress that the Polish and the Lithuanian Parties joined the RSDLP and, as a result,

Dzerzhinskii was elected a member of the Central Committee.

Between his arrests, exiles, and years in jail, Dzerzhinskii worked as a propagandist at Vilno, Kovno, Lodz, Warsaw, and other cities in Lithuania and Poland. Every time he escaped from Siberia, he appeared in Krakow (under Austria), then in Warsaw, and later in other cities. After he became a member of the Central Committee of the RSDLP, he worked briefly (for two months) in that capacity in Petersburg and then again left for Warsaw.

In 1912 Dzerzhinskii was arrested in Warsaw, jailed, and in 1914 exiled to Siberia. In 1916 he was again tried in Moscow and sentenced to exile. This time only the revolution in March of 1917 freed him. He immediately began to work for the Central Committee. At the Sixth Party Congress in 1917, he was again elected a member of the Central Committee, and in October 1917 he became a member of the Military Revolutionary Committee headed by Trotskii.

In December 1917 Dzerzhinskii was appointed Chairman of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, known in short as Cheka (the notorious Police), and he remained Chairman of that institution until his death in 1926. For a short time in 1921, he was also Commissar of Transportation and Communication and in 1924, Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council. In 1919 he was elected a member of the Politbureau. The Soviet Encyclopedias reveal that Dzerzhinskii died of a heart attack on July 20, 1926,

three hours after he delivered a "passionate" speech at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee in which he "exposed the hideous enemies of the people-- Kamenev, Piatakov, and others."

Rakovskii's political activity was the most versatile of all members of the top elite. According to Malaiia Sovetskaia Entsiklopedia (1st ed., Vol. 7), he participated "in the Social-Democratic Movement in Bulgaria" from 1889 when he was sixteen. In his biography, however, Rakovskii writes that in 1887 he was expelled from the gymnasium at Varna for his participation in the students' demonstrations. At this time he was only fourteen, and it does not appear that he was a politically developed person. In 1889 he was expelled from another gymnasium at Gabrovo for similar reasons when he was sixteen. Rakovskii writes that it was here that he became a Marxist.

Since 1890, Rakovskii lived in Western Europe studying medicine, but in fact most of his time was devoted to political work. While in Switzerland, he became acquainted with the Russian Marxists Plekhanov, Zazulich, Axelrod and, in Bern in 1915, with Lenin. He was a member of both the Bulgarian SDP since the late 1880's (no date is given) and the Rumanian SDP since the 1890's and only in 1917 did he join the Bolshevik Party in Petersburg.

As a student in Geneva, Rakovskii was active among

the Russian students. At the same time he was also involved with the students, socialist groups, and parties of Switzerland, Belgium, and France. While in Berlin in 1893, he was in touch with Karl Liebknecht, one of the leaders of the German SDP, contributed to German socialist papers, and worked among the Russian students. When in 1894 he moved to Montpellier in order to complete his study of medicine, he immediately became active among the Bulgarian and Russian students and, at the same time, cooperated with the French Marxists, contributing to their journal The Socialist Youth. But his main concern was the Bulgarian SDP. He contributed to the Party's publications in Bulgaria, such as Den, Robotnik, and Drugar. He represented the Bulgarian Party at the Congress of International Socialists held in Zurich in 1893. In 1896 he appeared in Bulgaria where he delivered a number of speeches to the workers in various cities. From Bulgaria he went to Rumania (he was a citizen of Rumania) where he began his service in the army. From this time on he was more involved in the Rumanian SDP than in the Bulgarian, although he continued to work with the latter, publishing his articles, pamphlets, and even representing the Party at the Congress of the International Socialists held in Amsterdam in 1904.

In 1905-1907 Rakovskii lived in Rumania, published the paper Rabochnaia Rumyniia, and was active in the

Rumanian Social-Democratic Party. In connection with the peasant uprising in 1907, he was arrested and expelled from the country. From that time until 1916 he appeared in Rumania illegally several times and was frequently arrested and sent abroad. In 1914-1916 he was a member of the Central Committee of the Rumanian SDP; in 1915 he was elected Secretary of the Bureau of the newly formed, in Bukharest, Federation of the Balkan Revolutionary Workers and Socialists. In the spring of 1916 he took part in the meeting of the Zimmerwald group (the European leftist Parties which held their Conference at Zimmerwald in 1915).

In spite of his work and positions in the Bulgarian and Rumanian Socialist Parties, Rakovskii was attached to Russia. He confesses in his biography that he developed a sympathy for Russia when, as a boy, he learned that the revolutionary activities of his "grandfathers and uncles" on his mother's side were "connected with Russia." But from his political biography it is clear that there were other reasons. The Russian Marxists in Europe were the most numerous and most active of all emigree Socialist Parties. Naturally, such a group was attractive to a dynamic Bulgarian and, consequently, he worked among the Russian students. In addition, he married a Russian revolutionary, E. P. Riabova, who, after staying for several years in Europe, returned to Russia. In this connection Rakovskii

visited Russia in 1896 and in 1900. While in Russia, he worked with his wife in the RSDLP, contributed to the Party's paper under the assumed names Inzarov and Grigoriev, and wrote his book in Russian, Sovremennaja Frantsiia.

In 1916 Rakovskii was arrested in Rumania for the last time and freed from jail in May 1917. Immediately after that he arrived in Petersburg, but he did not participate in the November revolution because at that time he was in Stockholm waiting for the conference of the Zimmerwald group to take place. In January 1918 he was sent to Odessa for the purpose of forming the government of the Russian Soviet Republic in the south, but he failed due to the objective circumstances. While in Odessa, he became Chairman of the Supreme Autonomous Collegium for the Struggle with the Counterrevolution in the Ukraine and Rumania. His attempt to block the Rumanians from occupying Bessarabia was unsuccessful. In 1918 Rakovskii also headed the delegation of the Soviet government (in Moscow) to negotiate the peace treaty with the Ukrainian Central Rada (government of the Ukrainian independent state) which resulted only in an agreement on a cease fire between the two governments.

From 1918 until 1923, with one short interruption due to war, Rakovskii was Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist

Republic. At the same time he also was Chairman of the Cheka in the Ukraine, Chairman of the Sanitation Commission, and Chairman of the Ukrainian Economic Council.

Rakovskii became a member of the Bolshevik Party in 1917 and was elected a member of the Central Committee and a member of the Orgbureau in 1919. From 1918 until 1924 he was a member of the Central Committee and the Politbureau of the Ukrainian Communist Party. In 1923-1925 he served as an ambassador to Great Britain and in 1925-1927, to France. His main mission was to convince the governments of both countries to recognize the Soviet government and, in the case of France, he was successful.

In the 1920's he found himself in opposition to Stalin. In 1923, during the debates at the Party Congress over the form of the Soviet Union which was then in the process of formation, Rakovskii, together with N. A. Skrypnyk, argued (against Stalin) that the union republics should retain their institutions, such as the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the diplomatic corps, and others. A few years later Rakovskii joined the Leftist Opposition against Stalin and, as a result, was expelled from the Party in 1927. The Soviet sources do not reveal his work after that. In March 1938 Rakovskii, together with twenty other members of the opposition (among them Bukharin, Rykov, Iagoda, and Krestinskii), was publicly tried for belonging to the "Anti-Soviet Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites" and, unlike others, was sentenced to imprisonment, and from that time on was never heard of.

National Composition

The national composition of all top elites from 1917 until the present time is important primarily for two reasons. In the first place, the Communist movement in Russia, as elsewhere, has always emphasized in theory the international world outlook as opposed to the national. The whole theory of Marxian socialism, which was adopted by the Russian revolutionaries, was based on class distinction, and not on national entities. All communists were ideologically obliged to abandon their national orientation in politics in favor of international solidarity of the exploiting classes.

In the second place, Russia became an empire through the conquest of many nations. Those nations were culturally and politically suppressed by the Tsarist regime, and the Russian communist leaders, in order to win the support of many nations, proclaimed a policy of equality of all nations. How this policy was followed in practice is partly manifested in the composition of the top elites from the beginning of the Soviet regime until the present day.

The national composition of the 1919 top elite was quite diversified. There were five Russians: Lenin, Krestinskii, Kalinin, Bukharin, and Stasova; three Jews: Trotskii, Kamenev, and Zinoviev; one Georgian: Stalin; and one Pole: Dzerzhinskii. Rakovskii was Bulgarian by nationality and Rumanian by citizenship. Although there were several "nationals" in the top elite, Russians and Jews made up the majority. For this reason the top elite of 1919 can justly be called the Russian-Jewish group.

TABLE 10

DISTRIBUTION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE TOP ELITE OF 1919
ACCORDING TO YEAR OF JOINING THE PARTY, NATIONALITY,
ARREST AND EXILE, AND LIVING IN EUROPE

Name	Joined the Party or Revolutionary Groups		Nationality	Arrest and Exile	Living in Europe
	Year	Age			
Bukharin, N. I.	1906	18	Russian	x	x
Dzerzhinskii, F. E.	1894	17	Polish	x	x
Kalinin, M. I.	1895	20	Russian	x	
Kamenev, L. B.	1901	18	Jew	x	x
Krestinskii, N. N.	1903	20	Russian	x	
Lenin, V. I.	1888	18	Russian	x	x
Rakovskii, K. G.	1889 Revol. movement in Bulgaria; Bolsh.P., 1917	16	Bulgarian by birth; Romanian by nationality	x	x
Stalin, I. V.	1896	17	Georgian	x	
Stasova, E. D.	1896	23	Russian	x	
Trotskii, L. D.	1897 revol. groups; Bolsh.P., 1917	18	Jew	x	x
Zinoviev, G. E.	1901	18	Jew	x	x

TABLE 11

POLITICAL CAREER OF THE TOP ELITE OF
1919 BEFORE AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER 1919

Name	Revolu- tionaries	Party Appar- atus	Po- lice	Government: Central Executive Committee or Council of People's Commissars	
				Republican	Central
Bukharin, N. I.	x				
Dzerzhinskii, F.E.	x		x		
Kalinin, M. I.	x				x
Kamenev, L. B.	x				
Krestinskii, N. N.	x				x
Lenin, V. I.	x				x
Rakovskii, K. G.	x			x	
Stalin, I. V.	x				x
Stasova, E. D.	x	x			
Trotskii, L. D.	x				x
Zinoviev, G. E.	x				
Total	11	1	1	1	5

The biographic data that have been presented indicate that the members of the 1919 top elite had several common characteristics which constituted the elements of their group cohesiveness.¹⁷ Three types of cohesiveness are readily discernable: institutional, ideological, and social.

It is, of course, obvious that the top elite, as any other well-organized and disciplined unit, was institutionally a cohesive group. The top elite consisted of members of the three top Party organs: the Politbureau, the Orgbureau, and the Secretariat. Except for the last named which consisted of one person, the members of each organ acted as a unit simply because they belonged to the same institution. They were bound by the same organizational norms (holding meetings, methods of reaching decisions), by the collective obligation to make decisions in the areas of their institution's jurisdiction, and by the collective responsibility for the consequences of their decisions.

If we move above each particular Party organ, we still can find elements of an institutional nature which united the entire top elite into a cohesive group. First of all, in some cases the membership in the three institutions was interwoven. A Secretary was a member of both the Politbureau and the Orgbureau, and the two members of the Politbureau were also members of the Orgbureau. But the most

¹⁷The cohesive aspect of the top elite is discussed here in connection with Carl J. Friedrich's ideas described briefly on pp. 20-21 of this work.

important uniting factor of the top elite was its common interest in, and responsibility for directing the entire Party and government machineries, for formulating the goals and policies of the nation, and for seeing that they were implemented.

The top elite of 1919 was also a cohesive group ideologically. This was a group of men of the same conviction and of similar life experience. Although they might have differed on details or some aspects of Marxism, they all accepted Marxism as their ideology and thereby became likeminded men. Their work as professional revolutionaries enhanced their convictions and psychologically brought them closer together. They joined the revolutionary movements at the average (arithmetic mean) age of (approximately) 18.5, and since then they had gone through similar experiences in political activism, jail sentences, exiles in Siberia, and, in most cases, living abroad. It was also significant for the psychological make up of the group that all the members of the top elite belonged to the same generation. The age difference between Lenin, the oldest, and Bukharin, the youngest, was 18 years, but that between Lenin and the rest was a maximum of 13 and a minimum of 3 years. The average age of all members in 1919 was 40.5.

The top elite of 1919 was to a great degree a

socially cohesive group as well. In the first place, 9 out of 11, or about 82 per cent, came from the middle class and only 2, or about 18 per cent, from the lower class.

Secondly, formally or informally, 8 out of 11 men, or about 72 per cent, received higher education, mostly in the fields of law and economics. Two received a secondary, and one only an elementary, education.

In terms of nationality, however, the top elite of 1919 was not a homogeneous group. Five members, or about 45 per cent, were Russians, 3, or 27 per cent, were Jews, and the remaining 3 members belonged to three different nationalities--Georgian, Polish, and Bulgarian. This indicates that nationality was not a factor under consideration in the formation of the top elite in 1919. If it were, then the representatives from the various nations within the Russian empire (Ukraine, Belorussia, Armenia, Turkestan, and others) would have been included. The records of the political activities of all members rather indicate that the individual's qualities of leadership, such as initiative, dynamism, persistence, endurance, charisma, and hard work before, during, and after the revolution of 1917, were the criteria for the elevation to the top elite within the Party.

A few factors which have been mentioned above as contributing to the cohesiveness of the top elite also have other sociological and political meanings. A

superior education of the top elite, for example, can support an accepted thesis that organizing a revolution, building a new system, and leading a society in the twentieth century requires intellectual training. The statistics for the top elite as well as for the selected group of the lower elite indicate that the top elite was, on the whole, better educated than the lower. As a proof of this, we can compare the education of the top elite with the education of the delegates to the Eighth Party Congress in 1919 who, undoubtedly, represented, at least to a great degree, the lower Party elite. As it was pointed out, 72 per cent of the members of the 1919 top elite received higher (complete and incomplete) education. On the other hand, out of 305 delegates to the Congress in 1919 who provided the Credential Commission with data, only 73 men, or 24 per cent of the total number, received higher education.¹⁸ The consulted source does not indicate if the members of the top elite had answered the questionnaire, but if they did, then the percentage of the delegates with higher education would be lower. As will be shown later, similar educational differences existed in 1939 and in 1961, although the gap, particularly with respect to the elite of 1961, was much narrower.

¹⁸ Vosmoi Sezd RKP(b): Protokoly (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1959), p. 452.

Another conclusion that can be made on the basis of the available data is that the top elite members were older than the members of the lower elite. Thus, the average age of the top elite members of 1919 was 40.5 and that of the same delegates 31.¹⁹ The explanation for this difference can be found in the fact that the members of the top elite, being older, started their political career earlier and, consequently, assumed the leading positions within the Party sooner. Another explanation can be found in the autocratic type of the Party. In the absence of a genuine election, the top elite tries to keep its power as long as it can.

The study of the social origin of the top elite members can also lead to a certain conclusion. Since no data on social origin of the delegates to the 1919 Party Congress are available, no comparative conclusion can be made. But the known social origin of the top elite is in itself interesting from the point of view of the Communist ideology. The above discussion of the political careers shows that it was the men of the 1919 top elite who organized the successful socialist revolution in Russia in November 1917. The data on their social origin reveal that they came in most cases (approximately 82 percent) from the middle class (bourgeois class) families. Therefore, it cannot be claimed, as the Marxian ideology had

¹⁹Ibid.

taught, that the socialist revolution in Russia was a revolution of the working class led, in the words of the Communist Manifesto, by "the most advanced and resolute section of the working class parties."²⁰ Neither was it a revolution, as Stalin had contended, at whose "head marched the revolutionary proletariat, which had such an important ally as the vast mass of the peasantry who were oppressed and exploited by the landlords."²¹

Instead, the socialist revolution in Russia, as the data show, was an act of voluntarism on the part of a tiny group of the middle class intelligentsia who one-sidedly decided to represent the Russian toiling masses.²²

²⁰ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (New York: International Publishers, 1948), p. 22. The resolute quality of the Russian top leaders, however, cannot be denied.

²¹ Joseph Stalin, Foundations of Leninism (New York: International Publishers, 1939), p. 36.

²² Lenin recognized the decisive role of the bourgeois intelligentsia in the socialist movement still in 1902. He wrote that the workers by themselves could not develop political consciousness and that it could only be "brought to them from without." Using Marx and Engels as an example, he stated that it was "the educated representatives of the propertied class," "the bourgeois intelligentsia" who had developed the revolutionary theory without which no revolutionary movement could exist. He argued that it was these "conscious" elements (including professional revolutionaries from the working class) that were supposed to lead the spontaneous movement of the working class. V. I. Lenin, What is to be Done (New York: International Publishers, 1929) pp. 33, 115.

The November revolution was organized secretly, and after it had been accomplished in a few cities at a different time, it was at best supported only by a small minority of the toiling masses. This was indicated by the results of the elections to the Constituent Assembly. On November 25, 1917, a few weeks after the Bolsheviks took power in the country, the long awaited elections to the Constituent Assembly took place. Thirty-six million people went to the polls and of these, only nine million voted for the Bolshevik Party. As a result, out of the total 707 seats, the Bolsheviks received only 175 seats, but the Social-Revolutionaries received 370, the left Social-Revolutionaries 40, the Mensheviks 16, and the rest went to other small groups. In the face of such a defeat, Lenin's government disbanded the Assembly on the next day of its meeting on January 19, 1918.²³ The success of the Bolshevik revolution was determined by several factors among which were a chaotic situation in the country, organizational skill and dedication of the Bolshevik leaders on all levels, and the police and military power.

The representation of various institutions in the 1919 top elite, such as the Secret Police, the Red Army, is noticeable but since the top Party organs in 1919 had just started, it is difficult to reach a definite conclusion on this development.

²³Georg von Rauch, A History of Russia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 67-69.

CHAPTER V

THE TOP ELITE OF 1939

Following the Eighteenth Party Congress, the newly elected Central Committee at its plenum on March 22, 1939, elected the following members to the Politbureau, the Orgbureau, and the Secretariat: members of the Politbureau - Andrei Andreevich Andreev, Klement Efremovich Voroshilov, Andrei Aleksandrovich Zhdanov, Lazar Moissevich Kaganovich, Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, Anastas Ivanovich Mikoian, Viacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Iosif Vissarianovich Stalin, Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev; candidate members - Lavrentii Pavlovich Beria, Nikolai Mikhailovich Shvernik. Secretaries: Andrei Andreevich Andreev, Andrei Aleksandrovich Zhdanov, Georgii Maksimilianovich Malenkov, Iosif Vissarianovich Stalin. Members of the Orgbureau: Andrei Andreevich Andreev, Andrei Aleksandrovich Zhdanov, Lazar Moissevich Kaganovich, Georgii Maksimilianovich Malenkov, Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis, Nikolai Aleksandrovich Mikhailov, Iosif Vissarianovich Stalin, Nikolai Mikhailovich Shvernik, Aleksander Sergeevich Shcherbakov.¹

Comparing this list with that of 1919, it appears that of all members of the top elite of 1919, only Stalin and Kalinin remained in power in 1939. The previous

¹Partiinoe Stroitelstvo, No. 7-8 (April 1939), p. 110.

chapter briefly described the fate of many members of the top elite under Lenin. The members of the top elite of 1939, except for Molotov, were recruited by Stalin between 1924 and 1939. They differed from those of the 1919 group in several respects: they came mostly from the lower social classes, received less education, were for a short time revolutionaries, fought either as political commissars of lower ranks or as ordinary soldiers in the Civil War, or became very active as Party members during that time, usually as komitetchiki, and, finally, reached the pivotal positions within the Party through their manifested loyalty to Stalin.

Social Origin

Within this group only Zhdanov, Malenkov, Molotov, and Mekhlis can be considered to have come from the middle or lower-middle class. Zhdanov was born in 1896 (died in 1948) in the town of Mariupol, now Zhdanov, where his father was an inspector of the elementary schools. Apparently, by profession his father was a teacher before he assumed the administrative position.²

Malenkov's social origin is identified by the Soviet sources only in general terms. According to them, he was born in 1902 in the town of Orenburg, now Chkalov, where his father was an office employee. Since he was

²Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, 2nd ed., XV, 604-607. Malaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, 2nd ed., IV, 256-257; 3rd ed., III, 843-844. Henceforth the Soviet Encyclopedias will be identified by their initials. All sources identified in this section with regard to all members of the top elite will be used in all other sections of this chapter.

able to attend the secondary school under the Tsarist regime when the cost of education was high, it means that his father belonged to at least lower-middle class.³

Molotov, whose father's name was Skriabin, was born in 1890 in the village of Kukarka, now Sovetsk, Kirov oblast, but in his youth he lived in the small town of Nolinsk. His father was a shop assistant, most probably at Nolinsk. According to his authorized biography, Molotov's father was able to send his three sons, including Molotov, to the gymnasium at Kazan. This undoubtedly indicates that he also belonged to the middle class.⁴

The Soviet sources give rather brief information on Mekhlis. Accordingly, he was born in 1889 (died in 1953) in Odessa where his father was an office employee.⁵

There were seven members who came from the working class families. As was established in the previous chapter,

³B.S.E., 2nd ed., XXVI, 145-146; Dr. Heinrich E. Schulz and Dr. Stephen S. Taylor (eds.), Who's Who in the USSR - 1961-1962 (Montreal: International Book and Publishing Co., 1962), pp. 472-473.

⁴B.S.E., 1st ed., XXXIX, 721-726; 2nd ed., XXVIII, 152-154. Iu. S. Gambarov, V. Ia. Zheleznov, M. M. Kovalevskii, S. A. Muromtsev, and K. A. Timiriachev (eds.), "Deiateli Soiuz Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i Oktjabrskoi Revoliutsii," Parts I, II, and III, in Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar Russkogo Bibliograficheskogo Instituta "Granat," 7th ed., Vol. XLI (Moskva: Russkii Bibliograficheskii Institut "Granat," n.d.). Schulz, et al., op. cit., pp. 521-522.

⁵B.S.E., 2nd ed., XXVII, 430-431. M.S.E., 3rd ed., V, 1243.

Stalin was the son of a shoemaker and a factory worker at Tiflis. Mikoian, born in 1895 in the village of Sanain, Armenia, was the son of a carpenter-worker.⁶

Voroshilov was born in 1881 in the village of Verkhnee, now Dnepropetrovsk oblast. The Soviet Encyclopedias identify his father as a railroad watchman, but in his biography Voroshilov adds that his father also worked as a farm laborer.⁷ Khrushchev, born in 1894 in the village of Kalinovka, now Kursk oblast, was the son of a coal miner in Donbass.⁸

The exact occupation of Shcherbakov's and Shvernik's fathers is difficult to establish, for the Soviet sources reveal only that their fathers were workers. Shcherbakov⁹ was born in 1901 (died in 1945) in the town of Ruze, now belonging to the Moscow oblast and Shvernik,¹⁰ in 1888

⁶B.S.E., 2nd ed., XXVII, 430-431. M.S.E., 1st ed., V, 201-202; 3rd ed., V, 1260-1261. Schulz, et al., op. cit., p. 509. Deputaty Soveta Soiuzu i Soveta Natsionalnostey-Piatyi Sozyv (Moskva: Izdatelstvo "Izvetia Sovetov Deputatov Trudiashchikhsia SSSR," 1958), p. 268; henceforth identified as Deputaty.

⁷B.S.E., 1st ed., XIII, 173-177; 2nd ed., IX, 128-130. M.S.E., 3rd ed., II, 607-608. Gambarov, et al., op. cit., pp. 93-97. Schulz, et al., op. cit., p. 841. Deputaty, p. 87.

⁸B.S.E., 2nd ed., XLVI, 390-391. M.S.E., 2nd ed., XI, 493-494; 3rd ed., X, 158-160. Schulz, et al., op. cit., p. 348. Deputaty, p. 426.

⁹B.S.E., 2nd ed., XLVIII, 262-263. M.S.E., 3rd ed., X, 687. Ukrainska Radianska Entsyklopediia, Vol. XVI, p. 405; henceforth identified as Ukr. R.E.

¹⁰B.S.E., 1st ed., LXII, 105-106; 2nd ed., XLVII, 599. M.S.E., 2nd ed., II, 738; 3rd ed., X, 541. Schulz, et al., op. cit., pp. 699-700. Deputaty, p. 445.

(died in 1970) in Petersburg, now Leningrad.

The sources on Mikhailov's biography do not indicate his social origin at all, but the fact that he was born in Moscow (in 1906) and worked in a factory in that city in his youth strongly suggests that he, too, came from a working family.¹¹

The remaining four men--Kalinin, Andreev, Kaganovich, and Beria--came from peasant families. As it was noted in the previous chapter, Kalinin was born in 1875 (died in 1946) in the village of Verkhniaia Troitsa, now in Kalinin oblast.¹² Andreev¹³ was born in 1895 in the village of Kuznetsovo, now in Smolensk oblast; Kaganovich,¹⁴ in 1893 at Kabany (village) near Kiev; and Beria,¹⁵ in 1899 (executed in 1953) in the village of Merkheuli in Georgia.

¹¹B.S.E., 2nd ed., XXVII, 609. Schulz, et al., op. cit., p. 507. Deputaty, p. 270.

¹²B.S.E., 1st ed., XXX, 716-725. M.S.E., 2nd ed., V, 165-167; 3rd ed., IV, 387-388. Ukr. R.E. (1961), VI, 88.

¹³B.S.E., 1st ed., II, 732; 2nd ed., II, 428-429. M.S.E., 1st ed., I, 323-324. Ukr. R.E. (1959), I, 227-228. Schulz, et al., op. cit., p. 44. Deputaty, p. 22.

¹⁴B.S.E., 2nd ed., XIX, 282-283. M.S.E., 1st ed., III, 604-605; 2nd ed., V, 125-128. Schulz, et al., op. cit., p. 306.

¹⁵B.S.E., 2nd ed., V, 22-23.

TABLE 12

DISTRIBUTION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE
1939 TOP ELITE ACCORDING TO DATE OF
BIRTH, PLACE OF BIRTH, AND SOCIAL ORIGIN¹⁶

Name	Date of Birth	Place of Birth	Social Origin
Andreev, A.A.	1895-	Kuznetsovo, vil., now Smolensk <u>obl.</u>	Peasant
Beria, L.P.	1899-1953	Merkheuli, vil., Georgia	Peasant
Kaganovich, L.M.	1893-	Kabany, vil., now Kiev <u>obl.</u>	Peasant
Kalinin, M.I.	1875-1946	Verkhniaia Troitsa, vil., now Kalinin <u>obl.</u>	Peasant
Khrushchev, N.S.	1894-	Kalinovka, vil., Kursk <u>obl.</u>	Worker
Malenkov, G.M.	1902-	Orenburg, now Chkalov, town	Lower-middle Class
Mekhlis, L.Z.	1889-1953	Odessa, town	Lower-middle Class
Mikhailov, N.A.	1906-	Moscow	Worker
Mikoian, A.I.	1895-	Sanain, vil., Armenia	Worker
Molotov, V.M.	1890-	Kukarka, vil., now Sovetsk, Kirov <u>obl.</u>	Lower-middle Class
Shcherbakov, A.S.	1901-1945	Ruza, town, now Moscow <u>obl.</u>	Worker
Shvernik, N.M.	1888-1970	Petersburg, now Leningrad	Worker
Stalin, I.V.	1879-1953	Gory, town near Tiflis	Worker
Voroshilov, K.E.	1881-	Verkhnee, vil., Dnepropetrovsk <u>obl.</u>	Worker
Zhdanov, A.A.	1896-1948	Mariupol, now Zhdanov, town	Middle Class

¹⁶As in the previous chapter, the listing in this Table is in alphabetical order. The listing of names in subsequent Tables will follow the listing order herein.

Education

The educational level of the 1939 top elite was, in general, lower than that of the 1919 group. It should be admitted that even those members who did receive higher education (complete or incomplete) were not as sophisticated as those of the 1919 top elite. In the 1939 group only six out of fifteen men can be considered to have received university education, and of these only three (Malenkov, Mekhlis, and Shcherbakov) graduated and the other three (Stalin, Molotov, and Mikhailov) never completed their higher education.

According to the available Soviet sources, Malenkov attended Moscow Higher Technical Institute from 1921 to 1925 and received his degree in engineering. He was the only one within the group who had received a technical higher education.

Shcherbakov, on the other hand, received his education in the Party schools, studying from 1921 until 1924 at the Sverdlov's Communist University and from 1930 until 1932 at the Institute of Red Professors in Moscow. Although the Soviet sources do not indicate it, it is probable that he graduated from both schools.

Not much information is available about the educational history of Mekhlis. The Soviet sources only reveal that he graduated in 1930 from the Institute of Red Professors.

Stalin, as was noted in the previous chapter, studied

at the Theological Seminary in Tiflis from which, after almost five years, he was expelled (in 1899) for "spreading of Marxism" among the students.

Molotov attended gymnasium at Kazan from 1902 until 1909 and passed his graduation examinations at Vologda (no date is given) where he lived between 1909 and 1911 in exile. Between 1911 and 1914 he studied (with interruptions due to his arrests) economics at Petersburg Polytechnical Institute. Being arrested in 1914 and subsequently banished to Siberia, he never was able to graduate from the Institute.

The least information on education and social origin is available with regard to Mikhailov. The Soviet sources state only laconically that he received "incomplete higher education" without identifying the school, years of study, or field of specialization. Since he worked in his youth as an editor of various papers and as an official of the Komsomol, it is possible that he attended the Party schools.

Mikoian, Beria, Zhdanov, and Khrushchev can be considered to have received a secondary education. It is briefly stated in the Soviet sources that Mikoian graduated from the Armenian Theological Seminary in Tiflis, probably in 1914 or 1915, and his education is officially classified as secondary. Undoubtedly, this Seminary was on the secondary school level. When Mikoian graduated, he was nineteen or twenty years old and, at that age, he could not have finished the school at the university level.

Beria studied at the secondary Mechanical-Construction-Technical School at Baku from 1915 until 1919 (with some interruptions) and in 1919 received his diploma in technical-architectural construction. He also was enrolled at the Baku Polytechnic Institute in 1920, but there is no indication that he actually attended the school. He most probably did not because since April 1921 Beria worked full time in the state security organs.

It is difficult to establish the education of Zhdanov because the Soviet sources are totally silent on this question. However, the fact that he joined the students' revolutionary group at Tver at the age of sixteen suggests that he attended a secondary school in that town. Hence his education is considered here as secondary.

Khrushchev did not even complete elementary school, but in 1922-1925 he studied at Workers' Factory Donets Industrial Institute at Stalino (now Donetsk) which was an elementary technical school for adult workers. From 1929 until 1931 he studied at Stalin's Industrial Academy in Moscow. Summarizing his education, it is perhaps fair to classify it as being on the secondary school level.

Andreev, Kalinin, Shvern timer, Varoshilov, and Kaganovich received only elementary education.

TABLE 13

DISTRIBUTION OF THE MEMBERS OF
THE 1939 TOP ELITE ACCORDING
TO LEVEL AND TYPE OF EDUCATION

Name	Level of Education	Type of Education				
		Soc.	Soc.	Hum.	Technical	Other
Andreev, A.A.	Elementary					
Beria, L.P.	Secondary				x	
Kaganovich, L.M.	Elementary					
Kalinin, M.I.	Elementary					
Khrushchev, N.S.	Secondary				x	
Malenkov, G.M.	Higher				x	
Mekhlis, L.Z.	Higher	x				Party School
Mikhailov, N.A.	Higher	x				Party School
Mikoian, A.I.	Secondary			x		
Molotov, V.M.	Higher	x				
Shcherbakov, A.S.	Higher	x				Party School
Shvern timer, N.M.	Elementary					
Stalin, I.V.	Higher			x		
Voroshilov, K.E.	Elementary					
Zhdanov, A.A.	Secondary					

Political Activity and Career

The members of the 1939 top elite, due to their age differences, began their political activities at different times. In this respect they can be divided into two groups: the revolutionaries and the Civil War fighters. Of all, only one member began his political career a decade after the November revolution.

Although the members of the top elite of 1939 differed in age and political experience, they were, with a very few exceptions, similar in at least one respect: they were komitetchiki-apparatchiki. The following discussion of all members of the top elite will illustrate the differences and similarities of their political careers.

The data on Stalin's political career, which was related to the year of 1919, was presented in the preceding chapter. Here, some of them will be mentioned again because Stalin continued to hold the posts acquired in 1917 and 1919 for several years, while he gradually took on some new ones.

As has been mentioned, Stalin became Commissar of Nationalities in 1917. In this capacity he played a very important role in establishing the Soviet Union. The methods he used for this purpose ranged from propaganda and Party pressure to the use of force, as illustrated by the formation of the Transcaucasian Republic which was, in fact, a preliminary step toward the Union.

Stalin was one of the principal drafters of the Union

Constitution which was approved in 1923 by the then ill Lenin and was formally ratified by the Second All-Union Congress of the Soviets in January 1924.

In 1919 Stalin also became Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate. The function of this institution was to control the whole state bureaucracy in order to insure that it worked honestly and efficiently.

Stalin became an absolute dictator of the Soviet Union not through the government, but through the Party. The Eleventh Party Congress, held in March 1922, modified the Party's statutes by enlarging the Central Committee and by creating the office of General Secretary. On April 3, 1922, it was announced that Stalin had become General Secretary and his staunchest supporters, Molotov (who had been in the Secretariat since early 1921) and Kuibyshev, had become the Secretaries. Stalin gradually began to change the administrative and coordinating type of the Secretariat into the supreme controlling organ of the whole Party machinery. In this way he became an absolute dictator of the Soviet Union.

In his bid for power at the end of 1923 when Lenin was seriously ill, Stalin, as General Secretary, together with Zinoviev and Kamenev, formed a triumvirate against his rival Trotskii. But in the middle of 1925, he formed a new coalition with Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsii (known as the right faction) against Trotskii who, with his former collaborators Zinoviev and Kamenev, was known as the left

faction. However, by 1928 this coalition practically ended and after an attack upon the rightist deviationists, Stalin finally removed Rykov as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and appointed in his place his trusted man Molotov. Beginning with Trotsky's expulsion from the Soviet Union in 1927, all of Stalin's opponents were purged from the Party and exiled to Siberia or liquidated. On May 6, 1941, on the eve of Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, Stalin himself became Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. Following this attack, he also became Chairman of the State Committee of Defense,¹⁷ Commissar (Minister) of Defense, and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the USSR. After the war, Stalin continued only as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Secretary of the Secretariat, and a member of the Party's Praesidium. He died on March 5, 1953.

Kalinin, an old Bolshevik and a revolutionary, was very active among the workers in various parts of Russia before the revolution. As a revolutionary, he was arrested several times, and once he was exiled to Siberia. He made his career in government rather than in the Party. However, he was neither intellectually strong nor politically influential. As discussed in the previous chapter, Kalinin joined the Union for Struggle for the Liberation of the

¹⁷This Committee was created in June 1941 after the outbreak of war and first it consisted of Stalin (Chairman), Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov, and Beria. In 1942 Voznesenskii, Kaganovich and Mikoyan were co-opted and in 1944 Bulganin replaced Voroshilov. The Committee had the supreme power and authority over the government, Party and all other institutions in the country and was in charge of the organization of human and material resources to win the war.

Workers in 1895 at the age of twenty and the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party in 1898. In 1919, after Sverdlov's death, he was elected Chairman of the All-Russian Executive Committee of the Russian Soviet Republic and served in that capacity for eighteen years. With the formation of the Soviet Union, Kalinin was elected in December 1922 as Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, remaining in that post until the structural reorganization of the central organs of the government in 1936-38. At the first session of the newly established Supreme Soviet in January 1938, he was elected Chairman of the Praesidium of the Soviet Union and held that post until 1946.

Kalinin was elected a candidate member of the Party's Central Committee in absentia in 1912, and a full member in 1919. In 1919 he was also elected a candidate member of the Politbureau and a member of the Orgbureau. In 1926 he became a full member of the Politbureau and remained in that body until his death in 1946.

Voroshilov was another revolutionary in the 1939 top elite. He was a military man--a hero of the Civil War. In his youth he worked in various factories, mostly at Lugansk where he became familiar with the revolutionary ideas. In 1903, at the age of twenty-two, Voroshilov joined the RSDLP at Lugansk, and from that time on he was very active among the workers and in the Party. As an elected delegate of the Lugansk Party organization, he took part in both the Fourth (Unified) Party Congress in Stockholm

in 1906 and in the Fifth Congress held in London in 1907. Upon his return from the last Congress, Voroshilov was arrested and banished to Siberia for three years. However, in December of the same year (1907) he escaped and appeared at Baku where he met Stalin. In 1908 he showed up in Petersburg but was very soon caught by the police and sent again to Siberia (Archangelsk gubernia). This time he remained in exile until 1912 and then came to the Donbass area and worked briefly in a factory. Arrested and exiled to Siberia once more in 1913, he returned (legally) to Donbass but, being persecuted by the police, he left for Tsaritsin and then, in 1915, for Petersburg where he continued to be active in the Party.

After the revolution in February 1917, Voroshilov became a member of the Petrograd Soviet, but in March 1917 he left for Lugansk where he was elected Chairman of the Lugansk Soviet. During the November revolution, he was Commissar of Petrograd and, shortly afterwards, helped Dzerzhinskii to organize the Secret Police--Cheka.

Voroshilov began his military career in 1918. In that year he organized the guerrilla unit which fought the Germans in the Ukraine. At Tsaritsin (later Stalingrad and now Volgograd) he was instrumental in forming the Tenth Army which in 1919 successfully defended the city against the Tsarist general Denikin. It was here that Voroshilov became a military hero. In 1918 he became

Commissar of the Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, and a year later (June 1919) he was appointed commander in chief of the Fourteenth Army which fought in the Ukraine. Voroshilov was also instrumental in forming the First Cavalry Army in 1919, and for this he was appointed a member of its Revolutionary-War Council. From 1921 until 1924 he was in charge of the Northern Caucasus Military District and from 1924 until 1925, of the Moscow Military District.

Voroshilov frequently worked with Stalin, particularly during the defense of Tsaritsin, and later supported Stalin in the latter's bid for the supreme power in the Party. Therefore, it is no surprise that he was rewarded with positions both in the government and the Party. After Frunze's death in 1925, Voroshilov served between 1925 and 1934 as Commissar of the Military and Navy Affairs and Chairman of the Revolutionary-War Council of the USSR, and between 1934 and 1940, as Commissar of Defense. In 1935 he was named Marshal of the USSR.¹⁸ In 1940 he was relieved as Commissar of Defense and was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissariat (Council of Ministers) and Chairman of the Defense Committee. With the creation in 1941 of the Defense State Committee headed by Stalin, Voroshilov became one of its members. During

¹⁸ Since Voroshilov was not a member of the top elite of 1961 (which will be discussed in the next chapter), his political career is described here beyond 1939. The same will be done with the rest of the members, except for Mikoian, Khrushchev, and Shvernik.

World War II Voroshilov also served briefly as Commander in Chief of the North-Western Armed Forces which defended Leningrad. In 1941 he was a member of the Soviet delegation to the Allied Conference held in Moscow and, again, in 1943 at Teheran. Between 1945 and 1947 Voroshilov was Chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary. Between 1946 and 1953 he again was Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and between 1953 and 1960 Chairman of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet.

As far as his career in the Party is concerned, it should be mentioned that he was elected to the Central Committee in 1921 and, except for more than four years (from November 1961 to April 1966), he was a member of that body until 1971. He was a member of the Politbureau between 1926 and 1952 and a member of the Praesidium between 1952 and 1960.

Voroshilov was closely associated with Stalin. He praised the latter at various public meetings and followed him faithfully. Two of his several books were devoted to glorification of Stalin: the first, Stalin and the Red Army, published in 1929, and the second, Stalin and the Armed Forces of the USSR, published in 1950. In 1956 at the Twentieth Party Congress, Voroshilov was one of those who opposed Khrushchev's intention to deliver the "Secret Speech" at a closed meeting against Stalin. In 1957 Voroshilov, in the beginning, supported the so-called "anti-Party group" against Khrushchev. But

when he saw that Khrushchev was on the winning side, he switched to the victor. Voroshilov, nevertheless, was discredited by Khrushchev at the Twenty-first Party Congress in 1959. He was, however, allowed to stay in the Presidium but in July 1960 he was finally removed from that body. At the Twenty-second Congress in 1961, Voroshilov was not elected even to the Central Committee. In 1966 at the Twenty-third Party Congress, he was again elected a member of the Central Committee, and in August of the same year he was also elected a member of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet.

Molotov was another revolutionary whose political career was connected with Stalin. Like many others, Molotov from the beginning of his political activity until 1930 was a komitetchik and an apparatchik.

A. Arosev, the author of his biography in the earlier quoted Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar, writes that Molotov, as a fifteen year old boy, became interested in socialist ideas under the influence of Vasnetsov, an old Marxist who lived at that time in exile at Molotov's town Nolinsk. As a result, Molotov joined in 1906 the revolutionary group in the gymnasium at Kazan. According to the Soviet Encyclopedias, Molotov joined the RSDLP in 1906 but this is unlikely because in that year he joined the above group which consisted of students, many of whom had not yet developed their Party allegiance. Molotov in this group considered himself as a "non-Party member." Only

one man was known to be a declared Bolshevik. But in the course of conspiratorial work and debates, the whole group as a unit joined, at the end of 1907, the Bolshevik faction of the RSDLP at Kazan. Molotov was then seventeen years of age.

In 1909 the whole group was arrested and Molotov was banished for two years to Vologda gubernia where he secretly continued to work in the Party, primarily as a propagandist among the railroad workers. In 1911 he came to Petersburg and enrolled at the Polytechnical Institute to study economics. Here he became very active among the students and in the Party. In 1912 he began to contribute to the Bolshevik paper Zvezda, was co-founder, a member of the editorial board, and a technical secretary of Pravda. It was here that he met Stalin and worked with him for the first time. In the same year he also became a member of the Petrograd Party Committee.

In 1913 and 1914 Molotov was arrested several times and, being persecuted by the police, he left in 1914 for Moscow where he again was very active in the Party. As a result, he was arrested in 1915 and exiled to Siberia (Irkutsk gubernia) for three years. However, in 1916 he escaped from Siberia and returned to Petersburg where he began to work as a "Party professional." In the same year he was co-opted to the Russian Bureau of the Party's Central Committee in Petersburg, and by the time of the February revolution in 1917, he was already Chairman of the

Bureau. Between the February revolution and the November uprising, Molotov became a member of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet and the Military Revolutionary Committee which was in charge of the Bolshevik uprising.

In 1918 Molotov was appointed Chairman of the Council for National Economy of the Northern region of Russia. From the end of 1919 until the end of 1920 he was Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Novgorod gubernia, and from November 1920 until March 1921 he was Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. At the Ninth Party Congress in 1920, Molotov was elected a candidate member and at the next Congress in 1921, a full member of the Central Committee and Secretary of the Central Committee. He held the latter position without interruption until 1930. In 1921 he was also elected a candidate member of the Politbureau and in 1926, a full member, remaining in that body until 1952. Between 1952 and 1957 Molotov was also a member of the Party's Praesidium.

During the struggle for power after Lenin's death, Molotov strongly supported Stalin. In order to keep the Moscow Party organization loyal to Stalin, Molotov served for two years (1928-1930) as its Secretary. In 1930 he replaced Rykov as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (Prime Minister),¹⁹ and in 1939 he also became

¹⁹On March 15, 1946, the name of the Council of People's Commissars was changed to the Council of Ministers.

Commissar for Foreign Affairs. When in May 1941 Stalin took over the chairmanship of the Soviet government, Molotov became his deputy and continued to serve as Commissar for Foreign Affairs until 1949. During the war (1941-1945) he was also Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee headed by Stalin.

In 1949 Molotov was replaced as Minister for Foreign Affairs by Vishinskii, but he remained in the Council of Ministers as Stalin's deputy. After Stalin's death Molotov once again was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs but on June 2, 1956, on the day when Tito arrived in Moscow, he was replaced by Shepilov. This was a political gesture to Tito, for Molotov was the one who in 1948 signed the Cominform resolution expelling Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc and since then followed the "unfriendly" policy toward that country. But he remained in the Party's Praesidium and at the end of 1956 was appointed Minister of State Control.

Molotov, together with Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Shepilov, planned to remove Khrushchev from his position in the Party. At the June plenary meeting of the Central Committee in 1957, this group found itself in a minority, was castigated as the "anti-Party group," and was expelled both from the Praesidium and the Central Committee of the Party. As a result, Molotov lost all his posts in the Party and government. In the same year, however, he was appointed Ambassador in Outer Mongolia where he stayed

until 1960. Upon his return to the Soviet Union, he went into retirement.

Shvernik was another revolutionary and a komitetchik in the top elite. He made his career mainly in the trade unions. There are no indications that he was politically influential in the elite, but he was useful to Stalin when the latter purged the "right opposition" from the Soviet trade unions in 1929-1930.

After four years of elementary education in his native Petersburg, Shvernik began to work in 1902 as an apprentice lathe operator in the electromechanical factory. He joined the Bolshevik Party in 1905 at the age of seventeen. In the same year he became a member of the Party Committee in Petersburg; in 1910-1911, at Nikolayev; in 1911, at Tula; in 1915-1917, again in Petersburg; and in the beginning of 1917, at Samara. He was arrested several times and spent about three years in exile in Siberia (no date is given).

Following the February revolution in 1917, Shvernik was elected Chairman of the Workers' Committee in one factory at Samara, and on the eve of the November uprising he became Chairman of the All-Russian Workers' Committee of the "artillery factories", also at Samara. After the Bolshevik revolution he served for more than a year as Chairman of the Samara Executive City Committee (government). From 1919 until 1921 Shvernik was in the Red Army, first as a fighting soldier and later as Political Commissar on the Eastern and Southern fronts. In 1921 he was elected

Chairman of the Donets Raion Committee of the Metal Trade Union, and in 1922 he worked in the Party's Central Control Commission. In 1923 he was promoted to the membership in the Praesidium of the Central Control Commission and, at the same time, appointed People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection of the RSFSR, holding both positions until 1925.

Shvernik was elected a member of the Party's Central Committee in 1925. In 1925-1926 he was Secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee and in 1926-1927, Secretary of the Party's Central Committee. After that, in 1927-1928, he served as Secretary of the Ural Oblast Party Committee and in 1929, as Chairman of the Central Committee of the Metal Trade Union. His great advance came in 1930. In that year he was elected First Secretary of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and held that position without interruption until 1944. In 1930 he also was elected (and in 1934 and 1939 re-elected) a member of the Orgbureau; in 1934, a candidate member of the Central Committee's Secretariat; and in 1939, a candidate member of the Politbureau.

Kaganovich, like many others, was a revolutionary and a komitetchik-apparatchik. His activity and career after the revolution was very versatile. He was known to be a troubleshooter and very close and loyal to Stalin.

From the age of fourteen, Kaganovich worked in shoe factories in various cities where he became familiar with socialist ideas. While working in Kiev, he joined the

Bolshevik Party in 1911 at the age of eighteen. In 1914-1916 he became a member of the Kiev Party Committee and once (in 1915) was arrested and forbidden to live in Kiev. In 1916 he left Kiev for Ekaterinoslav (now Dnepropetrovsk) to work in a shoe factory. Here he secretly organized the union of the shoe workers and became its Chairman. At the same time he organized the Bolshevik Party in that city and worked as an agitator among the workers. Very soon he became both the "leader" of the City Raion Party Committee and a member of the City Party Committee. For his activity he was fired from the shoe factory and although he was reinstated in his job upon the demand of the workers, he left Ekaterinoslav for Melitopol where he worked for a short time in a shoe factory, was Chairman of the shoe workers' union, and a Party organizer. Very soon, however, he moved to Iuzovka (known later as Stalino) and, as usual, began to work in a shoe factory and in the local Party organization.

After the February revolution in 1917, Kaganovich was, for a short time, a member of the Iuzovka Party Committee and Deputy Chairman of the Iusovka Workers' Soviet. In May 1917, while in the military service at Saratov (most probably in the Red Guard), he became the leader of the Party military organization, a member of the Saratov Party Committee, and a member of the Executive Committee of the Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies Soviet. While attending the Conference of the Bolshevik military

organization in Petrograd in June 1917, he was elected a member of the All-Russian Bureau of the Military Party Organization.

About two months before the November uprising, Kaganovich was sent to Gomel in Belorussia where he became Chairman of the Gomel Party Committee and in that capacity was in charge of the Bolshevik revolution in that city and area. In 1918 he was elected to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviet, and he remained in that body (under different names) until after his expulsion from the Party's Praesidium and the Central Committee in 1957.

In 1918 Kaganovich worked as Commissar of the Organization-Propaganda Section of the All-Russian Collegium for the organization of the Red Army. In the next year he was sent, together with other leaders such as Stalin, Voroshilov, Ordzhonikidze, and Budennii, to the Southern front (Voronezh) to conduct the military operation against the Tsarist armies. After the Bolshevik victory, he became Chairman of the Gubernia Revolutionary Committee at Voronezh and later also Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Soviet in that city. For a year (1920-1921) Kaganovich worked in Turkestan where he held the most important Party and government positions and, as such, was in charge of establishing the Soviet regime in that non-Russian territory. In 1922 he moved upward closer to the top elite. In that year he was

appointed Chairman of the Organization-Instruction Department in the Secretariat and in 1924, Chairman of the Organization-Assignment Department.

Kaganovich was elected a candidate member of the Central Committee in 1923 and a full member in 1924, remaining in that organ until 1957. In 1924-1925 he was Secretary of the Central Committee and in 1925-1928, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine in Kiev. Upon his return to Moscow, he was again elected Secretary of the Central Committee and this time remained there until 1939. At the same time, he was promoted to the membership in the Politbureau. In 1926 he was elected a candidate member of the Politbureau and in 1930, a full member. When the Praesidium replaced the Politbureau in 1952, he was elected a member of this new body, too.

In addition to these positions, Kaganovich served in 1930-1935 as First Secretary of the Moscow Party Committee replacing Molotov who, at that time, became Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. In 1933 he also became Chairman of the newly established Agricultural Department in the Secretariat of the Central Committee, being particularly in charge of the creation of the Machine-Tractor Stations (MTS).

Kaganovich worked not only in the Party but in the government as well. In 1935-1937 he served as People's Commissar of Transportation and in 1937-1941, as Commissar of Heavy Industry, succeeding Ordzhonikidze who committed

suicide in 1937. In 1939 he also became Commissar of Oil Industry. During the war Kaganovich became (in 1942) Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Defense, being in charge of wartime transportation. In 1944 he was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council of Commissars and in 1946 served as Minister of Building Materials.

After Stalin's death Kaganovich became First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. In 1957, as one of the members of the "anti-Party group," he was relieved of all his Party and government posts and appointed Director of a construction project in the Urals. Now he lives on pension.

Zhdanov's pre-revolutionary activities are not described in great detail in the Soviet sources but from what is offered, it can be said that he, too, was a revolutionary and a komitetchik. He joined a revolutionary group in the secondary school at Tver (now Kalinin) in 1912 at sixteen, but he formally became a member of the Bolshevik Party in 1915 and worked as a propagandist among the workers. A year later he was already a member of the Tver Party Committee.

During the revolutionary events in 1917, Zhdanov was in the Urals where he was one of the Party organizers at Shardin'sk and Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Shardin'sk Soviet. In 1919-1924 he worked in the Party and government, mostly at Tver: in 1920 he was elected Deputy Secretary of the Tver Gubernia Party Committee and in 1922,

Chairman of the Tver Gubernia Executive Committee of the Soviet.

In 1924-1934 Zhdanov was Secretary, first of the Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia Party Committee, and then of the Gorkii Krai Party Committee where he made his reputation as an energetic organizer of the industrial enterprises (building of the Molotov Automobile plant, paper plant, and others) and collectivization. From 1920 he participated in all Party Congresses. In 1925 he was elected a candidate member and in 1930 a full member of the Party's Central Committee. After that, he moved up to the pivotal posts in the Party. In 1934 he became both Secretary of the Central Committee and a member of the Orgbureau, and in the next year he also became a candidate member of the Politbureau. After the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939, he was elected a full member of the Politbureau, the Orgbureau, and the Secretariat. It should be noted that of all members of the top elite in 1939, only three men-- Stalin, Andreev, and Zhdanov--were elected to these Party organs.

While working in the Party's central organs, Zhdanov served in 1934-1944 also as Secretary of the Leningrad Oblast and Leningrad City Party Committees. In 1938 he became Chairman of the Agitation and Propaganda Department in the Central Committee's Secretariat. During the war Zhdanov was in charge of the defense of Leningrad. From 1944 until his death in 1948, he worked full time in the Secretariat of the Central Committee in Moscow. In 1920-1937

he was a member of the Praesidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and in 1937-1948, a deputy to the Supreme Soviet.

In his political career since the 1930's, Zhdanov assumed the role of a guardian of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism and a glorifier of Stalin. He was the one who publicly formulated the "Party's line" in art, literature, philosophy, and history. In 1937, for example, he delivered an authoritative speech to the First Congress of the Soviet Writers on how the writers should write. In 1938 he was the main propagator of Stalin's Short Course on the History of the VKP(b). In 1946 Zhdanov delivered a speech to the Party's aktiv in Moscow in which he "uncovered the mistakes and shortcomings" in the Soviet literature. The same was done by him in 1948 to Soviet musicians. In 1947, in his criticism of G. F. Alexandrov's History of Western European Philosophy, he elaborated on how the Soviet philosophers should write their works. Zhdanov represented the orthodox type of Russian Communism. By his totally negative attitude toward the Western civilization on the one hand, and the glorification of the ideas and accomplishments of the Russian Communism on the other, he resembled pretty much the most conservative Slavophiles in the nineteenth century Russian empire.

Andreev in his youth was also a revolutionary and a komitetchik. After the revolution, he made his career mostly in trade unions. He became familiar with the

Marxist ideas at sixteen, while working in Moscow. In 1914 he came to Petersburg to work in factories and there he joined the Bolshevik Party (in 1914) at the age of nineteen. In 1915-1916 he advanced to the membership of the Petersburg Party Committee. Following the revolution in February 1917, Andreev again became a member of the Party Committee in Petersburg, an organizer of the Metal Workers' Union in that city, and a participant in the November uprising.

After the November revolution, Andreev was sent to the Ural area where in 1917-1919 he was active as an organizer of the Party units, local governments, and the trade unions. For a short time in 1919, he worked in the Ukraine as a member of the Southern Bureau of the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions and a member of the Central Committee of the Metal Workers' Union. In the same year he was sent again to the Ural area for Party and trade union work. In 1920 Andreev was elected Secretary of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and in 1922, Chairman of the Railroad Workers' Union, holding the latter position until 1927.

Andreev was elected to the Party's Central Committee in 1920. Being re-elected in 1922, he remained a member of the Central Committee until 1961. From the 1920's his political star began to rise. In 1924-1925 he was Secretary of the Central Committee and in 1926-1930, a candidate member of the Politbureau. He was elected a full member

of the Politbureau in 1932 and remained in that organ until 1952. In 1927-1930 Andreev served as Secretary of the North-Caucasus Party organization and in 1930-1931, both as People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and as Deputy Chairman of the People's Commissars. In 1931-1935 he was People's Commissar of Transportation. After that he returned to work in the Party. In 1935-1946 he again was Secretary of the Central Committee. Following the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939, Andreev was also elected a member of the Orgbureau and Chairman of the Central Control Commission. Thus, in 1939 he was a full member of the Politbureau, the Secretariat, the Orgbureau, and Chairman of the Control Commission.

Andreev, as deputy to the Supreme Soviet, was in 1938-1945 Chairman of the Soviet of the Union, and in 1953 he became a member of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet. During the war he was, together with others, in charge of the military supply and the railroad transportation. In 1946-1953 he was again Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers.

In 1952 Andreev's powers began to decline. An indication of this was the fact that in 1952 he was elected neither to the Praesidium nor to the Secretariat, although he remained a member of the Central Committee. After that it is known that in 1957 he became Chairman of the Soviet-China Friendship Association.

Mikoian, like many others, was a revolutionary and a komitetchik. Until 1920 he was very active in the Transcaucasia, mostly in Baku. He joined the Bolshevik Party in 1915 at twenty and in the beginning was active among the youth. In 1917 he became a member of the Baku Party Committee, later of the Tiflis Party Committee, and then again of the Baku Committee. In 1918, as a leading Party functionary, Mikoian attended the local Party's conferences, contributed to the Party's papers, and was Commissar in the Red Army in the Transcaucasia. When in 1918 the British disbanded the Soviet government in Baku, he went into the underground heading the Bolshevik Party of the city. In 1919 he became "the leader" of the Bolshevik Party of Azerbaidzhan and served in that capacity until 1920. From the end of 1920 until 1922 Mikoian was Secretary of the Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia Party organization and in 1922-1926, Secretary first of the Southern-Western Bureau of the Central Committee and then of the North-Caucasus Party organization.

Mikoian was transferred to Moscow in 1926 where he was appointed People's Commissar of Internal and External Trade. He was elected in 1919 to the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Deputies and in 1937 to the Supreme Soviet, holding the latter position until the present time. In 1922 he was elected a candidate member and in 1923, a full member of the Central Committee, remaining in that

organ also until the present time. From 1926 until 1935 Mikoian was a candidate member and from 1935 until 1952 a full member of the Politbureau. But he was most active in the government. In 1930-1934 he was People's Commissar of Supplies; in 1934-1938, Commissar of Food Industry; in 1937-1946, Deputy Chairman of the People's Commissars; and in 1938-1946, also Commissar of Foreign Trade.

Beria can also be considered a revolutionary and an apparatchik. He made his career both in the Party and in the state security organs. He began his revolutionary activity while in the secondary technical school at Baku where he joined a Marxist group. But he formally became a member of the Bolshevik Party in 1917 at the age of eighteen. For a short time Beria served in the Tsarist army as a technician on the Rumanian front, but very soon he returned to Baku where he continued his education and work in the Party. For a year (1919-1920) he headed the Party organization of the technicians at Baku and in 1920 was sent to his native Georgia for the underground Party work (in Georgia at that time the Mensheviks were in power) where he was soon arrested and expelled from the country.

Beria, after graduation from the secondary technical school, switched from the Party to the Secret Police. From 1921 until 1931 he worked in the state security organs: first as Deputy Chairman of the Cheka (All-Russian Extraordinary Commission) in Azerbaidzhan, then (probably in 1922) as Chairman of the GPU (State Political Administration) in

Georgia, and very soon as both Chairman of the GPU for the entire Transcaucasia and member of the Collegium of the OGPU of the USSR (when in 1923 the Soviet Union was formed, GPU was renamed OGPU--Unified State Political Administration).

In 1931 Beria returned to the work in the Party to enhance the "discipline" in the Transcaucasian republics. In 1931 he was appointed both First Secretary of the Communist Party in Georgia and Secretary of the Transcaucasian Krai Committee of the Bolshevik Party, and in 1932, First Secretary of the latter, serving in that capacity until 1938. In 1938 he returned to work in the state security organs but this time on the national level. In 1938 he replaced Yezhov as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs (OGPU was transformed in 1934 into the NKVD--People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs) and retained this position until 1953.²⁰ In addition, Beria became in 1941 Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and shortly after Hitler's invasion on the Soviet Union, a member of the State Committee of Defense, becoming its Deputy Chairman in 1943.

²⁰ In 1943 the NKVD was divided into the NKVD and the NKGB--People's Commissariat of State Security. In 1946, together with all other Commissariats, the two organs were renamed Ministries. Beria remained head of the NKVD-MVD and S. D. Ignatiev became head of the NKGB-MGB. Following Stalin's death in 1953, the two Ministries were merged into the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) with Beria as Minister.

Beria was elected to the Central Committee in 1934 and remained a member of that body until 1953. In 1939-1946 he was a candidate member and in 1946-1952, a full member of the Politbureau. When in 1952 the Politbureau was transformed into the Praesidium, Beria became its full member. After Stalin's death, he became First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Internal Affairs. However, other members of the top elite, fearing Beria's power as head of the security forces, ordered his arrest and eventual execution in 1953.²¹

Except for Mikhailov, the rest of the members of the 1939 top elite began their political activity and career during the Civil War in Russia. Although not being revolutionaries nor pre-revolutionary komitetchiki, they were Party apparatchiki--devoted sincerely or deceptively (but no less effectively) to Stalin.

Khrushchev was one of them. In his youth he worked first as an apprentice and later as an experienced metal fitter in the Donbass mine factories where his father was a coal miner. It was here that he joined the Party in 1918 at the age of twenty-four.

In 1919-1922 he served in the Red Army, fighting on the Southern front against the Tsarist armies. Both in the factories in Donbass and in the army he headed the Party cells. After the Civil War he returned (in 1922) to Donbass

²¹ The description (providing it is accurate) of the motives and the arrest of Beria can be found in "Khrushchev Remembers," Life (December 11, 1970), pp. 55-70.

and until 1925 studied at the Rabfak (Workers' Faculty, a vocational school for adult workers) at Iuzovka, later renamed Stalino. At the same time he worked in the Party. In 1925-1929 he held various posts in the Party: first, he was Secretary of the Petrovskii-Marinskii Raion Party Committee in Donbass, then became in "charge" of the organizational section of the Okrug Party Committee at Stalino, and, finally, worked in an unspecified capacity in the Kiev Party Committee.

Khrushchev was relieved of his duties in Kiev in 1929 and sent to Moscow to study at Stalin's Industrial Academy where he immediately became Secretary of the Party organization. Apparently, having proved himself once more to be a good functionary, he was appointed in 1931 Secretary, first of the Baumanskii and later of the Krasnopresnenskii Raion Party Committee in Moscow. From there on Khrushchev's political career began to grow rather quickly. In 1932 he was promoted, first to Second Secretary and then to First Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee as well as to Second Secretary of the Moscow Oblast Party Committee. In 1935-1938 he served as First Secretary of both Committees. In 1938 he was sent to Kiev to be First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and held that position until 1947.

Khrushchev was elected a member of the Party's Central Committee in 1934, a candidate member of the Politbureau in 1938, and its full member in 1939. In 1938-1946 he also

was a member of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

Mekhlis was the least known political figure of all members of the top elite. There are no indications that he was an influential man in the pivotal circle of the Party structure. He was a typical apparatchik who worked for a number of years directly under Stalin. For reasons of brief and incomplete information, it is possible to trace his political career only in very general terms. Thus, it is known that during World War I he served in the Tsarist army. He joined the Bolshevik Party in 1918 at the age of twenty-nine and during the Civil War in Russia served as Political Commissar in the Red Army in the Ukraine. In 1921 he was transferred to Moscow and for a year worked in the Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection headed by Stalin. In 1922-1927 he worked in the Secretariat of the Party's Central Committee. After his graduation from the Institute of Red Professors in 1930, Mekhlis was on the editorial board of Pravda. In 1937-1940 he served as Chairman of the Main Political Administration of the Red Army and in 1940 was appointed People's Commissar of State Control, whose function was to check on the efficiency and expenditure

of funds of the Soviet administration.²²

At the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934, Mekhlis was elected a candidate member and in 1939, both a full member of the Party's Central Committee and a member of the Orgbureau. During the war he served in the Red Army in an unspecified capacity. At the Nineteenth Party Congress he was re-elected to the Central Committee but not to the newly formed Praesidium. Mekhlis died in 1953.

Shcherbakov was an apparatchik in the Komsomol and the Party. In his youth he worked first in a printing shop and then on road construction in the northern part of Russia. After the Bolshevik revolution, he served briefly in the Red Guard and in 1918, at the age of seventeen, he joined the Bolshevik Party. In 1918-1922 Shcherbakov worked in the Komsomol apparatus and afterward studied at the Sverdlov Communist University. In 1924-1930 he worked in the Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia Party organization, holding various posts: first, he was in charge of a section

²²This Commissariat was the successor to the Workers' and Peasants' Insoectorate known in short as Rabkrin. It was established in 1920 with Stalin as Commissar for the purpose of checking upon the state bureaucracy. In 1934 the Rabkrin was replaced by the Soviet Control Committee which in 1940 was again raised to the status of Commissariat with Mekhlis as Commissar. In 1946 it was re-named Ministry of State Control and, after Molotov's removal from all Party and state organs (he was in 1956-1957 Minister of State Control), it was abolished. In its place Commissions for Soviet Control under the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Union Republics were established. In 1962 they were also replaced by the Party-State Control Committee under the Chairmanship of A. N. Shelepin. In 1965 the latter in turn was replaced by People's Control Committee which, since then, has been headed by P. V. Kovanov.

(unspecified), then served as Secretary of two Raions Party Committees (at different times) and as editor of the Party paper (Nizhegorodskaya Kommuna), and finally, as both Chairman of the Agitprop and Secretary of the Muromskii Okrug Party organization.

After Shcherbakov finished the Institute of Red Professors in Moscow, he worked in 1932-1934 in the apparatus of the Central Committee (in the Secretariat). In 1934 he was elected Secretary of the Union of the Soviet Writers and held that post until 1936. In 1936-1937 he was Secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee and, for a short time in 1938, Secretary of the Donets and then of the Stalino Oblast Party Committees. In 1938 he replaced Khrushchev as First Secretary of both the Moscow City and the Moscow Oblast Party Committees, retaining those posts until 1945.

Shcherbakov became a member of the Central Committee and a member of the Orgbureau in 1939. In 1941 he was elected Secretary of the Central Committee and a candidate member of the Politbureau. A year later, he became Chairman of the Main Political Administration of the Red Army, Deputy Commissar for Defense, and Chairman of the State Information Bureau. He died in 1945.

Malenkov was another typical Party apparatchik. During the Civil War he served in the Red Army as Political Commissar on the Eastern and Turkestan fronts. While in the Army, he joined the Bolshevik Party in 1920 at eighteen.

After the demobilization from the Army, he studied at the Moscow Higher Technical Institute and then in 1925-1930 worked in the Central Committee apparatus (the Secretariat). In 1930-1934 Malenkov worked in the apparatus of the Moscow City Party organization. Although not being a member of the Central Committee, he headed in 1934-1939 the Department of Leading Party Organs in the Secretariat. From 1937 until 1957 he also was deputy to the Supreme Soviet.

Malenkov was elected to the Central Committee, to the Secretariat, and to the Orgbureau in 1939. He worked as Secretary of the Central Committee until 1946, heading the Cadres Administration Department. In 1941 he became a candidate member and in 1946, a full member of the Politbureau. During the war (1941-1945) he was a member of the State Committee of Defense and in that capacity visited several fronts and was in charge of providing the army with airplanes and mechanical equipment. In addition, in 1943 he was appointed Chairman of the Committee for the Economic Rehabilitation of Liberated Areas (Beria, Mikoian, Voznesenskii, and Andreev were members). In 1946 he became Deputy Prime Minister.

In 1952 Malenkov was elected to the newly established Party's Praesidium and re-elected to the Secretariat. After Stalin's death he became Prime Minister, remained in the Praesidium, but lost his post in the Secretariat. In the process of the struggle for power, Malenkov "resigned"

as Prime Minister in 1955. For his leading role in the organization of the so-called "anti-Party group", he was expelled in 1957 from the Party's Praesidium and the Central Committee and appointed Director of the Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydroelectric plant.

Mikhailov, the product of the Soviet regime, was both Party and Komsomol apparatchik and a journalist. In his youth he worked (1922-1932) in the "Serp i Molot" Metallurgical plant in Moscow where in 1930, at the age of twenty-four, he joined the Party. In 1932 he served as Secretary of the Party organization in the plant and was the editor of the plant paper Martenovka. After that until 1937, he was in charge of the Press Department of the "Proletarii" Raion Party Committee in Moscow and the editor of the Party paper at "Dinamo" plant, also in Moscow. In 1937-1938 he was on the editorial board of Pravda and the executive editor of Komsomolskaia Pravda. From 1938 until 1952 Mikhailov was First Secretary of the Komsomol, and it was this position which led him to the top elite of the Party. In 1939 he was elected to the Central Committee and to the Orgbureau, remaining a member of the former until the present time and of the latter until its dissolution in 1952.

In 1952 Mikhailov was elected to the Party's Praesidium, but in the process of reduction of that unusually large body after Stalin's death, he lost his membership in it. In 1952-1953 he was also Secretary of the Central Committee.

From that time on, he began to lose his power. In 1953-1954 he served as First Secretary of the Moscow Oblast Party Committee, then in 1954-1955 as Ambassador to Poland, and upon his return to the Soviet Union he was appointed Minister of Culture, holding that post until 1960. In 1960-1963 he again served as Ambassador, but this time in Indonesia. From 1946 until the present time, he has continually been a deputy to the Supreme Soviet.

National Composition

In terms of nationality, the top elite of 1939 was much more homogeneous than the top elite of 1919. There were eleven Russians, two Georgians, one Armenian, and one Jew. The Russians were: Andreev, Voroshilov, Zhdanov, Kalinin, Molotov, Khrushchev, Shvernik, Malenkov, Makhlis, Mikhailov, and Shcherbakov. Stalin and Beria were Georgians, Mikolan was an Armenian, and Kaganovich a Jew. Thus, the Russians constituted slightly over 73 percent of the total elite membership. Therefore, the top elite of 1939 can justly be called the Russian group. Such major nationalities in the Soviet Union as the Ukrainians, Belorussians, Turkestanis, and a number of smaller national groups were not represented in the Party's top elite of 1939.

The following two Tables summarize the career characteristics of the 1939 top elite.

TABLE 14

DISTRIBUTION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE TOP ELITE OF 1939
 ACCORDING TO YEAR OF JOINING THE PARTY, AGE, TYPE OF ACTIVITY
 BEFORE AND AFTER THE NOVEMBER REVOLUTION, AND NATIONALITY

Name	Year of Joining the Party	Age	Type of Activity			Nation- ality
			Revolu- tionary	Komitet- chik	Apparat- chik	
Andreev, A.A.	1914	19	x	x	x	Russian
Beria, L.P.	1917	18	x		x	Georgian
Kaganovich, L.M.	1911	18	x	x	x	Jew
Kalinin, M.I.	1898	22	x			Russian
Khrushchev, N.S.	1918	24			x	Russian
Malenkov, G.M.	1920	18			x	Russian
Mekhlis, L.Z.	1918	29			x	Russian
Mikhailov, N.A.	1930	24			x	Russian
Mikolai, A.I.	1915	20	x	x		Armenian
Molotov, V.M.	1907	17	x	x	x	Russian
Shcherbakov, A.S.	1918	17			x	Russian
Shvern timer, N.M.	1905	17	x	x	x	Russian
Stalin, I.V.	1898	18	x	x	x	Georgian
Voroshilov, K.E.	1903	22	x			Russian
Zhdanov, A.A.	1915	19	x	x	x	Russian

TABLE 15

DISTRIBUTION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE
TOP ELITE OF 1939 ACCORDING TO
THEIR MAIN INSTITUTIONAL CAREERS

Name	Party	Govern- ment	Trade Union	Komso- mol	Police	Army
Andreev, A.A.	x		x			
Beria, L.P.	x				x	
Kaganovich, L.M.	x	x				
Kalinin, M.I.		x				
Khrushchev, N.S.	x	x				
Malenkov, G.M.	x					
Mekhlis, L.Z.	x	x				
Mikhailov, N.A.	x			x		
Mikolai, A.I.	x	x				
Molotov, V.M.	x	x				
Shcherbakov, A.S.	x			x		
Shvernik, N.M.	x	x	x			
Stalin, I.V.	x	x				
Voroshilov, K.E.		x				x
Zhdanov, A.A.	x					

The data discussed in this chapter show that the top elite of 1939 had several distinctive features which made it different from the top elite of 1919. Undoubtedly, one of the most important features was that its members (with only two exceptions) were either pre-revolutionary komitetchiki, or post-revolutionary apparatchiki, or in most cases both. In one word, they were the administrators. It is true that the majority of the 1939 top elite were revolutionaries (for a short time, though) and the rest (with one exception) Civil War fighters, but they were all Party functionaries at the grass roots level operating within the framework of the policies and instructions coming from above. While the revolutionaries of the 1919 group were, in the first place, the theoreticians, goals and policies formulators and only then, in a few cases, Party operators, the revolutionaries and the Civil War fighters of the 1939 group were the executors of these goals and policies at the lowest level of the Party organization.

Another distinctive feature of the 1939 top elite was that its members reached the peak of the Party's pyramid through their manifested loyalty to Stalin. Undoubtedly, they were not the best men in any respect the Party had, but they were among those who worked hard in the Party apparatus, who supported Stalin during his struggle for power, and who faithfully implemented his policies. This

throws some light on their psychological make up. Unlike most of the members of the 1919 top elite who expressed their own ideas on many public issues, the members of the 1939 group, for reasons of conviction, career, or fear, were conformists.

In addition, again unlike the great majority of the top elite of 1919, the majority (over 73 per cent) of the 1939 top elite came from the lower classes (working and peasant classes), and the majority (60 per cent) received lower (secondary and elementary) education.

All these features constitute the political, psychological, and social elements of the group cohesiveness. It goes without saying that the 1939 top elite was institutionally and ideologically also a cohesive group.

While calling attention to the common characteristics of the members of the 1939 group, it should be admitted that they differed in at least two respects. In the first place, they differed, as was noted above, in political experience: some were revolutionaries, others Civil War fighters who had no experience in underground work. Secondly, they differed in terms of age. There were six men who were born between 1879 and 1890, six between 1890-1900, and three between 1900 and 1906. Certainly, this age gap, particularly between the first and the third group, had an effect upon their attitude toward each other, and consequently, upon their behavior. But comparing these differences with the similarities between the members of the 1939 top elite, it appears that the latter prevailed.

As far as the national composition is concerned, the top elite of 1939 was more homogeneous than the elite of 1919. There were 11 Russians who constituted over 73 percent of the total membership of the 1939 elite as against 45 percent of the Russians in the 1919 elite. Therefore, the 1939 elite can be called the Russian group.

Some of the main characteristics of the top elite mentioned above lead us to certain generalizations. In the last chapter the comparison of data showed that the top elite of 1919 had more education than the lower elite (as represented by the delegates to the Eighth Party Congress). The comparative data reveal that the same is true with regard to the 1939 top elite. It should be emphasized, however, that the educational difference between the top and the lower elite in this case is much narrower than in the case of the 1919 two groups. For comparison, we consider the delegates to the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939 who represented, to a great measure, the entire lower elite. According to the Credential Commission's Report, there were 418, or 26.5 percent of all voting delegates, who had completed higher educations and 78, or 5 percent, who had not completed higher educations. Among the non-voting delegates, there were 116, or 25 percent, of those who had completed their higher education.²³

²³ G. Malenkov, "A Report of the Credential Commission to the XVIII Congress of the VKP(b)," XVIII Sezd VKP(b): Stenograficheskii Otchet (1939), p. 148. The number of the non-voting delegates who received incomplete higher education is not separately identified but is included among those who received secondary education.

Thus, altogether there were 612 delegates, or 30.0 percent of the total number of delegates (2,035), who had received higher education. At the same time there were 6, or 40 percent of the total number of the members of the top elite, who had received (completed and non-completed) higher education. If there had been no purges among the top elite members since the late 1920's, and they had remained in their positions, this difference would have been much greater. No data are provided for the educational distribution of all members of the Party in 1939. But an indication of this can be found in the statistics for 1937. Accordingly, in 1937 there were 1,981,697 Party members and of these, 156,819, or 8 percent of the total number, received (completed and incomplete) higher education.²⁴

The conclusion made in the preceding chapter that the top elite members were older than the lower elite holds true with regard to the 1939 top elite. According to the same source, there were 293 men, or 18.5 percent of the total number of 1,569 voting delegates, who were forty years old or over.²⁵ No data for the non-voting delegates was provided. But if we assume that the percentage among them within this age bracket was higher, say 25 percent, then the total percentage of all delegates would be only slightly higher (20 percent) because the

²⁴"KPSS v Tsifrakh," Partiinoe Stroitelstvo, No. 19 (October 1967), p. 14.

²⁵Malenkov, op. cit., p. 149.

total number of the delegates with no right to vote was only 466 as against 1,569 voting delegates. In contrast, there were 13 members of the top elite, or 86 percent of the total number, who were forty years old and over.

The age difference is also reflected in the Party seniority. There were 304 men, or 19.4 percent of the total number of the voting delegates, and 96, or 20.6 percent of the non-voting delegates, who joined the Party between the earliest time and 1920 inclusive. Altogether there were 400 men, or 19 percent of the total number of all delegates, who joined the Party during this time. It can be noted that this percentage was much higher than the percentage of the same age group in the entire Party (8.3 percent).²⁶ On the other hand, within the top elite there were 14 men, or 93 percent, who joined the Party between 1898 and 1920 inclusive.

It is difficult to make a definite conclusion about the social origin of the lower elite. The quoted Report of the Credentials Commission does not give any data on the social background of the delegates to the Party Congress in 1939. But it can be mentioned that the working and peasant elements constituted a majority within the entire Party. From 1928 to 1930, for example, the percentage of the workers increased

²⁶Ibid., pp. 148-150.

from 40.8 to 48.6 but that of the peasants decreased from 22.3 to 19.7.²⁷ During the purges in the 1930's the Party membership decreased (from 1934 to 1939 by 270,000), and it is therefore possible that the ratio of both groups in the Party remained more or less the same.

Most of the members of the top elite also came from the working and peasant class; there were 7 men, or 46 percent, of the working class and 4 men, or 26 percent, of the peasant class. Altogether there were 72 percent of the top elite members who were of a lower class origin. Therefore, it can be claimed from a strictly statistical point of view that the top elite of 1939, in contrast to that of 1919, was part of the toiling masses and consequently had a legitimate right to rule. However, such a conclusion would not be well founded because there are no indications that the social origin was the criterion for recruitment to the top elite. The political biographies rather show that all these men were elevated to the highest position within the Party as a result of their collaboration with and support of Stalin during his struggle for power in the 1920's, or because they proved to be loyal and effective apparatchiki during the 1930's. It was for the same reasons that the other three men of the middle-class origin became members of the top elite.

²⁷Partiinoe Stroitelstvo, No. 11-12 (June 1930), p. 19.

It is interesting to look at the top elite of 1939 from the point of view of representation of various Party and state institutions. As Table 15 indicates, the top elite consisted of representatives of government, the Party apparatus, trade unions, the army, the Secret Police, and the Komsomol. Obviously, not all of these institutions were equal in power, for each of them played a different role in the Soviet society. But all of them were, in their proper place, the pillars of the Soviet system.

The representation of most of these institutions goes back to Lenin's time. The government, the Party apparatus, the army, and trade unions were practically continuously represented in the top elite. The Secret Police, on the other hand, had no representation after Dzerzhinskii's death in 1926. Only in 1937 N. I. Yezhov, Commissar of the NKVD, was elected a candidate member of the Politbureau and in 1939 replaced by his successor Beria. The Komsomol received its representation in the top elite for the first time in 1939.

In the absence of documents it is not easy to assess the meaning of the representation of various organizations and institutions in the top elite. It can only be speculated. One way of doing this would be to use the Party's goals and the Party's concepts of the structure and function of all kinds of organizations as a basis of reasoning. Following this method, we can recall

that the basic Party's goals were the reconstruction of the Soviet society and the industrialization of the country. These were formidable tasks which the Party has still not achieved to its satisfaction. Long before these tasks were formulated, the Party leaders developed a concept of a centralized and hierarchical Party organization. After the November revolution this concept was applied to the government and non-government organizations alike. The aim of this was to assure a control from above as well as to increase the efficiency of operation of all organizations. Keeping this in mind, it is reasonable to assume that the representation of the key institutions and organizations in the top elite was motivated by the desire of the top leaders (Stalin in particular) to facilitate the implementation of the Party's goals. The top elite made vital decisions which were to be carried out by others. Consequently, it was, perhaps, better to have the representatives of some organizations and institutions in the top elite because their direct participation in making decisions made them more responsible for carrying these decisions out.

If we look at the top elite from the structural point of view, we can see it as a peak of the Soviet centralized system. Through the representatives of the most important organizations in the Soviet Union, the top elite is connected with these organizations, and through them with the masses of the people. In this way the control of the whole Soviet system by the top elite is enhanced.

It can be added at this point that due to their composition, the members of the top elite, out of necessity or opportunity, tried to protect and to advance the interest of the organizations with which they were affiliated. It is a known fact, for example, that since the Civil War there always was a conflict between the political commissars and the officers in the army. At the meetings of the Politbureau this question might have been discussed. On such an occasion, it is natural to expect that the representative from the army would try to protect the interest of the officers and the representative from the Party apparatus that of the political commissars. Obviously, a situation like this was never publicised, but it is difficult to imagine any organization anywhere where the conflicting interests would not come to fore. Although in the Soviet Union the official policy always was to subordinate completely particular interests to that of the general, the Party leaders still remained human and, undoubtedly, behaved in a similar manner as the political leaders do in any other country.

CHAPTER VI

THE TOP ELITE OF 1961

After the Twenty-second Party Congress ended, the newly elected Central Committee met at its plenary session on October 31, 1961, and elected members to the Praesidium and the Secretariat. The following men were elected full members of the Praesidium: Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, Gennadiy Ivanovich Voronov, Frol Romanovich Kozlov, Alexei Nikolaevich Kosygin, Otto Vilhelmovich Kuusinen, Anastas Ivanovich Mikoian, Nikolai Viktorovich Podgornyi, Dmitrii Stepanovich Polianskii, Mikhail Andreevich Suslov, Nikita Sergeivich Khrushchev, and Nikolai Mikhailovich Shvernik. Candidate members: Viktor Vasilevich Grishin, Sharaf Rashidovich Rashidov, Kiril Trofimovich Mazurov, Vasilii Pavlovich Mzhavandze, and Vladimir Vasilevich Shcherbitskii. Secretaries: Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev (First Secretary), Frol Romanovich Kozlov, Petr Nikolaevich Demichev, Leonid Fedorovich Ilichev, Otto Vilhelmovich Kuusinen, Boris Nikolaevich Ponomarev, Ivan Vasilevich Spiridonov, Mikhail Andreevich Suslov, and Alexandr Nikolaevich Shelepin.¹

The biographical data show that this group consisted of a few revolutionaries, a few Civil War fighters, and many apparatchiki who belonged to the new generation of the Party's elite. Since the latter constituted the

¹ Izvestia, November 6, 1961.

greater majority, they characterized the top elite of 1961. The entire top elite was thus composed of three groups which differed in several respects. At the same time, however, they possessed the elements of similarity, particularly in terms of their social origin.

Social Origin

All members of the 1961 top elite, with two exceptions, come from the lower classes--the working and the peasant. Only two--Voronov and Ponomarev--come from the middle or lower-middle class. Voronov was born in 1910 in the village of Rameshki, now in Kalinin Oblast, where his father was an elementary school teacher,² and Ponomarev was born in 1905 in the town of Zaraisk, now in Riazan Oblast, where his father worked as an office employee.³

Thirteen other men were born to the working class families. The Soviet sources specify their fathers'

²Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR-Sedmoi Sozyv (Moskva: Izdatelstvo "Izvestia Sovetov Deputatov Trudiashchikhsia SSSR," 1966), p. 91. Henceforth this book will be identified only as Deputaty. Ezhegodnik Bolshoi Sovetskoi Entsiklopedii (1966), p. 581. Henceforth identified by its initials. Andrew I. Lebed, Dr. Heinrich E. Schulz and Dr. Stephen S. Taylor (eds.), Who's Who in the USSR: 1965-1966 (New York: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1966), p. 931. These sources will be used to discuss Voronov in all other sections of this chapter. The same applies to the sources of all other members of the top elite discussed in this chapter.

³Malaja Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, 3rd ed., VII, 416. Ukrainska Radianska Entsiklopediia (1963), XI, 385. Henceforth both encyclopedias will be identified by their initials. E.B.S.E. (1966), p. 607. Deputaty, p. 360. Lebed, et al., op. cit., p. 664.

occupation only in a few cases. Otherwise, they merely identify the class status as "workers." As was discussed in the previous chapter, Khrushchev's father was a coal miner in Donbass⁴ and that of Mikoian, a carpenter-worker at Samain near Tiflis.⁵ Kuusinen, an old Bolshevik, was born in 1881 (died in 1964) in Finland (the exact place is not identified in the consulted sources) to a father who was an artisan-worker in his native country.⁶

Brezhnev's father was a steel worker in the town of Kamenskoe, now Dneprodzerzhinsk in the Ukrainian SSR where his son was born in 1906,⁷ and that of Shalepin was a railroad worker in the town of Voronezh, now in the RSFSR, where Alexander was born in 1918.⁸

The fathers' occupations of the other eight members of the elite were identified by the consulted sources simply as workers. Therefore, only their place and year of birth are mentioned here. Shvernik, as was noted in

⁴Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 2nd ed., XLVI, 390-391. Henceforth identified by its initials. M.S.E., 2nd ed., II, 493-494; 3rd ed., X, 158-160. Deputaty (1962), p. 449. E.B.S.E., (1962), p. 620.

⁵B.S.E., 2nd ed., XXVII, 430-431. M.S.E., 3rd ed., V, 1260-1261. Deputaty (1966), p. 299. E.B.S.E. (1958), p. 636. Lebed, et al., op. cit., p. 299.

⁶B.S.E., 2nd ed., XXIV, 149-150. M.S.E., 3rd ed., V, 294. Deputaty (1962), p. 244. E.B.S.E. (1962), p. 602. Lebed, et al., op. cit., p. 425.

⁷M.S.E., 3rd ed., I, 1204. Ukr. R.E. (1960), II, 84. Deputaty (1966), p. 72. E.B.S.E. (1965), p. 579. Lebed, et al., op. cit., p. 142.

⁸B.S.E., 2nd ed., XLVII, 647. Ukr. R.E. (1964), XVI, 302. Deputaty (1966), p. 496. E.B.S.E. (1966), p. 619. Lebed, et al., op. cit., pp. 753-754.

the previous chapter, was born in Petersburg, now Lenin-grad, in 1888 (died in 1965)⁹ and Kosygin, also in Petersburg in 1904.¹⁰ Podgornyi was born in the village of Karlivtsi, now in Poltava Oblast of the Ukrainian SSR, in 1903. Although living in the village, his father is listed in the Soviet sources as a worker.¹¹ Grishin was born in the town of Serpukhov, now in Moscow Oblast, in 1914;¹² Mzhavandze, in the city of Kutaisi, now in the Georgian SSSR, in 1902;¹³ Shcherbitskii, in the town of Verkhno-dniprovsk, now in Dneprodzerzhinsk Oblast of the Ukrainian SSR, in 1918;¹⁴ and Demichev, in Pesochnaia town, now Kirov in Kaluga Oblast of the Russian Republic, in 1918.¹⁵

⁹B.S.E., 1st ed., LXII, 105-106; 2nd ed., XLVII, 599. M.S.E., 2nd ed., XI, 738; 3rd ed., X, 541. Deputaty (1962), p. 465. E.B.S.E. (1966), p. 619. Lebed, et al., op. cit., p. 770.

¹⁰M.S.E., 2nd ed., XXIII, 141-142; 3rd ed., IV, 1306. Deputaty (1966), p. 233. E.B.S.E. (1966), p. 595. Lebed, et al., op. cit., p. 429.

¹¹M.S.E., 3rd ed., VII, 266. Ukr. R.E. (1963), II, 185. Deputaty (1966), p. 357. E.B.S.E. (1962), p. 610. Lebed, et al., op. cit., p. 656.

¹²M.S.E., 3rd ed., III, 168. Deputaty (1966), p. 120. E.B.S.E. (1966), 584. Lebed, et al., op. cit., p. 292.

¹³M.S.E., 2nd ed., V, 1251-1252. Ukr. R.E. (1962), IX, 116. Deputaty (1966), p. 298. E.B.S.E. (1958), p. 636. Lebed, et al., op. cit., p. 579.

¹⁴Ukr. R.E. (1964), XVI, 406-407. Deputaty (1966), p. 505. E.B.S.E. (1966), p. 620. Lebed, et al., op. cit., p. 751.

¹⁵Deputaty (1966), p. 135. E.B.S.E. (1966), p. 585. Lebed, et al., op. cit., p. 184.

The Soviet sources do not identify the social origin of Ilichev. However, the fact that he was born (in 1906) in the city of Krasnodar where he worked in a factory in 1918-1924, and also the fact that he received higher education under the Soviet regime in a time when it was very difficult for the children of all former upper-classes (and even in many cases of the middle class) to have such an educational opportunity, suggest that he, too, came from a working class family.¹⁶

The remaining six members of the top elite came from peasant families. They were: Kozlov, born in the village of Loshchinino, now in Riazan Oblast of the Russian Republic, in 1908 (died in 1965);¹⁷ Polianskii who was born in Slaviansoserbske village in the present Lugansk Oblast of the Ukrainian Republic in 1917;¹⁸ Suslov, born in the village of Shakhovskoe, now in Ulianovsk Oblast of the Russian Republic, in 1902;¹⁹ Rashidov, born in the town of Dzhizake, now in Syrdaria Oblast of Uzbekistan;²⁰

¹⁶E.B.S.E. (1962), p. 596. Lebed, et al., op. cit., pp. 309-310.

¹⁷M.S.E., 3rd ed., IV, 928. Ukr. R.E. (1961), VI, 543-544. Deputaty (1962), p. 213. E.B.S.E. (1966), p. 594. Dr. Heinrich E. Schulz and Dr. Stephen S. Taylor (eds.), Who's Who in the USSR: 1961-1962 (Montreal: Intercontinental Book and Publishing Co., 1962), p. 398.

¹⁸M.S.E., 3rd ed., VII, 403. Ukr. R.E. (1963), XI, 360. Deputaty (1966), p. 359. E.B.S.E. (1962), p. 610. Lebed, et al., op. cit., p. 662.

¹⁹B.S.E., 2nd ed., XLI, 319-320. M.S.E., 3rd ed., VIII, 1256. Deputaty (1966), p. 429. E.B.S.E. (1966), p. 614. Lebed, et al., op. cit., pp. 829-830.

²⁰B.S.E., 2nd ed., XXXVI, 136. Ukr. R.E. (1963), XII, 148-149. Deputaty (1966), p. 376. E.B.S.E. (1966), p. 608. Lebed, et al., op. cit., pp. 690-691.

Mazurov, born in the village of Rudnaia-Pribytovskaia, now in Gomel Oblast of the Belorussian Republic, in 1914;²¹ and Spiridonov, born in an unidentified village of the Russian Republic, in 1905.²²

²¹M.S.E., 3rd ed., V, 838. Ukr. R.E. (1962), VIII, 391. Deputaty (1966), p. 275. E.B.S.E. (1966), p. 600. Lebed, et al., op. cit., pp. 538-539.

²²M.S.E., 3rd ed., VIII, 999. Deputaty (1966), p. 419. E.B.S.E. (1966), p. 613. Lebed et al., op. cit., p. 807.

TABLE 16

DISTRIBUTION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE
TOP ELITE OF 1961 ACCORDING TO DATE OF²³
BIRTH, PLACE OF BIRTH, AND SOCIAL ORIGIN

Name	Date of Birth	Place of Birth	Social Origin
Brezhnev, L.I.	1906	Kamenskoe, T. (Dneprodzerzhinsk)	Worker
Demichev, P.N.	1918	Pesochnaia (Kirov) T., Kaluga <u>Obl.</u>	Worker
Grishin, V.V.	1914	Serpukhov, T., Moscow <u>Obl.</u>	Worker
Ilichev, L.F.	1906	Krasnodar, T.	Worker
Khrushchev, N.S.	1894	Kalinovka, vil., Kursk <u>Obl.</u>	Worker
Kosygin, A.N.	1904	Petersburg (Leningrad)	Worker
Kozlov, F.R.	1908- 1965	Loshchinino, vil., Riazan <u>Obl.</u>	Peasant
Kuusinen, O.V.	1881- 1964	Finland	Worker
Mazurov, K.T.	1914	Rudnaia-Pribitovskaia, vil., Gomel <u>Obl.</u>	Peasant
Mikolain, A.I.	1895	Sanain, vil., Tiflis <u>Obl.</u>	Worker
Mzhavandze, V.P.	1902	Kutaisi, T.	Worker
Podgorny, N.V.	1903	Karlivtsi, vil., Poltava <u>Obl.</u>	Worker
Polianskii, D.S.	1917	Slavianserbsk, vol.,	Peasant
Ponomarev, B.N.	1905	Zaraisk, T., Riasan <u>Obl.</u>	Middle Class
Rashidov, Sh. P.	1917	Dzhizake, T., Syrdaria <u>Obl.</u>	Peasant
Shcherbitskii, V.V.	1918	Verkhodniprovsk, T., Dneprodzerzhinsk <u>Obl.</u>	Worker
Shelepin, A.N.	1918	Voronezh, T.	Worker
Shvern, N.M.	1888- 1969	Petersburg (Leningrad)	Worker
Spiridonov, I.V.	1905	Village X	Peasant
Suslov, M.A.	1902	Shakhovskoe, vil., Ulianovsk <u>Obl.</u>	Peasant
Voronov, G.I.	1910	Rameshki, vil., Kalinin <u>Obl.</u>	Middle Class

²³Names are listed in alphabetical order. The same order will be used in all other Tables in this chapter. The letter T stands for town. Towns in parentheses indicate their present names.

Education

The educational level of the 1961 top elite was, in general, very high. Only one man received elementary education and two secondary, but it can be noted that all three belonged to the older generation. All other members received higher education, most of them in technical fields.

Altogether there were eighteen men who received higher education. Two of them--Rashidov and Shelepin--studied humanities. Rashidov, an expert on Islam and the Middle East languages, graduated in 1936 from the Pedagogical Institute at Dzhizake and then for a year taught in a secondary school. In 1937 he enrolled at the State Samarkand University from which he graduated in 1941 in the field of philology. In addition, Rashidov graduated in 1948 from the Higher Party School in Moscow by taking correspondence courses.

Shelepin graduated in 1941 from the Moscow Institute of History, Philosophy, and Literature. The Soviet sources do not indicate in what particular field he majored but the name of the school suggests that it was a combination of three fields. Since two of these--philosophy and literature--are definitely in the area of humanities, Shelepin can be considered to have received his education in humanities.

Four men studied what can be termed as social

sciences.²⁴ One of them was Kuusinen who graduated from Helsinki University (in Finland) in 1905, majoring in history and philology. Since he has never been mentioned as a specialist in languages, it should be assumed that he specialized in history. In 1958 he became a member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

Ponomarev was another member of the elite who received his education in social sciences majoring in history and Marxism-Leninism. In 1926 he graduated from the Moscow State University and in 1932, from the Institute of Red Professors in Moscow. He became an expert in the history of the Communist Party of the USSR and in international Communist movements. As such, he was appointed a professor in the areas of his specialization, and in 1958 he became a member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

Ilichev's education was somewhat similar to that of Ponomarev. He graduated in 1930 from the North Caucasian Communist University and in 1938, from the Institute of Red Professors in Moscow. The consulted sources do not specify his major field of study, but from the type of schools he attended and from his work in the area of ideology and foreign affairs, it can be assumed that he studied Marxism-Leninism, Party history, and propaganda.

²⁴ Although there is no complete agreement in the Western intellectual world as to what group of sciences the discipline of history belongs, in this work it is considered as being part of social sciences. This is justified particularly in the case of Soviet history because it is very much interwoven with political economy and Party history.

Ilichev is a university professor and a member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

Suslov studied economics, majoring most likely in its political rather than in its industrial branch. In 1921 he began his study at the Prechistenskii Workers' Faculty in Moscow from which he graduated in 1924. In 1928 he graduated from the Moscow Institute of National Economy. In 1929-1931 he studied as a post-graduate student at the Economic Institute of the Communist Academy, and in 1936-1937 at the Economic Institute of Red Professors. For a short time (1928-1931), Suslov taught economics both at Moscow University and at the Industrial Academy in Moscow.

Mzhavandze was the only one within the top elite who had received a military-political education. In 1921-1924 he worked and at the same time took evening courses at an unidentified school and in an unspecified field (probably at Workers' Faculty). Then in 1924, he began his military study at the Georgian Military School from which he graduated in 1927. Ten years later, after three years of study, he graduated from the Lenin Military-Political Academy in Leningrad. As the name of the last school indicates, Mzhavandze studied both military and political disciplines which later made him a qualified political commissar in the Red Army.

The eleven other members of the top elite with higher education graduated from the technical (engineering)

schools and four of them also from Party schools. Kosygin was one of them. He graduated (studied in 1921-1924) from the Leningrad Cooperative Technicum in 1924 and from the Kirov Leningrad Textile Institute in 1936. The latter was an engineering school, and Kosygin most probably majored in industrial management. Brezhnev studied engineering. He graduated in 1927 from the Kursk Technicum for Land Utilization and Reclamation and in 1935 from the Dneprodzerzhinsk Metallurgical Institute. Subsequently, he worked as a metallurgical engineer. Kozlov also studied engineering. The consulted sources note that he first studied ("since 1928") at the Workers' Faculty in Leningrad's Mining Institute, but they do not indicate if he graduated. The same sources, however, are more explicit about his later education. Accordingly, Kozlov graduated in 1936 from the Leningrad Politechnical Institute and, like Brezhnev, became a metallurgical engineer.

Spiridonov studied mechanical engineering. He graduated in 1925 from the Stalingrad Mechanical Technicum and in 1939 from the Leningrad Correspondence Institute of Industry. Grishin, like Spiridonov, was a mechanical engineer. He first graduated from the Moscow Geodesic Technicum in 1932 and then worked briefly as a survey engineer. Then in 1937 he graduated from the Moscow Technicum of Locomotive Traction specializing in mechanical engineering.

Shcherbitskii was a chemical engineer. In 1936-1941

he studied chemistry at the Dnepropetrovsk Chemical-Technological Institute from which he graduated in 1941 and worked professionally afterwards. Podgornyi first studied in 1923-1926 at the Workers' Faculty in Kiev's Politechnical Institute, then in 1926-1931 at the Kiev Politechnical Institute of Food Industry, graduating from both schools. From the name of the latter school and from his subsequent work in factories, it would appear that he was a chemical engineer specializing in the process of food products.

There were four men within the 1961 elite who studied first in technical institutions and then in Party schools. Voronov belonged to this group. He studied engineering (the field not specified) at the Kirov Industrial Institute in 1932-1936 from which he most probably graduated. In 1937 he graduated from the Novosibirsk Institute of Marxism-Leninism. Mazurov first studied what in the United States is called civil engineering. He graduated in 1933 from the Gomel Highway Technicum and afterwards worked for three years in his profession. In 1947 he also graduated from the Higher Party School of the Central Committee in Moscow by taking correspondence courses.

Polianskii specialized in agricultural science. In 1935 he began his study at the Kharkov Agricultural Institute from which he graduated in 1939. Ten years later (in 1949) he also graduated from the Higher Party School of the Central Committee in Moscow. Demichev, like Shcherbitskii and Podgornyi, studied chemical

engineering. In 1944 he graduated from the Mendeleev Institute of Technology in Moscow and for a year afterward taught at the same Institute.²⁵ In 1953 he also graduated from the Higher Party School of the Central Committee.

As was established in the previous chapter, Khrushchev and Mikoian received only secondary educations. Khrushchev finished the Workers' Faculty at Stalino in 1925 and studied at the Stalin Industrial Academy in 1929-1931, concentrating very likely in industrial management. In this work he is considered to belong to the technological group. Mikoian, on the other hand, finished the Theological Seminary at Tiflis, and he is therefore considered here as having received his education in humanities.

Shvernik was the only one within the entire top elite who received only an elementary education.

²⁵Since he was in the Army between 1937 and 1944, he must have studied at the same time.

TABLE 17

DISTRIBUTION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE
TOP ELITE OF 1961 ACCORDING TO
LEVEL AND TYPE OF EDUCATION

Name	Level	Type of Education				
		Huma- nities	Social Sci.	Techni- cal	Party School	Military School
Brezhnev, L.I.	Higher			x		
Demichev, P.N.	Higher			x	x	x
Grishin, V.V.	Higher			x		
Ilichev, L.F.	Higher		x		x	
Khrushchev, N.S.	Secondary			x		
Kosygin, A.N.	Higher			x		
Kozlov, F.R.	Higher			x		
Kuusinen, O.V.	Higher		x			
Mazurov, K.T.	Higher			x	x	
Mikolain, A.I.	Secondary	x				
Mzhavandze, V.P.	Higher					x
Podgornyi, N.N.	Higher			x		
Polianskii, D.S.	Higher			x	x	
Ponomarev, B.N.	Higher		x		x	
Rashidov, Sh. P.	Higher	x			x	
Shcherbitskii, V.V.	Higher			x		
Shelepin, A.N.	Higher	x				
Shvern timer, N.M.	Elementary					
Spiridonov, I.V.	Higher			x		
Suslov, M.A.	Higher		x		x	
Voronov, G.I.	Higher			x	x	

Political Activity and Career

The Soviet sources on the top elite of 1961, with regard to all younger men, provide very brief and in some cases even incomplete information. The reason for this is not possible to document; it can only be speculated. Since much more information is given about the older members of the elite than about the younger ones, it is probable that the latter, due to their youth and relatively recent advancement, have had no time to build up their national prestige and popularity and, consequently, were late to be treated in the consulted sources the same way the older men were considered.

Another reason for such a disparity of information can be related to the possibility that the positions of the younger men in the top elite are not secured. As experience indicates, they can be relieved of their duties and given more obscure posts within the Party or the state, and, as is usually the case, be excluded from the information sources. Therefore, the publicity of younger men follows a rather cautious line. Whatever the reason, the fact remains that the Soviet sources do not give, for example, any information about the childhood or secondary education of any of the younger men. On the other hand, they provide us with more information about their professional and political careers, although this information is written in a "telegraphic style"--very briefly, to the point, and with no explanation. In spite of these

shortcomings, this information is more than sufficient to detect the factors and avenues which led all members of the younger generation to the pivotal positions within the Party. At the same time it illustrates what type of top elite is asserting itself within the Party in our time. Having this in mind, the discussion of the political activity and careers of all the members of the 1961 top elite will follow the order of age--from the oldest to the youngest.

The oldest man was Otto Kuusinen, a revolutionary in Finland. In 1905, the same year he graduated from Helsinki University, he joined the Social Democratic Party of Finland at the age of twenty-four. Within the Party he always represented its left wing.

After graduation he began to work as an editor: in 1906-1908 he was the editor of the Socialist Journal and in 1907-1916, the editor of the central organ of his Party, the Worker. At the same time he was active in the political life of Finland. Between 1908 and 1917 he was a deputy to the Finnish Parliament from his Party and served as a leader of its left faction. In 1917 and 1918 he was one of the prominent Party leaders who directed the Communist revolution in Finland. In 1918 he became Commissar for Education in a short-lived Communist government headed by Manner. In the same year he founded the Communist Party of Finland.

Kuusinen's later career was connected with the Communist international movement. From 1921 until 1939 he served as Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. Because the government of Finland banned the Communist Party in the country in the 1930's, Kuusinen moved to Moscow and devoted himself entirely to the work in the Comintern.

Kuusinen was also active in the government. He was Chairman of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Karelo-Finnish Republic from its formation in 1940 until its inclusion as an Autonomous Republic in the Russian Federative Republic in 1956. He served simultaneously as Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Praesidium of the Soviet Union until 1958. He was a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR from its first convocation in 1937 until his death in 1964.

Kuusinen's career in the Party was a long one, but he joined the top elite only in his advanced age. He was a member of the Central Committee of the Finnish Communist Party from 1918 to 1944. In 1941 he was elected to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and remained its member until 1964. When Stalin created the Praesidium of the Party in 1952, Kuusinen became its member but in 1953, as a result of the reduction of its members, he was excluded from it. Only in 1957 was he once more elected to the Praesidium, and this time he remained in it until 1964. During the

same time he was Secretary of the Central Committee.

While working in political institutions, Kuusinen also was engaged in intellectual pursuit. He wrote a number of articles and several books, mostly on the international Communist movement. He was recognized for his intellectual pursuit by being appointed a member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

Shvernik, as was established in the preceding chapter, was a revolutionary--komitetchik who made his career mainly in the trade unions and the government.²⁶ He joined the Party in 1905 at the age of seventeen. From 1930 to 1944 he was Secretary of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. Undoubtedly, this position was one of the reasons that he was promoted in 1939 to the candidacy in the Politbureau.

During World War II Shvernik served as Chairman of the Special Committee charged with the study of damage caused by the Germans in the liberated areas. In 1944-1946 he was both Deputy Chairman of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and Chairman of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic. Following the death of Kalinin in 1946, Shvernik became Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Praesidium, and he remained in that position until 1953 when Voroshilov replaced him. In 1953-1956 he served once more as Chairman²⁷ of the All-Union

²⁶For his earlier career see pp. 283-284.

²⁷At this time the title "Secretary" was changed to "Chairman." In the interval between 1944 and 1953 this position was held by V. V. Kuznetsov, a professional engineer.

Central Council of Trade Unions.

In 1952 Shvernik was elected to the Party's Praesidium but, like Kuusinen, he lost his membership in 1953 due to the reduction of the members of this organ. In 1956 he was again elected to the Praesidium but as a candidate member. However, in 1957, when the so-called "anti-Party group" was expelled from all Party and government organs, Shvernik was promoted to full membership in the Praesidium, and he remained in that body until 1966. Between 1956-1962 he also was Chairman of the Party's Central Committee. After the Twenty-third Party Congress in 1966, Shvernik was re-elected to the Central Committee but not the Politbureau.

Khrushchev, as was discussed earlier,²⁸ was a Civil War Party member and an apparatchik. He was elected a candidate member of the Politbureau in 1938 and a full member in 1939. From 1938-1947, with a short interruption in 1947, he was First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukrainian Republic and in 1947 briefly served as Chairman of the Council Ministers of the same Republic.

During the war Khrushchev was on the front in the southern part of the Soviet Union and, in recognition of this, he received in 1943 the rank of Lieutenant General of the Red Army. From 1949 to 1953 he was both First Secretary of the Moscow Oblast Party Committee and Secretary of the Central Committee (Secretariat). He was a

²⁸See pp. 296-298.

member of the Party's Praesidium from its inception in 1952 until 1964.

After Stalin's death in 1953, Khrushchev remained in the Secretariat and in September of the same year was elected First Secretary of the Party. In 1956 he also assumed chairmanship of the Central Committee Bureau for the Russian Republic, and in 1958 replaced Bulganin as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Thus, by 1958 he held the supreme positions both within the Party and the government. In October 1964, however, by means of a plot, he was removed from all his positions and replaced by Brezhnev and Kosygin.

Mikoian, whose earlier political career was also discussed in the preceding chapter,²⁹ was a revolutionary-komitetchik who joined the Party in 1915 at the age of twenty and later made his career in the government. It can be recalled that he proved to be very efficient in domestic and foreign trade affairs. In 1935-1952 he was a member of the Politbureau. In addition, in 1937-1946 he served as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Commissars of the USSR and in 1938-1946 also as Commissar for Foreign Trade.

During the war (1942-1945) Mikoian, in addition to his post as Commissar, was a member of the State Committee for Defense headed by Stalin. In 1946-1955 he was again

²⁹See pp. 293-294.

Deputy Chairman and then in 1955-1964, First Deputy Chairman, of the Council of Ministers. From 1953 to 1955 he served once more as Minister for Foreign Trade. His advancing age led him to a more honorable post. In 1964-1965 he was Chairman of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and since 1965 has been only its member.

When in 1952 the Politbureau was transformed into the Praesidium, Mikoian became its member and from then until 1966 was continuously re-elected to that body. After the Twenty-third Party Congress in 1966, apparently due to his old age, he was elected only to the Central Committee.

Suslov's political career was similar in some respects to that of the younger members of the top elite. He rose to prominence within the Party through the Komsomol, his educational specialization, and the Party apparatus on the national and local levels. In 1918-1920 he worked in the Poverty Relief Committee and the Komsomol in his native village Shakhovskoe. He joined the Bolshevik Party in 1921 at the age of nineteen, and in the same year he was sent to study in the Workers' Faculty in Moscow. After his graduation from both the Moscow Institute of National Economy in 1928 and the Economic Institute of Red Professors in 1931, he worked in 1931-1934 in the apparatus of the Party's Central Control Commission and the Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasant's Inspectorate. In 1934-1936 he worked for the State Control Commission. As an apparatchik of the Control Commission, he took part in the Party purges in 1933-1934 in the Urals and the Chernigov Oblast.

After this experience Suslov was transferred to work in the local Party organizations. In 1937-39 he was first in charge of a department, then one of the Secretaries, and finally, Second Secretary of the Rostov Oblast Party Committee. From 1939 to 1944 he held the post of First Secretary of both the Stavropol Krai Party Committee and the Stavropol City Party Committee. In 1939-1941 he also was a member of the Party's Central Auditing Commission. During the war Suslov held several other posts. In 1941-1945 he was a member of the Military Council of the North Caucasian Front as well as Chief of Staff of the Stavropol Krai Guerrilla Forces.

Suslov was elected to the Central Committee in 1941 and has been its member ever since. Although being a Russian, he served from 1944 to 1946 as Chairman of the Central Committee Bureau for the Lithuanian Republic. In 1946 he returned to work in the apparatus of the Central Committee as Chairman of the Agitation and Propaganda Department (from 1946 to 1947). In the next year (1947), he was elected Secretary of the Secretariat and has held that post until the present time. While working as Secretary, he also was, from 1949 to 1951, chief editor of Pravda.

Suslov was elected to the Party's Praesidium in 1952 but, like many others, he lost that position in 1953. However, in 1955 he was once more elected to the Praesidium, and this time he retained his membership in it until the present time.

In addition to working in the Party, Suslov has been consistently elected since 1937 to the Supreme Soviet and in 1950-1954 served in its Praesidium. He traveled quite widely performing mostly representative functions. Between 1948 and 1963 he visited China, Bulgaria, Hungary, India, France, Mongolia, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Italy, usually in connection with the congresses of the Communist Parties in these countries. His other functions on these occasions have never been revealed.

Mzhavandze reached the top level of the Party through his position as Political Commissar in the Red Army and the highest post in the Party of his native Georgia. In his youth he worked in a factory at Tsulukidze in Georgia and studied in the evening school. He served in the army in 1924 and studied at the Georgian Military School from which he graduated in 1927. In the same year he joined the Party at the age of twenty-five. Since that time, he began his career in the army holding various commanding and political posts. Following his graduation from the Lenin Military-Political Academy in 1937, Mzhavandze rapidly began to advance in the army. In 1937-1939 he was Commissar of the infantry regiment of the Leningrad Military District, and in 1939-1941 he was both Chairman of the Organization Section of the Political Department of the Army and Brigadier Commissar of the Baltic Military District.

During World War II Mzhavandze served as Commissar

of an infantry division, Commissar of the Maritime Operational Group, and a member of the Military Council on the Leningrad and the Ukrainian fronts. After the war (1945-1946) he was a member of the Military Council and Deputy Commander for Political Affairs of the Kharkov Military District; in 1946-1947, a member of the Military Council of the Kiev Military District; and in 1950-1953, of the Carpathian Military District.

While stationed in the Ukrainian Republic, Mzhavandze was involved in civilian political life. In 1947 and in 1951 he was elected a deputy to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and in 1952 both to the Central Committee and the Orgbureau of the Communist Party of Ukraine. In 1952 he began his political career in Georgia. In 1952 he was elected a member of the Praesidium and in 1953, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia; and he has kept both positions until the present time. Having secured the highest posts within the Georgian Party, Mzhavandze began to move upward. In 1955 he was elected a deputy of the Georgian Supreme Soviet and a member of the Praesidium. In the same year he was also elected a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and since then has been consistently re-elected. Following this advancement (which, obviously, was not very significant from the power point of view), Mzhavandze was elected in 1956 a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and in 1957 a candidate member of its Praesidium. In 1966 he was re-elected a candidate member of the Politbureau, as he was in 1971.

Podgornyi was one of the technocrats who switched from his professional work to the work in the Party and government in the Ukraine which eventually led him to the top elite. In 1918-1921 he worked at various factories as a mechanic and in 1921-1923 served as Secretary of the Komsomol cell and a member of the Komsomol Raion Committee in the Poltava Oblast. He joined the party in 1930 at the age of twenty-seven. After his graduation from the Kiev Politechnical Institute of Food Industry in 1931, Podgornyi worked professionally as an engineer. In 1931-1939 he was engineer, then deputy chief engineer, and finally chief engineer at various sugar plants in the Ukraine. After this experience he worked in the government. In 1939-1940 he served as Deputy Commissar of Food Industries of the Ukrainian Republic and in 1940-1942, as Deputy Commissar of Food Industries of the USSR. Then for two years (1942-1944) he was Director of the Moscow Technological Institute of Food Industries.

After World War II Podgornyi was in 1946-1950 a permanent representative of the Ukrainian Republic in the Council of Ministers of the USSR. It was at this point of his political career that he became a full-time Party official. In 1950-1953 he was First Secretary of the Kharkov Oblast Party Committee, and in 1953 he was elected a member of the Central Committee, a member of the Praesidium, and Second Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine. In 1957 he was promoted to the post of First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party and served in

that capacity until 1963. From 1947 until the present time he has been continuously a deputy of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet.

As the highest Party official in the Ukraine, Podgornyi was gradually promoted to the top positions within the Party of the Soviet Union. In 1956 he was elected to the Central Committee; in 1958 he became a candidate member; in 1960 he became a full member of the Praesidium and has remained in that organ (Politbureau since 1966) until the present day. In addition, from 1963 to 1965 he was Secretary of the Central Committee (the Secretariat).

While working in the Party, Podgornyi has been continuously elected since 1954 to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. In 1958-1965 he was a member of the Supreme Soviet Praesidium and in 1965 became its Chairman. Like many other members of the top elite, he visited on various occasions many countries, mostly within the Soviet bloc.

Kosygin made his career mainly as a professional manager and a government official. These were the main channels through which he reached the top elite level within the Party. Although it is difficult to believe because of his youth, the Soviet sources claim that he served in the Red Army during the Civil War in 1919-1921. (If this is true, he began his service when he was fifteen.)

After his graduation from the Leningrad Cooperative Technicum in 1924, Kosygin worked from 1924 to 1930 in

the system of the Cooperative Consumers' Union in the Siberian Krai (mostly in the Irkutsk Oblast) first as an instructor, then as a board member, and finally as Chairman of the Planning Department. He joined the Bolshevik Party in 1927 at the age of twenty-three. In 1935 he graduated from the Leningrad Textile Institute and after that held managerial posts in various plants. In 1935-1937 he was a foreman and then shop superintendent at the Zhelabov Textile Plant and in 1937-1938, Director of the Octiabr Spinning Mill, also in Leningrad. It was at the time when he held the last position that he became fully involved in Party work. In 1937-1938 he was a member of the Bureau of the Vyborg Raion Party Committee in Leningrad and in 1938, Chairman of a department (unspecified) of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee. In 1938 he also became Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Leningrad Soviet, apparently after he had quit the spinning mill.

From the local government in Leningrad, Kosygin quickly moved up to the national government. In 1939-1940 he was People's Commissar for Textile Industry; in 1940-1946, Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR; and from 1943 to 1946, also Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Russian Republic. In 1946 he was re-appointed Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers (in 1946 the name People's Commissariat was changed to Council of Ministers) of the USSR and with a

brief interruption in 1953 and 1956-1957 he held that post until 1960. In addition, Kosygin served for a year in 1948 as Minister of Finance, in 1948-1953 as Minister of Light Industry, in 1953 as Minister of Light and Food Industry, and in 1953-1954 as Minister of Consumer Goods Industry. In 1956-1957 he was First Deputy Chairman of the State Economic Commission for Current Planning of National Economy; in 1959, Deputy Chairman and in 1959-1960, Chairman of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan).

Kosygin was elected to the Party's Central Committee in 1939 when he was local Party and government official. In 1946-1948 he was a candidate member of the Politbureau and in 1948-1958 a full member. He was again a candidate member of the Praesidium from its inception in 1952 to 1953 and from 1957 to 1960. In 1960 he became a full member of the Praesidium and First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. In 1964 he replaced Khrushchev as Prime Minister and remained in the Praesidium-Politbureau until the present time.

Ponomarev became a member of the top elite mainly through his work in the Party's educational institutions and the Party apparatus. Like in the case of Kosygin, the Soviet sources state that he served in the Red Army in 1919-1920 (when he was a fourteen-fifteen year old boy) working mostly in the Military Revolutionary Committee in his native town Zaraisk. It was here that he joined the Bolshevik Party in 1919 at the age of fourteen. In

1920-1922 he was a "leading" worker in the Komsomol in the Riazan Gubernia and in 1922-1923, Secretary of the Party cell in the "Red East" factory in the Moscow Oblast (the town is not identified).

After his graduation from the Moscow University in 1926, Ponomarev worked in 1926-1928 as a member and then as Deputy Chairman of the Propaganda Group of the Central Committee of the Turkmen Republic. He began his academic career after he had graduated from the Institute of Red Professors in 1932. For a year (1932-1933) he taught at various institutions of higher learning, and in 1933-1936 he served as Deputy Director of the Institute of Red Professors. After that he worked from 1936 to 1943 in the apparatus of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. In 1943-1944 he was Deputy Director of the Institute of Marx-Engels-Lenin in Moscow and then switched to work in the Party apparatus on the highest level. From 1944 to 1946 he worked in the apparatus of the Central Committee (Secretariat) as Deputy Chairman of a department (probably of the Agitprop); from 1946 to 1949 he was First Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Information Bureau (organ of the Council of Ministers); and from 1950 to 1953 he again worked in the Central Committee Secretariat heading the International Department.

Ponomarev was elected a candidate member of the Central Committee in 1952 and a full member in 1956. After the Twenty-second Party Congress in 1961, he was elected

Secretary of the Central Committee and re-elected in 1966 and 1971. He was Chairman of the International Department within the Secretariat from 1953 to 1965.

As all other members of the top elite, Ponomarev has been a deputy to the Supreme Soviet since 1958.

Ponomarev is known as a historian of the Soviet Communist Party and of the Communist International movement in general. He was chief editor of the second edition of the Political Dictionary, published in 1958, and chief editor of the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, published in 1959. He is also a university professor and a member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

Spiridonov was another technocrat who started to work in the Party after a lengthy experience in the engineering profession. Upon his graduation from the Stalingrad Mechanical Technicum in 1925, he worked for two years as a fitter and then until 1939 as Head of the Technical Department in the "Banner of Labor" Plant in Leningrad. After his graduation from the Leningrad Correspondence Industrial Institute in 1939, he was director of various factories: in 1939-1941 he was Director of the Textile Machinery Plant in Orel; in 1941-1944, Director of a factory in Kuznetsk in Siberia; and in 1944-1950, Director of the "Cosmets" Works in Leningrad.

It was after this experience that Spiridonov became a Party worker. He joined the Party in 1928 at the age of

twenty-three. In 1950-1952 he was Secretary of the "Moscow" Raion Party Committee in Leningrad and in 1952-1954, Deputy Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Leningrad Oblast Soviet. Then he returned to work in the Party. From 1954 to 1956 he was Secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee; from 1956 to 1957, First Secretary of the Leningrad City Party Committee; and from 1957 to 1962, First Secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee. In addition, in 1956-1961 he was a member of the Central Auditing Commission of the Party.

Spiridonov also became a deputy to the Supreme Soviet. He was elected a deputy in 1958 and then re-elected in 1962 and 1966.

In 1961 Spiridonov was elected a member of the Party's Central Committee and Secretary of the Secretariat. However, in 1962 he was replaced as Secretary by Kirilenko because (officially) he had assumed the chairmanship of the Soviet of the Union in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. In 1966 he was re-elected only to the Central Committee.

Brezhnev, like Spiridonov, received his training in engineering. He reached the top level of the Party's pyramid through the local Party and government organizations. He began to work in factories in 1921. Following his graduation from the Kursk Technicum for Land Utilization and Reclamation in 1927, he worked in 1927-1930 as a land utilization specialist in the Urals area and held various positions connected with his profession in the local

governments. In 1931-1935 he worked in a factory and studied at the Dneprodzerzhinsk Metallurgical Institute from which he graduated in 1935. He joined the Party in 1931 at the age of twenty-five. After his service in the army (1935-1936), he returned to Dneprodzerzhinsk where in 1937 he became Director of the Technicum from which he himself had graduated. At the same time (1937-1938) he served as Deputy Chairman of the Dneprodzerzhinsk City Executive Committee (city government).

Brezhnev began his career in the Party in 1938. He served in 1938-1941 as Chairman of a department and simultaneously (1939-1941) as Secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Party Committee. With the outbreak of the war in 1941, he served in the army as Political Commissar. After the war he was, in 1946-1947, First Secretary of the Zaporozhe Oblast Party Committee; in 1947-1950, First Secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Party Committee; and in 1950-1952, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Moldavian Republic.

Brezhnev was elected to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1952 and, for a year, was both a candidate member of the Praesidium and Secretary of the Secretariat. In 1953, however, he was excluded from the latter two organs and was appointed Deputy Head of the Main Political Administration of the Red Army. In 1954-1956 he was Second and then First Secretary of the

Communist Party of the Kazakhstan Republic. In 1956 he again was elected to the Secretariat of the Communist Party of the USSR and this time held that post without interruption until 1960. In 1956 he was once more elected a candidate member of the Praesidium, and in 1957 he became its full member and has remained in that organ (Politbureau since 1966) until the present day. In 1960-1964 he served as Chairman of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and for this reason he was relieved from the Party's Secretariat. However, in 1963 he became Secretary again and a year later replaced Khrushchev as First Secretary of the Party. At the Twenty-third Party Congress he was re-elected to the highest post in the Party under the old title of Secretary General (also elected in 1971).

Ilichev's education and political career is to some extent similar to that of Ponomarev. In 1918-1924 he worked in a factory in his native town Krasnodar and in 1924 joined the Party at the age of eighteen. From 1924 to 1927 he was Head of the Political Education Department and, simultaneously, Secretary of the Raion Party Committee as well as a "worker" in the Komsomol Okrug Committee, most probably in Krasnodar. After his graduation from the North Caucasian Communist University in 1930, he remained in the University for a year as an instructor. From 1931 to 1934 Ilichev worked in the apparatus of the North Ossetian Oblast Party Committee and at the same time headed the chair at the Gorskii Agricultural Institute in the town

of Ordzhonikidze. In 1934-1937 he studied at the Institute of Red Professors and after graduation worked in the Editorial Boards of various periodicals: in 1938-1940 he was a member of the Editorial Board and the Executive Secretary of the journal Bolshevik and in 1940-1944, of the newspaper Pravda. In 1944-1948 he was Chief Editor of Izvestia. For a year Ilichev worked in the Central Committee Secretariat and then, in 1949-1952, was Deputy Chief Editor of Pravda. From 1953 to 1958 he was Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and a member of the Collegium of the Foreign Ministry.

Ilichev was elected a candidate member of the Central Committee in 1952 and held that position until 1956 when he became a member of the Party's Central Auditing Commission. In 1958-1961 he headed the Agitation and Propaganda Department in the Party's Secretariat. In 1961 Ilichev was elected a full member of the Central Committee, Secretary of the Central Committee, and Chairman of the Ideological Commission in the Secretariat. But in 1965 he was relieved from the latter two posts. No official explanation was given for his removal, but it was probably connected with his transfer to the Foreign Ministry of the USSR. In 1965 he was appointed Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs in which post he remains until today. Like Ponomarev, Ilichev never was a member of the Praesidium-Politbureau.

Ilichev has been a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of

the Russian Republic since 1958. He traveled quite widely, either on a special mission or as an advisor to Khrushchev.

Ilichev, again like Ponomarev, taught at various educational establishments from 1934 to 1952. He became a full professor and a member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

Kozlov was a technocrat and a Komsomol-Party apparatchik. His road to the top elite went through the work in the local Party organizations. In 1923-1926 he was a worker and then an assistant foreman in the Red Textile Worker Plant at Kasimov. He joined the Party in 1926 at eighteen. Between 1926 and 1928 he was Secretary of the Komsomol Committee in the same factory at Kasimov and Director of the Economic Department of the Kasimov Uezd Komsomol Committee. In 1928 he moved to Leningrad where he began to study at the Workers' Faculty in the Leningrad Mining Institute. Later, he studied at the Leningrad Politechnical Institute from which he graduated in 1936. Following his graduation, Kozlov worked in 1936-1939 first as an engineer and then as Director of the Metallurgical Plant at Izhevsk. In 1939-1940 he was both a Party organizer and Secretary of the Party Committee in the same plant.

From that time on, Kozlov moved upward in his political career. In 1940-1944 he was Secretary of the Izhevsk City Party Committee, and almost at the same time (1941-1944) he was in charge of production and supply of ammunitions to the front in the Izhevsk area. In 1944 he was transferred

to work in the apparatus of the Central Committee (Secretariat) where he remained until 1947. From 1947 to 1949 he was Second Secretary of the Kuibyshev Oblast Party Committee and from 1949 to 1952, Second Secretary and then First Secretary of the Leningrad City Party Committee. From here he moved upward to the Oblast level: in 1952-1953 he was Second and then First Secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee. For a year (1957-1958) Kozlov served as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Republic.

Kozlov was elected to the Party's Central Committee in 1952, but he became a candidate member of the Praesidium only in 1957. However, at the end of the same year he was promoted to the Praesidium's full membership. His political star was rising rapidly and some Western scholars even speculated that he was a potential candidate for the supreme power in the Soviet Union. In 1958-1960 he was First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and in 1960-1964, Secretary of the Party's Secretariat. Thus, by 1960 he was a member of both the Praesidium and the Secretariat.

Kozlov also was a deputy to the Supreme Soviet between 1954 and 1965 and a member of its Praesidium in 1954-1958 and in 1962-1964. Due to illness, he was relieved in 1964 from all his posts in the Party and the Supreme Soviet.

Voronov was one of the technocrats who did not work professionally after his graduation from a technical school;

instead, he went directly to the Party school and afterward began to work in the Party apparatus on the local level. However, he received experience in technical work before he began his study.

In 1929-1932 Voronov worked first as an electrical mechanic and then as a foreman in the plants at Cherepovtse and Perm in Northwest Siberia. While working there, he joined the Party in 1931 at the age of twenty-one. From 1932 to 1936 he studied at the Kirov Industrial Institute in Tomsk and then at the Novosibirsk Institute of Marxism-Leninism from which he graduated in 1937. Having finished his education in Siberia, he remained there for a number of years in political work. In 1937 he was made in charge of the Cultural-Propaganda Department at the "Kirov" Raion Party Committee in Tomsk, and in 1938-1939 he was in charge of the Agitation and Propaganda Department as well as Secretary of the City Party Committee at Prokopiievsk. After this experience, he was promoted to higher posts in the Party. From 1939 to 1948 he was Secretary, then Second Secretary, and finally from 1948 to 1955 First Secretary of the Chita Oblast Party Committee. In 1948-1950 he also served as First Secretary of the Chita City Party Committee.

While working in Siberia, Voronov was elected to the Central Committee in 1952, and in 1955 was transferred to Moscow where in 1955-1957 he served as Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the USSR. In 1957, however, he was sent

back to work in the local Party organizations. From 1957 to 1961 he served as First Secretary of the Orenburg Oblast Party Committee. Being recalled back to Moscow in the beginning of 1961, he was appointed Deputy Chairman and at the end of the same year Chairman of the Central Committee Bureau for the Russian Republic. From 1962 to 1966, however, he was only a member of the same organ.

In 1961 Voronov joined the top elite. He was elected a candidate member of the Praesidium in January 1961 and a full member at the Twenty-second Party Congress in October 1961. In 1966 he was elected to the Politbureau as its full member and has remained in it until the present time. In 1961 Voronov also became Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Republic and by now is still holding that post.

As can be expected, Voronov has been a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic since 1947, and of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR since 1950.

Grishin, like most younger men in the top elite, was a technocrat. He reached the top elite gradually through his work in the engineering profession, local Party organizations, and trade unions. He graduated from the Moscow Geodesic Technicum in 1932 when he was eighteen and then worked for a year as a survey engineer in his native town of Serpukhov. After that Grishin began his studies at the Moscow Technicum of Locomotive Traction from which he graduated in 1937. In 1937-1938 he worked as Director of

the Serpukhov Locomotive Depot, and in 1938-1940 he served in the army. It was in the army in 1939 that he joined the Party at the age of twenty-five. In 1940 he returned to Serpukhov to his old job.

Grishin switched to work in the Party in 1941. In 1941-1942 he was Secretary of the Party Committee at the Serpukhov Railroad Center and in 1942-1950 served as Secretary, then Second Secretary, and finally as First Secretary of the Serpukhov City Party Committee. After this, he was transferred to Moscow where in 1950-1952 he served as Chairman of the Machine Building Department and in 1952-1956, as Second Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee.

Grishin was elected to the Party's Central Committee in 1952, and in 1956 he replaced Shvernik as Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. He held that post until 1967 when he in turn was replaced by Shalepin. In 1961 he was elected a candidate member of the Praesidium and in 1966, a candidate member of the Politbureau. When he was removed from the highest position in trade unions, he became First Secretary as well as a Bureau member of the Moscow City Party Committee, succeeding Nikolai Yegorichev.

In addition to his work in the Party, Grishin has been a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR since 1950. Like many other members of the top elite, he traveled quite extensively, particularly in his capacity as chairman of the central organ of the Soviet trade unions.

Mazurov reached the top elite through his work in the Komsomol and the Party in Belorussia. After his graduation from the Gomel Highway Technicum in 1933, he worked in 1933-1936 first as a technician and then as Director of the Kamarin Raion Roads Department (local government). In 1936-1938 he served in the army and afterwards worked from 1938 to 1940 in the Political Department of the Belorussian Railroad and in the Gomel Oblast Komsomol Committee.

Mazurov joined the Party in 1940 when he was twenty-six. Following his admission into the Party, he was appointed in 1940 Secretary of the Gomel City Party Committee and First Secretary of the Brest Oblast Komsomol Committee. During the war he served in the army for two years (1941-1942) and then, until the end of 1943, he was with the Bolshevik partisans in Belorussia behind the German line. In 1942-1946 he also was Secretary of the Personnel, then Second Secretary, and finally in 1946-1947 First Secretary of the Komsomol in Belorussia.

From the Komsomol Mazurov was shifted to work in the Party and government. From 1947 to 1949 he worked in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belorussia, and in 1949-1950 he was Second and then First Secretary of the Minsk (capital of Belorussia) City Party Committee. In 1950-1953 he was First Secretary of the Minsk Oblast Party Committee.

After this experience, Mazurov was appointed to the

highest posts in the Party and government of Belorussia. From 1953 to 1956 he was Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Belorussian Republic and from 1953 to 1965, a member of the Praesidium of the Belorussian Communist Party. In 1956 he was elevated to the position of First Secretary of the Communist Party of Belorussia, and he held that post until 1965.

Mazurov's highest Party and government positions in Belorussia opened the door for him to the top elite in the Soviet Party. He was elected a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956. One year after he had become First Secretary of the Belorussian Party, Mazurov was elected (in 1957) a candidate member and in 1965 a full member of the Praesidium. Following the Twenty-third Party Congress, he was elected a member of the Politbureau and has remained in that organ until the present time. In addition, he has been First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR since 1965.

Like all other members of the top elite, Mazurov has been a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR since 1950 and a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian Republic since 1938 (with the exception of 1942-1946).

Polianskii's political career was similar to the careers of all other younger men in the top elite. He joined the Komsomol in 1931, and in 1931-1932 he first worked on the state farm and later in the Lugansk Oblast

Komsomol Committee. Following his graduation from the Kharkov Agricultural Institute in 1939, he served in 1939-1940 as Chairman of an unidentified department in the Kharkov Oblast Komsomol Committee. He became a Party member in 1939 at the age of twenty-two.

In 1940 Polianskii began his service in the army and despite the war, he was discharged from the army in 1942 and sent to work in the local Party organizations in Siberia. In 1942 he graduated from the Higher Party School (probably by correspondence) and in 1942-1945 was Head of the Political Section of the Khorosheno Machine-Tractor Station, and then First Secretary of the Karasuk Raion Party Committee (in the Novosibirsk Oblast). In 1945-1949 he worked in the Central Committee apparatus, first as a personnel organizer and later as an inspector. In 1949 Polianskii was transferred to Crimea where in 1949-1952 he was Second Secretary of the Crimean Oblast Party Committee and in 1952-1953, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Crimean Oblast Soviet. From 1953 to 1955 he was First Secretary of the Crimean Oblast Party Committee; from 1955 to 1957, of the Orenburg Oblast Party Committee; and from 1957-1958, of the Krasnodar Krai Party Committee.

After his experience in the work of the local Party organizations, Polianskii was transferred to Moscow where in 1958 he was appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Republic, the position he held until 1962. While still working in the Ukrainian Republic

(Crimean Oblast), he was elected in 1952 (and in 1954) a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and in 1956, of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. From 1956 to 1960 Polianskii was a candidate member of the Party's Praesidium and from 1960 until the present day, a full member. In 1962 he became Deputy Chairman and in 1965, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

Polianskii has also been a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR since 1954.

Rashidov advanced in his political career through his work in the Party in the Uzbek Republic. Like many members of the top elite of his generation, he worked first in his profession and then in the Party. In 1936 he graduated from the Pedagogical Technicum, and thereafter until 1937 he taught in a secondary school. While studying philology at the Uzbek State University in Samarkand in 1937-1941, Rashidov was successively the Executive Secretary, Assistant Editor, and finally Editor-in-Chief of the newspaper Lenin-yuly. He joined the Party in 1939 at twenty-two.

In 1941 Rashidov was drafted into the army but having been wounded in the war, he was discharged in 1942 and served for a year as Director of a secondary school at Dzhizake. In 1943 he returned to his former position as Editor-in-Chief of Lenin-yuly. At this point of his life, Rashidov became a full-time Party official serving in

1944-1947 as First Secretary of the Samarkand Oblast Party Committee. From 1947 to 1949 he was Chief Editor of the newspaper Kzyl Uzbekistan, the central organ of the Uzbek Party. While working, he graduated by correspondence in 1948 from the Central Committee Higher Party School and in 1949-1950 served as Chairman of the Uzbek Union of Writers. From 1950 to 1959 Rashidov was Chairman of the Praesidium of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet and Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Praesidium of the USSR.

Rashidov became First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Uzbek Republic in 1959, and he has remained in that post until the present time. In 1956 he was elected a candidate member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and in 1961, a full member. In 1961 he was also elected a candidate member of the Praesidium and in 1966, a candidate member of the Politbureau, re-elected in 1971.

Rashidov has been a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan since 1947 and of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR since 1950. He is the author of several novels (The Victors, The Song of Kashmir, Stronger than Storm) in which he depicted the village life in Uzbekistan and the heroes of the collective farms.

Shelepin became a member of the top elite through his work in the Komsomol and the Secret Police. He joined the Komsomol probably before 1936 for, while studying at the Moscow Institute of History, Philosophy, and Literature

in 1936-1939, he was Secretary of the Komsomol in the Institute. In 1939-1940 he served in the army as Political Commissar on the Finnish front. He joined the Party in 1940 at the age of twenty-two and from 1940 to 1943 was first an instructor and then both Secretary and Chairman of the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Moscow City Komsomol Committee. At this time (1941) he graduated from the Institute and began to advance in the Komsomol hierarchy. In 1943-1952 he was Secretary, then Second Secretary, and in 1952-1958 First Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Komsomol. In that capacity he directed, among other things, the mobilization of the youth to be sent to work in the "virgin land," in the construction in Siberia, and in the collective farms in the remote areas of the Soviet Union.

From the work in the Komsomol, Shlepin was sent to work in the Party and government. In 1958, for less than a year, he headed an unspecified department in the Central Committee Secretariat, and from 1958 to 1961 he headed the Committee for State Security (KGB).

Shlepin was elected to the Party's Central Committee in 1952 and a member of the Secretariat in 1961. From 1962 to 1965 he also was Chairman of the Committee for Party and State Control. In 1964 he became a member of the Praesidium and has remained in that body (Politbureau since 1966) until the present time. In 1967 he was relieved as Secretary of the Secretariat and appointed

Chairman of the Praesidium of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. In 1962-1966 he was Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Shelepin has been a deputy to the Supreme Soviet since 1954.

Shcherbitskii was one of the two youngest technocrats in the top elite. He reached the pivotal position within the Party through the Komsomol and the Party apparatus in the Ukraine. While studying in a secondary school, he worked in 1934-1936 as an instructor for a Raion Komsomol Committee, most probably in his native town of Verkhnodni-provsk. He joined the Party in 1941 at the age of twenty-three. Upon graduation from the Dnepropetrovsk Chemical Technological Institute in 1941, Shcherbitskii worked briefly in his profession as a deputy chief mechanic in a factory in the Dnepropetrovsk Oblast. From 1941 to 1945 he served in the army and after the war (1945-1946) worked as an engineer in a coal-chemical plant in Dneprodzerzhinsk. It was at this time that he switched to work in the Party. In 1946-1948 he was Secretary of the Party Committee in the plant where he worked, and for a short time in 1948 he also was in charge of the Organizational Section of the Dneprodzerzhinsk City Party Committee.

Following this brief experience in Party work, Shcherbitskii was gradually promoted to the higher Party posts. In 1948-1951 he was Second Secretary of the Dneprodzerzhinsk City Party Committee and then worked

for a year in the apparatus of the Central Committee as an organizer of the Party in a metallurgical plant in the same city. In 1952 he was promoted to the post of First Secretary of the same Party Committee. In 1954-1955 he served as Second Secretary and in 1955-1957 as First Secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Party Committee.

Shcherbitskii was elected in 1956 to the Central Committee and in 1957 to the Praesidium of the Communist Party of Ukraine, and held the latter post until 1963. In 1957-1961 he also was Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Since the 1950's, Shcherbitskii was gradually promoted in the Party organs on the national level. In 1956 he was elected a member of the Auditing Commission and in 1961, both a member of the Central Committee and a candidate member of the Praesidium. In 1963, however, he was relieved from the Praesidium and appointed First Secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Party Industrial Committee, serving in that capacity until 1965. In 1965 Shcherbitskii was once more elected a candidate member of the Praesidium, in 1966 a candidate member of the Politbureau, and in 1971 a full member of the Politbureau.

Shcherbitskii also worked in the government. In 1961-1963 and then since 1965 he has been Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian Republic. He has been a deputy of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet since 1955, and that of the USSR since 1958.

Demichev was another technocrat who advanced in the Party hierarchy through his work in the local Party organizations. In 1937 he was already Secretary of a Raion Komsomol Committee, probably in his native town of Kirov. From 1937 to 1944 he served in the Red Army where he finished the Military Academy, and in 1944 he also graduated from the Mendeleev Institute of Chemical Technology in Moscow. In 1944-1945 he remained in the Institute as a researcher and an instructor.

Demichev joined the Party in 1939 at the age of twenty-one. In 1945 he started to work as a Party official and until 1950 was successively Chairman of a department and Secretary of the Sovetskii Raion Party Committee in Moscow. From 1950 to 1956 he worked in the apparatus of the Central Committee and the Moscow City Party Committee. While working in the apparatus, he graduated by correspondence from the Higher Party School in 1953. In 1956-1958 he was Secretary and in 1959-1960, First Secretary of the Moscow Oblast Party Committee. Between these posts he worked for a year as Permanent Secretary of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. From 1960 to 1962 Demichev was First Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee. In 1959-1961 he also was a member of the Central Committee Bureau for the Russian Republic.

Demichev was elected a member of the Central Committee at the Twenty-second Party Congress in 1961. In 1961 he was also elected (and in 1966 re-elected) Secretary of

the Central Committee (Secretariat), and has retained that post until the present time. In 1962-1965 he was Chairman of the Chemical and Light Industries Department within the Secretariat. In 1965-1966 he headed the Ideological Commission within the Secretariat, replacing Ilichev. While working in the Secretariat, Demichev was elected in 1964 a candidate member of the Party's Praesidium and in 1966 and 1971, a candidate member of the Politbureau.

Demichev has been a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR since 1958 and between 1962 and 1966 served as a member of its Praesidium.

National Composition

The top elite of 1961 was a multi-national body. However, only seven nationalities were represented and the Russians, as one of them, constituted a majority. There were thirteen Russians: Shvernik, Khrushchev, Suslov, Kosygin, Ponomarev, Spiridonov, Brezhnev, Ilichev, Kozlov, Voronov, Grishin, Shelepin, and Demichev. There were three Ukrainians: Podgornyi, Polianskii, and Shcherbitskii. Other non-Russians were: Mazurov - Belorussian, Mikoian - Armenian, Rashidov - Uzbek, Mzhavandze - Georgian, and Kuusinen - Finn.

There are indications that the younger men among the non-Russians were recruited to represent the Parties of their national republics in contrast to the non-Russians in the top elite under Lenin and, in most cases, under Stalin. Mikoian was the old-timer and can hardly be said

to represent the Communist Party of Armenia. Kuusinen could not represent the Finnish Party because the Karelo-Finnish Republic was abolished in 1956. He was probably recruited to the top elite as a reward for his work in the Comintern and for his consistent loyalty to the top elite in the Soviet Union. But Podgornyi, Mazurov, Mzhavandze, and Rashidov were elected to the top elite while being First Secretaries of the Parties of their respective national republics (and the last three have retained these posts until the present time). The remaining two Ukrainians also made their career in the Communist Party of Ukraine. Their presence in the top elite can be attributed to the intention of maintaining a proportional representation of various nationalities in the top decision-making bodies. By 1966 this representation was even more balanced when the number of Russians was reduced and that of the Ukrainians and the Belorussians increased. The same is true with regard to the top elite of 1971.

TABLE 18

DISTRIBUTION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE TOP ELITE
OF 1961 ACCORDING TO YEAR AND AGE OF JOINING
THE PARTY, TYPE OF ACTIVITY BEFORE AND AFTER
THE NOVEMBER REVOLUTION, AND NATIONALITY

Name	Year of Joining Party	Age	Revo- lution- ary	Komi- tet- chik	Apparat- chik	Nationality
Brezhnev, L.I.	1931	25			x	Russian
Demichev, P.N.	1939	21			x	Russian
Grishin, V.V.	1939	25			x	Russian
Ilichev, L.F.	1924	18			x	Russian
Khrushchev, N.S.	1918	24			x	Russian
Kosygin, A.N.	1927	23			x	Russian
Kozlov, F.R.	1926	18			x	Russian
Kuusinen, O.V.	1905	24	x			Finn
Mazurov, K.T.	1940	26			x	Belorussian
Mikolai, A.I.	1915	20	x	x		Armenian
Mzhavandze, V.P.	1927	25			x	Georgian
Podgornyi, N.N.	1930	27			x	Ukrainian
Polianskii, D.S.	1939	22			x	Ukrainian
Ponomarev, B.N.	1919	14			x	Russian
Rashidov, Sh. P.	1939	22			x	Uzbek
Shcherbitskii, V.V.	1941	23			x	Ukrainian
Shelepin, A.N.	1940	22			x	Russian
Shvernik, N.M.	1905	17	x	x		Russian
Spiridonov, I.V.	1928	23			x	Russian
Suslov, M.A.	1921	19			x	Russian
Voronov, G.I.	1931	21			x	Russian

TABLE 19

DISTRIBUTION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE TOP
ELITE OF 1961 ACCORDING TO THEIR
PROFESSIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CAREERS³⁰

Name	Profession	Komsomol	Party	Government	Trade Union	Police	Army	Comintern
Brezhnev, L.I.	x		x	x				
Demichev, P.N.		x	x	x				
Grishin, V.V.	x		x	x	x			
Illichev, L.F.	x	x	x	x				
Khrushchev, N.S.			x	x				
Kosygin, A.N.	x		x	x				
Kozlov, F.R.	x	x	x	x				
Kuusinen, O.V.			x	x				x
Mazurov, K.T.	x	x	x	x				
Mikoian, A.I.			x	x				
Mzhavandze, V.P.	x		x	x			x	
Podgornyi, N.N.	x	x	x	x				
Polianskii, D.S.		x	x	x				
Ponomarev, B.N.	x	x	x	x				x
Rashidov, Sh. P.	x		x	x				
Shcherbitskii, V.V.	x	x	x	x				
Shelepin, A.N.		x	x	x	x		x	
Shvernik, N.M.			x	x	x			
Spiridonov, I.V.	x		x	x				
Suslov, M.A.	x	x	x	x				
Voronov, G.I.			x	x				

³⁰By professional career is meant here man's working in the area of his specialization for which he was trained in educational institutions. A career in government includes posts in the Council of Ministers and the Supreme Soviet both on the local and national levels.

The discussion of several aspects of the top elite of 1961 leads us to draw a few conclusions. First of all, it is evident from the data that the top elite of 1961 consisted of men belonging to three generations. It should be admitted, however, that in some cases it is difficult to draw a definite generation line because the age differences among several men were narrow. But this does not hold true with respect to many other individuals. There were four men born between 1881 and 1895, ten between 1902 and 1910, and seven between 1914 and 1918. The age difference between the oldest in the first group and the oldest in the second was 21 years, and therefore, in this case we have two men who definitely belonged to two different generations. However, the age difference between the youngest of the first group and the oldest of the second was only 7 years, and consequently, it is difficult to speak of them as belonging to two generations. Similar is the case between some individuals of the second and the third group. Such extreme age differences are reduced if we count the average age of each group as a unit. The average age (arithmetic mean) of the first group was 71.5 years, of the second 55.9, and that of the third 44.4. If we accept 15 years as a minimum age dividing generations, then we can say that the first two groups belonged to two generations. But the same cannot be said about the second and the third group. On the other hand, there were individuals in both groups whose age difference was 15 years or more.

Therefore, we can conclude that in the top elite there were men who belonged to three different generations and there were also those who were on the border between them. This indicates that in spite of dramatic changes in the top elite since the late 1920's, the Party manifested a remarkable continuity in the ruling elite.

It should also be noted that all men born between 1902 and 1918 were, by their education and political experiences, the product of the Soviet system. They received higher education after the Soviet regime was established, in most cases worked for a number of years in their respective professions, switched to work in the Party, and gradually through the test work in the local Party or government organizations reached the highest level of the Party's pyramid. The education and the political experiences of the older men, on the other hand, were different and did not follow any particular pattern. One man received higher education, two secondary, and one an elementary. As far as their political experience is concerned, three were revolutionaries (one in Finland) and one a Civil War fighter. Under the Soviet regime, one worked for many years in the Comintern, one made his career mainly in trade unions, one in government, and only one rose to the highest position within the Party gradually through his work in the local Party organizations.

Another important characteristic of the 1961 top elite was its specialized educational background. A great majority of men were specialists, among whom the

technocrats constituted the largest group. There were eighteen men, or 86 percent of the total number, who received higher education in several specialized fields: three in humanities, four in social science, one in the "military-political science," and twelve in some kind of engineering. These twelve men constituted over 66 percent of all specialists, or 57 percent of the total membership. As will be shown in the next chapter, the process of growth of the technocrats in the top elite was continuing; by 1966 their number increased to 75 percent and by 1971, to 76 percent.

Still another characteristic, although not surprising in any way, was that most men of the top elite came from the lower classes. Except for two who can be classified as coming from the middle or lower-middle class, the rest came from the working class (13) and the peasant class (6). This fact can be interpreted in several ways. One of them would be to say that the fact that so many men from the lower classes received higher education and grew to political prominence is a testimony that the Soviet regime in the past favored the working and the peasant classes. This does not have to be true in the future as the Party Program of 1961 declared that the Soviet state became a state of the whole people. The children of the present Soviet middle class (factory managers, teachers, local Party bureaucrats, etc.) and of the upper class (high government and Party officials, high ranking army

officers, and others), having educational and political opportunities, may in the future assume the supreme power within the Party and the state.

If we are looking for the elements of cohesiveness within the top elite of 1961, we can point out that merely belonging to the decision-making Party organs made these men functionally a cohesive group. In addition, the top elite was ideologically one unit. Obviously, it is difficult under the Soviet regime to measure the degree of commitment of the members of the top elite to the Communist ideology, but their overt dedication to it made them, at least in appearance, a group united by the same conviction. Coming from similar social origins and having similar political experiences, the elite members in most cases became to some degree psychologically also alike.

In the conclusions of the last two chapters it was shown on the basis of comparison between the top and the lower elites as represented by the delegates to the Party Congresses that the top elites of 1919 and 1939 as groups were better educated than the lower elites. A comparison between the delegates to the Twenty-second Party Congress in 1961, to the Twenty-third Congress in 1966, and to the Twenty-fourth in 1971 and the top elites elected at the same times shows that this is also true in all these cases. The Party Congress in 1961 was attended by 4,408 voting delegates. According to the Report of the Credential Commission, there were 2,312 voting delegates, or 52 percent

of the total number, who received higher education and 230, or 5.2 percent, who received incomplete higher education. Among the non-voting delegates, there were 186, or 46 percent of all men, who received both complete and incomplete higher education.³¹ Altogether there were 2,733, or 56.8 percent of all delegates, who received either complete or incomplete higher education. As can be expected, this percentage was much higher than the percentage of all Party members with completed higher education, which by July 1961 was 13.3 percent.³² In the top elite, on the other hand, 18 men, or 86 percent of all members, received complete higher education.

Similar is the case with the top elite of 1966. At the Twenty-third Party Congress in 1966, there were 4,619 voting delegates and 323 non-voting delegates--altogether 4,942. Of these 2,742, or 55.5 percent, received higher education (no data for incomplete higher education was given).³³ At the same time, according to Brezhnev's Report to the Congress, only 18.3 percent of all Party members received higher education, either complete or

³¹ V. N. Titov, "Report of the Credential Commission to the Twenty-second Party Congress," XXII Sezd KPSS: Stenograficheskii Otchet (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1962), pp. 427.

³² "KPSS v Tsifrakh," Partiinaia Zhizn, No. 1 (January 1962), p. 48.

³³ I. V. Kapitonov, "Report of the Credential Commission to the Twenty-third Party Congress," XXIII Sezd KPSS: Stenograficheskii Otchet (Moskva: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1966), p. 284.

incomplete.³⁴

In contrast, all members of the top elite of 1966 received complete higher education.³⁵

The number and percentage of the delegates with higher education to the Twenty-fourth Party Congress in 1971 slightly increased. Kapitonov reported that almost 58 percent of all delegates had higher education and about 27 percent incomplete higher and secondary education. No data on educational level of all Party members were given at this Congress.³⁶

Again, in contrast with the delegates, all members of the top elite received higher (completed) education. Thus, on the basis of the data for the top elite from five different times we can generalize that the Party's top elite in the Soviet Union tends to be better educated than the lower elites.

In the preceding two chapters it was also established that the members of the top elites of 1919 and 1939 were, on the average, older than those of the lower elites. The same is true with regard to the top elite of 1961, 1966, and 1971. Again, for comparison we take the delegates to

³⁴Pravda, March 30, 1966.

³⁵In the top elite of 1966 there were 14 men from 1961 and 10 new members. The sources for these new men are: Deputaty (1966); E.B.S.E. (1962, 1966); Ukr. R.E. (1963), XII; and Lebed, et. al., op. cit.

³⁶I. V. Kapitonov, "Report of the Credential Commission to the Twenty-fourth Party Congress," Pravda, April 3, 1971. This source is used to discuss other aspects of the 1971 top elite in this section. The biographic data for this elite is the same as for the 1966 elite.

the Party Congresses. At the Party Congress in 1961, 2,706, or 61.4 percent of all voting delegates, were 41 years old or older.³⁷ No data were given for the non-voting delegates. But if we assume that the percentage of them in this age bracket was lower (due to the fact that they represented Party candidate members who usually are younger than the full members), say 60 percent, then the total number of all delegates between 41 years of age and over was 2,949, or 61.2 percent.

In contrast, all members of the top elite belonged to this age group, the youngest being 43 years old and the oldest 80.

The same is true with regard to the 1966 top elite. At the Twenty-third Party Congress there were 2,955 voting and non-voting delegates, or 59.8 percent of all delegates, who were 40 years old or over.³⁸ At the same time all members of the top elite belonged to this age group--the youngest was 48 years old and the oldest 67.

The age of the delegates to the Twenty-fourth Party Congress in 1971 was higher than the age of the delegates to the previous Congress. Among the delegates 3,384, or 68.2 percent, were between the ages of 41 and over 60.

The members of the top elite, on the other hand, completely belonged to this age group--the youngest was 44 and the oldest 72.

³⁷Titov, op. cit., p. 429.

³⁸Kapitonov, "Report of the Credential Commission to the Twenty-third Party Congress," op. cit., p. 284.

Age is related to Party seniority. At the Twenty-second Party Congress in 1961, according to the official statistics, there were 1,453 voting and non-voting delegates, or 30 percent of all delegates, who joined the Party between the earliest time and 1940 inclusive.³⁹

In the top elite of 1961, on the other hand, there were 20 members out of 21, or 95.2 percent, who joined the Party between 1915 and 1940 inclusive. Only one man became a Party member in 1941 who really makes no great difference as far as the whole group is concerned.

At the Party Congress in 1966 there were 1,021 voting and non-voting delegates, or 20.6 percent of the total number, who joined the Party between the earliest time and 1940 inclusive and 1,220, or 24.7 percent, between 1941 and 1945.⁴⁰

The top elite of 1966, in contrast, had 22 men out of 24, or 91 percent, who joined the Party between 1915 and 1940 inclusive and only 2, or 9 percent, between 1941 and 1945.

Among the delegates to the Twenty-fourth Party Congress, 1,605, or 32.3 percent of the total number, joined the Party between 1922 and 1945. The rest joined the Party between 1946 and 1970 and a few (21 men) between 1917 and 1921.

³⁹Titov, op. cit., pp. 429-430.

⁴⁰Kapitonov, op. cit., p. 285.

Among the members of the top elite of 1971, 21 men, or 85 percent, joined the Party between 1927 and 1943, three between 1915 and 1921, and one in 1952.

All these data suggest that the top elite members tend to be older than the members of the lower elites.

Finally, a few words can be said about the representation of various organizations--institutions in the top elite. By this is meant the representation in the Praesidium-Politbureau, and not in the Secretariat; for, as was pointed out in the preceding chapter, the latter was always an operational body where the secretaries worked full time, holding no positions in other organizations. This was not the case with the Praesidium-Politbureau. It always consisted of top men from government, trade unions, etc., including the Secretariat.

In 1961, 1966, and 1971 the Praesidium-Politbureau included the representatives from the Secretariat, the central government, and the Party apparatuses of various union republics. The Komsomol, the army, and the police lost their "seats" after Stalin's death. The police, however, regained its representation in 1967. The Komsomol was only represented under Stalin from 1939 to 1952 when Mikhailov was its First Secretary. The army was represented since the early 1920's by the Minister of Defense Voroshilov and in 1956-1957 by G. E. Zhukov, also Defense Minister. Since Zhukov's expulsion from

the Praesidium in 1957, no one replaced him from the army. The police were represented from 1919 until 1926 by its chairman Dzerzhinskii (a member of the Orgbureau), and from 1937 to the end of 1938 by N. I. Ezhov (candidate member of the Politbureau), and from 1939 until 1953 by Beria, who was first a candidate member and since 1946 a full member of the Politbureau (since 1952 called the Praesidium).

There is no reason to believe that all those organizations or institutions that lost their seats in the top Party organs also lost their importance for the Soviet system, for they continued to perform the same functions as before. But it can be said that perhaps they lost the opportunity to protect or advance their interests in the decision-making organ, and their leaders lost prestige and influence. Instead of participating in the process of decision-making on the highest level and influencing the outcome, these leaders were placed in a position only to accept the ready-made decisions for implementation.

The Secret Police, however, regained its representation in the top elite in 1967 when Yurii Andropov, Secretary of the Central Committee (Secretariat) since 1962, was appointed Chairman of the State Security Committee. But it is questionable whether this was an advancement of the police or an extension of the elite's direct control

over it. Since Stalin's death, the KGB lost its practically unlimited power, but it still remained a formidable instrument of power. Unlike Ezhov and Beria, Andropov was made chief of the police as a member of the top elite. Therefore, it is possible that instead of protecting the interests of the KGB in the top elite, he was to protect the interest of the top elite in the police.

CHAPTER VII

THE EMERGENCE OF THE TECHNOCRATS IN THE TOP ELITE

In the "Introduction" to this work we proposed a hypothesis that the progressive development of industrialization and technology in the Soviet socialist totalitarian state led to the progressive emergence of the technocratic type of top elite in the Party. In order to see more clearly the development of this phenomenon, we test this hypothesis by using not only the top elite of 1919, 1939, and 1961 discussed in the last three chapters, but also the top elite of 1924, 1926, 1930, 1934, 1946, 1952, 1956, 1966, and 1971.

The term "technocrats" refers here to the members of the Party elite who received their training in engineering, agriculture, and industrial management both on the secondary school and university levels. As far as the Party's top elite is concerned, it should be emphasized that between 1930 and 1964 only four men received technical education in special secondary schools; others received higher technical education.

As the following discussion and statistics will show, in this case there is no need to formulate a null hypothesis or an alternative one as the statisticians usually do. Therefore, we will go on directly to prove the hypothesis as stated above, first by statistical data, and then by causal factors of industrial and technological development and the totalitarian socialism in the Soviet Union.

The discussion of the 1919 top elite in chapter four showed that no member was a technocrat. The elite consisted of the revolutionaries, most of whom received a complete or incomplete higher education in the field of social sciences (including law). But after the Soviet regime entered the road of industrialization, the top elite began to change qualitatively--until World War II rather slowly and after that quite rapidly. As Table 20 shows, in 1924 there were 24 men who were members of the top elite. Twenty-three of them are identified in the Soviet sources, and they show that only one, or 4.3 percent, was a technocrat (A. S. Bubnov).¹ In 1926 the same man remained the

¹Many different sources were consulted for the information about the top elite of 1930, 1934, 1939, 1946, 1952, 1956, 1961, 1966, and 1971. Most of them were: Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1st ed. and 2nd ed.; Malaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, 1st ed., 2nd ed. and 3rd ed.; Ukrainska Radianska Entsyklopediya, 19 ; Ezhegodnik Bolshoi Sovetskoi Entsiklopedii, 1958, 1962, 1966; Iu. S. Gamberov, V. Ia. Zheleznov, M. M. Kovalevskii, S. A. Muromtsev, and K. A. Timiriachev (eds.), "Dielateli Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik i Oktiabrskoi Revoliutsii," Parts I, II, and III, in Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar Russkogo Bibliograficheskogo Instituta "Granat," 7th ed., Vol. XLI (Moskva: Russkii Bibliograficheskii Institut "Granat," n.d.); Deputaty Soveta Soiuzu i Soveta Natsionalnostei: Piatyi Sozyv and Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR: Shestoi Sozyv and Sedmoi Sozyv (Moskva: Izdatelstvo "Izvestia Sovetov Deputatov Trudiakhchisia SSSR," 1958, 1962, 1966); S. V. Utechin, Everyman's Concise Encyclopedia of Russia (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1961); Dr. Heinrich E. Schulz and Dr. Stephen S. Taylor (eds.), Who's Who in the USSR: 1961-1962 (Montreal: International Book and Publishing Co., 1962); Andrew I. Lebed, Dr. Heinrich E. Schulz, and Dr. Stephen S. Taylor (eds.), Who's Who in the USSR: 1965-1966 (New York: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1966). These sources will be used to discuss all other aspects concerning the top elites in this section.

technocrat in the elite. By 1930, however, three men in the top elite were technocrats (they were, in addition to Bubnov, S. M. Kirov and V. Ia. Chubar who received only secondary technical education) and they constituted 12.0 percent of the 25 identified elite members (two are not identified). In 1934, of the three technocrats, two retained their positions (Kirov and Chubar) and they counted for 9.5 percent of the 21 identified elite members (again two are not identified). In 1939 three technocrats appeared in the top elite (G. M. Malenkov, L. P. Beria, and N. S. Khrushchev--the latter two had secondary technical education). Since the top elite in 1939 consisted only of 15 men, they constituted 20.0 percent of the total membership.

TABLE 20

NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF TECHNOCRATS IN
THE PARTY'S TOP ELITE IN SELECTED YEARS

Years	Total Number of Elite Members	Number of Unidentified Members	Number of Identified Members (N)	Number of Technocrats	Percent of Technocrats (of N)
1919	11		11		
1924	24	1	23	1	4.3
1926	27	2	25	1	4.0
1930	27	2	25	3	12.0
1934	23	2	21	2	9.5
1939	15		15	3	20.0
1946	27	4	23	6	26.0
1952	36	4	32	16	50.0
1956	20		20	8	40.0
1961	21		21	12	57.1
1966	24		24	18	75.0
1971	25		25	19	76.0

From 1946 on the number and the percentage of technocrats was growing quite fast. This was due to the fact that the younger men were recruited into the top elite and they, in most cases, received higher technical education. Thus, in 1946, of the 23 identified members (four are unidentified), 6, or 26.0 percent, were technocrats (N. S. Khrushchev, G. M. Malenkov, L. P. Beria, A. N. Kosygin, N. S. Patolichev, and V. V. Kuznetsov). In 1952 both the number and the percentage of technocrats in the top elite doubled. Sixteen out of 32 identified members (four are not identified), or 50.0 percent, were technocrats (N. M. Pegov, A. M. Puzanov, A. B. Aristov, L. P. Beria, V. V. Kuznetsov, G. M. Malenkov, L. G. Melnikov, M. G. Pervukhin, P. K. Ponomarenko, M. Z. Saburov, N. S. Khrushchev, L. I. Brezhnev, I. G. Kabanov, A. N. Kosygin, I. F. Tevosian, and N. S. Patolichev). All, except Khrushchev and Beria, received higher technical education. It was the year when Stalin replaced the Politbureau with the Praesidium which he enlarged to 25 full members and 11 candidates. All secretaries were either full or candidate members of the Praesidium.

In 1956, however, as a result of the reduction of the elite's membership after Stalin's death, the number of technocrats was also reduced. There were altogether 20 members of the top elite and 8 of them, or 40.0 percent, were technocrats (A. I. Kirilenko, G. M. Malenkov, M. G. Pervukhin, M. Z. Saburov, N. S. Khrushchev, L. I. Brezhnev,

E. A. Furtzeva, and A. B. Aristov). In 1961 the number of technocrats increased to 12 men, or 57.1 percent of the total membership (G. I. Voronov, N. S. Khrushchev, L. I. Brezhnev, A. N. Kosygin, N. V. Podgornyi, V. V. Grishin, V. V. Shcherbitskii, P. N. Demichev, F. R. Kozlov, D. S. Polianskii, K. T. Mazurov, and I. V. Spiridonov).


After the Twenty-third Party Congress in 1966, the elected top elite included 18 technocrats, or 75.0 percent of all 24 members. Many of them had been members of the 1961 top elite, but for the sake of clarity both old and new technocrats should be identified. They were: Brezhnev, Voronov, Kirilenko, Kosygin, Mazurov, Podgornyi, Polianskii, P. E. Shelest, Grishin, Demichev, D. A. Kunaev, P. M. Masherov, D. F. Ustinov, Shcherbitskii, Iu. V. Andropov, I. V. Kapitonov, F. D. Kulakov, and A. P. Rudakov.

In 1971, following the Twenty-fourth Party Congress, the membership of the top elite was increased to 25 and the number of technocrats to 19. Consequently, the percentage of the latter within the top elite rose to 76.0. These were all the same men as in 1966, except for two newcomers. When Secretary Rudakov died in July 1966, he was replaced in December of the same year by another technocrat--M. S. Solomentsev. In addition, in April 1968 K. F. Katushev (also a technocrat) became Secretary of the Central Committee.² In general, we can say that when the younger

²The composition of the Politbureau and the Secretariat for 1971 can be found in Pravda, April 10, 1971.

men joined the top elite, the number of technocrats increased. Figure 1 illustrates graphically the increase of technocrats in the top elite of the Party from 1924 to 1971.

Fig. 1. INCREASE OF TECHNOCRATS
IN THE PARTY'S TOP ELITE



It is interesting to establish the numerical relationship between the technocrats and those who studied social sciences and humanities. Social sciences here include economics, history, and law. Although the latter is a field in itself, it is attached to social sciences in our grouping because those who studied it devoted much of their time to the study of economics and political theories. It will be recalled from chapter four that within the 1919 top elite five men studied law: Lenin, Krestinskii, and briefly Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Rakovskii. In the 1930-1934 elite only one, A. I. Rykov, briefly studied law and none in the later years.


Humanities here include philosophy, literature, and languages. Those who obtained general secondary education are not included in any of these groups. But those who received technical education on the secondary school level are included (as was noted earlier) among the technocrats. Mikoian, who finished the seminary on the secondary level, is considered here as belonging to the group of men who studied humanities because his school was a specialized school.

As Figure 2 shows, those who studied humanities never exceeded 15 percent of the total elite membership between 1919 and 1971. Indeed, 14.3 percent in 1961 was the highest for all years. The next higher was 13.3 and 13.0 percent in 1939 and 1946 respectively. In 1966 and 1971 only 8.0 percent of the elite membership belonged to this group

(Shelepin and Rashidov). Such a low percentage of those who studied humanities in the top elite between 1919 and 1971 indicates that both the period after the revolution (1920's) and the period of industrial and technological growth since the late 1930's provided only small opportunities for them to advance. The first favored the social science revolutionaries and the second, technocrats.

Perhaps more interesting is the numerical relationship between those who obtained their education in social sciences and those who were trained in technology. Figure 2 shows that the first group in the 1919 top elite represented the highest percentage in the entire Party history since the November revolution. It consisted of 6 men who accounted for 54.5 percent of the elite membership. But this percentage was gradually decreasing in the following years. In 1924 there were 8 men who studied social sciences, but they represented 34.8 percent of the total elite members; in 1927--7 men, or 24.0 percent; and in 1934--4 men, or 16.0 percent. Between 1939 and 1956 this group of men vacillated between 26.6 and 30.0 percent of the total elite membership. Indeed, the 30.0 percent in 1956 was the highest since 1926, but it was comprised of only 6 men. In the following years both the number and the percentage of these men dropped significantly. In 1961 there were 4 men, or 19.0 percent, who studied social sciences; in 1966--3 men, or 12.5 percent; and in 1971 also 3 men (A. Ia. Pelshe, M. A. Suslov, and B. N. Ponomarev),

**Fig. 2. PERCENTILE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
ELITE MEMBERS WHO STUDIED TECHNOLOGY,
SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND HUMANITIES**




or 12.0 of the total 25 elite members.

While the social science men were decreasing in number and percentage in the top elite, the technocrats were rapidly increasing, particularly since the 1940's. This can be explained by the reasons alluded to above. The first type of men had better opportunity than any other type to advance in the post-revolutionary period, but the technocrats had the advantage over the first under the conditions of developing industrialization and technology. It is questionable whether in the future the technocrats will totally control the pivotal organs of the Party because there will always be a need for social science specialists, particularly in the Secretariat, to deal with, for example, ideology, culture, and propaganda.

There is also a relationship between the level of education and the increase of technocrats between 1919 and 1971. The statistics show (Figure 3) that 8 men, or 72.7 percent, within the top elite of 1919 received higher education; 2 members, or 18.1 percent, secondary; and 1 man, or 9.0 percent, elementary education. By 1930 the ratio between men with higher and elementary education was almost reversed. Fifteen men, or 60.0 percent of 25 elite members, received only elementary education and 6 members, or 24.0 percent, higher. Since then the number and the percentage of men with both

**Fig. 3. HIGHER, SECONDARY, AND ELEMENTARY
EDUCATION OF THE PARTY'S TOP ELITE MEMBERS**

Percent



— Higher Education
 - - - Secondary Education
 Elementary Education

elementary and secondary education was decreasing, reaching the zero point in 1966. At the same time the percentage of elite members with higher education was sharply increasing, reaching 100 percent in 1966. While the educational level of the top elite was increasing, the number of technocrats was also increasing. A simple explanation for this phenomenon can be found in the fact that men of the younger generation, who became members of the top elite, received higher education in technology.

Professional and Political Experiences of Technocrats

The technocrats in the top elite, particularly since 1946, were engineers, agronomists, and industrial managers not only by their education but also by experience. In the 1924 and 1926 top elite, the technocrat Bubnov, who studied agriculture, did not have any experience in his profession. Kirov and Chubar in the 1930 and 1934 elite studied in the secondary technical schools and both worked, at least briefly, in their professions. The first was a draftsman in 1904, and the second did mechanical work in various factories. It should be admitted that their brief experience in comparison with the engineers and other specialists in the 1960's was insignificant. However, in the Soviet sources Kirov is accredited with industrial accomplishments in Leningrad when he was Party Secretary there, and this could have been attributed partly to his technological training and experience.

In the 1939 group none of the technocrats worked professionally, but in 1946 three new and younger men who joined the elite (Kuznetsov, Patolichev, and Kosygin) had many years of successful experience in engineering or industrial management. Similar is the case with all other younger technocrats who became members of the top elite in later years. Their number increased to 81.0 percent of all technocrats in 1952, then dropped to 75.0 percent in 1956 but rose to 83.0 percent in 1961, and to about 90.0 percent in 1966 and 1971. In the 1961 elite only Voronov and Khrushchev did not work professionally after they finished their studies. In the 1966 and 1971 elites, Voronov and Andropov also did not work professionally. The following Table gives the statistical summary of the technocrats' professional experiences.

TABLE 21
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE OF TECHNOCRATS

Year	Number of Technocrats	Number with Professional Experience	Percentage
1924	1	0	0
1926	1	0	0
1930	3	2	66
1934	2	2	100
1939	3	0	0
1946	6	3	50
1952	16	13	81
1956	8	6	75
1961	12	10	83
1966	18	16	88
1971	19	17	90

The consulted Soviet sources reveal that all technocrats also received experience in political work before

they were recruited into the top elite. In this connection it is perhaps worthwhile to cite Lenin's view on the role of "engineers and agronomists" in politics in the future. Speaking to the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets in December 1920 about the government plan of electrification of the country, Lenin, in part, said:

I now come to the last item--the question of electrification which is on the agenda of the Congress. You will hear a report on this subject. I think that we are witnessing a moment of great change, a moment which in any case marks the beginning of important success of the Soviets. Henceforth on the rostrum of the All-Russian Congresses will appear not only the politicians and administrators but also engineers and agronomists. This is the beginning of the very happy epoch when politics will recede gradually into the background, when politics will be discussed less often and at shorter length, and engineers and agronomists will do most of the talking.³

This prediction was practically overfulfilled in the Party's top elite: the engineers and the agricultural specialists not only stood beside politicians, but themselves became politicians and took over the Party's leadership in the 1960's. All technocrats, regardless whether they worked professionally or not, were politically active in the Party, trade unions, Komsomol, or government on various lower levels before they became members of the top elite. All those men who joined the top elite after World War II (1946-1971) followed the pattern of political activity as exemplified by the technocrats (as well as non-technocrats) of the 1961 elite, discussed in the last chapter. After working for several years

³V. I. Lenin, Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii, 5th ed., Vol. XLII (Moskva: Gossudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1963), p. 156.

professionally, they switched to work in the Party organizations, or government, or some other organization (but mostly in the Party) usually on the regional, or district, or city levels. After successful work and manifested loyalty to their superiors, these technocrats eventually ended up in the top elite. The same applies to those few technocrats who did not receive experience in their respective professions.

There remained one aspect which should be mentioned here. Some of the technocrats also graduated from the Party schools. The first technocrat with this education was Saburov in the 1952 top elite. In 1956 there were two such members: Saburov and Furtseva; in 1961, four: Voronov, Demichev, Polianskii, and Mazurov; in 1966 and 1971, six: in addition to these four, Andropov and Shelest. It is not known from the Soviet sources if this education helped them in their political careers. It can be surmised that in individual cases it did. However, the fact that most technocrats advanced politically without this type of additional training suggests that the Party school education on the whole was not the determining factor in their political advancement.

**Causal Factor: The Development of
Industrialization and Technology**

The emergence of the technocratic type of the top elite was, in part, the result of the development of industrialization and technology in the Soviet Union.

No country in our century had so successfully undertaken the task of industrializing its economy on such a grand scale and in such a short time as the Soviet Union did. This is not to imply that the Soviet economy became fully developed. Indeed, in the area of consumer goods it is behind many Western states. But in the sector of heavy industry it scored a great success.

Industrialization and technology are really inseparable. By technology is usually meant, in brief, the development of technical sciences, the knowledge of utilizing the mineral resources, the invention of machines and the knowledge to operate them. By industrialization, in essence, is meant the development of all branches of economy by using the technological instruments and the sophisticated organizational devices to maximize the production. The industry in the Soviet Union, as well as in other countries, is divided into heavy and light industries. The first embraces the production of means of production as well as the military armaments, and the second, the consumer goods. The Party leaders from Lenin to Brezhnev and Kosygin have always given priority to the first at the expense of the second.

It is worthwhile to devote a few pages to the discussion of the reasons for a rapid industrialization because it was directly related to the training of technical experts some of whom later became members of the top elite. When the Bolshevik Party came to

power in 1917, Russia was industrially a backward country. The Russian Tsars did make some progress, but they never caught up with the Western states.⁴ The Party leaders were determined to do what the Tsars could not--to surpass economically the capitalist countries in a short span of time. They had several reasons for this. The most conspicuous were: the defense of the Soviet state, construction of socialism-communism in the Soviet Union, and an ambition to prove to the world that the Soviet socialism was superior to capitalism.

In reference to the first reason, it can be mentioned that Lenin on a number of occasions warned the communists that the Soviet state was surrounded by technically superior capitalist states. He urged that in order to be able to defend itself, the Soviet state had to develop industry and technology. In his speech to the Second All-Russian Congress of Political Education Department in October 1921, in which he urged the communists "to get down to business" and work with the capitalists, concessionaries, and leaseholders in Russia in order to learn "the business of running the economy," he said:

You must remember that our Soviet land is impoverished after many years of trial and suffering, and has no socialist France or socialist England as neighbors which could help us with their highly developed technology and their highly developed industry. Bear that in mind. We must remember

⁴ A brief discussion on the economic development in Russia under the Tsars can be found in Harry Schwartz, Russia's Soviet Economy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1958), pp. 53-68.

that at present all their highly developed technology and their highly developed industry belong to the capitalists, who are fighting us. We must remember that we either strain every nerve in every day's effort, or we shall perish. Owing to the present circumstances, the whole world is developing faster than we are. While developing, the capitalist world is directing all its forces against us. That is how the matter stands. That is ⁵why we must devote special attention to this struggle.

Stalin spoke about this problem even more often and with more urgency than Lenin did. In his speech to the Plenary session of the Central Committee on the question of industrialization in November 1928, he stated:

A starting point of our theses is the position that a rapid industrialization in general and of the production of means of production in particular is the essential beginning and the key to the industrialization of the entire country, the essential beginning and the key to reorganization of our economy on the basis of socialist development. . . . The question of rapid development of industry would not be so acute if we were not the only country with the dictatorship of the proletariat, if the dictatorship of the proletariat was established not only in our country but also in others, more advanced ones, say in Germany and in France. Under these conditions the capitalist encirclement would not be so seriously dangerous to us as it is now. . . .

In order to attain the final victory of socialism in our country, we have to pass and surpass these /capitalist/ countries also technologically and economically. Either we attain this or they will crush us.⁶

Stalin's successors followed their predecessors in picturing the danger from the capitalist states and urging

⁵Lenin, op. cit., Vol. XLIV, pp. 167-168.

⁶V. V. Stalin, Sochinenia, Vol. XI (Moskva: Gossudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1949), pp. 246-251.

further development of industrialization, but they did this in a more mitigated form. Khrushchev, in his report to the Twenty-second Party Congress in 1961, said that the Soviet Union was not encircled by the capitalist states any more but by the socialist. He stated that the Soviet Union would follow the policy of "peaceful coexistence." But at the same time he also said that one of the reasons the Party will continue to emphasize the heavy industry was that it constituted "the basis for the consolidation of the socialist state's defense capacity."⁷

Kosygin, in his economic report to the Twenty-fourth Party Congress in March 1971, said the same thing. Promising that under the new Five Year Plan all branches of economy would continue to grow, he, nevertheless, said:

Heavy industry was and remains to be the basis of the economic might of our country. It ensures the technical progress, the development of the entire economy. . . . It also strengthens the defense capacity of the Soviet state.⁸

The second reason for rapid industrialization was ideological. Being in harmony with the communist ideology, the Party leaders maintained that without industrial growth socialism and communism could not be established. Although communism was objectively a utopian vision, it, nevertheless, provided the Party with the purpose. As in many other cases, the Party leaders derived their basic

⁷Pravda, October 19, 1961.

⁸Pravda, April 7, 1971.

ideas about economy under socialism and communism from Karl Marx. In his works he never elaborated on the future system of communism, except in "The Critique of the Gotha Program" in which he gave rather an impressionistic picture of the future. In reference to "the higher phase of communist society," Marx said that its prerequisites were, among others, an increase of "productive forces" and the abundant flow "of cooperative wealth", and only then the slogan "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs" would be realized.⁹ He implied that the industrial development would begin with the lower phase of communist society, which Lenin labeled "socialism," and would reach its peak in the next stage. The Party leaders have repeated these prerequisites in a more elaborative form time and again and have urged that only developed industrialization can lead to the construction of socialism and eventually communism in the Soviet Union. Lenin in his report to the Tenth All-Russian Conference of the Party in May 1921, said:

Large-scale industry is the one and only real basis upon which we can multiply our resources and build a socialist society. Without large factories, such as capitalism has created, without highly developed large-scale industry, socialism is impossible anywhere and still less is it possible in a peasant country and we in Russia know this better than before. . . .¹⁰

⁹Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Selected Works, Vol. II (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1958), p. 24.

¹⁰Lenin, op. cit., Vol. XLIII, pp. 305-306.

Lenin was captivated with the idea of electrification, quite rightly considering it as the prime mover of the economy. Speaking about the prepared plan of electrification to the Eighth All-Russian Congress of the Soviets in May 1921, he expressed his hope that it "will grow into a grand economic plan" and that it "will show how to transform Russia into a real economic basis indispensable for communism."¹¹

The Party leaders in later years used the same arguments, although in different form. Nikolai A. Voznesenskii, for example, Chairman of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) since 1938 and a candidate member of the Politbureau in 1941 (he became a full member in 1947 and liquidated in 1949), spoke to the Eighth All-Union Party Conference in February 1941 about the Third Five Year Plan. He enumerated several objectives and one of them reads as follows:

Secondly, the plan for 1941 proceeds from the task of developing socialist production to the utmost in all branches of the national economy, which implies a further step towards the completion of the construction of classless, socialist society in the USSR.¹²

In more recent years the most elaborate spokesman on the need for further development of industrialization for ideological reasons was Nikita S. Khrushchev. In his speech to the Twenty-second Party Congress in 1961 he

¹¹ Ibid., Vol. XLII, p. 158.

¹² N. Voznesenskii, Economic Results of the USSR in 1940 and the Plan of National Economic Development for 1941 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1941), p. 12.

proclaimed that the Soviet Union had entered the threshold of communism and that within two decades its material and technical basis would be built. But this would necessitate pursuing several "important tasks":

firstly, to build up unprecedentedly powerful productive forces and move into first place in the world for production per head of population;

secondly, to achieve the world's highest productivity of labor, which, in the final analysis, is the most important, the principal thing for the victory of the new social system, and to equip the Soviet people with the most advanced technology, to turn labor into a source of joy, inspiration, and creative endeavour.¹³

It should be re-emphasized that it is not important in this case whether or not all these leaders sincerely believed in establishing communism in the Soviet Union. The important fact is that the ideology was used as one of the motivations for rapid industrialization of the country.

Still another reason for rapid industrialization was the psychological-political factor. The Party leaders on a number of occasions manifested their ambition to prove to the world that their socialist system is better and more efficient than the capitalist. They also expressed their hope that the Soviet economic system would become a model for other countries in the future. Lenin, for example, at the end of his already quoted speech to the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets in December 1920 said:

¹³Quoted in William G. Andrews (ed.), Soviet Institutions and Policies (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966), p. 280.

. . . if Russia is covered with a dense net of power stations and powerful technical installations, our communist economic construction will become a model for the future socialist Europe and Asia.¹⁴

Ambition usually breeds pride over the accomplishments, and the Soviet leaders were far from modest to express it. The aim was not only to express their feeling of success but also to enhance the conviction that the socialist system was progressive, superior to the capitalist system and, therefore, worthy of being adopted by other countries. In his speech to the Twenty-second Party Congress, Khrushchev compared the three Party Programs of 1903, 1919, and 1961, which exemplified the Soviet progress in many areas, including economic, to a three-stage rocket: "The first stage wrested our country away from the capitalist world, the second propelled it to socialism, and the third is to place it in the orbit of communism. It is a wonderful rocket, comrades!"¹⁵ On the eve of the same Congress, Pravda published an editorial which in part stated:

The success of research in the cosmos, the active intrusion into the depth of the micro-world of the atom and the living cell, the progressive and boisterous development of electronics, automatic machines, and many others characterize the gigantic steps that the Soviet Union has taken toward the peak of the scientific and technical progress.¹⁶

¹⁴ Lenin, op. cit., Vol. XLII, p. 161.

¹⁵ Pravda, October 19, 1961.

¹⁶ Pravda, October 14, 1961.

Articles of this nature can be found in practically all Soviet periodicals very often. They indicate that political ambition and pride played a role of a stimulus for industrial and technological development in the Soviet Union.

Having recognized this need, the Party leaders embarked upon the rapid industrialization of the country. They mobilized all the human and material resources to achieve that goal. The method was harsh, human sufferings were great, but the success was remarkable. Lenin started the process of industrialization with his modest plan of electrification in 1920. But it was really Stalin who took a major step in industrializing the country with his First Five Year Plan in 1928. From that time on the Soviet economy began to develop, although not all plans were completely fulfilled. The rate of economic growth was progressing. Malenkov in his main speech to the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1952, using the industrial output of 1929 as 100 percent, claimed that in 1939 this output reached 552 percent, in 1943--573, in 1946--466, in 1947--571, in 1948--721, in 1949--870, in 1950--1,082, and in 1951--1,266 percent.¹⁷ Malenkov did not specify what he meant by "industrial output" but this must have been gross industrial output, probably including farm output. Harry Schwartz, basing his study on several Soviet sources, also

¹⁷ Pravda, October 6, 1952.

gives very impressive figures for the Soviet economic growth. Using the 1913 level of economic development as 100 percent, he writes that the national income (money) grew from 103.3 percent in 1926 to 1,340.0 percent in 1953; gross industrial output grew from 98.8 percent in 1926 to 2,143.2 percent in 1953; and gross farm output grew from 116.7 percent in 1929 to 203.2 percent in 1952.¹⁸ Western economists are skeptical about the accuracy of the Soviet statistics. They do not exclude the possibility of double-counting, manipulation, or simply exaggeration by the top elite for propaganda purposes. Schwartz, by giving these statistics, recognizes this.¹⁹ Although having reservations about the Soviet statistics, Western economists do not deny a tremendous growth of Soviet industrialization and technology.

The goal of rapid development of industrialization and technology required as rapid training of skilled manpower. And it is here where the roots of the present-day technocrats in the top elite can be found. The industrialization was a fertile soil which necessitated the growth of the economic experts, some of whom later reached the highest positions in the Party. From the beginning of the Soviet regime, the Party leaders felt a grave shortage of specialists in all branches of the economy.

¹⁸ Schwartz, op. cit., p. 127.

¹⁹ Alec Nove in The Soviet Economy: An Introduction (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 308-309, expresses his doubt that the Soviet statisticians "invent" figures "to produce propaganda effect" but he shows by examples that the Soviet statistics are ambiguous and occasionally distorted.

The old (Tsarist) experts were numerically small and politically unreliable. According to the official statistics, in 1928 there were in the Soviet Union 47 thousand engineers and 51 thousand technicians.²⁰ But the Soviet author Lutchenko gives different figures. He writes that "at the end of 1927 there were in the economy of the USSR 40,798 engineers and technicians, while in 1913 there had been in Russia 46,500 engineering and technical workers."²¹ This discrepancy is probably due to counting the engineers and technicians on a different principle. In any case, there is no doubt that the old specialists were too small to undertake such a gigantic task of industrializing the Soviet Union in accordance with the Party's Plans.

In addition, because of their negative attitude toward the new regime in many cases, the old specialists were not trusted. The quoted Lutchenko writes that "the considerable portion of the bourgeois specialists worked passively or continued to fight against the Soviet government."²² Between 1928 and 1931 Stalin personally accused them publicly on several occasions of sabotage, conspiracy, and espionage. Several trials were held where some of

²⁰ Srednie Spetsialnoe Obrazovanie v SSSR: Statisticheskii Sbornik (Moskva: Gosstatizdat, 1962), p. 6.

²¹ A. I. Lutchenko, "Rukovodstvo KPSS Formirovanem Kadrov Tekhnicheskoi Inteligentsii," Voprosy Istorii KPSS, No. 2 (February 1966), p. 30.

²² Ibid., p. 31. A reference to the same question can also be found in F. Konstantinov, "Sovetskaia Intelligentsiia," Kommunist, No. 15 (October 1959), pp. 51-52.

them were sentenced to death.²³ It is difficult to believe that many of the old "spetsay" were spies, or conspirators. It is very probable that in many cases they were made scapegoats for economic failures. In 1931 Stalin, being pressed by the need of economic experts, reversed his policy of terror and urged the communists to "change their attitude toward the engineering-technical forces of the old school."²⁴ As a result, many suspects and those who were jailed were employed in the economy. At the same time the Soviet government invited technicians from the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany. But all these measures did not solve the problem of the shortage of specialists.

The Party leaders from the beginning of the Soviet regime waged a vigorous campaign which, with the inauguration of the First Five Year Plan, assumed a high crescendo to prepare the new Soviet specialists. In line with this, they began to establish new schools on the higher and secondary levels, many of them of a technical type. Kaganovich in his organizational report to the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934 presented the statistical data on

²³In 1930 and 1931 several trials were staged in which many engineers, technicians, and professors were accused of sabotage and espionage, and consequently sentenced in many cases to death. A brief description of these trials as well as the attitudes of the Party leaders toward the old-regime intelligentsia can be found in Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 360-366.

²⁴Stalin, op. cit., Vol. XIII, p. 73.

the growth of these schools. According to him, in 1928 there were in the USSR 129 VUZy (Higher Educational Establishments) and VTUZY (Higher Technical Educational Establishments) and in 1930--600; also in 1928 there were 1,033 technicums (secondary technical schools) and in 1933--3,522.²⁵ A. F. Khavin, the Soviet author, writes that by the end of the First Five Year Plan (end of 1932) there were in the Soviet Union 14 industrial academies which also prepared specialists of various kinds, such as forest specialists, agronomists, etc.²⁶

In order to have more schools, the Party leadership used a dual method: establishing completely new schools and breaking up the multi-divisional schools into separate units. In some years, however, some schools were united. This practice led to the fluctuation of higher schools in the Soviet Union, but, in general, between the 1920's and the 1940's they were growing. Perhaps the most comprehensive study of the Soviet educational system is Nicholas

²⁵Partiinoe Stroitelstvo, No. 5-6 (March 1934), p. 5. VUZy is a general name applied to all institutions of higher learning which prepare specialists for various branches of economy and culture. VTUZY is a name applied only to the higher schools preparing technical specialists in engineering, construction, architecture, and others. Bolehaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, 2nd ed., Vol. 9, pp. 514-514, 512. Technicums are secondary schools preparing semi-professionals, or technicians both of technical and non-technical nature, such as librarians, pedagogues, etc. See Alexander G. Korol, Soviet Education for Science and Technology (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1957), pp. 101-103.

²⁶A. F. Khavin, "Kapitany Sovetskoi Industrii," Voprosy Istorii, No. 5 (May 1966), pp. 4-5.

DeWitt's book. Basing his study on many Soviet sources, he gives the statistical data on the growth of all kinds of higher schools from which we select examples only for a few years.²⁷

TABLE 22

SOVIET INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER
LEARNING IN SELECTED YEARS

Year	Number of Schools	Year	Number of Schools
1922	248	1940	817
1925	145	1945	789
1928	152	1950	880
1930	579	1954	798
1932	832	1957	763
1934	688	1960	739
1936	700	1965	756
1938	708	1967	785

In the light of these statistics, it is interesting to see how many technical schools of higher learning were established in the USSR in various years. DeWitt has a Table of all higher schools by fields of specialization which he compiled from many different sources for the years 1913-1949. He notes, however, that the Soviet Government in the past did not publish directories for higher educational establishments. Therefore, he admits that by compiling the data from imprecise sources, he could have omitted some schools and double-counted others.

²⁷ Nicholas DeWitt, Education and Professional Employment in the U.S.S.R. (Washington: National Science Foundation, 1961), p. 746. Data for the years 1960, 1965, and 1967 are taken from Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1967g: Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik (Moskva: Statistika, 1968), p. 788. Henceforth only title will be identified.

Among them he identified the number of engineering educational establishments in the major fields of industry, construction, transportation, and communication. In addition, he also established the number of agricultural schools in the Soviet Union. And it is these schools that we present here in total number in the following Table.²⁸

TABLE 23

NUMBER OF ENGINEERING AND AGRICULTURAL
SCHOOLS OF HIGHER LEARNING IN SELECTED YEARS

Year	Engineering Schools	Agricultural Schools
1913	19	15
1919	27	14
1926	23	30
1928	26	31
1930	248	96
1931	241	125
1935	150	92
1939	165	85
1949	166	90

Since DeWitt enumerates universities separately and combines the Party schools with the correspondence schools, these are apparently excluded from this Table, although some of them also trained technical specialists. The author has another Table for the years 1947-1959 in which the engineering schools in ten major fields (chemistry, civil engineering, light industry, etc.) and agricultural schools in five major fields are identified. Accordingly, the total number of engineering schools increased from 179 in 1947 to 191 in 1959 and the number of agricultural

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 746-747.

schools from 100 to 109 in the respective years.²⁹ The above Table shows that the engineering and agricultural schools greatly increased in the 1930's during the campaign for training the economic specialists, but that they remained more or less stable in later years. This trend is correspondent with the increase and stability of all higher schools in the USSR.

The picture of the intensity of developing the educational institutions which reflects the speed of preparing specialists for the national economy would be incomplete without mentioning secondary technical schools. As it was noted earlier, all specialized secondary schools in the USSR are usually called technicums. There are technicums of industry, agriculture, commerce, medicine, dentistry, library, pedagogy, etc. They train technicians or semi-professionals. Here we are concerned only with the industrial (engineering) and agricultural technicums. The Table that follows shows the number of all technicums as well as the number of the engineering and agricultural technicums for the years 1927-1939.³⁰

²⁹Ibid., p. 748.

³⁰Ibid., p. 624. DeWitt gives the total number of all secondary technical schools for the years 1914-1959, but he identifies the engineering and agricultural schools only for the years 1927-1939.

TABLE 24
NUMBER OF SPECIALIZED
SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN SELECTED YEARS

Year	Total Number of Schools	Engineering	Agricultural
1927	1,033	201	204
1928	1,054	215	207
1929	1,111	280	226
1930	2,932	1,129	651
1931	3,096	906	801
1933	2,861	737	646
1938	3,732	634	515
1939	3,733	671	550

In 1924 there were 921 secondary specialized schools and, therefore, the number of technical and agricultural schools was much smaller than in 1927. This can also be assumed on the basis of the fact that it was at the end of the 1920's that the Soviet leaders started a major campaign for more schools of these types. In 1960, according to the earlier quoted Narodnoe Khoziaistvo, there were 3,328 specialized secondary schools and in 1967--4,075. On this basis it can be reasonably assumed that the number of technical and agricultural schools also increased. It can be mentioned in passing that in addition to the formal educational establishments, there were many factory schools in the Soviet Union which prepared skilled workers.

As in the case of higher technical schools, the Table above shows that during the massive campaign in the late 1920's and early 1930's the number of secondary technical schools increased, but later it decreased somewhat and remained more or less stable.

The establishing of schools was, obviously, only one part of preparing specialists for the national economy. The other was sending young men to study. The mass campaign to encourage the communists, Komsomol members, as well as men from the lower classes outside these organizations was started by Lenin in connection with his plan of electrification in 1920. Appearing, for example, before the Third All-Russian Congress of the Komsomol in October 1920, he urged the young generation to study "the sum total of human knowledge of which communism itself is a consequence." In the following words he gave "a practical example" as to what and how they should study:

We know that a communist society cannot be built unless we regenerate industry and agriculture, and these must not be regenerated in the old way. They must be regenerated on a modern basis, in accordance with the last word in science. You know that this basis is electricity. . . . You realize perfectly well that illiterate people cannot tackle electrification, and even mere literacy is not enough. It is not enough to understand what electricity is; it is necessary to know how to apply it technically to industry and to agriculture. We must learn this ourselves, and must teach it to the whole of the younger generation of working people.

This is the task that confronts every conscious Communist, every young person who regards himself as a Communist and who clearly understands that by joining the Young Communist League he pledges himself to help the Party to build communism and the whole younger generation to create a communist society. He must realize that he can create it only on the basis of modern education; and if he does not acquire ³¹ this education communism will remain a pious wish.

³¹V. I. Lenin, The Young Generation (New York: International Publishers, 1940), pp. 34-35.

Stalin appeared to be even more persistent than Lenin on the question of technical education. In his letter to the First All-Union Conference of Proletarian Students held in April 1925, he admonished the communist students for engaging in "high politics" and, therefore, lagging behind the non-Party students in their studies. From this he concluded:

. . . the Communist students and the Soviet students in general must clearly and definitely set themselves an immediate task, namely, to master science and to create new successors for the old professional staff consisting of new, Soviet people. I do not mean by this that students should not engage in politics. Not at all. All I mean is that Communist students must know how to combine³² political work with the work of mastering science.

In his speech to the Eighth All-Union Congress of the Komsomol in May 1928, Stalin again referred to the "task" of "mastering science." At one point he declared:

Dilettantism and universalism are now fetters on our ankles. What we now need are Bolshevik specialists in metals, textiles, fuel, chemistry, agriculture, transport, trade, bookkeeping, and so on and so forth. . . . What we need now is an influx of the revolutionary youth into the field of science.³³

In order to have a multi-dimensional view of the educational campaign led by Stalin, at least one more passage should be quoted. In his speech to the Meeting of the Business Executives in June 1931, Stalin insisted

³² Joseph Stalin, The Tasks of the Youth (New York: International Publishers, 1940), p. 18.

³³ Ibid., p. 28.

that the new technical (engineering) intelligentsia should be recruited from the working class because it will understand and accept as its own the interests of the working class. Explaining this point, he said:

It means that our country has entered into such a phase of development when the working class should create its own, real, industrial-technical intelligentsia.³⁴

These quotations from Lenin and Stalin only illustrate how extensive the campaign was to train the economic specialists. In the same spirit many resolutions were passed by the Party, many articles were published in the Soviet periodicals, and many speeches were delivered by the Party officials from top to bottom. Such slogans as "Communism is Soviet power plus electrification" in the 1920's, "The Youth must master science," "Technology in the period of reconstruction, decides everything," and "The Cadres, which master technology, decide everything" in the late 1920's and 1930's were repeated practically day after day. Such a campaign really bordered on the creation of a cult of science and technology. Even today this can be noticed in the Soviet written and oral messages. In recent years many articles, for example, have appeared in the Soviet press both extolling the Soviet success in the economy and science and urging that the administration of the economy be based on scientific foundations. One of the "sins" of Khrushchev

³⁴ I. V. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. XIII (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1951), p. 66.

was "subjectivism," i.e. he made decisions not on scientific findings, but on his personal notion of what should be done. Under the "cult of science and technology," the value of economic specialists ran very high and this, in some measure, also contributed to the policy of recruiting them into the Party's elite.

In addition to speeches, articles, and slogans, the Party leaders took very practical steps to prepare technical experts for the national economy. At the Plenary session of the Central Committee in July 1928, it was decided to establish higher technical schools of a new type, such as schools of construction to prepare engineers and technicians within 3-4 years. Also decided on was the proletarianization of higher and secondary technical schools. In harmony with this policy, the Plenum decreed that no less than 65 percent of all students admitted into the higher technical schools and technicums should come from the working class. But perhaps the most interesting decision was to send, in 1928, 1000 communists to higher technical schools.³⁵

The Central Committee Plenum of November 1929 went one step further. It decided, among other things, to establish more higher technical schools, to send at least 500 "workers" abroad to get practical-technical training, and to invite foreign specialists into the Soviet Union.

³⁵KPSS v Rezolutsiiakh, Vol. II (Moskva: Gossudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1954), p. 521.

In order to continue the policy of proletarianization of the Soviet educational establishments, it was decided to admit into the higher and secondary technical schools no less than 70 percent of students from the working and peasant class and to Industrial Workers' Faculties (schools that prepared students-workers for higher technical schools) no less than 80 percent. The Plenum further decided to send to higher technical schools in 1930-1931 no less than 2000 and in 1931-1932 no less than 3000 communists.³⁶ Various cities and regions were assigned a quota of students to be sent to these schools. Thus, Leningrad was supposed to send 380 communists, Moscow--500, Crimean region--10, and a few others. Lutchenko, for one, admits that the 1928 educational decisions were not fully implemented, but he has nothing critical to say about the decisions of 1929.³⁷ It can be expected that not all decisions were fulfilled completely, but there is no doubt that most of them were carried out. In the years that followed, the number of students who graduated from technical schools increased manifoldly. The following Table shows the number of graduates in the field of engineering (industry, construction, transportation, and communication) and agriculture from higher technical schools in various years, and the percent of the total graduates from all

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 636-639.

³⁷ Lutchenko, op. cit., p. 34.

higher schools.³⁸

TABLE 25
GRADUATION FROM HIGHER EDUCATIONAL
ESTABLISHMENTS IN ENGINEERING AND AGRICULTURE

Year	Number of Graduates (in thousands)	Percent of Total Graduates
1928	15.3	53.4
1935	46.0	55.0
1940	40.4	32.1
1945	13.0	23.8
1950	48.8	27.6
1955	90.0	36.6
1958	124.5	42.8
1960	146.0	42.5
1965	195.2	48.3
1967	229.5	47.9

The secondary technical schools graduated more technicians (semiprofessionals) than the higher schools did engineers and agricultural specialists, which is rather normal. The next Table shows the number of graduates in engineering (industry, construction, transportation, and communication) and agriculture from the secondary technical schools and their percent of total graduates from all secondary schools.³⁹

³⁸DeWitt, *op. cit.*, p. 328. The statistics for 1950 through 1967 are taken from Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v. 1967 g., p. 800.

³⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 608-609 and 800 respectively. Percentages supplied.

TABLE 26

GRADUATION FROM SECONDARY SCHOOLS
IN ENGINEERING AND AGRICULTURE

Year	Number of Graduates (in thousands)	Percent of Total Graduates
1928	11.2	39.2
1930	23.9	38.9
1932	70.9	65.8
1935	59.9	53.4
1940	51.5	21.7
1945	39.3	33.3
1950	153.0	48.8
1955	225.5	58.1
1958	352.5	65.0
1960	305.5	63.3
1965	389.7	62.7
1967	493.8	61.3

Neither DeWitt nor the consulted Soviet sources give the statistics for graduates from higher and secondary technical schools prior to 1928. But on the basis of the fact that between 1919 and 1927 there were fewer schools in the Soviet Union, we can logically assume that fewer technical specialists (or simply, technicians) were graduated in these years. It should be noted that the ratio of agricultural specialists graduated both from higher and secondary schools was much smaller than that of engineers.

The two Tables show that the percentage of technicians graduated from schools in comparison to all other professionals was very high, ranging from about 40 to 65 between 1928 and 1967. Because of lack of available data, it is difficult to establish the number and percentage of communists among them. But it is possible to get a general idea about the technicians among the Party members from

scattered Soviet sources. In order to have economic specialists in its ranks, the Party followed a dual policy: sending communists to technical schools and recruiting specialists into the Party. The first policy was particularly emphasized in the late 1920's and early 1930's, and since then the second was mostly practiced. As was discussed earlier, the leaders sent 1000 Party members to higher technical schools in 1928, and in the next years they doubled and tripled that number. As a result, the number of Party members as well as Komsomol members among the students was increasing every year. The Soviet author claims that while in 1923 the Party and Komsomol members constituted 11.4 percent of all students in higher technical schools, in 1933 they increased to 61.3 percent.⁴⁰ Another author writes that among all industrial and technical specialists in the Soviet Union in 1929, only 10.4 percent were Party and Komsomol members, but by 1932 they rose to 25.1 percent.⁴¹

At the same time the Party was recruiting its members from technological intelligentsia. Although these data are imprecise and cover only some years (as far as the consulted sources are concerned), they nevertheless give a very good idea as to the growth of technocrats in the

⁴⁰Khavin, op. cit., p. 4.

⁴¹F. Zauzolkov, "Formirovanie i Rost Sotsialisticheskoi Intelligentsii v SSSR," Kommunist, No. 11 (August 1958), p. 59.

Party. Thus, Lutchenko quotes the Soviet source which claims that by 1933 "up to 30 percent of the engineering-technical workers joined the Communist Party."⁴² Khavin in his article writes that in 1922 only 29.4 percent of all directors of heavy industry establishments were Party members but by the mid-thirties 97.4 percent of them were Party members.⁴³ Still another author writes that from November 1936 to November 1938 the District Party Committee of the Gorky Region admitted 602 candidates into the Party and of these, 208 were engineering-technical personnel.⁴⁴ DeWitt found that in 1947 about 30 percent of all engineers and about 19 percent of all agricultural specialists in the Soviet Union employed in the national economy were Party members. At the same time (1947) the Party members constituted 30 percent of all professionals employed in the economy. In 1959 they increased only to 30.8 percent.⁴⁵

The data for later years present a more comprehensive picture of the Party's technical intelligentsia. In 1957, for example, the Party had 50.7 percent of "employees" and of those 19.3 percent were engineering-technical

⁴²Lutchenko, op. cit., p. 41.

⁴³Khavin, op. cit., p. 6.

⁴⁴Quoted in Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 525.

⁴⁵DeWitt, op. cit., pp. 534-535.

workers and agricultural specialists.⁴⁶ In 10 years this latter percentage almost doubled. According to the same source, in 1967 the employees within the Party constituted 45.9 percent but the engineering and agricultural specialists rose to 34.9 percent.⁴⁷ Khrushchev, in his report to the Twenty-second Party Congress in 1962, said that the Party members had increased from 1959 to 1961 by two and a half million men, and among the newly admitted members (and candidates) 35.6 percent were employees. Of these, he said, "almost two thirds were engineering-technical workers, agronomists, zootechnicians, and other specialists."⁴⁸ Brezhnev's report to the Twenty-fourth Party Congress in March 1971 revealed the same thing. Noting that by the time of the Congress the Party had 44.8 percent of employees, he said that "more than two-thirds of the communist-employees were engineers, agronomists, zootechnicians, teachers, doctors, scientists, writers, and artists."⁴⁹

⁴⁶Partiinaiia Zhizn, No. 19 (October 1967), p. 13.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Pravda, October 18, 1961.

⁴⁹Pravda, March 31, 1971. In recent years the Party leaders showed apprehension about the influx of the intelligentsia into the Party. Apparently fearing to lose contact with the masses and perhaps to ruin the image of the Party as "the Party of the working class," the top elite has been trying to reverse this trend by recruiting more workers. The speeches and resolutions at the last two Party Congresses declared that the working class "should continue to play the leading role" in the Party. Indeed, the number of "employees" decreased from 50.7 percent in 1957 to 45.9 percent in 1967 and then to 40.1 in 1971. But the workers never played and will never play "the leading role" in the Party. In the complex industrialized society, only the educated men can "lead."

Quite naturally, the economic specialists were employed in great majority in the national economy and only a small proportion of them assumed positions of a political nature. An indirect indication of this is the statistics for more recent years. Thus, in 1956 only 14.1 percent of all employees (all kinds of specialists including engineers and agriculturalists) held the leading positions in various organizations--Party, government, Komsomol, trade unions, etc.; in 1957, 13.1 percent of them held the same positions; in 1961, 10.2 percent; in 1962, 10.0 percent; and in 1971, 8.9 percent. These percentages in absolute terms are small but they will assume different meanings when we take into account the total number of Party members and the percentage of employees among them for the same years. In 1956 the Party had over 7.1 million members of whom 50.9 percent were employees; in 1957 the Party had over 7.4 million members with 50.7 percent of employees; in 1961, over 9.2 million members with 48.0 percent of employees; in 1965, over 11.7 million members with 46.2 percent of employees; in 1967, over 12.6 million members with 45.9 percent of employees; and in 1971, over 14.4 million members with 44.8 percent of employees.⁵⁰ This means that, for example, in 1956 over one million employees held political positions and some portion of them were technicians. It is difficult

⁵⁰ Partiinaya Zhizn, No. 1 (January 1962), pp. 47-48; No. 10 (May 1965), p. 11; No. 19 (October 1967), p. 13; Pravda, March 31, 1971.

to obtain even this kind of data for the past years. But we can assume that the percentage of all employees, including technicians, in political positions was smaller, simply because there were fewer employees in the Party. Thus, between 1922 and 1928 the number of employees within the Party fluctuated between 16 and 29 percent of the total membership.⁵¹ In these years the number of technicians was also small. But as their number was increasing, more of them were assuming political positions in the Party or other organizations. As the discussion in the last chapter showed, it was from this group that most of the present day members of the top elite were recruited.

To say this is not to imply that the law of averages was working within the Party. It is difficult to believe that in the Party, which is tightly organized and very sensitive about the selection not only of its leaders but also of its members, there is much room for the law of averages to operate as it is the case in more open groups. The appointment of technicians into the Party's leading positions was a rational policy motivated by the need of the Party to adjust itself to the growing new conditions of the industrialized society. What the process of industrialization did was to produce specialists for the national economy. Some of them joined the political party and thus became also available for political work. Obviously, the

⁵¹ Fainsood, *op. cit.*, p. 213. As was indicated on p. 416, the term "technicians" refers to all technical specialists. For the meaning of the term "technocrats," see p. 378.

initial step depended upon their will and ability to be Party leaders, but the rest was up to the Party's policy of recruitment and the support of their immediate superiors. With this we come to the second cause for the emergence of the technocratic type of the top elite in the Party.

Causal Factor: Socialism-Totalitarianism

Linking the emergence of technocrats in the Party's top elite with the growth of industrialization and technology in the country, one can logically look at other highly industrialized societies and see if this phenomenon is also taking place in them. Such a comparison will help to locate more easily another cause for what has happened in the Soviet Union. We can look at several Western states, such as the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany, which had achieved the highest stage of industrial and technological development a long time ago. In the course of their industrialization since the 19th century, these countries always trained a great number of technicians needed for all branches of the national economy. Without these men the economic growth would have been unthinkable. If we limit ourselves to more recent decades and look at their governing top elite (the executive and the legislative branches), we cannot find there many engineers, chemists, agronomists, or other technicians.⁵² The most representative

⁵²Since the top elite of the Communist Party of the USSR is the governing elite in the country, it seems reasonable to compare it with the legislative and executive branches in the Western states.

groups in these bodies have been lawyers, businessmen, bankers, teachers, journalists, and several others. In 1966 the British House of Commons, for example, had only three civil engineers and four architects and the rest belonged to the above-named professional groups.⁵³ Having Soviet experience in mind, one can properly ask the question why the technicians in all these highly industrialized countries have not ascended to the position of the governing top elite. One answer could be that these specialists, having acquired a very practical profession which provided them with many opportunities for advancement and rewards, were not interested in politics.

This answer, however, based on the subjective factor, cannot be complete. The fact that in the Western highly industrialized societies the technicians are practically absent from the governing top elite and in the Soviet Union they are in a great majority can be related to two different economic and political systems. In the Western states capitalism and democracy exist which determine governments' powers and functions. In the sphere of national economy, these governments perform a regulatory

⁵³ Many sources have been consulted for this generalization. Some of the most recent ones were: Gwendolen M. Carter and John H. Herz, Major Foreign Powers (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1967); Henry W. Ehrman, Politics in France (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968); Lewis J. Edinger, Politics in Germany (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968); Donald R. Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World (New York: Vintage Books, 1960); R. M. Punnet, British Government and Politics (New York: W. M. Norton and Company, Inc., 1968); Claudius O. Johnson, et al., American National Government (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1964).

function--prescribing rules and regulations for the working conditions, working hours, minimum wages, etc. And it is in connection with this function that the technicians and scientists are needed. But they work as professionals providing the political leaders with expert information to make proper decisions. Their influence cannot be discounted, but they are not members of the top governing elite. The managing functions of the Western governments in the economic area are rather negligible. They are limited to running various projects, such as TVA in the United States, military installations in all countries, nuclear research, or radio and television networks in European countries, and a few others. The managerial functions in the economic sector are in the hands of private individuals organized in various forms--companies, corporations, cooperatives, unions, etc. Consequently, there is no pressing need for the governing top elite to become technocratic.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has a socialist system of economy in which the government performs both the regulatory and managerial functions.⁵⁴ Therefore,

⁵⁴In harmony with the usual practice, the Soviet authors divide the history of the state into several periods in which the government performed different internal and external functions. Thus, before socialism was established in the Soviet Union, the government performed the function, among others, "of suppressing the exploiting classes" but when socialism became "victorious," this function disappeared. However, the function of managing the economy, defending the state, influencing the direction of cultural life and education has always been in force and will remain so for the foreseeable future. A. Denisov, Sovetsko Gossudarstvo (Moskva: Izdatelstvo Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1967), pp. 145-148. V. M. Chkhikvadze, Gossudarstvo, Demokratiia, Zakonnost (Moskva: Izdatelstvo "Iuridicheskaiia Literatura," 1967), pp. 109-110.

there is a greater need than in the Western states to have a technocratic type of top elite. It is common knowledge that the government in the Soviet Union is a separate institution from the Party and, among other concerns, it deals with the daily process of managing the economy. But the Soviet government in terms of goals, policies, and composition is the same as the Party because the latter has the monopoly on power. The Party prepares goals for the Soviet society, formulates policies for the states, and executes them through various government as well as non-government institutions which it controls primarily by means of its members. This role the Party also plays in the economic sector. Having assumed a complete responsibility for the directing of the national economy, the Party created the need to have in its top elite (and in the lower elites as well) men with expert knowledge of various branches of the economy. Without these specialists, under the condition of the growing complexity of the economy, the Party could not make knowledgeable and rational decisions and, consequently, could not entirely play its directive role in the Soviet society.

It can be speculated that while the Party needs to have economic specialists in the national economy, government, and in its own apparatus, it does not have to have so many technocrats in the top elite. It can always utilize the experts by placing them in subordinate positions in a manner similar to the Western governments' practice.

In the absence of factual information, the answer also could be speculative. First of all, there are many economic experts in the Party apparatus on the highest level (and also on a lower level) who provide the top elite with all kinds of information, for the latter cannot possibly know everything. But as experts themselves, the technocrats in the top elite are able to understand such information and to use it to suit their own purposes and policies. This, of course, does not mean that these leaders cannot make a bad choice, or follow their impulses or intuitions instead of "scientific facts."

But there is something more to it than what was just said. We have to keep in mind that science, technology, and industrialization have been given the highest value in the Soviet society. The "scientific approach," "scientific management," and "specialization" have always been extolled in the USSR from the time of Lenin to the present day. Consequently, the value of those who were specialists and scientifically oriented was very high. On the other hand, there is no genuine election of the top elite in the Party. The leaders have practiced the policy of "grabbing" the power by means of all kinds of manipulations. The struggles for power by Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev and Kosygin are vivid examples of this. It is reasonable to assume, then, that under the created climate of

"scientism," "technology," "expertism," the non-technocratic top elite would lose its "right" to rule. Consequently, those technocrats, who actually make economic decisions for the non-technocratic elite, could, at an opportune time, "grab" the supreme power in the Party. (That this speculation is not utopian, we can recall once more that the present top Party leaders justified the dismissal of Khrushchev from all his posts in 1964 precisely on the ground that he lacked the "scientific" approach to various problems and followed his "subjectivism.")

The Party's totalitarianism was another contributing factor to the emergence of the technocratic type of top elite. The concept of totalitarianism was popularized in the 1950's. It applied to the political system in Germany under Hitler, in the Soviet Union, and, with some reservations, to Italy under Mussolini. It was claimed that although this system was "linked" in several ways (one ruler, for example) with such systems of the past as tyranny, despotism, absolutism, it was the phenomenon of the twentieth century industrial societies. Friedrich and Brzezinski defined totalitarianism in terms of its six features: one official ideology, one mass party led by a dictator, a system of police terror, the party's monopoly of mass communication and "of all means of effective armed combat," and the control and direction of the entire economy.⁵⁵

⁵⁵Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956), pp. 9-10.

This definition applied to the entire political system. However, totalitarianism was practiced by the political party in a given country.

In the Soviet Union, since the death of Stalin, some changes have taken place. The use of terror has receded, the power of a "dictator" has weakened, occasionally different views on various aspects of Soviet policies have been expressed within and mostly outside the Party. These mitigative elements of the Soviet system have led Western scholars to re-evaluate the concept of totalitarianism. As far as the Party itself is concerned, it is argued, for example, that the Party is not a monolithic unit anymore as the original idea of totalitarianism had assumed. Instead, the Party is seen as a "conglomeration of interests." It is claimed that it consists of various groups which try to protect their interests. Skilling, for example, argues that "within the Party there is a hidden struggle for power, a subterranean rivalry over policy and the public interest, sometimes bursting into the open in purge and counterpurge." On the scale of the whole system, the author writes that the Party is subjected to the influence of various groups and, in making decisions, it takes into account the interests of conflicting groups. Consequently, the "new model" of the system is emerging which is neither "pure totalitarianism" nor "genuine pluralism"; it is, in his opinion, "a kind of imperfect monism" or "pluralism of elites" in which the Party "is

more powerful than all others but is not omnipotent."⁵⁶

It is undeniable that these changes, at least in some measures, have taken place in the Soviet Union and within the Party, but they are not of such magnitude as to obliterate the totalitarian character of the Party. If we define the Party's totalitarianism as a monopolistic direction and control of all aspects of social life in the country, then the Party has remained totalitarian as before. The difference between the past and the present is that the method of control has changed and a more relaxed political atmosphere has been introduced. Terror as an instrument of totalitarianism has been reduced. But as before, the Party has a monopoly on power which it diligently guards by not allowing any other group to become an independent political force. It continues to maintain the exclusive "right" to direct and control the economic, cultural, educational, and other aspects of Soviet life. The Party has always based this "right" on the theory that it was the "vanguard of the working class" and since 1961, of the entire people. The Party Rules of 1961 re-emphasized its directive role in the society in the following form: "It directs the great creative activity of the Soviet people, and imparts an organized, planned,

⁵⁶H. Gordon Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (eds.), Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1968), p. 264.

and scientifically-based character to their struggle to achieve the ultimate goal, the victory of communism."⁵⁷
 This role also applies to the economic sector.

The Party's controlling function in the economy is perhaps best reflected in its Rules of 1961 which read as follows:

Primary Party organizations of the industrial enterprises and trading establishments; state farms, collective farms; and design organizations, drafting offices and research institutes directly related to production enjoy the right to control the work of the administration.⁵⁸

In the non-productive sectors, the same Party organizations have the responsibility to "promote the improvement" of work. The same was stated in the previous Party Rules.

Having assumed the monopoly of directing and controlling the Soviet economy, the Party could not have remained the Party of ideologists and propagandists. To do so, would have meant to relegate these roles to the group of economic specialists outside the Party. Ideology could have inspired the revolutionaries and idealists between the 1890's and 1920's; it could have served as a guidance to formulate goals, however utopian they might have been; it could have been used to justify the Party's domestic and foreign policies; or it could have been used as a frame of reference to interpret domestic and foreign events. But

⁵⁷ Jan F. Triska (ed.), Soviet Communism: Programs and Rules (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1962), p. 155.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 191.

the ideology could not have helped to solve very practical political and economic problems. With the growing of industrialization and technology, the economy was becoming too complex to be handled by the ideologists. Therefore, when the leaders began the process of industrialization, they also began to prepare the Party to rule under the new conditions by sending communists to technical schools and by recruiting its members from the technical intelligentsia. Stalin expressed this purpose very clearly. In his letter to the First All-Union Conference of Proletarian Students in 1925, quoted earlier, he noted that the Communist students were engaged in "high politics," in "endless discussion of world problems" and, consequently, were behind the non-Communist students in their studies. Following this, he warned that "the Communist students are running the risk of becoming bad leaders of socialist construction, for it is impossible to lead the building of a socialist society without having mastered science."⁵⁹ In 1928, in his speech to the Eighth All-Union Congress of the Komsomol, he again said: "We cannot now confine ourselves to training Communist forces in general, Bolshevik forces in general, people who are able to jabber a little about everything," but must train forces of specialists.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Joseph Stalin, The Tasks of the Youth (New York: International Publishers, 1940), p. 18.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 28.

As soon as more of these specialists were trained, a number of them were given political positions within the Party, mostly on the local level. It is difficult to obtain the data on how many technicians became Party officials in various years. But the scattered information indicates that their number was growing. Thus, M. Sokolov wrote that in 1938 in the Leningrad Party Organization "236 engineers work as secretaries of the Party Committees. . . ." ⁶¹ Another Party official, V. Makarov, wrote in the same journal that, in 1938 in his raion in the city of Moscow, "28 percent of the new secretaries have higher education and 32 secondary. Professionally many of them are engineers." ⁶²

The trend of appointing technicians to the Party posts has been continued on a larger scale in later years. Thus, in the Saratov Oblast in 1961 almost half of all raion Party secretaries and government chairmen were "industrial and agricultural specialists." ⁶³ In the Ukraine in the same year about one-third of all raion Party secretaries and government chairmen also were industrial and agricultural specialists. ⁶⁴ The First Secretary of the Communist Party

⁶¹ M. Sokolov, "Vyroshchivanie Kadrov v Leningradskoi Partorganizatsii," Partiinoe Stroitelstvo, No. 13 (July 1938), p. 50.

⁶² V. Makarov, "Novie Sekretari Partkomov," ibid., p. 55.

⁶³ Pravda, October 31, 1961.

⁶⁴ Pravda Ukrainy, September 29, 1961.

of Kazakhstan stated in his speech to the Party Congress of his republic in 1961 that "many specialists of industry, construction, and agriculture have joined the Party committees" in Kazakhstan.⁶⁵

These selective statistics show quite clearly how the Party, in order to maintain its monopoly on ruling the country, was adjusting itself to the conditions of an industrialized society. The emergence of the technocratic type of the top elite was the natural result of this process.

⁶⁵Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, September 29, 1961.

CHAPTER VIII

NATIONAL REPRESENTATION IN THE TOP ELITE

The Soviet Union is a multi-national state based in theory on the principle of federalism. Its highest legislative body consists of the Soviet of the Union where all people are represented, and the Soviet of Nationalities where the people of the union and autonomous republics as well as the autonomous regions are represented. The Party, on the other hand, is a centralized organization both in theory and in practice. But it still consists of many national groups some of whom have their union republics. The Party units in the union republics not only hold their congresses but also elect their representatives to the Party Congresses on the national level. Because of this composition and structural arrangement, the question is, what policy of national representation in the organs of the top elite (the Politbureau, Orgbureau, and the Secretariat) did the Party follow. One way of answering this question is to suggest for testing the following hypothesis: After the death of Stalin the Party leaders in their quest for legitimacy recruited, unlike in the past, into the Praesidium-Politbureau the natives from the major union republics in a rough proportion to their Party membership and population.

The statistical data show that the Politbureau and to a lesser degree Orgbureau under Lenin and Stalin were

multi-national in composition but the non-Russians, with very few exceptions, did not come from the union republics and did not in many cases reflect the numerical strength of their national groups within the Party and the Soviet population. The Secretariat is eliminated from the consideration because it never was a really representative body. From 1919 to 1922 it consisted entirely of Russians. (There are no exact statistics for 1923.) Between 1924 and 1934 the Secretariat always included a few Russians, one Georgian (Stalin), at different times three Jews (I.A. Zelenskii, K. Ia. Bauman, and L. M. Kaganovich), and one Pole (S. V. Kossior). In 1934 the policy of reduction of the number of non-Russians began in all top organs. Consequently, in that year the elected Secretariat was comprised of two Russians, one Georgian, and one Jew (the same Stalin and Kaganovich), and in 1939 of three Russians and Stalin. At the next election in 1946, of five elected Secretaries, all were Russians except Stalin. The same was repeated in 1952, although the Secretariat was increased from five members to ten. After Stalin's death until 1957, it was packed completely with Russians. Then between 1957 and 1961, for the first time in its history, one Uzbek was elected a Secretary (N. A. Mukhitdinov), one Ukrainian (A. I. Kirichenko), and one Finn (O. V. Kuusinen). After 1961 until 1964 only Kuusinen remained in the Secretariat. From 1964 until the present time it became again totally controlled by the Russians.¹ Thus,

¹The sources for the composition of the Secretariat and the nationality of all men mentioned so far are the same as identified on p. 379. These sources are also used to discuss the Orgbureau and the Politbureau members in this entire section.

it appears that the Secretariat as the executive arm of the Party was not meant to be a representative body.

The Orgbureau was a more nationally representative organ than the Secretariat, but, as the following statistics will show, it is difficult to conclude without reservation that it was supposed to be a representative body. Between 1919 and 1924 the Orgbureau consisted of several Russians, two Jews (L. D. Trotskii, L. B. Kamenev), one Pole (F. E. Dzerzhinskii), and one Bulgarian (K. G. Rakovskii). In 1924 it had 17 members (11 full members and 6 candidates) and of these, there were twelve Russians, one Georgian (Stalin), two Jews (Zelenskii and Kaganovich), one Pole (the same Dzerzhinskii), and one Latvian (I. I. Lapse)--the last two being candidates. Since in 1926 both the Politbureau and the Orgbureau were in the process of change in membership as a result of Stalin's victory over Trotskii, we take the composition of the Orgbureau of 1927. In that year it was increased to 13 full members and 7 candidates and of these, fifteen were Russians, one was Pole (Kossior), one Jew (Rukhimovich), one Georgian (Stalin), one Latvian (Lapse--a candidate member), and one man (Shmidt) whose nationality is difficult to establish (could be a Jew or a German).

In 1930 the Orgbureau was reduced to 15 members (11 full members and 4 candidates) and of these, eleven were Russians, two were Jews (Bauman and Kaganovich), one Georgian (Stalin) and one (Ia. B. Gamarnik) most probably

a Ukrainian--all full members. In 1934, of the 10 full members and 2 candidates, eight were Russians, two were Jews (L. M. Kaganovich and M. M. Kaganovich--a candidate), one Georgian (again Stalin), and one probably Ukrainian (the same Gamarnik).

In 1939 the Orgbureau was reduced to 9 full members and all were Russians except for Stalin and Kaganovich. In 1946 it was again increased to 15 members and all of them were Russians of the younger generation with the exception of Stalin. In 1952 it was abolished.

The most multi-national organ was the Politbureau. Although it became between 1939 and 1952 more a Russian body than anytime before, the Politbureau always had more non-Russian members than any other organ of the top elite. If to this we add the Praesidium-Politbureau after Stalin's death which consisted of the representatives from the Communist Parties of the union republics, we cannot fail to conclude that the Politbureau, as a decision-making organ, was meant to be a nationally representative body. To be sure, some of the members of the Politbureau were also members of the Orgbureau, or the Secretariat, or both. As it was established in chapter four, the Politbureau in 1919 consisted of four Russians, three Jews (G. E. Zinoviev, L. B. Kamenev, and L. D. Trotskii), and one Georgian (Stalin). Between 1919 and 1922 only minor changes were made. After the Eleventh Party Congress in 1922, the Politbureau had 7 full members

and 4 candidates and of these seven were Russians, three Jews (the same as in 1922), and one was Georgian (Stalin). In June 1924 the Politbureau was increased to 13 members (7 full members and 6 candidates), and this time it became more nationally diversified than ever before. It consisted of seven Russians, the same three Jews as before, one Georgian (Stalin), one Pole (F. E. Dzerzhinskii), and one Latvian (Ia. F. Rudzutak)--the last two being candidate members. Due to the struggle for power between Stalin and Trotskii in 1925-1926, the Politbureau went through various changes in its composition. Here we mention the Politbureau as it constituted itself after Stalin's victory. In 1927, after the Fifteenth Party Congress, the Politbureau was elected of 17 members (9 full members and 8 candidates). Among them were ten Russians, one Georgian (Stalin), one Latvian (Rudzutak), two Ukrainians (G. I. Petrovskii and V. Ia. Chubar--both since 1926), one Jew (L. M. Kaganovich), one Pole (S. V. Kossior), and one Armenian (A. I. Mikoian)--the last five being candidate members.

The same national composition remained in 1930 except that the Politbureau was reduced to 15 members (10 full members and 5 candidates) and in this reduction the Russians lost two seats. Kossior and Kaganovich were promoted to full membership. At the next election in 1934 the Politbureau was also comprised of 15 members (10 full members and 5 candidates) but the Russians were reduced to seven men. Among the non-Russians, two were

Georgians (Stalin and G. K. Ordzhonikidze), one was a Jew (Kaganovich), one Pole (Kossior), two Ukrainians (Petrovskii and Chubar), one Armenian (Mikoian), and one Latvian (Rudzutak)--the last four being candidates.

Between 1934 and 1939, as a result of purges which affected such members of the top elite as Chubar, Petrovskii, Kossior, Rudzutak, and, in a sense, Ordzhonikidze (he committed suicide), the number of nationalities in the Politbureau decreased significantly. Following the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939, the Politbureau was elected of 9 full members and 2 candidates. Of these, seven were Russians, two were Georgians (Stalin and L. P. Beria), one was a Jew (Kaganovich), and one Armenian (Mikoian)--all full members except Beria. In 1941, after the Eighteenth Party Conference, the Politbureau was elected with minor changes as far as Russians are concerned. To the seven Russians in 1939, three more were added (N. A. Voznesenskii, G. M. Malenkov, and A. S. Shcherbakov), and no one from among the non-Russians was elected. At the next election in 1946 the same national composition was retained. Of the 11 full members and 5 candidates, twelve were Russians and the other four were the same non-Russians as in 1939 (Beria was promoted to full membership).

In 1952 the Politbureau was replaced by the Praesidium and its membership was increased to 25 full members and 11 candidates. Altogether six nationalities were

represented but the Russian members were still in great majority. There were twenty-nine Russians, two Georgians (Stalin and Beria), two Armenians (Mikoian and I. F. Tevosian--the latter a candidate member), one Ukrainian (D. S. Korotchenko), one Jew (Kaganovich), and one Finn (D. V. Kuusinen).

All the non-Russian members of the Politbureau--Presidium, with the exception of the Ukrainians and with some reservation of one Armenian and one Georgian, did not come from the union republics, as it became the practice after Stalin's death, simply because there was no Polish, Bulgarian, Latvian, or Jewish union republic in the Soviet Union. Consequently, the union republics and their Parties were not the basis of recruitment of the members of the top elite. To be sure, the Latvian republic was established in 1940 but at that time no Latvian was a member of the Orgbureau or the Politbureau. The Ukrainians had their union republic, but they were members of the Politbureau only between 1926 and 1938. It is true that the First Secretaries of the Communist Party of Ukraine (Kaganovich, Postyshev, Kossior, Khrushchev) were in the Politbureau, either as full members or as candidates. But in contrast to the First Secretaries of the post-Stalin period, they were not native Ukrainians (Postyshev and Khrushchev were Russians, Kossior a Pole, and Kaganovich a Jew).

Stalin cannot be identified with the Georgian republic

or its Party because since the revolution he always worked in Moscow. Beria, on the other hand, was First Secretary of the Georgian Party and the First Secretary of the Transcaucasian krai between 1931 and 1938, but it is obvious that he became a member of the Politbureau not because of this but rather because he was Commissar of Internal Affairs. Mikoian after the revolution was even less associated with the Communist Party of Armenia. Indeed, in 1920 he was a member of the Politbureau of the Communist Party of Azerbaidzhan and in 1922-1926 was a Secretary of the Northern Caucasian Krai Committee. In 1926, being transferred to Moscow, he became Commissar of Trade and at the same time was elected a candidate member of the Politbureau.

A proportional representation of various nationalities in the top elite between 1919 and 1952 is another aspect of the nationality question within the Party that can be discussed here, for it is precisely the case with the Praesidium-Politbureau in the post-Stalin period. It has to be repeated that the Soviet Union was inhabited (and, of course, is still being inhabited) by many nationalities, some of which had their union or autonomous republics, or regions, while others had not. But regardless of their political status, they all constituted part of the Soviet population and Party membership. Among them were Jews, Poles, Bulgarians, Latvians, Ukrainians, Finns, and others. According to the available statistics, these nationalities, with a few exceptions between 1927

and 1934, were not more or less proportionally represented in the Party's top elite. To illustrate this, we take the statistics for 1924, 1926-1927, and 1930. It should be kept in mind that the Politbureau membership was increased from 7 in 1920 to 13 in 1924, and the Orgbureau from 5 to 17, and as a result both bodies became nationally more diversified than before.

At the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1924, Stalin reported that the Party consisted of 72.0 percent Russians, 5.88 percent Ukrainians, 5.2 percent Jews, over 4.0 percent Turkic nationalities, and "then followed such small nationalities as Latvians, Georgians, Armenians, and others."² At the same time the Russians within the entire top elite (in the Politbureau, the Orgbureau, and the Secretariat) constituted 62.5 percent, Jews 20.8 percent, Latvians 8.2 percent, and Georgian and Pole 4.1 percent each. If we take only the Politbureau, the percentile picture will look slightly different. In the Politbureau the Russians accounted for 53.2 percent, the Jews 23.0 percent, the Latvian, Georgian, and Pole for 7.6 percent each. In both cases the Russians were under-represented, the Jews and the Latvians were heavily over-represented, and the Ukrainians were not represented at all, although they had more members in the Party than Jews or Latvians.

More complete statistics are available for the population of 1926 and the Party membership of 1927. These

²XIII Sezd RKP(b): Stenograficheskii Otchet (Moskva: Gossudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1963), p. 117.

are the censuses taken by the government and the Party in 1926 and 1927 respectively. The following Table presents a somewhat different picture from that of 1924.³

TABLE 27

PERCENTILE COMPARISON OF NATIONAL GROUPS IN THE TOTAL POPULATION, PARTY, TOP ELITE, AND POLITBUREAU, 1927

Nationality	Population in 1926	Party Membership in 1927	Top Elite Membership in 1927	Politbureau Membership in 1927
Russians	53.9	65.0	68.7	58.8
Ukrainians	21.7	11.8	6.2	11.7
Jews	1.8	4.4	3.1	5.9
Georgians	1.3	1.5	3.1	5.9
Armenians	1.1	1.7	3.1	5.9
Poles	0.5	1.1	3.1	5.9
Latvians	0.1	1.2	6.2	5.9

This Table shows that the Russians both in the top elite and in the Politbureau generally reflected their numerical strength in the Party and the Soviet population. The Ukrainians, as far as the population is concerned, were under-represented in the top elite but their percentage

³Vsesoiuznaia Perepis Naseleniia 17 Dekabria 1926 g., Vypusk IV: Narodnost i Rodnoi iazyk Naseleniia SSSR (Moskva: Izdanie Ts. S. U.S.S.S.R., 1928), pp. V-IX. Sotsialnyi i Natsionalnyi Sostav VKP(b), Itogi Vsesoiuznoi Partiinai Perepisi 1927 goda (Moskva: Gossudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo, 1928), p. 114. The top elite includes members of the Politbureau, the Orgbureau and the Secretariat.

in the Politbureau was equal to that in the Party. The Jewish people were overrepresented in the Party but their percentage in the top elite and the Politbureau was also close to their share in the Party. The other nationalities were overrepresented both in the top elite and in the Politbureau. This unequal percentile distribution makes it clear that the proportional representation was not the rule in the top elite and, undoubtedly, was not meant to be. It appears from this Table that the population of various national groups, except perhaps for the Russians, was not a consideration at all in the recruitment of members of the top elite, for the Ukrainians were underrepresented, and the Jews, Poles, and Latvians very heavily overrepresented. To this it can be added that according to the same statistical source, the Belorussians constituted almost 3.3 percent of the Soviet population, the Uzbeks over 2.6 percent, and the Tatars over 2.0 percent. If the population was an influencing factor as to which national group was to be represented in the top elite, then instead of the Armenians, the Poles, and the Latvians, the Belorussians, the Uzbeks, and the Tatars would have been selected.

The number of the non-Russians in the Party does not appear to have been a determining factor as to which national group was to be represented in the top elite either, although occasionally it might not have been entirely ignored. A very close correspondence between

the percent of the Ukrainians and the Jews in the Party and in the top elite could have been an exception or simply an accidental occurrence. To support this assumption, we again use the statistics from the same Party source identified in the last footnote. Accordingly, the Belorussians accounted for almost 3.2 percent of the total Party membership, the Uzbeks 1.2 percent, and the Tatars 1.4 percent. Had Stalin followed the rule of proportional representation in the Politbureau, or in the top elite in general, he would have selected the Belorussians, the Uzbeks, or the Tatars rather than the Poles and the Latvians who had fewer members in the Party than the former nationalities.

It must be admitted, however, that the top elite in general and the Politbureau in particular were in 1927 more proportionally constituted than ever before, and they continued to be so for several more years. No similar statistics are available for later years, but if the ethnic groups among the delegates to the Sixteenth Party Congress in 1930 reflected their numerical strength in the Party, then it would appear that only minor changes took place in the ratio of the non-Russians in the Party and the top elite. The Russians had over 57.0 percent of the delegates, 66.6 percent of the members in the top elite, and 53.3 percent of the Politbureau members--and this was a decrease from 1927, but the ratio is still similar to that in 1927. The Jewish delegates increased

from 7.4 percent in 1927 to 10.6 percent in 1930, but their contingent in the top elite and the Politbureau remained the same as before. The same is true with respect to the Ukrainians, except that their percentage among the delegates decreased from 9.8 in 1927 to 8.6 in 1930. Similar minor changes took place among other nationalities, except for the fact that one Latvian lost his seat in the Orgbureau.⁴

In the succeeding years the top elite was becoming more and more Russian. Between 1934 and 1939 the Ukrainians, a Latvian, and a Pole were eliminated completely from the top elite. At the same time only one Georgian was added. The domination of Russians was enhanced by the recruitment of several more Russians in 1941 and in 1946. Consequently, we cannot speak at all of proportional representation of the nationalities in the top elite or in the Politbureau between 1939 and 1952.

In 1952 the Praesidium consisted of six nationalities, but the Russians (29 men) accounted for 80.5 percent, the Georgians (2 men) and the Armenians (also two men) for 5.5 percent each, the Ukrainians (1 man), the Jews (1 man), and the Finns (also 1 man) for 2.8 percent each. For the first time the Communist Party of Belorussia was represented in the top elite by its First Secretary N. S. Patolichev, but he was a Russian. Again no proportional

⁴B. R. "XVI Sezd VKP(b) v Tsifrakh," Partiinoe Stroitelstvo, No. 13-14 (July 1930), p. 30.

representation of the nationalities can be detected in the composition of the Praesidium. The Russians never accounted for 80.0 percent of the population or Party membership. The Georgians and the Armenians did not match the Ukrainians in terms of population or Party membership, yet they had more representatives in the Praesidium than the Ukrainians.

All these data lead us to the conclusion that a proportional representation of the nationalities in the top elite was not the policy of the Party between 1919 and 1952.

The policy of recruitment of the top elite members from the ethnic groups changed after the death of Stalin. The top elite in this case does not include the members of the Secretariat, for the latter, as it was established earlier, became totally a Russian body. Gradually, within half a decade, the natives from the union republics were selected to the Praesidium in a rough proportion to their Party membership and population. It should be emphasized that the term "proportion" is used here only in a sense of approximation, for the statistics show that there was no strict proportional representation of various national groups in the Praesidium-Politbureau in all cases and at all times. It should be kept in mind that the Praesidium-Politbureau have been very small organs. One Belorussian, for example, accounted for 6.2 percent of the total Praesidium members in 1961, but the Party of his union republic constituted 2.5 percent of all Party members

and the republican population 3.8 percent of the total Soviet population. But the number of various nationalities in the Praesidium was clearly related to the number of Party members and population in their union republics.

The beginning of this new policy of recruitment can be traced to the year of 1953 when in May of that year D. S. Kirichenko, then Second Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine and a native Ukrainian, was elected a candidate member of the Praesidium. On June 12 of the same year, Kirichenko replaced L. G. Melnikov, a Russian, as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine and thus became the first Ukrainian to hold that post in the Party's history. Kirichenko's career in the Ukrainian Party and the Praesidium was, however, short. In 1957 he was replaced as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine by another Ukrainian, N. V. Podgorny, and Kirichenko, in addition to being a member of the Praesidium, became Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. But in 1960 he lost both positions.

Another Ukrainian, D. S. Korotchenko, Prime Minister of the Ukrainian Republic since December 1947, who had been elected a full member of the Praesidium in 1952, lost the latter post after Stalin's death but was elected a candidate member of the Praesidium in 1957. In 1961 he was not elected to the Praesidium.

In 1956-1958 the policy of recruiting the natives from the union republics into the Praesidium gained momentum. In 1956, following the Twentieth Party Congress,

the first Uzbek in the Party's history, N. A. Mukhitdinov, was elected a candidate member of the Praesidium. In 1951-1955 he was Prime Minister of the Uzbek Republic and in 1955-1957, First Secretary of the Uzbek Party. Like Kirichenko, he was the first Uzbek to hold the last post. In 1957 he became Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and was promoted to full membership in the Praesidium. In 1961 he lost his post in the Secretariat and was replaced in the Praesidium (as a candidate member) by another Uzbek, Sh. R. Rashidov, who had been First Secretary of the Uzbek Party since 1959.

In 1957, following the expulsion of the so-called "anti-Party group" from the Party's highest organs, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Belorussia, K. T. Mazurov, was elected a candidate member of the Praesidium. Like Kirichenko and Mukhitdinov, he was the first native Belorussian to become First Secretary of the Communist Party of Belorussia in 1956 and was also the first Belorussian to be ever elected to the organ of the top elite. At the same time (1957), V. P. Mzhavandze, a Georgian and First Secretary of the Communist Party of Georgia since 1953, was also elected a candidate member of the Praesidium. In addition, Ia. E. Kalnberzin, a Latvian and First Secretary of the Latvian Party, was elected a candidate member of the Praesidium. But his stay in the Praesidium was short, for in 1959, together with several other Latvian Party leaders, he was removed from his post for "nationalist deviations" and replaced as First Secretary

by another Latvian, an "old Bolshevik" A. Ia. Pelshe. Pelshe, however, did not succeed his predecessor in the Praesidium. He became a member of the Politbureau only in 1966.

In 1958 Podgornyi, a Ukrainian and First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party since 1957 and D. S. Polianskii, another Ukrainian, were elected candidate members of the Praesidium, and the first was promoted in 1960 to the Praesidium's full membership. It is noticeable that all these men became candidate members of the Praesidium and only those who were given various positions in Moscow were promoted to full membership.

Except where otherwise indicated, all the listed men were re-elected to the Praesidium in 1961. In addition, in 1961 V. V. Shcherbitskii, a Ukrainian who was one of the Secretaries of the Ukrainian Party and Prime Minister of his republic in 1961-1963 and since 1965 until the present time, was elected a candidate member of the Praesidium. Thus, by 1961 all the new members of the Praesidium (including the Russians), except one, came from and were natives of the union republics. The only member of the Praesidium without a union republic was O. V. Kuusinen, a Finn, but when he died in 1964 no one from the nationality without a union republic replaced him. The same was true in the case of Kaganovich, a Jew. When he was removed from the highest posts in the Party in 1957 as one of the "anti-Party group," no other Jew

or anyone else from the non-union republic succeeded him either. Thus, in 1961, as was established in chapter six, the Praesidium consisted of eight Russians, three Ukrainians, one Belorussian, one Uzbek, one Georgian, one Armenian (Mikoian), and one Finn.

In order to show the reflection of the proportional representation of the nationalities in the Praesidium, we compare the percentage of the population, Party members, and members of the Central Committee of the union republics with the percentage of the nationalities in the Praesidium. Because it is not possible to obtain the statistics for all years under discussion (1961, 1966, 1971) on the national distribution of the Soviet population and Party membership, we consider the total population and the total Party membership in each union republic which had its representatives in the Praesidium. We take the population for 1959 because no data for 1961 are obtainable.⁵

⁵Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1959 godu: Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik (Moskva: Gosstatizdat TsSU SSSR, 1960), pp. 17-20. "KPSS v Tsifrah," Partiinaiia Zhizn, No. 1 (January 1962), p. 44. Christian Duevel, "Union Republican Representation," Radio Liberty Research Paper, No. 6a (New York: Radio Liberty Committee, 1966), p. 6. The percent of the Central Committee members from the union republics is taken from this source. The author, by using the statistical data, convincingly argues that each union republic between 1959 and 1966 had a quota representation in the CPSU and in the Central Committee. The Table below does not include Finns because in 1961 there was no Finnish republic.

TABLE 28

PERCENTILE COMPARISON OF THE UNION
REPUBLICS' POPULATION, PARTY
MEMBERS, CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS,
AND PRAESIDIUM MEMBERS, 1961

Union Republics	Popula- tion, Jan. 15, 1959	Party Members October 1961	Central Committee Members, 1961	Praesidium Members, October, 1961
Russian	56.3	63.0	58.2	50.0
Ukrainian	20.0	14.9	14.9	18.7
Uzbek	3.9	2.5	3.6	6.2
Belorussian	3.8	2.5	4.1	6.2
Georgian	1.9	2.3	1.5	6.2
Armenian	0.8	0.9	1.5	6.2

As this Table shows, the Ukrainians were more evenly represented in the Praesidium than Russians, but a proportional representation in a very broad sense is quite apparent. In terms of absolute numbers, other nationalities, particularly Georgians and Armenians, were slightly overrepresented in the Praesidium. But we have to remind ourselves that one person in the Praesidium accounted for 6.2 percent of the total membership.

It has to be noted that among the nationalities listed in Table 28 only Armenians had fewer Party members in their republic than the Azerbaidzhani and Kazakhs who were not represented in the Praesidium. But, on the other hand, there were more Armenians in the entire Party than there were Kazakhs or Azerbaidzhani. The person of Mikoian was probably a determining factor, for when he was not elected to the Politbureau in 1966, no other Armenian was selected

to succeed him. Instead, a representative of the Kazakh republic became a member of the Politbureau.

The statistics for the national breakdown of the Soviet population and Party membership, in contrast to other years, are available for 1961 (population for 1959).⁶ If we make the same comparison as in Table 28, we will discover only minor changes. Thus, the Russians accounted for 54.6 percent of the total Soviet population in 1959, 63.5 percent of the total Party membership, and 50.0 percent of the Praesidium members; the Ukrainians--17.8 percent of the Soviet population, 14.7 percent of the Party membership, and 18.8 percent of the Praesidium members; the Belorussians--3.8 percent of the population, 3.0 percent of the Party members, and 6.2 percent of the Praesidium members; the Uzbeks--2.9 percent of the total population, 1.5 percent of the Party membership, and 6.2 percent of the Praesidium members; the Georgians--1.3 percent of the population, 1.8 percent of the Party membership, and 6.2 percent of the Praesidium members; and, finally, the Armenians--1.3 percent of the Soviet population, 1.7 percent of the total Party membership, and 6.2 percent of the Praesidium members.

By 1966 some changes had taken place among the non-Russians in the Politbureau. First of all, as was mentioned

⁶Ibid., pp. 13 and 49 respectively. Duvel's article was not used in this case because it lacks statistics on the national distribution of the members of the Central Committee.

above, Kuusinen died in 1964 and Mikoian, probably because of his advanced age, was not re-elected to the Politbureau. In 1963 P. E. Shelest, a Ukrainian, replaced Podgornyi as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine and was elected a candidate member of the Praesidium of the Communist Party of the USSR. In 1966, following the Twenty-third Party Congress, he was promoted to full membership of the Politbureau. P. M. Masherov, a Belorussian and First Secretary of the Communist Party of Belorussia since 1965 (when he replaced another Belorussian, Mazurov), was elected after the Twenty-third Congress a candidate member of the Politbureau. D. A. Kunaev, a Kazakh and First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan since 1960 when he replaced the last Russian N. L. Beliaev, was elected in 1966 a candidate member of the Politbureau. A. Ia. Pelshe, a Latvian and First Secretary of his republican Party since 1959, was also elected a full member of the Politbureau in 1966. It should be noted that the latter, being also elected Chairman of the Party Control Committee, relinquished his post in Latvia in favor of another Latvian, A. E. Voss. The other non-Russians in the Politbureau were the same as in the 1961 Praesidium. Altogether the Politbureau in 1966 had nine Russians, four Ukrainians, two Belorussians, one Uzbek, one Georgian, one Kazakh, and one Latvian.

In order to discover the reflection of the proportional representation of the nationalities in the Politbureau, we make the same comparison as in Table 28. Because no statistics were published for the population of 1966, we take the Soviet estimates for January 1, 1968.⁷

TABLE 29

PERCENTILE COMPARISON OF THE UNION REPUBLICS'
POPULATION, PARTY MEMBERS, CENTRAL COMMITTEE
MEMBERS, AND POLITBUREAU MEMBERS, 1966

Union Republics	Population, Jan. 1, 1968	Party Members, 1966	Central Committee Members, 1966	Politbureau Members, April 1966
Russian	54.0	64.3	55.7	47.4
Ukrainian	19.6	17.0	17.2	21.0
Kazakh	5.4	3.9	5.2	5.3
Uzbek	4.8	2.7	3.1	5.3
Belorussian	3.7	2.7	4.2	10.5
Georgian	2.0	2.1	1.6	5.3
Latvian	1.3	0.8	1.0	5.3

The Russians, according to this Table, were underrepresented by one man but this was a temporary situation, for in 1967 Yu. V. Andropov, upon his appointment as Chairman of the Committee for State Security, was transferred from the Secretariat to the Politbureau as a candidate member. By 1971, as will be shown later, the Russians were more proportionally represented than in 1966. The Belorussians, on the other hand,

⁷ Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1967 godu: Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik (Moskva: Statistika, 1968), p. 9. Dugvel, op. cit., p. 6. The percent of the Party members is taken from the last source.

were overrepresented in the Politbureau by one man. This can, perhaps, be explained by the fact that Mazurov became in 1965 First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers in Moscow and thereby relinquished his post of First Secretary of the Belorussian Party to Masharov. The Party leaders might have felt that the Communist Party of one of the major republics should have been represented in the Politbureau and, therefore, added its First Secretary. By 1971 the percentage of the Belorussians was slightly lower than that of any other nationality. It should also be noted that each union republic represented in the Politbureau, with the exception of the Latvian republic, had more people and Party members than any other republic in the Soviet Union. From the quoted statistical sources it appears that the only republic which had more people and Party members than the Latvian was the Armenian republic which was not included in the Politbureau. But it should be emphasized that the difference between the two was very small. The presence of a Latvian in the Politbureau was probably due to the political advantage of having one man in the top decision-making body from the Baltic republics. Pelshe, as an old Bolshevik and a completely trusted man, could have also been one of the reasons. In any case, the Latvian representation appears to be the exception to the general rule that the priority to the seat in the top Party organ belonged to the union republics which had more people and more Party members than others. On the

whole, the Table shows that the approximate proportional representation of various nationalities in the Politbureau was quite evident.

The Politbureau in 1967 was increased from 19 to 20 members, and after the Twenty-fourth Party Congress in March-April 1971, to 21. From this increase only the Russians benefited. All the non-Russians from the 1966 Politbureau were re-elected. The only change that took place after the Congress was the promotion of Kunaev and Shcherbitskii from candidates to full members. As a result, all the Ukrainians became full members of the Politbureau. There were eleven Russians, four Ukrainians, two Belorussians, one Uzbek, one Kazakh, one Georgian, and one Latvian.

Again as before, we make the same kind of comparison. For the population, we take the census of January 15, 1970.⁸

⁸ Pravda, April 17, 1971. Pravda Ukrainy, March 18, 1971. Pravda Vostoka, March 3, 1971. Kazakhstanskaia Pravda, February 25, 1971. Zaria Vostoka, February 28, 1971. Sovetskaia Latvija, February 26, 1971. Partiinaiia Zhizn, No. 6 (March 1971), p. 46. No statistics are available for the Communist Party of the Russian Republic as of this moment. Here we take it to be a minimum of 61.0 percent of the total Party membership. The percent of the Party members from the union republics in the Central Committee is also not obtainable.

TABLE 30

PERCENTILE COMPARISON OF THE UNION REPUBLICS'
POPULATION, PARTY MEMBERS, AND POLITBUREAU MEMBERS, 1971

Union Republics	Popula- tion Jan. 15, 1970	Party Members Feb.-March 1971	Politbureau Members, April 1971
Russian	53.8	61.0	52.4
Ukrainian	19.5	16.8	19.0
Kazakh	5.3	4.0	4.8
Uzbek	4.9	3.0	4.8
Belorussian	3.7	3.0	9.5
Georgian	1.9	2.0	4.8
Latvian	0.9	0.9	4.8

It appears from this Table that the Russians, the Ukrainians, the Kazakhs, and the Uzbeks were, broadly speaking, proportionally represented in the Politbureau. The Belorussians were again overrepresented for the same probable reason given above. It is difficult to say that the Georgians were overrepresented, for at least in terms of the Party membership their republic had more members than any other republic not listed in the above Table, and they had only one man in the Politbureau who accounted for 4.8 percent. Thus, in general, all the republics, with the exception of the Latvian republic, were more or less proportionally represented in the Politbureau. As before, it has to be noted that all union republics identified in this Table, except for one, had more people and more Party members than any other republic in the Soviet Union. The Latvian republic was the exception, for it had fewer people and Party members than, for example, the Azerbaïdzhani

republic. But again the difference between the two republics in this respect was insignificant. The situation was far from being the same as in 1927 when the Belorussians, for instance, had five times more people and three times more Party members than the Poles and yet were not represented in the top elite. The Uzbeks and the Tatars at the same time were also ignored, although their share in the Soviet population and the Party was greater than the share of Latvians and Poles who had their men in the top elite. In general, it can be said that the presence of the Latvian republic representative in the 1971 Politbureau was a minor exception to the general rule of selecting the Politbureau members from the union republics which had the greatest number of the people and the Party members.

The Quest for Legitimacy

The political developments since 1953 suggest that the recruitment of the non-Russians to the Praesidium-Politbureau from the major union republics was aimed at enhancing the legitimacy of the Party's top elite among the non-Russian peoples.⁹ By legitimacy is meant here basically to be accepted, approved, and supported by the people as rightful leaders of the country. Of course, the Party leaders in Moscow also used other means to achieve the same goal, such as propaganda, indoctrination, Party

⁹ The Russians are excluded from this consideration because they always dominated the top elite and the question of legitimacy from their point of view was irrelevant.

discipline, and perhaps several more. But the inclusion of the non-Russians in the top elite from the union republics in a rough proportion to their population and Party membership for the purpose of legitimacy was quite a novel development in the Soviet Union.

Studying Lenin's top elite between 1919 and 1924, it appears that he did not use this political device to legitimize his power among the non-Russian nations. To be sure, his Politbureau and the Orgbureau were multi-national in composition, but their members came from the numerically insignificant minorities. In order to win the acceptance and the support among the non-Russian nations, Lenin used the concept of "self-determination" and "the equal rights of all nations" in the Soviet state. One of the first acts of Lenin's government, following the November revolution in 1917, was the proclamation (November 15) of "The Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia" which declared that the Soviet Russian Government recognized "the right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination even to the point of separation and the formation of the independent state."¹⁰ On the logical level, it is difficult to connect the concept of self-determination with the search for legitimacy because the first proclaimed the right of nations to their political independence. But Lenin propagated this concept precisely for the purpose of winning the confidence, the acceptance, and the support

¹⁰ Decrees and Constitutions of the Soviet Union (New York: The Nation Press, Inc., 1957), p. 32.

of the non-Russian people. It was a tactical device which he had developed before the revolution of 1917. He wished to disassociate his Party from the Tsarist policy of national oppression. Still in 1903 he wrote:

The accursed history of autocracy has left us a legacy of tremendous estrangement between the working class and the various nationalities oppressed by that autocracy. This estrangement is a very great evil, a very great obstacle in the struggle against the autocracy.¹¹

Lenin spoke very openly about the real aim of self-determination. After the November revolution he said:

The freer Russia will be, the more decisively our republic will recognize freedom of secession for the non-Russian nations, the stronger will other nations be attracted to the union with us, the less friction will develop, the fewer will be the cases of actual secession and the shorter will be the period during which some of the nations will stay separated.¹²

Lenin was interested in gaining the support among the non-Russian toiling masses. Therefore, he qualified his concept of self-determination by insisting that this right belonged not to the nations as a whole, but to the proletariat and the Social-Democratic Parties. In response, for example, to the Manifesto of the Armenian Socialists he wrote in 1903 that "we are concerned with self-determination of the proletariat in each nationality rather than with self-determination of peoples or nations

¹¹V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. VI, 4th ed. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), p. 462.

¹²V. I. Lenin, Sochineniia, Vol. XX, 4th ed. (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1961), p. 325.

as a whole."¹³ In his major work on the nationality question he developed the dialectical approach to this concept. He stated that the proletariat of the oppressing nations must advocate self-determination and freedom of secession for the oppressed nations, but the proletariat of the latter "must place the weight of its agitation upon the second part of our formula: voluntary amalgamation of nations."¹⁴ The Third Congress of Soviets in 1918 formalized Lenin's qualified version of self-determination by passing a resolution in this spirit proposed by Stalin.¹⁵

Lenin's hope for a voluntary amalgamation of nations did not materialize. Between 1917 and 1918 many non-Russian nations proclaimed either autonomy or complete independence from Russia, and Lenin did not hesitate to send the Red Army and use local communists (whose majority in many cases were Russians) to unite them with the Russian republic. Only such nations as Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Finland, and Poland remained independent due to the inability of the Red Army to conquer them.

Since the concept of self-determination did not work to Lenin's expectation, its advocacy was weakening. But at the same time Lenin was emphasizing equal rights

¹³V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. VI (New York: International Publishers, 1935-1938), p. 329.

¹⁴V. I. Lenin, The Right of Nations to Self-Determination (New York: International Publishers, 1951), p. 109.

¹⁵Quoted in James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1918 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), pp. 396-397.

of all nations in the former Russian empire. The aim again was the same as before: to win confidence, acceptance, and support among the non-Russian nations. He advocated a very cautious and sympathetic policy to the non-Russian nations. Frictions between the native local Communist leaders and the Russian Party officials he attributed to the chauvinistic attitude and behavior of the Russians. In 1921 the Tenth Party Congress even adopted a resolution condemning "the danger of Great Russian nationalism."¹⁶ Lenin's aim of propagating equal rights to all nations in Russia can be illustrated by his reaction to the notorious Georgian "incident." The Caucasian Party Bureau, established by the Central Committee in Moscow under the leadership of Ordzhonikidze, a Georgian, accused in 1922 the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party of "nationalist deviations" by obstructing the political and economic unification of Transcaucasia. As the conflict was deepening, the entire Central Committee of Georgia resigned. Lenin saw in this incident the policy of the Russian chauvinists among whom he included Ordzhonikidze. He stated that at the next session of the Central Committee he would declare war on Russian chauvinism. On this occasion he dictated several notes in which he not only attacked Russian chauvinism and men like Stalin, Dzerzhinskii, and Ordzhonikidze for being worse than real Russians, but

¹⁶Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 271.

also explained the reasons for the policy of equal rights for nations in the Soviet state. At one point he said:

For the proletariat it is not only important but essentially indispensable to win for itself the maximum of confidence in the proletarian class struggle. What is necessary for that? For that there is necessary not only formal equality, for that there is necessary the indemnification, in one way or another, by means of behavior or concessions in regard to the minorities, of that mistrust, of that suspicion, of those insults, which the ruling imperialist nation had in the historical past brought them. I think that for a Bolshevik, for a Communist, it is unnecessary to elucidate this further, and I think that in this instance, in regard to the Georgian nation, we have a typical example where a truly proletarian attitude requires of us extraordinary caution, courtesy, and complaisance.¹⁷

Although Lenin was seeking for confidence, support, and the acceptance of his regime among the non-Russian nations, he failed to enhance his legitimacy by recruiting top elite members from the most populous non-Russian nations. He used, instead, ideology, slogans, and military force. His Politbureau and the Orgbureau consisted of men who came from very small national groups. Such nationalities as the Ukrainian, Belorussian, or Turkic groups were excluded from the ruling elite. This failure can perhaps be explained by the fact that the Soviet state was at that time in the stage of formation, when not many things were normalized or stabilized yet. But the most apparent reason for Lenin to exclude major nationalities from the top elite was his reliance upon men who, like himself, were recognized Party leaders before 1917, and

¹⁷Quoted in Pipes, p. 275.

who played a vital political role during and after the revolution. This is rather a normal result in all revolutionary-victorious parties. Those who lead the revolution to victory become the ruling elite.

It might appear from the statistics that Stalin, at the end of the 1920's and the beginning of the 1930's, was making the first step in the direction of enhancing the legitimacy of his power by recruiting non-Russians into the Party's ruling elite. The total number of the nationalities in the top elite was increased, and they included two Ukrainians who were Party officials in their native republic. However, the non-Russians, with the exception of the Ukrainians and perhaps an Armenian, came from small national groups which did not have their union republics. In addition, later the non-Russians in the top elite were reduced to a few men. These facts suggest that Stalin was selecting men to his political coterie on a personal basis without consideration of the size of their population or the number of Party members. It should be kept in mind that Stalin, since the death of Lenin, was struggling for power, and therefore personal loyalty to him was of prime consideration in selecting men to the top elite. After his victory he eliminated all the non-Russians, except for one Jew and an Armenian, and made the Politbureau and the Orgbureau practically a Russian body. He secured the legitimacy of his power by strict Party discipline, propaganda, and terror.

Stalin's successors, struggling for power among themselves, were, undoubtedly, unable and unwilling to use terror to secure their positions. Indeed, one of the terroristic acts they did was to liquidate the highest officials of the Secret Police--Beria and several of his associates--precisely because there was evidence that they tried to assume the supreme power in the Party and government primarily by means of the terroristic organ. Following this, Khrushchev, who was rising in power against such well-known Party leaders as Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and a number of lesser figures, needed the support from other Party leaders in order to strengthen and legitimize his position in the Party. One of the means of accomplishing this goal was the promotion of the non-Russians to the Party and government posts in their respective union republics and the recruitment of some of them to the Party's Praesidium. Of course, he did the same thing with respect to the Russians by promoting his supporters in the Russian republic.

The circumstantial evidences indicate beyond doubt that it was Khrushchev who was the real architect of the new policy of legitimizing the rule of the top elite among the non-Russian nations by recruiting their representatives into the Praesidium. This new policy began rather modestly in 1953, but it fully matured in 1956-1958 when Khrushchev's position was strengthened by the

removal of Malenkov as Prime Minister in 1955 and the expulsion of the "anti-Party group" from the highest Party posts.

There was one factor which contributed to the adoption of the new policy of the top elite's recruitment. From Lenin's time until after the death of Stalin, the leaders in Moscow followed the policy of appointing the Russians to the highest posts in all union republics, except of Georgia, over the native Party leaders. The lower Party posts were also controlled in many cases by the Russians. In the Ukraine, for example, the First Secretaries of the republican Party were such Russians as V. M. Molotov, L. M. Kaganovich (a Jew), P. Postyshev, S. V. Kossior (a Pole), N. S. Khrushchev, and lastly, until 1953, L. G. Melnikov. In Belorussia the First Party Secretaries of the Russian nationality in the last years before 1955 were P. K. Ponomarenko, N. L. Gusarev, and N. S. Patolichev. In Kazakhstan the three last Russians who were First Secretaries of the republican Party were P. K. Ponomarev, L. I. Brezhnev, and N. L. Beliaev (until 1960). On the lower levels the natives were not as easily promoted as the Russians were. This policy of discrimination against the non-Russians in their native republics was covertly resented. This feeling was more openly expressed after Stalin's death in carefully formulated resolutions or public pronouncements. Thus, the Central Committees of the Latvian and the Lithuanian republics passed resolutions

in June 1953 complaining about the failure to promote the local communists to high Party positions.¹⁸ At the Twenty-first Party Congress in 1961 Mukhitdinov, an Uzbek, attacked in his speech the "anti-Party group" for its "chauvinism" toward the national minorities, implying that men of this group favored Russians at the expense of the non-Russians.¹⁹

There are clear indications in the Soviet press that Beria, planning to take over the control of the Party and the government, was trying to capitalize on this resentment. To be sure, he had at his disposal the secret police, but this probably was not enough. Apparently, having no hope of getting support among the members of the top elite, he was seeking support among the non-Russian republican Party leaders. After his arrest on June 26, 1953, Beria was accused of several crimes. One of them was that he was planning to seize power in the USSR and for that purpose was promoting "officials in the Ministry of Internal Affairs on the basis of their personal loyalty to him."²⁰ Moreover, he was accused of "undermining" the unity of the Soviet Union in the following words:

By various cunning methods Beria sought to undermine the friendship of peoples of the USSR--

¹⁸Quoted from Pravda in Robert Conquest, Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R. (New York: Harper and Row, 1961) p. 215.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 387.

²⁰Quoted from Pravda of July 10, 1953 in William G. Andrews, Soviet Institutions and Politics: Inside Views (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966), p. 89.

the foundation of foundations of the multi-national socialist state and the chief requirement for all the successes of the fraternal Soviet republics: to sow friction among the peoples of the USSR and to activize bourgeois-nationalist elements in the union republics.²¹

The verdict of the court which tried and sentenced Beria to death in December 1953 was even more explicit on this question. At one point it declared:

In his anti-Soviet, treacherous aims, L. P. Beria and his accomplices carried out a number of criminal measures to activize remnants of the bourgeoisie nationalist elements in the union republics, to sow hostility between the peoples of the USSR and in the first place, to undermine the friendship of the peoples of the USSR for the great Russian people.²²

The meaning of these accusations can perhaps be better understood if we quote from the Soviet sources when Beria was still in power. Thus, S. Iakubovskaia published an article in Kommunist of June 1953 dealing with the nationality question in the USSR. The following quotation is very relevant to Beria:

The struggle against any sort of distortion of the nationality policy of the Party is the most important requirement for the development of nations on the path toward Communism. For the future, the task consists in carefully developing and promoting local cadres who know the language, customs, ways of life and norms of the people, and in developing the local school and theater in improving the work of all Soviet institutions, and in raising the material and cultural level of the broad masses of toilers of all the national republics and regions.²³

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid., p. 91.

²³ Quoted in Frederick C. Barghoorn, Soviet Russian Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 48.

The article very clearly states that the "local cadres" should be promoted for the benefit of the union republics and thus implies that this was not exactly the case in the past. But, as Barghoorn points out, the interesting fact in this article was that the author quoted only Beria from his speech to the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1952. In that speech he contrasted the Tsarist nationality policy with that of the Soviet Government by pointing out that in the past the non-Russians were denied their statehood and were governed by the Russian-speaking officials. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, followed just the opposite policy. The article probably aimed at identifying Beria with the positive policy toward the non-Russian nationalities.

But even more explicit than this article was another published in Voprosy Filosofii in January 1958, more than four years after Beria was executed. The pertinent paragraph reads as follows:

The Party proclaims the principles of promoting national cadres, whereas bourgeois nationalists or people who are influenced by bourgeois-nationalist ideology try to follow a policy of making discrimination between the cadres in accordance with their nationality. That was exactly what was done by the enemy of the people Beria, who chose as one of the main forms of his diversionary work in the national republics the placing of cadres of different nationalities in opposition to one another.²⁴

If all these quotations are juxtaposed, we will come to the conclusion that Beria, in order to gain support

²⁴Quoted in Conquest, op. cit., p. 218.

among the non-Russians for seizing power, was replacing the Russian police and Party officials in the union republics with the natives. This is probably what Khrushchev had in mind when he accused Beria at the fateful meeting of the Praesidium in June 1953 of "interference in the Party organizations of the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Baltic states" and of "relying on nationalist antagonisms to undermine Soviet unity."²⁵

Some changes in the Party command in several union republics, indeed, took place when Beria was Minister of Internal Affairs. First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, L. G. Melnikov, a Russian, was replaced by a Ukrainian, A. I. Kirichenko. The Central Committee of the Ukrainian Party accused Melnikov of committing "gross errors in the selection of cadres and in the carrying out of the national policy of the Party." It also stated that

The bureau of the Central Committee and the secretary of the same Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Comrade Melnikov, committed in their practical work distortions of the Leninist-Stalinist national policy of our Party.²⁶

In Latvia and Lithuania the positions of the Second Secretary of the Party, always held by the Russians, were transferred in June 1953 to the natives (but given back to the Russians in 1956). In Belorussia the Prime Minister, A. E. Kleshchev, and the Minister of Internal Affairs, Tsanava, both Belorussians, were dismissed after Beria's

²⁵"Khrushchev Remembers," Life, December 11, 1970, p. 68.

²⁶Quoted from Pravda, June 13, 1953, in Conquest, op. cit., p. 214.

fall implying that both might have been connected with Beria.²⁷

All these changes might have been inspired or directed by Beria. But whatever his implications, the most important is the fact that the discriminatory policy against the non-Russians in the Party became an open issue and this could not have been ignored by Khrushchev. This was coupled with his need to be accepted and supported by the Party leaders on all levels, including the leaders of the union republican Parties. For this purpose he denounced Stalin and tried to present himself as a man of changes. He also used propaganda, as well as Party and state machinery, to achieve that goal. But in order to enhance the legitimacy of his power among the non-Russian population, he promoted the local Party leaders to the lower and higher positions and some of them he selected to the highest decision-making organ of the Party--the Praesidium. His successors just followed that policy for the same purposes. To be sure, the selection of men to the top elite was not based solely on nationality consideration. Personal loyalty, competence, and achievements in Party work were other criteria. But this was done within the scope of nationality considerations.

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 216-217.

The Political Portrait of the Non-
Russians in the Praesidium-Politbureau

The question remains to be answered to what extent the non-Russians in the Praesidium-Politbureau can be identified with their respective nations. This is a very relevant question on two accounts. In the first place, since the 1930's the Party followed the policy of extensive Russification under various pretexts, such as "internationalism," "brotherhood," "fusion of nations under Communism," "superiority of the Russian culture," "the leading role of the Russian proletariat during the October revolution," etc.²⁸ This Russification was advanced in the years when the present members of the top elite were maturing both personally and politically. In the second place, the non-Russian Party leaders were always vulnerable to charges of "national deviations" or insufficient resistance against the nationalist elements. Under Stalin such men were usually liquidated, but in more recent times they were removed from their political positions. As late as in 1959 a number of local Party leaders, including First Secretaries in Latvia, Uzbekistan, Azerbaidzhan, were relieved from their posts for several reasons, and one of them was either national deviations or a failure to resist the manifestation of nationalism in their republics.²⁹

²⁸A good discussion of the Russification policy can be found in Barghoorn, op. cit., pp. 39-44, 59-66, 97-124.

²⁹Conquest, op. cit., pp. 385-386. In 1958-1959 some Party leaders in the union republics opposed the new educational law which made the native language not a compulsory subject in schools. A good discussion of this problem can be found in Yaroslav Belinsky, "The Soviet Education Law of 1958-9 and Soviet Nationality Policy," Soviet Studies, XIV, No. 2 (October 1962), pp. 238-257.

But the present non-Russian members of the top elite were constantly growing in power and in the 1950's reached their present status in the Party. It is not easy to find a complete explanation for their political growth due to the dictatorial nature of the Soviet system where many political movements and expressions are kept secret. But logically speaking, if others were found guilty of national deviations or of lack of vigilance against the manifestation of nationalism and were, consequently, removed from the positions of power, then the men who were rising in power must have been free of these political "sins." Indeed, if their overt behavior and public pronouncements reflected their genuine feelings and convictions, then they can justifiably be called the Russified centralists. Ethnically, these non-Russian members of the top elite identify themselves with their nations. Behind the closed doors they most probably also defend the interests of their people in such areas as economy, or even culture, in a limited sense (a folksy aspect, not antagonistic to the Russian culture). But politically, and to a great degree culturally, each of these men is a homo Russicus.

Like Russians, the representatives of the union republics in the top elite are vehemently against nationalism among their people. But it should be noted that nationalism is defined very broadly. Pelshe, for example, sharply attacked in 1960 the Latvian Party leadership for not opposing or suppressing those elements among the

Latvian people who did not want their children to study the Russian language. Addressing himself to these elements, he wrote:

They had begun to howl that by studying the Russian language and culture young Latvians would forget the national peculiarities of their own culture. . . . Such a reasoning can only harm the Latvian young people. It is nothing but a manifestation of bourgeois nationalism. The Russian language facilitates association and mutual aid among the working people of all the numerous nations of our homeland.³⁰

While attacking nationalism, they invariably emphasize both brotherhood and the unity of their people with the Russian people, and political centralism. Kunaev, for example, in his article on the occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the October Revolution in 1967, wrote:

The present imperialistic propaganda, the remnants of the defeated bourgeois nationalist groups (living abroad) wish to sow diversity and discord among the nations of the USSR. But the mighty bourgeois propaganda to undermine the monolithic, the ideological-political unity and brotherhood of the USSR nations is futile.³¹

First Secretaries of all other union republics have their articles in the same book. After enumerating the economic and cultural accomplishments, they all praised the "indestructible friendship" of all nations of the Soviet Union, "brotherly assistance" of the Soviet republics, "proletarian internationalism," the Central Committee of the Party in Moscow, or other elements of unity and centralism.

³⁰ The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, March 2, 1960, p. 16.

³¹ D. Kunaev, "Torzhestvo Leninskoi Natsionalnoi Politiki," 50 Let Oktjabria--Torzhestvo Marxizma-Leninizma (Moskva: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1967), p. 213.

The same themes were emphasized in the speeches by the non-Russian members of the top elite on other occasions. For an illustration we will quote relevant paragraphs from the speeches delivered at the last Party Congress in March-April 1971. Thus, Shelest at one point declared:

All our accomplishments and victories are the result of a still further strengthening of the moral and political unity of the Soviet peoples, of the unity of the working class and the peasants, of the brotherly friendship of the nations of our multi-national country--the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.³²

Masherov spoke in the same way by stating:

The impressive and constantly growing economic might of the Belorussian SSR is the result of Lenin's wise nationality policy, of indestructible social, economic, and spiritual unity as well as of great friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union.³³

Rashidov was the most expressive of all. In his speech he said:

The Russian people are the elder brother and a faithful friend of all Soviet nations. They have deservedly gained the inflammable love of and a great respect among all nations. The people of our country have merged forever in a holy union with the Russian people.³⁴

These kinds of public pronouncements are recurrent and typical of the non-Russian members of the top elite and, therefore, it is difficult to dismiss them as sheer propaganda. These kinds of words must have been followed by their deeds, for otherwise they would have not remained

³²Pravda, April 1, 1971.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Pravda, April 2, 1971.

in the top elite for long.

It can be concluded that the non-Russians in the top elite are politically useful and reliable men. They identify themselves with their nations but at the same time they are Russian centralists. And that is, undoubtedly, the type of men the Russians need to have in the top elite.

CONCLUSION

The analysis of the top elite of the Communist Party of the USSR suggests a few concluding remarks. In general, the elite apex since 1919 underwent several qualitative changes corresponding to the socio-economic changes in the country and to the Party's role in the Soviet society. Since 1919 three types of the elite have existed in the Communist Party: the sophisticated revolutionary type under Lenin, the unsophisticated apparatchiki type under Stalin, and the apparatchiki-technocratic type under Khrushchev-Brezhnev.

The first type consisted of revolutionaries who came from the middle (bourgeois) class families and were well educated or learned men in social sciences and law, and who manifested their sophistication in ideology and their skill in revolutionary strategy. In these respects they were no different from the revolutionary leaders of other countries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Hence the socialist revolution in Russia was not led by the best elements of the proletarian class as Stalin had maintained but by the middle class intelligentsia. As was shown in the text, contrary to the Marxian ideology, the Russian revolution was not a rise of the proletariat against the existing system but rather a voluntaristic act on the part of the unproletarian revolutionary leaders. As in the case of all other revolutions, the Russian

leaders of the revolution established themselves as the rulers of the country precisely because they were the leaders of the victorious revolutionary Party.

Under Stalin a new type of top elite emerged. Lenin's revolutionary-ideologists were replaced by the pre-revolutionary as well as post-revolutionary Party apparatchiki or administrators. Coming from the lower class (working and peasant), they were able to obtain only lower education and their lack of sophistication they compensated for by using coercive means. No clear cut single explanation can be given for the emergence of this kind of elite. There were at least two factors which, in practice complemented each other. With the consolidation of power, the Soviet state, as states everywhere, became an administrative machine where the Party had a monopoly on power. Consequently, the need for the revolutionary ideologists who were accustomed to debates, reasoning, and argumentation diminished and the need for the administrators, capable of daily routine work, was increased. Therefore, the ideologists were replaced by the administrators. However, the circumstances under which Stalin's men were recruited suggest that this explanation cannot be accepted without qualification. Stalin selected his administrators in the process of struggle for power in the Party against the revolutionary ideologists. Therefore, loyalty to him was, undoubtedly, of prime consideration. It can be noted that some of the old Bolsheviks were no

worse than some of Stalin's administrators. Trotskii, for example, was better as War Commissar than Voroshilov in a similar position, and Rykov was no worse as Chairman of the People's Commissariat than was his successor Molotov. Therefore, it can be concluded that both personal loyalty to Stalin and the need of administrators were the basic causes for the emergence of the unsophisticated apparatchiki type of top elite under Stalin.

But the most interesting development in the Party was the emergence of the technocratic type of the elite. In Stalin's later years there were a few technocrats in the elite and in 1952 when the Praesidium consisted of thirty-six men, 50.0 percent of them were technocrats. In 1956, however, the technocrats decreased to 40.0 percent, but in 1961 they increased to 57.0 percent, in 1966 to 75.0 percent, and in 1971 to 76.0 percent. These men came from the working and peasant class indicating that the regime favored these classes in the 1930's at the expense of the intelligentsia. They received their higher education in engineering, agriculture, and management and consequently, became specialists in their respective fields. Those few non-technocrats in the elite were also specialists in their respective fields, such as Party history, ideology, and theoretical economy.

The political careers of the technocrats (as well as non-technocrats) point to the regularization and stabilization of the recruitment policy of the elite in general.

Unlike the members of the two former elites, the technocrats went through political training systematically and gradually. After finishing their education, they worked for a number of years in the fields of their specialization and then switched to work full time in the Party apparatus. As a rule, they started with the local Party organizations on the district, city, and regional levels and then moved up the Party ladder until they reached the apex of the Party's pyramid.

The emergence of the technocratic type of the top elite was related to the industrial and technological development of the Soviet Union. Having decided to industrialize the country, the Party leaders launched the campaign to train badly-needed specialists for all branches of the national economy. The entire educational system in the late 1920's and in the 1930's was geared toward that goal. As a result, many communists received technical education. In addition, the Party recruited many of its members from the technological intelligentsia. As a result, some of these men, after becoming full time Party officials, eventually joined the Party's top elite.

But social phenomena rarely have one, single cause. The Soviet socialism and Party totalitarianism also contributed to the appearance of the technocrats in the elite. Under the Soviet socialist system, the Government, among many other functions, manages the national economy. Since the Party has the monopoly on power, it needed to have in its elite competent men to make vital economic decisions

in the complex industrialized society. The relationship between the socialist system and the emergence of the technocratic elite becomes clearer if we look at the capitalistic-democratic systems in the Western, highly industrialized countries. Although the United States, Great Britain, France, and several other countries are highly industrialized, no technocratic type of top political elite has emerged in them. This can be explained by the fact that the governments in these countries perform only (with a very few exceptions) regulatory functions in the national economy and the management is left in the hands of private individuals.

The Party's totalitarianism was another factor contributing to the emergence of the technocratic type of top elite. Having assumed the monopoly on power, the Party imposed its total control over all aspects of social and economic life. The development of the economy produced many professional groups whose elite were capable to run the economy. But the Party leaders, unwilling to share their exclusive power with any outside group or groups, recruited into the highest elite economic specialists and thus made themselves capable to perpetuate their totalitarian control over the national economy. The total control of the economy does not preclude the Party from being responsive to the needs or ambitions of many professional groups, but this is the matter of policy decided by the top elite. It can be concluded that as long as the Party will continue to hold its monopoly on economic control, the technocratic

type of the Party's top elite is likely to remain in power.

This study also suggests a generalization of a wider application, namely, that in the socialist country which is undergoing the process of rapid industrialization and in which one party maintains a totalitarian regime, the technocratic type of ruling elite is likely to emerge.

The analysis of the nationality aspect of the Party's top elite also invites a few concluding remarks. One way of legitimizing the Soviet power among the non-Russian nations was to have representatives of the ethnic groups in the state organs. This policy, however, was not followed in the Party's top organs either by Lenin or by Stalin. Lenin's elite consisted of several non-Russians, but they came from very small nationalities which did not have their union republics. They became members of the top elite because they were the Party leaders before, during, and immediately after the revolution. To legitimize the elite's power among the non-Russians, Lenin used ideology, propaganda, and such uneffectuated policies as "self-determination," and "equal rights of nations" in the Soviet state.

Stalin followed a similar policy of elite recruitment, except that he had in 1927-1938 two native Ukrainians in the elite. In the beginning, his top elite was multi-national in composition, but as those under Lenin, they came in most cases from very small ethnic groups. In 1938-1953 the top Party organs were in practice completely in

the hands of Russians. Stalin enforced his legitimacy by using Party discipline, propaganda, and terror.

After Stalin's death, the Party leaders in Moscow, being unable and unwilling to use terror, adopted the policy of recruiting the top elite members from among the natives of the major union republican Parties in a rough proportion to their Party membership and population. This reverse policy of Stalin's discrimination against major nationalities was followed by Khrushchev in his search for the legitimacy of his power among the non-Russian nations.

The national composition of the top elite since 1964 (when Khrushchev was removed from power) shows that this policy was not only followed but also improved by Brezhnev, for the proportional representation of the major union republican Parties in the Politbureau became more accurate than before. At the same time, however, the analysis of statements made by the non-Russian members of the top elite on many occasions indicate that they are, at least politically, "Russian men." But coming from and formally identifying themselves with their respective nations, these men serve as one of the sources of legitimizing the top elite's power among many nations of the Soviet Union. It can be speculated that if the supreme leader (or leaders) of the Party does not resort to the Stalinist type of terror, this utilitarian nationality policy will continue to be followed in the Party's top elite in the future.

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